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ABSTRACT 
 
An important question in development is how far can the contemporary global context create 
industrial development opportunities for the South, particularly for Low Income Countries? In an 
important sense, this can only be answered in non-abstract terms, since the institutional conditions 
facing particular industries at particular times are highly specific. In this research, a configuration of 
four regimes- the structural regime on production and trade in apparel, the labour regime, the neo-
statist European Union regime on production and trade in apparel and the neo-statist United States 
regime on production and trade in apparel- creates a window of opportunity for a Kenyan export 
oriented apparel industry. However, we must ask whether this industry is autonomous from these 
regimes to the extent that its gains can be sustainably embedded within Kenya, notably in terms of 
product and labour upgrading, or is it, rather, subservient to them?  
 
My theoretical discussion shows that the Global Value Chain (GVC) approach presents lead firms as 
the primary governors in GVCs, while International Relations theory presents regimes as the primary 
governors in issue areas. The discussion gives a Dependency interpretation of regimes, subsuming the 
GVC approach in that interpretation, and arguing that, as far as issue areas are concerned, ‗external‘ 
control-emergent regime governance of the GVC overrides ‗internal‘ control lead firm governance. 
My empirical discussion shows that the upgrading of the Kenyan apparel industry has been 
insignificant, and that the governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, while not a 
necessary condition, was a sufficient condition to undermine it. Nonetheless, the Kenyan 
Government and social movements can exploit systemic weaknesses, the former by negotiating for a 
single transformation of fabric and promoting export of folklore/ hand loomed/handmade 
products, the latter by demanding for the full implementation of minimum labour conditions.     
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1 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This text is about apparel export promotion in a Low Income Country (LIC) in the light of 
international regime governance of the apparel Global Value Chain (GVC). It analyses product and 
labour upgrading trends in the Kenyan apparel industry, and determines the role of international 
regimes on production and trade in apparel, and the international regime on labour, in accounting for 
such trends. The text hopes to contribute to the understanding of the essential nexus between regime 
governance of the apparel GVC and upgrading.  
 
One of the central questions in contemporary development debate is the extent to which LICs can 
use the apparel industry as a launching pad for industrialisation. Historically, the industry has been 
the ideal ‗starter‘ industry. Most recently, the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of South East 
Asia (SEA) extensively promoted it in the 1960s and early 1970s, and made significant industrial 
upgrading (see Galenson, 1979; White, 1988). Essentially, industrial upgrading could be seen from 
two perspectives. There is the wider perspective of structural change of the national economy as a 
whole, as a country abandons the apparel industry to concentrate on more technologically advanced 
ones. This is the perspective taken by Ranis (1979), Scott (1979) and Wade (1988) in their analyses 
of Taiwan, as well as Michell (1988) in his analysis of South Korea. In theory, this would be 
accompanied by higher standards of living among citizens of such an economy, including better 
wages and working conditions for labour. Alternatively, upgrading could be seen in the narrower, 
sectoral lens of producing more value added products, or engaging in more profitable functions in 
the industry (such as brand marketing), which would also be accompanied by higher standards of 
living, including better wages and working conditions for labour in the industry. This text is 
concerned with the latter perspective. In addition, while in theory upgrading in this subsector can be 
buoyed by domestic demand, the debate the study engages in concerns exportism. 
 
At least two palpable contradictions that characterise the industry are central to an analysis of LICs‘ 
upgrading opportunities through apparel exportism. First, theoretical innuendos from the 1950s 
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suggested that the North was to hand over the industry to the South. In Vernon‘s (1971) Product 
Cycle theory, for instance, an industrialised country carves out a niche for a product it exports and 
uses Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to produce for local markets abroad. Then the industrialising 
country builds a comparative advantage of its factor proportions of cheap labour, and starts 
exporting to the country where the product originated, by which time the developed country has 
switched to another product. In reality, however, laissez faire Product Cycle is utopia. The only 
Product Cycle explanation that makes sense in the real world is the managed (through industrial 
policy) ‗flying geese‘ version developed by Japan (Kojima, 1977) that gave birth to NICs. This was a 
doctrine for managing the international economy by deliberately hiving off industries to less 
industrialised countries as the industrially advanced countries move on to higher levels (Biel, 2000). 
 
Thus in the real world, the North has handed over the industry only partially. The main mechanism 
used to achieve this is trade restriction. The main violations of the supposedly free trade that the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) espoused began in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
initially covering cotton products only (under mechanisms of ‗voluntary‘ exports, Short Term 
Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (STA) and Long Term Arrangement (LTA)). Restrictions for 
manmade fibre and wool-based products began in 1969 culminating in the Multi-Fibre Agreement 
(MFA) of 1974 (Aggarwal, 1985). The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) phased out the 
MFA between 1995 and 2005. These violations were directed mainly at Asia, which had inherited 
the bigger share of the industry from the North. Since capitalism thrives partly on social Darwinism 
(it is the fittest who survive), some Asian countries applied false labelling (to change the apparent 
country of origin) and/or relocated some production to non-MFA signatories or countries whose 
quotas were not fully utilised (Dicken, 2003). It is this response that is responsible for the first main 
wave of apparel exportism in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Kenya was hit by the first MFA-related 
wave from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 1993 (Government of Kenya (GoK), ca. 2000).  
 
The other contradiction is that multilateralism is dovetailed into regional spheres of accumulation 
that contradict it. First, since at least the early 1980s, there was the European Union (EU) 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSPs) that offered ‗preferential‘ quotas and duty reduction on 
African apparel imports. However, by the time the spontaneous spread of the chain reached Kenya in 
1993, the local supply chain was non-existent; hence Kenya could not meet this GSP‘s demand for a 
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double transformation Rule of Origin (RoO). Therefore, the country‘s exports under this GSP were 
puny, at best reaching only three percent share of SSA exports (Author‘s calculation based on United 
Nations Statistics Division- Commodity Trade Statistics (UNSD-COMTRADE) database). Then 
secondly, the United States (US) GSP, initially instituted in 1976, was improved by the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000. AGOA marked the second investment wave in SSA 
because it was more liberal than previous GSPs. The inclusion of apparel was missing in previous US 
GSPs. In addition, the complete removal of landed duty, and the exempting of LICs, such as Kenya, 
from a double transformation RoO were missing from previous US and EU GSPs. The first wave of 
AGOA-related investment boom in Kenya came from Sri Lanka in 2001, while the second came 
from India in 2002. Especially because of AGOA‘s RoO exemption, nearly 100 percent of apparel 
exports from the country since 2002 go to the US, for example, 99 percent in 2002 (Gibbon, 2003).  
 
The scope of Kenyan industrial upgrading offered by these two investment waves- themselves fuelled 
by the two contradictions- within systemic governance of international regimes has never been 
analysed. Focusing on the period 1992-2007, this thesis seeks to address this gap. It addresses two 
key questions. Firstly, what has been the trend on selected aspects of upgrading in the Kenyan apparel 
export industry between 1992 and 2007? Specifically, on product upgrading, to what extent have 
exports expanded? Furthermore, on product upgrading, and using the proxy of movement from 
assembly of imported inputs to Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) (specifically local 
integration, fabric value addition, export of folklore/hand loomed/handmade products and 
integration into the GVC), to what extent has unit value increased? In addition, in relation to labour 
upgrading, what has been the experience of implementing labour standards as represented by labour 
conditionalities enshrined in AGOA? Secondly, why has the trend arisen?  
 
Evidence shows that on product upgrading, apart from export expansion, the industry has not 
upgraded; the industry has not been locally integrated, fabric value addition is minimal, the country 
has exported only 3 out of 35 eligible folklore/hand loomed/handmade products, and integration 
into the GVC is poor. On labour upgrading, apart from the non-employment of children in apparel 
Export processing Zones (EPZs), no other AGOA labour conditionality has been met fully. 
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In deciphering these trends, this thesis uses a synthesis of GVC analysis and a Dependency 
interpretation of Regime literature. It posits that control lead firm GVC governance is nested within 
a pluralistic mode of control-emergent international regime GVC governance that is aimed at 
Northern accumulation, perpetuation of dependency and attainment of milieu goals of, among 
others, social reproduction of labour and low-level international social order. The structural regime 
on production and trade in apparel, and the EU-based and the US-based state-centric regimes on 
production and trade in apparel co-opt emergent industrial clustering in the South, while 
simultaneously restricting any substantive unsupervised industrial upgrading in the region. In 
addition, top-down Northern state policy accompanying state-centric regimes is meant to engender 
industrial cluster dynamism where it fails to emerge spontaneously. Thus a delicate balance is 
pursued: the structural regime pushes for a managed multilateral approach within the GATT/World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) to co-opt general global industrial spontaneous emergence, while the 
state-centric regimes pursue state-centred protectionist agreements to both co-opt general global 
industrial spontaneous emergence and engender it where it has failed to emerge. These regimes 
dictate lead firms‘ GVC governance of export volume, as well as the chain‘s geographical spread.  
 
State-centric regimes are also configured to restrict substantive Southern accumulation in another 
sense by introducing conditionalities against sweatshop labour, so that the South cannot maximise on 
its cheap labour. This configuration on labour standards, although partly related to the interest of 
international regimes on production and trade in apparel of restricting accumulation in the South, 
mainly operates within its own international regime on labour standards. Its overriding systemic 
objective is that, while achieving only minimum work conditions will restrict any substantial 
accumulation, it will also guarantee both social reproduction of labour and social order. This regime 
largely dictates lead firms‘ GVC setting and enforcement of labour standards in the chain.  
 
The implication of such regime governance on upgrading in LICs is that, in pursuit of Northern 
accumulation, instrumental barriers created by the three regimes on production and trade in apparel 
constrain LICs to pick up. These include quota limitations for the structural regime (up to 2005), 
and quotas and a restrictive RoO for the neo-statist regimes. It also implies that, in pursuit of global 
accumulation, the emergent nature of the structural regime leads to the emergence of major players 
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(currently China) who crowd LICs out of destination markets. These two implications mean that 
product volume and value upgrading in LICs is a Herculean task. However, because of the urgency to 
promote systemic milieu goals, the US-based regime has relaxed the RoO for SSA, until 2012, and 
hence Kenya has achieved limited volume upgrading. They also mean that this regime governance 
leads to the race to the bottom in LICs. This is what unites the inhibition of product upgrading with 
the inhibition of labour upgrading. However, in pursuit of milieu goals, the regime on labour calls 
for labour upgrading in such countries. But in juggling, on the one hand, Northern and global 
accumulation, and on the other hand, labour upgrading, the system is petrified by undermining the 
former than a failure to achieve the latter; hence labour conditions rarely improve in practice. Thus 
regime governance is a determinant of both product and labour upgrading.  
 
This thesis therefore argues in support of the hypothesis that the governance of regimes on 
production and trade in apparel, while not a necessary condition, was a sufficient condition to 
undermine product and labour upgrading in Kenya between 1992 and 2007. At the same time, the 
thesis shows the potential for Southern manoeuvres to embed development. In particular, the Kenyan 
Government and social movements can exploit systemic weaknesses, the former by negotiating for a 
single transformation of fabric and promoting export of folklore/ hand loomed/handmade 
products, the latter by demanding for the full implementation of minimum labour conditions. Above 
all, the knowledge possessed by Southern actors about the functioning of these regimes gives hope 
for success in future struggles to upgrade industry. 
 
In the remaining part of this chapter I will present the methodology employed in the research, which 
includes the main concepts of the research, and an overview of the chapters ahead. 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
1.2.1 Research Design  
 
Some research topics may require a combination of designs that might not fit into any conventional 
design (Blaikie, 2000), which is why this thesis adopted a mixed research design. However, while a 
battery of designs are present (archival analysis, secondary analysis, content analysis, case study, cross 
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sectional analysis, longitudinal analysis), the overwhelming designs are longitudinal and case study. It 
is longitudinal because it relates to change over time (in retrospect) from 1992 to 2007. However, as 
it is also a case study of the Kenyan apparel industry, the complete label is ‗longitudinal case study‘.  
 
The term ‗case study‘ is used here in one of the two senses I will use in this thesis- as a research 
design. In this regard, it is an embedded case study- it has a subunit of analysis (workers and 
management in one firm), while still treating the holistic case (the Kenyan apparel export industry) as 
a single case study (see Yin, 2003). All generalisations in the thesis, including those of the sampled 
workers, are dependent on what Yin (2003) calls ‗analytical generalisation‘ or what Mitchell (1983 
cited in Blaikie, 2000: 223) calls ‗logical inference‘ as opposed to ‗statistical inference‘. The second 
use of the term ‗case study‘ is as a mode of data selection (see section 1.2.5.1 below).  
 
1.2.2 Research Strategy 
 
The overarching research strategy used in this thesis is deductive analysis since, although one of the 
research questions is of the ‗what‘ type, the central one is of the ‗why‘ type. ‗Why‘ questions 
investigate the causes of, or the reasons for, the existence of regularities in a phenomenon. They are 
normally preceded by ‗what‘ questions as we need to know what is going on before we can explain it. 
Deductive strategy is based on an observed regularity which begs an explanation, and hence theory 
testing through hypothesis testing, as existing theories cannot account for these regularities. We reach 
an explanation by constructing a deductive argument whose premise will be either well-established 
abstract propositions or hypothetical propositions that can be tested; and not necessarily in the strict 
sense of the conventional cause and effect explanation (Blaikie, 2000: 25, 61, 74, 76).  
 
Deductive strategy is in contrast with inductive strategy. The latter is grounded in the Positivism of, 
among others, Bacon and Durkheim. Positivism relies on the ontological assumption of an ordered 
universe made up of discrete observable events experienced by the senses. This order, it is argued, can 
be represented by generalisations about the relationship between concepts. Its epistemological 
assumption is that knowledge is produced through the use of human senses and by means of 
experiments and comparative analysis. This means that statements based on observations become 
theoretical statements about order in reality (see Blaikie, 2000: 62, 102-3, 111-2). 
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Deductive strategy is grounded in Critical Rationalism, developed primarily by Karl Popper in the 
20th century. Critical Rationalism accepts most of Positivism‘s ontological assumptions, with the 
exception of the assumption that senses are a secure foundation for scientific theories. However, it 
differs in a fundamental way from Positivism epistemologically, as it makes no distinction between 
observational and theoretical statements (that is, observations occur within a horizon of expectations, 
or, better put, they are theory dependent). Deductive strategy, therefore, assumes that descriptions 
involve some point of view, and hence pure description is impossible. In a word, researchers should 
impose theories on the social world rather than wait for it to reveal its regularities (Blaikie, 2000: 
104-7, 111-2). Critical rationalism, using deductive reasoning, posits that the theory that offers least 
resistance to falsification should be preferred as the most probable explanation of the issue at hand.  
 
However, deductive strategy accepts that ‗why‘ questions can be preceded by ‗what‘ questions. Hence 
the strategy accepts using answers to the ‗what‘ questions of inductive strategy as topics for which 
answers to ‗why‘ questions are sought. According to Blaikie (2000), the ‗who‘, ‗where‘, ‗when‘, ‗how 
many‘ and ‗how much‘ questions are just different forms of the ‗what‘ question. Within deductive 
strategy, therefore, this thesis employs the inductive strategy to answer the ‗what‘ questions that build 
up to the ‗why‘ question. First, I will endeavour to uncover the trends in product and labour 
upgrading in the Kenyan apparel export industry between 1992 and 2007. Then I will use the 
observed trends to test the hypothesis that the governance of regimes on production and trade in 
apparel was a sufficient condition to undermine upgrading in Kenya. 
 
1.2.3 Main Concepts and Conceptual Model 
 
1.2.3.1 Introduction 
 
There are two ways of operationalising concepts: conceptualisation and operationalisation ‗proper‘. 
Conceptualisation is the formal definition of concepts in terms of how they are being employed in 
the research, whilst operationalisation ‗proper‘ concerns itself with transforming concepts into 
variables (see Blaikie, 2000: 133-6). While both strategies are present in the research, this thesis is 
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mainly concerned with the former. This is partly because the concepts employed are relatively 
abstract, and partly because hypothesis testing in the study is relatively informal. This thesis will be 
concerned with three main concepts- regimes, governance and upgrading. 
 
1.2.3.2 International Regimes 
 
Krasner defined international regimes as the explicit and implicit principles (beliefs of fact, causation 
and rectitude), norms (standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations), rules 
(specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action) and decision-making procedures (prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice) around which actor expectations converge 
in a given issue area (Krasner, 1982a)1. In addition, an issue area is ‗an organised or partially 
organised system of interaction‘ (Cox, 1972: 207). Aggarwal defined international regimes as ‗rules 
and procedures that regulate national actions‘, and meta-regimes as ‗principles and norms underlying 
the development of regimes‘ (Aggarwal, 1985: 16, 18). More recently, he has defined regimes as the 
‗sets of rules and procedures around which actors‘ expectations converge‘, and meta-regimes as the 
‗principles and norms that guide the entire regime‘ (Aggarwal, 2010: 263, 263-4).  
 
This thesis agrees with Aggarwal that principles and norms should not be included in the definition 
of regimes, for they are only but the fund from which actors draw on in international regime-
formation. However, it differs with him by arguing that Krasner‘s recognition of the implicit facet of 
regimes should be retained, for the process of drawing on is both implicit/informal and 
explicit/formal. The informal process is the emergent, and the key, facet of regimes, while the formal 
one, which is the actual formulation of rules and procedures, constitute the control facet of regimes. 
Thus if the thesis was to adopt this classic International Relations way of defining regimes, it would 
define them as the ‗implicit and explicit rules and procedures around which actors‘ expectations 
implicitly or explicitly converge on a given issue area‘. However, the thesis has chosen to emphasise 
the fact that regimes are primarily social institutions, rather than the more technical ‗rules and 
                                                     
1 International Relations has defined regimes in other ways. See, for example, Gilpin (2001), Puchala and Hopkins 
(1982) and Young (1982). 
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procedures‘ side of regimes emphasised in mainstream International Relations theory. In this regard, 
it is crucial that we be clear on how the thesis will define regimes.  
 
In the social sciences, the term ‗regime‘ can mean at least five things. First, a regime is any form or 
system of government or administration. Second, it is any set of rules about, say, tax, food, exercise et 
cetera; a ‗designed mode of organisation‘. These two are the broad definitions in common speech in 
political economy. However, they are not intended in this thesis. Third, a regime is an ‗emergent 
mode of organisation‘. This relates to the Régulation approach‘s specific use of the term ‗regime of 
accumulation‘. In this case, it is not only emergent, but also the time dimension is crucial because it 
assumes it to be a long cycle dealing with technology and institutional practices such as corporate 
structures and others. This concept is used in this thesis, but it is not the primary sense of regimes 
that is intended.  
 
The sense which is intended partly relates to the fourth definition: regime as a ‗designed mode of 
governance‘. This is an institutional structure under which, for example, trade operates at a particular 
time, such as the WTO. Krasner‘s (1982a) and Aggarwal‘s (1985; 2010) definitions are intended to 
capture this definition. True, Krasner‘s definition partly captures the emergent facet of regimes- in so 
far as it makes reference to the reserve of principles and norms, and to the fact that rules, procedures, 
principles and norms can, at times, be implicit. However, mainstream International Relations 
scholars- who mainly come from knowledge-based and rule-based schools of thought- apply this 
dominant International Relations definition to situations where actors are explicitly self-interested in 
bringing order in international relationships. As a result, they emphasise agency. For example, while 
Aggarwal labels the period 1950-60- prior to the STA- as the period of ‗nonexistence of a textile 
regime‘, or the period of ‗no distinct textile regime‘ (Aggarwal, 1985: 22), this thesis would maintain 
that the textile-apparel structural regime he is referring to was fully operational during that period, 
since its core facet- the emergent one- had existed from as far back as the 1930s, through, among 
others, ‗voluntary‘ export restraints; the formulation of the STA was just but the arrival of the 
control facet.  
 
Thus the intended sense partly relates to the fifth definition: regime as an ‗emergent mode of 
governance‘. This is the strictest sense intended, and it refers to an emergent structure, for example, 
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the way industrial clusters evolve. It is the sense behind the critique of the tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin, 1968) at the international level, and the work of Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom has clearly 
demonstrated this. Note that both the third and the fifth definitions share the common characteristic 
of emergence. A regime of accumulation is structured according to time, and it links to the long 
cycles, and to the International Political Economy (IPE). Regimes would flourish within those cycles. 
For example, industrial clusters flourish particularly in the kind of context of the crisis of the 1970s. 
The subsequent regime of accumulation merely co-opted them.    
 
An international regime, therefore, is partly a designed institutional structure and partly an emergent 
social institution of transnational scale that creates order at that level, on the premise of the absence 
of a sovereign transnational order. Regimes may or may not be followed by the establishment of an 
international organisation. They respond to the problem of disorder at the international level in the 
Hobbesian paradigm of International Relations theory. The Hobbesian state‘s role is to maintain 
order. However, historically, regimes became important because of the characteristic institutional 
form of resolution of the conflictual nature of classical imperialism. In brief, international regimes are 
partly based on the need for the North to have structures to control, among others, industry, and 
thereby achieve order at international level. This is particularly the case given that the post-War 
Northern state is preoccupied with maintaining social cohesion at home. If industry is not properly 
controlled, this might lead to disorder at international level and social alienation due to 
unemployment in the North, and hence Northern labour will make unnecessary demands.  
 
We also need to note that a regime can nest on a higher/wider regime. 
 
The concept of nesting can be understood from the perspective of a hierarchy of systems. The textile system is 
nested within the overall trading system, and the trading system, in turn, is nested within the overall 
international strategic system (concerning security matters). Actions countries take in these other systems 
influence behaviour in the textile subsystem…. Theoretically, one would expect problems in the ‗higher-level‘ 
system to evoke greater concern than problems in subsystems, and that countries would therefore endeavour to 
bring subsystem behaviour into line with objectives of the higher-level system (Aggarwal, 1985: 27).  
 
I need to emphasise that, although the regimes considered in this thesis are more akin to the designed 
structure definition than to the emergent structure one, this thesis shall highlight the interplay of 
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both definitions, while taking the latter as its primary understanding. For example, at one level, the 
WTO is an emergent institution, operating partly through hegemony and partly through 
voluntarism. If we view the great powers (effectively the Group of Seven (G 7)) as the effective actors 
in the balance of power model, the Prisoner‘s Dilemma in classical imperialism is solved under US 
hegemony. The US leads in pushing for voluntary multilateralism but in a way that permits it to act 
unilaterally. In this model, the G 7 countries are equal to each other out of their rapacious behaviour, 
but in addition, six agree to abide by US unilateralism, because if they don‘t there would be chaos. In 
its entirety, however, the WTO is not, strictly speaking, a regime. Rather, it is a disguised form of 
hegemony of the G 7, and effectively of the US, over other countries.  
 
This emphasis is crucial because some mainstream scholars discuss regimes in their true design-
emergent form, but what they refer to as ‗regime‘ is not this form. Regarding the US state-centric 
regime in the apparel sub-sector, for example, Heron (2002: 756, 757) talks of ‗the 807/9802 
regime‘ and ‗the 807A regime‘, in reference to the rules set out in the US-Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (US-CBTPA) (see also Heron, 2006a). This relates to regime as a ‗designed mode 
of governance‘, and, perhaps, to regime as a ‗designed mode of organisation‘, but certainly not to 
regime as an ‗emergent mode of governance‘.  
 
Nevertheless, Heron states that ‗the [807/9802 and 807A] regimes governing this [US-Caribbean 
Basin] trade to a large degree reflect particular configurations of power, involving the state and 
competing interest groups‘ (Heron, 2002: 765). This configuration of power, which he also refers to 
as ‗the domestic coalition of forces within the USA‘ (Heron, 2002: 760), is the true regime that is 
reflected by the 807/9802 and 807A rules and procedures, not the other way round. He shows that 
it comprises mainly the associations of textile-apparel industry, one internationally oriented and 
representing the interests of retailers and apparel manufacturers, the other domestically oriented and 
representing the interests of textile manufactures and labour. It also comprises other ‗special interest‘ 
actors, such as US states which are hubs to the industry, together with their actors such as Senators 
and House Representatives, the Governors with their executive agencies, various government-business 
partnerships, and the Union of Needle Trades, Industrial and Textile Employees. It is an emergent 
structure because it arose as a spontaneous response to the emergence of OEM firms in Asia, who 
became the main suppliers of US retailers. However, this spontaneity was hijacked by actors who 
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actively designed the 807/9802 and 807A production sharing rules. However, even in the designing 
of these rules, Heron is clear that the process was an emergent one, full of uneasy compromises, with 
the domestic oriented players emerging as the eventual winners. It is, therefore, a true designed-
emergent regime, and it is the same regime that is reflected by AGOA. It is an international regime 
because, although the bargaining process is domestic, the scale of articulating it is international. In 
this case, the poorer Caribbean and African countries are mere regime ‗takers‘, a fact that Ruggie 
(1982) has, with candour, conceded. 
 
Similarly, the EU Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) is a reflection of the EU state-centric regime 
of the EU countries, and its scale of articulation is international. The MFA is an international regime 
only to the extent that it serves the common interests of the North, and only to the extent that it is 
one of the incarnations of the structural regime on production and trade in apparel that crystallised 
in the 1930s and is still in existence.  
 
Finally, the thesis concentrates on the structural international regime on production and trade in 
apparel, the EU and the US state-centric international regimes on production and trade in apparel, 
and the international regime on labour standards. We will examine the extent to which perceptions, 
actions and strategies of selected regime actors demonstrate the governing influence of this 
international structure, as well as its implication on upgrading in Kenya. Regime actors will be 
classified as ‗takers‘ (Kenyan state bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, Cabinet, Kenya Tailors and Textiles 
Workers Union (KTTWU) and workers), ‗framers‘ (the US/ EU Governments and their allies) and 
‗intermediaries‘ (Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)). 
 
1.2.3.3 Governance 
 
GVC analysts define chain governance as the setting and/ or enforcing of parameters in a value 
chain, primarily by lead firms: 
 
We use the term [governance] to express that some firms in the chain set and/ or enforce the parameters under 
which others in the chain operate… [it] has something to do with exercise of control along the chain…The 
question of governance arises when some firms in the chain work according to parameters set by others…. In 
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short, governance refers to the inter-firm relationships and institutional mechanisms through which non-market 
coordination of activities in the chain is achieved (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001: 2, 4).  
 
It is clear from this that control emanating from within the chain has been the preoccupation of the 
GVC analysis. Control coming from outside the chain is discussed as well but not given as much 
attention; as is emergence from both within and without the chain, which is only implicitly discussed. 
According to the GVC approach, the parameters to be set are product definition (mainly varieties, 
packaging and design), production process definition (mainly technologies to be used, quality 
standards, labour standards and environmental standards), time of production, quantity to be 
produced and price (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). According to Humphrey and Schmitz, the first 
four are the most basic, while the first two are, in addition, the most critical. Price is considered 
neither very basic nor very critical.  
 
The concept of regimes helps me to contribute to the debate by showing the interplay between 
control and spontaneous emergence. As far as issue areas are concerned, ‗external‘ governance, which 
is mainly regime governance, plays a greater governance role than the ‗internal‘ governance, which is 
mainly control lead firm governance. I am broadening the governance concept to include the overall 
international structure of the specific issue areas affecting the chain. This thesis focuses on the two 
most important and/ or prominent issue areas in the apparel GVC: labour and international trade in 
the commodity (apparel). Within this structure the ‗internal‘ control emphasised by the GVC 
analysis becomes only a portion of the structure. In the light of this perspective, the priority of 
parameters put forward by the GVC analysis is no longer maintained. In its place, and in respect to 
the issue areas of labour and trade in apparel, quantities to be produced and labour standards become 
critical. In addition, such governance encompasses another parameter implicit in the GVC analysis: 
the geographical spread of the chain. These three parameters will be the focus of this thesis.      
 
1.2.3.4 Upgrading  
 
The third and final main concept is upgrading. Industrial upgrading is defined by Gereffi (1999a: 
51-2) as ‗a process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to more profitable 
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and/ or technologically sophisticated capital and skill intensive economic niches‘. There are two 
main ways of looking at upgrading. Gereffi considers the level at which upgrading is taking place, 
identifying four upgrading types: factory, inter-firm, local/ national and regional (Chart I below).  
 
(1) within factories—upgrading involves moving from cheap to expensive items, from simple to complex 
products, and from small to large orders; (2) within inter-firm enterprise networks—upgrading involves 
moving from mass production of standardised goods to the flexible production of differentiated merchandise; 
(3) within local or national economies—upgrading involves moving from simple assembly of imported inputs 
to more integrated forms of OEM and OBM [Original Brand-name Manufacturing] production, involving a 
greater use of forward and backward linkages at the local or national level; and (4) within regions— upgrading 
involves shifting from bilateral, asymmetrical, inter-regional trade flows to a more fully developed intra-regional 
division of labour incorporating all phases of the commodity chain from raw material supply, through 
production, distribution, and consumption (Gereffi, 1999a: 52) (emphasis in original). 
 
However, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001), McCormick and Schmitz (2002) and Schmitz (2004) see 
upgrading from the perspective of what is to be upgraded, and hence identify four types: product, 
process, functional and inter-sectoral. Product upgrading is movement into more sophisticated 
product lines (which can be defined in terms of increased unit values); process upgrading is 
increasing production efficiency by reorganising the production system or introducing superior 
technology; functional upgrading is acquiring new functions, such as branding, marketing and design 
(or abandoning existing functions to increase overall skill content of activities); and inter-sectoral 
upgrading is where a firm moves into a different sector using the knowledge acquired in particular 
chain functions (Chart 1).  
 
Bringing these two perspectives together, I see similarities between them, as the arrows in the chart 
show. However, combining the two perspectives might create an impression that product upgrading 
takes place only at the factory and inter-firm enterprise networks levels (assuming that flexible 
production and differentiated merchandise involve more sophisticated products than mass 
production and standardised merchandise respectively). Similarly it implies that process upgrading 
takes place at inter-firm enterprise networks and local/ national economy levels, and that functional 
upgrading takes place at the local/ national level.  
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Source: Adapted from Gereffi (1999a); Humphrey & Schmitz (2001) 
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Chart 1: Upgrading model 1 
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Source: Adapted from Gereffi (1999a); Humphrey & Schmitz (2001) 
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I want to correct this impression by stating that product, process, functional and inter-sectoral 
upgrading can take place at any of the levels identified by Gereffi, as I show in Chart 2 above. In 
reality, however, there are three important routes to upgrading (Chart 3 below). The most obvious 
route a factory, network, nation or region can use is to undertake process upgrading both as an end 
and as a means to achieve product upgrading. This is because it is insuperable to achieve product 
upgrading without process upgrading, as the progression is almost indissolubly related. In turn, 
product upgrading opens up possibilities for functional upgrading, which in turn opens up 
opportunities for inter-sectoral upgrading (‗A‘ arrows). Infrequently, it is possible to achieve 
functional upgrading (‗B‘ arrow) and inter-sectoral upgrading (‗C‘ arrow) directly without first 
experiencing process and product upgrading. 
 
 
 
Factory   Process    Product          Functional      Inter-sectoral 
Network      
Nation 
Region 
Source: Author‘s  
 
I will pursue only three selected aspects of upgrading. The first two come from Chart 3 route ‗A‘. 
The first is national product upgrading, defined as movement from small to large orders. Although in 
Chart 2 the size of orders is attributed to factory upgrading, I will nevertheless tackle it at the 
national level because the quantities involved in the unit case study of one firm are too puny for any 
meaningful analysis. The second is national product upgrading, defined as increased unit values as a 
result of moving from simple assembly of imported inputs to OEM2. This will involve an analysis of 
the extent of local integration of the industry (extent of exporting within RoO requirements and of 
availability of raw materials, especially the fabric), fabric value addition (unit price comparison in 
                                                     
2 By this I am effectively assuming that the increased unit values are linked to OEM production and both of these are 
associated with more complex products.   
B 
C 
A 
Chart 3: Upgrading routes 
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destination market and analysis of state of process technology), export of folklore/ hand loomed/ 
handmade products, and integration into the GVC (analysis of the rise of the top half of exports 
(ranked in value) as that of the bottom one falls, of product duty without AGOA ‗preferences‘ and 
of Chinese competition). The dotted red line in Chart 2 indicates both instances. 
 
Still, the image presented so far is vulnerable to the criticism of being empty of social improvement, 
incorporating not even the New Management Systems (NMSs) (Biel‘s terminology) of Asia. These 
are the new flexible ways of managing labour that are different from earlier post-War Taylourist-
Fordist forms. NMSs constitute four main elements: Just in Time/ Total Quality Management 
principles; decentralised management, multi-skilling (production work integrated with quality 
control, for example), multi-tasking and team work; union recognition to involve, motivate and 
control workers, as well as lifetime employment to enhance commitment to the firm‘s ideals; and 
exporting all the above, or as much as possible, to suppliers upstream (see Humphrey, 1995). Thus 
the second aspect of route ‗A‘ that is considered in this thesis is labour upgrading as part of process 
upgrading; as part of the reorganisation of the production process to increase production efficiency 
(dotted blue line in Chart 2). Within this, at least some aspects of NMSs such as labour multi-
tasking are subsumed. The point is that labour ‗is no longer seen as a cost of production which 
should be minimised, but a resource which needs to be augmented‘ (Kaplinsky, 1995: 63).  
 
Flipping this, introducing NMSs is actually augmenting exploitation of labour beyond Taylourism 
and Fordism, and hence incompatible with its true upgrading. This critique can also be directed not 
only to the GVC analysis but also to other ‗heterodox‘ approaches such as the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), the New Political Economy (Sayer, 2001), and the Régulation approach. 
Furthermore, some aspects of NMSs such as granting lifetime employment are not necessarily meant 
to improve production process efficiency, but to enhance, again in an exploitative way, its 
commitment to capitalism. Moreover, anti-sweatshop conditionalities may improve production 
process efficiency and may boost commitment to capitalism, but they primarily serve other 
exploitative milieu interests in capitalism of ensuring social reproduction of labour and maintaining 
international social order. Therefore, this thesis analyses anti-sweatshop conditions independently of 
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the model in the charts above, since at this level, the GVC model loses its usefulness. This definition 
of upgrading can only be captured by the overall conceptual model incorporating the other two 
concepts of regimes and systemic governance. This is the third and final upgrading aspect pursued. 
 
1.2.3.5 Overall Conceptual Model 
 
The overall conceptual model adumbrated here shows upgrading opportunities under the two forms 
(product and labour) and various phases of regime governance (sort of mini regimes of 
accumulation) (Chart 4 below). The opportunities are represented by the dotted green lines. To start 
with, product upgrading is considered within three phases. Phase A is 1992-2001 where EU-
destined exports dominated. The structural regime on production and trade in apparel, reflected by 
the MFA from 1992 to 1994 and the ATC from 1995 to 2001, was in operation. The EU state-
centric regime represented by its PTA was also in operation. Upgrading opportunity was primarily in 
the form of increased unit values, and it was found within the framework of the latter regime as it 
required fabric double transformation. It was an opportunity because ‗preferences‘ compensated for 
the difficulty in implementing the RoO.  
 
In Phase B (2002-4), US-destined exports dominated. The structural regime, reflected by the ATC, 
and the EU and the US state-centric regimes, reflected by, respectively, EU PTA and AGOA, were in 
operation. Although AGOA was enacted in October 2000, it only became operational in 2001, and 
hence its impact was only felt for a whole year for the first time in 2002. The opportunity here was 
primarily export expansion and was to be found in AGOA because the Act gave the exemption to the 
RoO. While increased unit values still remained a considerable opportunity in theory, it was more 
prudent to gobble up the opportunity to export as much as possible to attract further investment. 
Presumably this might have influenced public policy to move the development of the local supply 
chain up the ladder of priorities. 
 
The final Phase C (2005-7) is characterised by US-destined exports retaining their dominance, but 
with both sets of exports (EU and US) experiencing a slight slump. The structural regime was still in 
place, this time under the WTO‘s general rules and disciplines. The regimes reflected by EU PTA  
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and AGOA were still in place. Here, both export expansion and increased unit value were 
opportunities. The latter came to be an opportunity again because the assumption is that after the 
initial expansion of the industry, this phase should have been now concerned with developing fabric 
supply to buoy the industry when the RoO exemption was to cease in 2007. 
 
Turning to labour upgrading, the regime on labour represented by both the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and parallel initiatives was in operation throughout the period under study. 
However, the real labour upgrading opportunity came in 2003 when the advent of AGOA coincided 
with the putting in place of a more democratic Government in 2002 (see section 3.3.1). The latter 
opened up democratic space, and the parallel initiatives led by NGOs became relatively visible. It is at 
this international regime level, this thesis avers, that labour upgrading is useful to industrial capitalist 
production in a way conventional approaches refuse to recognise. This is through improved working 
conditions- in particular increased wages- as a way to boost its reproduction as well as limit Southern 
accumulation and maintain social order. Increased income is expected to have a multiplier effect of 
poverty reduction beyond the direct income earners. My theorisation overturns conventional analysis‘ 
argument that justifies labour exploitation in EPZs on the ground that, at any event, most of such 
workers, working in such substandard conditions by Western standards, would have been either 
unemployed or employed under worse conditions in the absence of the zones. I will use AGOA 
labour conditionalities as reference point for the analysis of labour upgrading.  
 
As the model shows, each of the regimes on production and trade in apparel is influenced by neo-
liberalism and neo-statism, while the regime on labour is influenced by neo-statism, neo-corporatism 
and neo-communitarianism. Finally, the 1992-2007 time line whereby inside it are sort of ‗mini‘ 
regimes of accumulation of MFA, EU PTA, ATC, AGOA and post-ATC helps us demonstrate 
dependency of the Kenyan apparel industry in very specific terms. 
 
 
 
- 36 - 
 
 
 
1.2.4 Data Collection Methods 
 
Firstly, this thesis employs triangulation in the sense that I will be combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, and not in the sense of minimising bias of 
particular methods as is the standard application in most social science research. Triangulation, it is 
propounded, corroborates data and enhances validity as well as elaborating so as to  expand 
understanding of the case by providing different perspectives (see Rossan and Wilson 1985 cited in 
Blaikie, 2000). However, Blaikie contends that triangulation has the danger of mixing up ontology. 
In its place, he recommends combining strategies in sequence; it is safer as it involves switching from 
one ontological assumption to another between stages. It is the approach I shall adopt. In Chapter 
Four, the data is mainly quantitative, while in Chapter Five, the data is almost entirely qualitative.   
 
Secondly, Blaikie notes that, while qualitative research methods of data collection are more likely to 
be used within the inductive strategy with its ‗objective‘ observation ontology, if the overall strategy is 
deductive, the meanings emanating from such qualitative data can be treated within the latter‘s 
ontology; some sort of ‗ontology superimposed over ontology‘. In accord, in Chapter Five, analysis of 
the perceptions, actions and strategies of actors is inductive, but the meanings emanating from the 
analysis are being treated deductively. 
 
Thirdly, I adopted three methods for collecting primary data. The first method was content analysis 
of original documents. While some of these- such as US and EU import data, the MFA and AGOA- 
were in electronic form and therefore available to the public, most of those in print form were not in 
public circulation. These include Kenya Development Plans, Sessional Papers, Statistical Abstracts, 
Cabinet Papers, Parliamentary Acts and archival documents. They also include private documents, 
personal documents and Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) documents. The second 
method was focused interviews for different categories of representatives: management in the case 
study firm; the Government corporation mandated to oversee EPZs- EPZ Authority (EPZA); the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI); trade association- Kenya Association of Manufacturers 
(KAM); trade union- KTTWU; KHRC; and production workers in the case study firm (see 
appendix A). The third and final method was my own informal observation. Primary data was 
combined with various sets of secondary data.  
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1.2.5 Data Selection 
 
1.2.5.1 Selection of NGO and EPZ Firm 
 
I could not research all EPZ firms and anti-sweatshop NGOs in Kenya owing to time and resource 
constraints, but more importantly the scope of the research. In this regard, out of the approximately 
ten anti-sweatshop NGOs, I purposefully selected one of them- KHRC- because it is the most active 
and organised on this issue area. It is treated in this research as an illustrative NGO actor in the 
labour regime, not a detailed case analysis. Out of the 20 firms operating in Kenya in April 2007, I 
purposefully selected one of the most vibrant firms- Protex EPZ Ltd (see appendix B for its 
structure).  
 
I regarded case study at this point, not as an aspect of research design, but as a special approach to 
selecting data. This is in contrast to those who view it as a technique of data collection, and is in 
accordance with theorists who see it in the sense I am proposing. For instance Goode and Hatt 
(1952 cited in Blaikie, 2000: 215) see it as ‗a way of organising social data so as to preserve the 
unitary character of the social object being studied…[it] views any social unit as a whole…a person, 
a family, or other social group, a set of relationships or processes…[or] culture‘. Similar to the earlier 
instance when case study was taken as a research strategy, I relied on ‗analytical generalisation‘ when 
analysing interviews with the case study firm‘s management and workers.  
 
1.2.5.2 Population and Sampling of Workers 
 
There are four zones that have apparel EPZ firms. These are Athi River, Nairobi, Mombasa and Voi 
(Map 1 below). The target population was the approximately 20 000 EPZ apparel workers in Kenya 
in 2007. The accessible population was 1 064 workers in Protex EPZ Ltd in Athi River EPZ.  
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Map 1: EPZs with apparel firms (2005) 
 
 
Sources: University of Texas (1988) (map); EPZA, 2005b (information on EPZs) 
 
 
Nairobi: various EPZs, 
6 firms (some multi-
plant) 
 
Athi River: 1 EPZ, 7 
firms  
 
 
Voi: 1 EPZ, 1 firm 
 
 
Mombasa: various 
EPZs, 12 firms (some 
multi-plant) 
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The rationale for defining and identifying the accessible population from the target population was 
partly based on theories of industrialisation, especially neo-Schumpeterian ones (see Chapter Two). 
These suggest that apparel industry workers at the assembly promotion stage of a LIC exhibit similar 
and often the same characteristics. Studies have indicated that the workers are highly skewed in terms 
of sex, age, level of exploitation and the like. In one global study, for example, United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) notes that ‗[f]or the particular industrial activities 
that dominate the zones, the companies have, at least to date, shown an overwhelming preference for 
young women‘ (UNIDO, 1980: 12). Therefore, the choice of any one firm in Kenya, whatever its 
size, as the accessible population guarantees population validity.  
 
I then carried out random sampling of workers in this firm. In doing so, I had envisaged that the 
fieldwork data would generate substantial quantitative results. However, as I continued with data 
collection and later analysed it, it occurred to me that very little of this data from the workers would 
be represented quantitatively- such as in numbers that can be quantified and summarised, with the 
final results being expressed in statistical terminologies (see Golafshani, 2003). Thus although I had 
arrived at the number of workers to interview after consideration of a battery of issues relevant to 
statistical analysis, such as those raised by Blaikie (2000) and Bouma (2000), and after employing the 
social science formula for calculating population sample (see Bernard, 2006: 178-83; Blaikie, 2000: 
208-10; Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999: 42-3), I organised that data qualitatively. The sample was 
71 workers; 33 females and 38 males. 
 
Therefore, I have ignored the detailing of the random sampling procedure in writing this thesis 
because it was initially taken to ensure repeatability, which was no longer relevant for the qualitative 
approach I eventually adopted. According to Golafshani, the question of replicability in the results 
does not concern a purely qualitative approach, such as the one I adopt here with regard to workers. 
What is important, is credibility. This is because  
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qualitative research uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific 
settings… [it is] any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or 
other means of quantification… [Rather than seeking] causal determination, prediction and generalisation [it 
seeks] illumination, understanding and extrapolation to similar situations (Golafshani, 2003: 600).  
 
It was also not possible to interview workers inside the factory; management is quite hostile to such 
arrangements. In addition, workers feared victimisation. Moreover, workers are not expected to be 
free to speak their mind in such circumstances. Therefore, I interviewed a few workers in their homes 
one by one, and most in batches at an agreed restaurant. The interviews were carried out between 2 
and 22 April 2007. It is also important to note that the experiences of the sampled workers were not 
restricted to Protex. This is because most have worked for at least two EPZ firms, and argued that 
their experiences cut across their employment, since the difference between firms is minimal.     
 
1.2.6 Data Reduction and Analysis  
 
The study yielded both quantitative and qualitative data. I first read through the qualitative data to 
familiarise myself with it. I then grouped it into categories, themes and patterns. Next, I established 
relationships between these groups on the one hand, while establishing their relationship with the 
concepts of the research on the other hand. I had used the Statistical Package for Social Science 
computer program to analyse quantitative data emanating from workers, but I have not used this data 
in the thesis because I changed strategy, as I have already explained. I also used the Excel computer 
program to analyse quantitative import data. All data was analysed in the light of the hypothesis and 
the research questions.  
 
1.3 ORGANISATION AND SUMMARY OF THE REST OF THE THESIS 
 
Having given the introduction and methodology of the study in this chapter, I will present in 
Chapter Two the theoretical framework. Most data will be secondary. I will begin with a 
classification of theoretical formulations on global industrial relocation. While not exhaustive, it will 
nevertheless show the two broad classifications of macro and meso/micro approaches. The chapter 
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will propound that the Kenyan case is best analysed by the micro/meso-institutional approach of 
GVC. A counterpoint analysis will show that the GVC analysis is not clear on how we should 
theorise ‗external‘ chain governance. The chapter will propose that this ‗external‘ governance is mainly 
regime governance seen from a Dependency perspective. Elements of both structure and agency on 
both sides of the regime-dependency divide result in control-emergent regime governance that, as far 
as issue areas are concerned, overrides control lead firm governance in pursuit of Northern 
accumulation and perpetuation of dependency. This regime governance is overlaid with the control 
dimension issuing from contemporary forms of Northern state strategic selectivity. The chapter will 
then show the relevance of a Dependency framework for the upgrading debate. On the one hand, 
firstly, it helps us to see international regimes as institutions that embody, and act as instruments of, 
the will of the core to dominate the system. This means that product upgrading in the South, 
especially in LICs and LDCs, is a Herculean task. Secondly, it shows us that the parameters of 
contemporary IPE are more complex than those described in classic Dependency literature of the 
1970s. However, far from necessarily facilitating upgrading, this factor may undermine it: in 
particular, the dependency of the apparel industry of a number of LICs, especially those of SSA, 
which include Kenya, on a new Asian sub-core, may further limit such LICs in their pursuit of 
product upgrading. On the other hand, a Dependency framework helps us to see possibilities 
inherent in this objective situation, and hence it inspires Southern agency in its struggle to embed 
industry, especially in its struggle to upgrade labour. The chapter closes with the hypothesis that the 
governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, while not a necessary condition, was a 
sufficient condition to undermine product and labour upgrading in Kenya between 1992 and 2007. 
 
Chapter Three will be on the evolution of the main regimes affecting the apparel industry, and of the 
Kenya apparel industry. In part one, first, the chapter will show the historical evolution of these 
regimes, beginning with the wider GATT/WTO regime. Then, it will show how the three regimes 
on production and trade in apparel- reflected by ‗voluntary‘ restraints/ STA/ LTA/ MFA/ ATC/ 
post-ATC, EU PTA and AGOA- have both evolved and nested within the GATT/WTO. It will 
then describe the regime on labour, which is only partly nested within the GATT/WTO. Second, it 
will show that under the regime instrumentality facet of these regimes, central capitalism‘s interest is 
to keep the periphery constantly in the same role, albeit in changing forms. Third, the chapter will 
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show major trends in global production and trade in apparel in the last 50 years as a result of these 
regimes. The trends come in five phases. In the first phase (up to 1960s), Japan began to be 
displaced by NICs as a result of Japanese ‗voluntary‘ export restraints. In the second phase (1970s), 
NICs reign, facilitated by the MFA. In the third phase (1980s), China, conditioned by the MFA, 
began to emerge and to challenge two of the NICs. Phase four (1990s) saw the emergence of India 
and Turkey, conditioned respectively by the MFA and the MFA accelerated by EU‘s outward 
processing arrangements. The MFA was also responsible for the first main wave of apparel exportism 
in Kenya. In the current phase (since 2000), China takes the lead and Mexico emerges as a dominant 
exporter. Also, Kenya starts exporting apparel worth a few hundred million US dollars. The MFA 
fuels the emergence of all these, but the process is accelerated by liberalisation (China) and US 
outward processing arrangements (Mexico and Kenya).  
 
In part two, the chapter gives the evolution of the Kenyan apparel industry. Most of the sources of 
data here are primary and in limited circulation. The chapter shows that the first investment in a 
textile-apparel Import Substitution Industry (ISI) was in 1960. Since there was minimal link between 
the textile and apparel subsectors before 1970, protective measures taken in 1977 improved the 
linkage drastically and increased the size of the industry to about 18 percent of manufacturing 
employment in 1983. In 1980, among other things, reliance on domestic fabric was about 100 
percent, and 98 percent of sales turnover went to domestic consumption. In a word, it was a classic 
ISI model. Importantly, labour repression played a key role in sustaining it. In the switch to Export 
Oriented Industrialisation (EOI), Kenya internally liberalised its economy beginning in 1980, and 
industrial sector liberalisation was inaugurated in 1988. Manufacturing under Bond (MuB) was 
introduced in 1989 and EPZs set up in 1991. As exportism was promoted, ISI firms, including 
textile-apparel ones, crumbled, beginning in the mid 1980s. Only six integrated mills and two 
spinners were in operation by 2006. Despite losing its composite nature, the sector is the second 
biggest employer in the manufacturing sector, and the fourth largest industrial segment. In the 
apparel export segment of this sector, much of the exportism is concentrated in the EPZs, with nearly 
100 percent of EPZ exports going to the US, and EPZ firms as the main players under AGOA. Also, 
EPZ apparel firms account for over 50 percent of the EPZ programme on all indicators. They also 
contribute 30 percent and 5 percent to non-food manufacturing and national exports respectively. 
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Whilst Kenya‘s exportism is insignificant by global standards, it plays a significant role in SSA. 
Finally, apparel firms in Kenya are inserted into the GVC in a ‗captive‘ way, they are controlled by 
South Asian capital and have no home workers.  
 
Chapter Four will be on upgrading. Almost all of the data is primary. This chapter will use six 
proxies in six sections. Section one will be on product upgrading as export expansion. The section 
will show that between 1992 and the peak of the growth in 2004, the expansion was 1005 percent. 
US-destined exports increasingly become the lifeline of the industry in the AGOA period (from 
2002) taking a share of over 95 percent. In 2007 Kenya was the second most dynamic SSA country 
in respect of US-destined exports, and experienced the highest growth- 329 percent- at the acme of 
the AGOA boom (2002-4). Although the growth began to slump from 2005 onwards following 
liberalisation of the sector, the country was the most resilient to the slowdown in SSA, experiencing 
the least slump (6 percent).  
 
Sections two to five will be on product upgrading as increased unit values as a result of movement 
from assembly of imported inputs to OEM production. Section two will be on local integration of 
the industry. This will involve an analysis of RoO implementation and local availability of the main 
raw material (fabric), including state policy on its provision. To some little extent, local availability 
of accessories will also be analysed. The industry is not locally integrated; EU PTA RoO was never 
implemented, the country relies on Asian fabric, and the public policy to reverse the dependence has 
so far been unsuccessful. Also, local input expenditure and local accessory sourcing is minimal. 
Section three will be on the extent of fabric value addition, using the proxies of unit price 
comparison in destination market and state of process technology. Unit price comparison with 
Chinese, Indian, Swazi and Mauritian products in the US market will reveal that Kenyan products 
have minimal ornamentation. The technology will be shown to be suitable for assembly-only 
production, and the country has not maximised on a multi-skilled labour force. Section four will be 
on export of folklores. It will show that the country has exported only 9 percent of eligible folklore/ 
hand loomed/handmade products. Section five will be on the integration of the industry into the 
GVC. It will show that, overall, the top half of products arranged in order of value had a smaller 
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share of upgrading than the bottom half. The section will also show that there is no evidence that 
AGOA ‗preferences‘ are sufficient to guarantee the continued existence of the industry in Kenya in 
the near future, outside of manmade fibre and woollen apparel exports, that have high import duties 
in the US. This further compromises integration into the GVC post-AGOA. Moreover, the section 
will reveal that most of the Kenyan products with a share upgrading of at least 1 percent were among 
the Chinese categories that the North limited in 2005 (at least 83 percent). Therefore, from 2009, 
this upgrading is very likely to have been undermined.  
 
Finally, section six will be on labour upgrading. Apart from non-employment of children, no other 
AGOA labour conditionality has been fully met. Despite this situation, lead firm monitoring of 
conditions of work is superficial. Auditors concentrate on conditions of work, rather than the pay 
and hours of work; workers are never sensitised on labour codes of practice by management and lead 
firms do not seem to question this; auditors are not bothered to find out who actually works at firms; 
workers are coached by management on what to tell auditors and lead firms are not keen to stamp 
out the practice; and management‘s presence during auditing negatively interferes with the process.  
 
In the light of the upgrading results of Chapter Four, Chapter Five will first examine the extent to 
which actors demonstrate the governance of regimes, and second, seek to link the governance of the 
regimes on production and trade in apparel with the hypothesis that, while it was not a necessary 
condition, it was a sufficient condition to undermine upgrading in Kenya. Thus at one level it will be 
analysing the extent of regime governance, while at another level it will be discussing this regime 
governance by showing its implication on upgrading. Since the hypothesis is not that the governance 
of regimes on production and trade in apparel was a necessary condition, but rather that it was a 
sufficient condition, to undermine upgrading in Kenya, this analysis and discussion is the direct link 
between this chapter and the findings presented in Chapter Four. 
 
Beginning with an analysis of the extent of regime governance, with regard to the regimes on 
production and trade in apparel, the structural international regime on apparel will be analysed first. 
Entrepreneurs will be shown to have a mixed perception, on the one hand being aware of regime 
instrumentality as a result of the influence of neo-liberalism, while on the other hand, being caught 
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on the hop by the sector being liberalised, which is the emergent facet of the regime. Cabinet‘s 
perceptions will also reveal an attempt at circumventing constrains imposed by the emergent nature 
of the regime. Bureaucrats‘ attempt to initiate a common SSA strategy in the light of liberalisation 
will be a further indicator of circumvention of the constraints resulting from emergent evolution of 
the regime. Second, although some bureaucrats and entrepreneurs will propound an exalted place for 
Kenya as a regime ‗taker‘, their overall perceptions, actions and strategies will be shown to take into 
account the instrumentality of the US-based regime governance, particularly as a result of the 
influence of the neo-liberal/ individual neo-statist Northern state strategic selectivity. Third, we will 
look at two dialectical interplays, between, on the one hand, the structural regime and the US-based 
and the EU-based regimes, and on the other hand, neo-liberalism and collective neo-statist Northern 
state strategic selectivity influences within the structural regime. A Kenya Cabinet paper and US 
government actors will show the first interplay, which results in Kenya running away from the 
limitations of ‗preferences‘ to more limitations within regime emergence where Asia has ubiquitously 
inserted itself in the GVC as a somewhat secondary metropolitan. The EU Trade Commissioner and 
Kenya entrepreneurs and bureaucrats will show the second interplay, which results in the South‘s lack 
of a common accumulation strategy.  
 
On the implication of this regime governance on product upgrading, two similar implications will be 
shown. The first is that the industry in LICs is constrained to pick up, particularly as a result of the 
instrumentality issuing from these regimes. This led Kenya to pursue a contradictory strategy: one 
that simultaneously reflected a fantasy influenced by NIC sanguinity on the one hand, and one that 
was constrained particularly by the US-based regime, on the other hand. Policy documents in Kenya, 
statements of US- and to some extent EU- policy makers, and interviews with bureaucrats and 
entrepreneurs will demonstrate this. The other implication is that LICs are crowded out of 
destination markets by major players. This is mainly a result of the emergent facet of the regime, 
where currently China is responsible for this limitation. Bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and secondary 
sources will demonstrate this. These two implications mean that product upgrading in LICs is a 
Herculean task. Nevertheless, because of the urgency to promote systemic milieu goals, the US-based 
regime has relaxed the RoO for SSA, until 2012, and hence Kenya has achieved limited volume 
upgrading. 
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When we turn to the extent of the governance of the labour regime, the interplay of forms of 
Northern state strategic selectivity will still be seen to influence regime actors. First, neo-statist form 
influence will be shown by entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. Their views on the social clause are 
incongruent, but the clause is seen to influence their proposals on labour upgrading. Second, 
entrepreneurs, the union, bureaucrats and workers will show the influence of neo-corporatism. 
Entrepreneurs and some bureaucrats prefer ILO‘s ‗international standards‘, while some bureaucrats 
prefer Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). While the union and workers will reveal the 
working of tripartism, entrepreneurs and the union will emphasise that the ILO is the central actor in 
neo-corporatism. Third, neo-communitarian form influence will be shown by bureaucrats, the union, 
the NGO and workers. They will all portray NGOs as the most active neo-communitarian actors.  
 
On the implication of the governance of the labour regime on labour upgrading, we shall continue 
with the regime-dependency theme of the previous three regimes. The interplay of the selectivity 
within the labour regime will be seen to theoretically provide for a Kenyan labour upgrading 
opportunity. However, the above two implications on product upgrading also mean that regime 
governance on apparel leads to the race to the bottom in LICs. In juggling labour upgrading in the 
South (which restricts Southern accumulation, and ensures labour reproduction and attainment of 
international social order) with the race to the bottom-driven Northern accumulation, capitalism is 
more petrified by undermining the latter than a failure to achieve the former, and hence labour 
conditions rarely improve in practice. This is what unites the inhibition of product upgrading with 
the inhibition of labour upgrading. It also shows regime governance as a determinant of both product 
and labour upgrading. The natural vanguard for labour upgrading would be unions. However, post-
War unionism has been rendered moribund, largely remaining a part of neo-corporatism. 
Nevertheless the regime of accumulation launched in 1980 saw the Northern state and its allies, such 
as NGOs, being influenced increasingly by neo-communitarianism. This provides the best 
opportunity so far to upgrade labour, and embryonic labour upgrading experimentation is ongoing in 
Kenya.  
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Thus the perceptions, actions and strategies of the actors selected will demonstrate regime 
governance that, as far as issue areas are concerned, overrides lead firm governance, and that is aimed 
at Northern accumulation, perpetuation of dependency and attainment of milieu goals. Hence the 
thesis will argue in support of the hypothesis that the governance of regimes on production and trade 
in apparel, while not a necessary condition, was a sufficient condition to undermine upgrading in 
Kenya. At the same time, this chapter will show the potential for Southern manoeuvres to embed 
development. Above all, the knowledge possessed by Southern actors about the functioning of these 
regimes gives hope for success in future struggles to upgrade industry. 
 
The text will close with Chapter Six, which will first summarise the preceding five chapters before 
giving conclusions and recommendations. It will conclude that the dominant theoretical approach in 
interpreting apparel chain governance and upgrading- the GVC analysis- is ill equipped to analyse 
systemic chain governance, that governance should be differentiated into systemic issue area chain 
governance (which is mainly control-emergent regime governance) and chain level control (which is 
mainly control lead firm governance), that regime governance largely determines chain upgrading 
outcomes, and that the knowledge possessed by Southern actors about the functioning of these 
regimes gives hope for success in future struggles to upgrade industry. It will recommend that the 
Kenyan Government and social movements can exploit systemic weaknesses, the former by 
negotiating for a single transformation of fabric and promoting export of folklore/ hand 
loomed/handmade products, the latter by demanding for the full implementation of minimum 
labour conditions.  
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I venture to formulate the theoretical framework. First, without being definitive or 
exhaustive, I will show approaches to industrial diffusion. Second, I will detail the main approach I 
critique in this study- the GVC approach. I will concentrate on the ‗external‘ governance dimension 
of the analysis. Thirdly, I will show how the GVC approach could be enriched by a Dependency 
reading of Regimes theory. In particular, regime governance from structure-agency interplay within 
regime-dependency debate will be theorised, followed by a presentation of the relevance of a 
Dependency framework for the upgrading debate. Finally, a hypothesis will be drawn.  
 
2.2 APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL DIFFUSION 
 
In general, following the industrial transformation of the 1970s, most theories on industrial diffusion 
have taken on board an institutional perspective (Gereffi, 2005). Strong institutionalism is often 
associated with radical approaches, weak institutionalism with liberal ones. Another departure is the 
macro or micro/meso. I illustrate this medley in Table 1 below.  
 
The neo-Schumpeterian approach has been closely associated with research at the Science Policy 
Research Unit, University of Sussex since 1966 (for example Dosi et al (1988)). It analyses the 
systemic and cyclical nature of capitalism; periodisation of Fordism; the match between a technico-
economic paradigm and a socio-institutional framework; and the stability of a long wave of economic 
development. Also, it lays a heavy emphasis on the role of technology and technical standards in 
initiating, sustaining and separating long waves (Amin, 2000). Neo-Schumpeterians see the 
transformative role of technology in driving capitalism in the four broad types of progressively 
significant technological change: incremental innovations, radical innovations, change of 
technological system and changes in the techno-economic paradigm (Dicken, 2003) (see also Elam, 
2000; Freeman and Perez, 1988).  
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Table 1: Representative theoretical approaches to industrial diffusion 
 Micro/meso institutional & organisational Macro institutional 
Name Emphasis Name Emphasis 
Liberal/ Less 
institutional 
GVC Vertical networks  Neo-
Schumpeterian 
Role of 
technology & 
technical 
standards in 
driving 
capitalism 
Radical/ More 
institutional 
Industrial Districts Horizontal networks Régulation Capitalism‘s 
instability, 
crisis & change 
Flexible Specialisation 
 
Horizontal networks; mass 
industrial production versus 
flexible specialisation 
Industrial Clusters Horizontal & vertical 
networks 
Source: Author‘s conceptualisation 
 
Neo-Schumpeterianism can be criticised. The most palpable criticism is that in practice, the forms of 
product innovation described above, also captured by the less grand laissez faire Product Cycle 
theorisation encountered in Chapter One, are rarely linear. Not infrequently, the progression of the 
rise and eventual fall in demand for a single product, as modelled by Product Cycle, for instance, is 
interrupted by the IPE cycle. This was what Froebel et al (1980) showed. Moreover, the partial 
recognition of socio-institutional factors by theoreticians like Freeman notwithstanding, the neo-
Schumpeterian approach is technologically deterministic and takes the survival of capitalism as given. 
It views the ‗socio-institutional‘ as subordinate to the ‗technico-economic‘ (Elam, 2000: 46). 
However, in managing capitalist systemic crisis, technology is not always useful. The solution in the 
1945 blockage, for instance, was a shift in international politics, represented in Keynesianism, which 
differs from the 1970s where technology, in particular technological management system, played a 
key role in the restructuring (Biel, 2000). Above all, neo-Schumpeterianism, being macroeconomic, is 
less useful to this thesis‘s sectoral interest.  
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Régulationists agree with much of neo-Schumpeterianism: systemic and cyclical nature of capitalism; 
periodisation of Fordism; the match between a technico-economic paradigm (régulationists use the 
term ‗regime of accumulation‘) and the socio-institutional framework (régulationists use the term 
‗mode of régulation‘); and the stability of a long wave of economic development. However, they 
reject neo-Schumpeterians‘ technological determinism and the assumed survival of capitalism by 
taking on board Marxian dialectics to argue that the future of capitalism will be determined by the 
contestations of various actors at any particular moment (Lipietz, 1987b; 2000; Jessop and Sum, 
2006). The approach has four levels of analysis. There is the relative stability that capitalism 
experiences over a relatively long period, the regime of accumulation. The Parisian school (there are 
at least seven schools) distinguishes between two accumulation regimes: intensive (associated with 
Fordism) and extensive (associated with post-Fordism) (Jessop and Sum, 2006; see also Amin, 2000; 
Lipietz, 1987b). In the latter, capitalism expands mainly by spreading into new areas of activity and 
into new geographical areas using flexible labour. It is this type of regime of accumulation, therefore, 
that, we are to infer, offers greater opportunity for industry to diffuse from the North to the South. 
The other three levels of analysis are the dominant industrial paradigm/ labour process/ mode of 
accumulation (see Amin, 2000; Jessop, 1991; 2000; Jessop and Sum, 2006; Lipietz, 1987b), the 
mode of régulation (see Amin, 2000; Jessop and Sum, 2006; Lipietz, 1987b) and the mode of 
societisation (see Boyer, 2002).  
 
The mode of régulation is the most appropriate level of analysing systemic governance. However, as a 
‗comparative institutional‘ theory3, the Régulation approach is focused on complete capitalist 
economies, or at least near complete ones, such as NICs. It has therefore very little explanatory power 
for a case like Kenya, where a substantial part of the economy is ‗informal‘. More importantly, the 
approach has done little to theorise international regimes which fall within this level of analysis. 
According to Vidal (2002), there has been only relative analysis of monetary regimes, in particular by 
Aglietta- one of its founders- and the stability and change in international economic relations.  
                                                     
3 Other ‗comparative institutional‘ theories that have gained prominence but will not be reviewed include National 
Systems of Innovations (Lundvall, 1992), Social Systems of Production (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997), Varieties of 
Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and Business Systems (Whitley, 1992).  
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Following this brief review of these two macro institutional approaches, and since my interest is 
sectoral, I consider the micro/meso institutional approach as best suited for such analysis. There 
have been three main micro/meso institutional approaches to the analysis of industrial diffusion. I 
will deal with the first two briefly as I have done with the macro analyses, and reserve a considerable 
detailed examination for the last one in the next section, since it is one of the two central approaches 
in the text.  
 
The first approach emphasises horizontal networks. This comes in two strands. The first is Industrial 
Districts literature (Humphrey, 1995; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992; Rabellotti, 1995; Sengenberger 
and Pyke, 1991) of late 1980s and 1990s that emphasises intra-cluster networks. The best cited case 
is that of Italy where small firms in the Emilia-Romagna region experienced tremendous export 
growth since the 1970s for such products as shoes, leather handbags, furniture, tile and musical 
instruments (Humphrey, 1995). Rabellotti (1995) defined industrial districts in terms of four key 
factors: a cluster of mainly small and medium enterprises, spatially concentrated and sectorally 
specialised; a set of forward and backward linkages among economic agents, based both on market 
and non-market exchanges of goods, information and people; a common cultural and social 
background linking the economic agents and creating a behavioural code, sometimes explicit but 
often implicit; and public and private local institutions acting to support the cluster.  
 
Closely associated with Industrial District literature is Flexible Specialisation literature. Its chief 
proponents- Piore and Sabel (1984)- attempt to reconceptualise the Japanese industrial experience 
within an understanding of small firms. The contention is that, alongside the post-1970s dominant 
model in large firms- variously referred to as Toyota, lean production, Just in Time and Just in Case 
or Total Quality Management- is a similar small firm model similar to that which had been observed 
in Italy (see Sabel, 2000). Flexible specialisation encourages the geographical clustering of productive 
activity (Storper, 2000). According to Amin (2000), its most distinguishing aspect is the de-
emphasis of the role of general structural tendencies in economic and social life, and more or less the 
rejection of a deterministic account of historical evolution and transition. It is based on a basic 
conceptual distinction between mass industrial production (before 1970s) and flexible specialisation 
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and/ or craft production (after 1970s). According to its apologists, these two have existed since the 
19th century, and occasionally, as a matter of historical circumstances and political choice (rather than 
a matter of logical necessity), one may limit the other to emerge as the prevailing international 
standard (Piore and Sabel, 1984: especially Chapter One and Chapter Two). We infer that industrial 
diffusion since the 1970s has been driven more by flexible specialisation than mass production.  
 
While both Industrial Districts and Flexible Specialisation theoreticians share an emphasis of 
horizontal networks, the former have impugned Piore and Sabel‘s observed similarities between this 
small firm model and the Toyota one. Humphrey for example contends that just as the Toyota 
experience was codified into the lean production model for a Western audience, Piore and Sabel have 
merely codified the Italian experience and presented it to the same Western audience in the name of 
Flexible Specialisation (see Humphrey, 1995). It has also been criticised for a lack of clarity on how 
a moment of stark choice between paradigms is reached, the dualistic logic that caricatures each of 
the paradigm with little room for diversity in each of them, its too easily slipping in between 
voluntarism and historical logic in explaining crossing industrial divides, the naivety of imagining a 
large scale rebirth of craft industries, and an underestimation of the power of Trans National 
Corporations (TNCs) as protagonists of Fordism (Amin, 2000). Also, the outlook of the global 
industry portrayed by the Flexible Specialisation approach is rebutted by some organisational 
approaches such as the GVC approach that shows strong global hierarchies and networks. Moreover, 
although the paradigm incorporates politico-institutional forces and exercises of economic power, its 
overwhelming attention to market trends renders an interpretation on which politics and exercises of 
power are too often shrivelled to the perceived actions of ‗sovereign consumers‘- securing a place for 
Adam Smith and his prefigurative powers of the market (Elam, 2000: 56).  
 
The second approach emphasises both horizontal and vertical networks. One of the best known 
strands is Industrial Clusters literature (Rabellotti, 1999; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999)4. It was an 
                                                     
4 Global Production Networks (Henderson, 2005; Henderson et al, 2002) could also be seen as another strand. Rather 
than focusing on the cluster, it focuses on firms and their horizontal relationships especially their embeddedness in the 
national economy alongside their vertical global relationships.   
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improvement of the ‗static‘ Industrial District model above, and it emphasises not only intra-cluster 
linkages but also those linkages external to the cluster. Industrial Clustering literature considers the 
collective efficiency emanating from clustering as one of the central opportunities to be found in 
clusters (Schmitz, 1995). Pure agglomerations of unrelated firms do not give rise to collective 
efficiency, hence in the strict sense they cannot be classified as industrial clusters. However, given the 
complexity of patterns of interaction, and the emphasis in Clustering literature on ‗soft‘ non-
measurable variables, such as trust, it is difficult to draw a clear cut border between mere industrial 
agglomerations and real industrial clusters with strong positive externalities (Altenburg and Meyer, 
1999). The inference here is that like the Flexible Specialisation approach, industrial diffusion since 
the 1970s has been driven by the collective efficiency of clusters. This time, however, what is being 
emphasised is both horizontal and vertical networks, not the dualistic logic of mass versus craft 
production.  
  
Still, these micro/meso institutional approaches are not very useful to this thesis. As we will see in 
Chapter Three, the specific form of 21st century dependent development typified by the Kenyan case 
of EPZs would fulfil only a fraction of the ingredients of the Industrial District/ Clustering 
categories. Clusters enjoy opportunities for collective efficiency emanating from the following: 
positive external effects emanating from the existence of a local pool of skilled labour and the 
attraction of buyers; forward and backward linkages between firms inside the clusters; intensive 
information exchange between firms, institutions, and individuals in the cluster, which gives rise to a 
creative milieu; joint action geared to creating locational advantages; the existence of a diversified 
institutional infrastructure supporting the specific activities of the cluster; and a socio-cultural 
identity made up of common values and the embeddedness of local actors in a local milieu which 
facilitates trust. While in the real world even the simplest industrial agglomerations, such as EPZs, 
will generate some very basic externalities, they would largely not fulfil any of the other variables 
(Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999). This shows spontaneous clusters like Sinos Valley and 
planned ones like EPZs are different things. Planned EPZs are meant by neo-liberalism to stimulate 
spontaneous emergence; although policy/planning has not brought about spontaneity in Kenya, and 
arguably the entire SSA. 
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This leaves us with GVC as the most suitable of the approaches to analyse our case. It emphasises 
vertical relationships not between clusters and external actors but between individual firms on the one 
hand and global actors on the other hand. GVC is an offshoot of earlier versions, in particular the 
Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach originating in Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994).  
 
2.3 THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN APPROACH  
 
2.3.1 Introduction and the Four Dimensions 
 
The value chain concept was used in the 1960s and 1970s by analysts interested in mineral exports, 
in late 1970s by French planning literature in the form of filiéres, and in the 1980s in the works of 
business economist Michael Porter (Kaplinsky, 2000). However, the version that is of interest to this 
thesis was originally widely analysed under the label GCC approach and primarily developed for 
manufacturing exports. It was first popularised by a 1994 publication edited by Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz. As noted by Gibbon and Ponte (2005) and Raikes et al (2000), in the remaining part 
of the 1990s, while the vanguard Gereffi applied it to apparel exports from East Asia, Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin to the US, others have applied it to other commodities, including tourism 
(Clancy, 1998), services (Rabach and Kim, 1994), footwear (Schmitz, 1999) and automobiles and 
auto components (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000; Kaplinsky and Morris, 1999).  
 
There are four dimensions in the GVC analysis. First, there is the input-output structure, the flow 
along the chain (a chain is a sequence of value adding economic activities). For example, typically, an 
apparel chain has five main stages: design, purchase of inputs, production, distribution through 
wholesalers and retailing. However, some of the stages may be subdivided or combined. Another 
parallel but less visible structure is the knowledge and expertise needed for the structure above to 
function. The latter, however, may differ from the former in terms of intensity at various stages. For 
example, knowledge inputs at a product‘s design stage may be greater than the material inputs, and 
vice versa for the production stage (McCormick and Rogerson, 2004). The second dimension is the 
geographical spread. Gereffi (1994) identified the third dimension as governance, and distinguished 
between producer-driven and buyer-driven GVCs. The former is governed by lead firms controlling 
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key product and process technologies, the latter by lead firms controlling intangible aspects, such as 
brands, markets and design. In producer-driven GVCs, large transnational manufacturers in capital 
and technology intensive industries, such as automobiles, play central roles in coordinating 
production networks. In buyer-driven GVCs, however, buyers of labour intensive commodities, such 
as apparel, play central roles in setting up decentralised export production networks, typically in the 
global South. In both types of chains, lead firms externalise low-profit functions- in particular 
production- to other suppliers upstream in the chain (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994).  
 
Gereffi (1994) had initially conceptualised only the first three dimensions. Later he added the 
institutional dimension (Gereffi, 1995). The GVC analysis has not been clear on what this should 
mean, although it resembles NIE‘s ‗rules of the game‘ (North, 1990). In Gereffi (1995: 113) it is the 
‗local, national and international conditions and policies that shape the globalisation process at each 
stage in the chain‘ (my emphasis). In Gereffi (1999b: 37), it is the ‗social and organisation 
dimensions of international trade networks‘ (my emphasis). Then take Gibbon and Ponte (2005). 
While the authors view policy regulation and quality conventions as part of what they call GVC 
‗external‘ governance, it would fit Gereffi‘s (1995) definition of institutional framework.  
 
We should not be hindered from seeing the wood for the trees. This thesis collapses both governance 
and institutional framework into one broader notion of governance. This is because my definition of 
governance in Chapter One- not as mere control as emphasised by the GVC analysis, but as control 
and emergent processes of organising capitalism- renders this bifurcation into governance and 
institutional dimensions irrelevant. The proposition here is that even what Bair calls ‗the broader 
institutional environment‘ should be seen as part of GVC governance. Indeed she states explicitly 
that the use of the term ‗external‘ to represent the institutional environment is misleading, since these 
conditions are not exterior to, but rather constitutive of, chain dynamics (see Bair, 2005).  
 
In the GVC tradition, the first two dimensions are meant to be descriptive. The last two, however, 
constitute the key theoretical concepts. However, this thesis will make an attempt to analyse a part of 
input-output and geographical spread dimensions under governance. First, the theoretical model 
allowed us to analyse geographical spread as a parameter to be set within the chain. Secondly, we will 
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analyse the parallel but less visible input-output structure of ‗knowledge and expertise‘. This 
dimension is only implicitly analysed in GVC literature, and in contexts outside governance. For 
example, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001), McCormick and Schmitz (2002) and Schmitz (2004) see 
it as either useful or necessary for inter-sectoral upgrading. Another example is where Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz (1994) argue that low profit is not the only factor considered in externalising 
functions; that a more important one is organisational flexibility of the subordinate firm.  
 
As we saw in Chapter One, the GVC analysis concentrates on chain control, and has portrayed lead 
firms as the principal chain governors in that regard. As a result the analysis has focused on what it 
has sometimes called ‗internal‘ governance (control mechanisms within the GVC), where its version 
of governance has featured more than its institutional framework. Infrequently the analysis has 
looked into other instruments of control such as NGOs and state policy. It has sometimes referred to 
this as ‗external‘ governance (control mechanisms emanating from outside the GVC), where both of 
its versions of governance and institutional mechanisms girdling it have featured. Since governance 
that recognises regimes is central to this thesis, it is ‗external‘ governance that is of relevance to my 
research. Nevertheless, ‗internal‘ governance has been the preoccupation of the GVC analysis, and an 
exposition that does not include this kind of control within the chain will make the review 
incomplete. It is therefore presented first, albeit briefly.  
 
2.3.2 ‗Internal‘ Chain Governance  
 
The GVC analysis developed the ‗internal‘ governance debate in three main stages. Firstly, Gereffi‘s 
twin typology of governance was questioned. In the late 1990s, it was observed that some producer-
driven chains in automobile, computer and consumer electronic industries exhibited characteristics of 
buyer-driven chains. While producers in these chains would sometimes outsource portions of 
component manufacture, as is archetypal of producer-driven chains, at other times they would 
outsource both supply chain logistics and assembly, while retaining the marketing of the brand- a 
characteristic of buyer-driven chains (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). In addition, Clancy‘s (1998) 
investigation of the tourism industry, focussing on hotels and airlines subsectors, questioned the 
applicability of this classification in such industries. While no adequate response has come from 
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Gereffi in relation to the former issue, with regard to the latter one, he has suggested that in addition 
to the two types of chains, possibly a third Internet-based form has been emerging since the mid 
1990s- the ‗infomediary-driven chain‘ (Gereffi, 2001a: 2001b).  
 
Secondly, his assertion that lead firms attain chain leadership partly by externalising low-profit 
functions was questioned as well. Sturgeon (2002) and Sturgeon and Lee (2001) contrasted three 
types of supply relationships: the commodity supplier (provides standard products through arm‘s 
length market relationships), the captive supplier (makes non-standard products using machinery 
dedicated to the buyer‘s needs) and the turnkey supplier (produces customized products for buyers, 
and uses flexible machinery to pool capacity for different customers). Their main contention was that 
increased strategic outsourcing by groups of lead firms has, over time, led to the rise of a shared 
supplier ‗modular production network‘ associated with the turnkey supplier. This can be accessed by 
the industry as a whole, including the lead firms that compete head to head in final product markets. 
They labelled such suppliers as Global Contract Manufacturers (GCMs). By this classification, 
apparel firms found in EPZs in LICs, including those in Kenya, are of the captive type (see section 
3.3.3.5). Thus Sturgeon and Lee showed that GCMs‘ generic capacity enables them to perform high 
profit functions [in some literature GCMs are simply referred to as OEMs and are to be found 
among first tier supplier firms]. (See also Fold‘s (2001) study on the impact of the restructuring 
within European chocolate processors on West African cocoa producers).  
 
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) defend the earlier assertion by Gereffi (1994) by arguing that the 
functions outsourced by lead firms were of low-profit at the time this took place, but became more 
profitable as a result of technological changes that created opportunities for scale economies. 
Moreover, this network seems to clarify, at least partly, the issue of producer-driven chains behaving 
like buyer-driven chains. However, the debate seems to have shifted focus from governance to supply 
relationships, a point which Gibbon and Ponte recognise.  
 
Thus the third stage of the debate accentuates supply relationships; analysing governance types within 
particular segments of chains. This is a move which Gibbon and Ponte (2005) refer to as a deviation 
to concentrate on forms of coordination within chains (or at least not making any distinction 
between overall forms of governance and forms of coordination). Gibbon and Ponte argue that this 
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makes it difficult to situate Gereffi‘s original twin typologies of governance within the new 
typologies.  
 
Two interpretations have been offered. The first comprises four particular control and governance 
types. In one instance, buying and selling is left entirely to the market in market-driven/ arm‘s length 
chains. This is typical of standard goods, such as men‘s cotton athletic socks. In the second instance, 
there is a balanced network of firms, for example, collaboration between producers of eco-friendly 
knitted fabric and the apparel manufacturers who make this fabric into fashion apparel. The third 
type of governance is where lead firms form a directed network/quasi hierarchy within which they 
control production, specifying what is to be produced and by whom. Examples would be the 
automobile industry (producer-driven) and the apparel industry (buyer-driven). Finally, there is a 
hierarchy of control with one or two firms owning and controlling the process from start to finish. 
An example would be most local knitting mills (Schmitz, 2004) (see also McCormick and Rogerson, 
2004). The ‗modular production network‘ was also recognised within this framework (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2004). What these scholars labelled as ‗arm‘s length‘ chains is what Sturgeon and Lee 
associated with ‗commodity‘ suppliers and what they labelled as ‗quasi hierarchical‘ is what Sturgeon 
and Lee associated with ‗captive‘ suppliers, such as those in Kenya.  
 
Gereffi seemed to have been influenced to lean towards the latter line of thinking. Another typology 
of governance in GVCs, which is the second interpretation, is introduced in Gereffi et al (2005). 
First, they argue that the ‗quasi-hierarchical‘ category identified by Humphrey and Schmitz 
corresponds to Sturgeon and Lee‘s ‗captive‘ category, as I have noted above. Second, they imply that a 
category they identify as the ‗relational network‘ corresponds to Humphrey and Schmitz‘s ‗balanced 
network‘ category. Third, they take these two categories to be subcategories of what they now call the 
‗network‘ category. Finally they add ‗modular governance‘ to this ‗network‘ category to come up with 
three distinct types of governance: modular, relational, and captive, with market-based relationships 
among firms, and vertically integrated firms (hierarchies) making up opposite ends of a spectrum. 
Hence there are five basic types of value chain ‗internal‘ governance. They argue that suppliers in 
modular value chains make products to buyers‘ specifications, but take full responsibility for 
competencies surrounding process technology, for example, when providing turnkey services. 
Relational networks are mutually dependent networks, and are managed through reputation, family 
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or ethnic ties, spatial proximity, et cetera. In captive networks, small suppliers are dependent on much 
larger buyers, and often face significant switching costs. Such networks are monitored and controlled 
by foreign firms.  
 
How has this debate related to upgrading? Although it is not always stated explicitly, the GVC 
analysis suggests that the network category, especially relational or modular, should be the ideal 
governance structure that guarantees industrial upgrading in the South (see Sturgeon, 2002).  
 
I now turn to ‗external‘ governance.   
 
2.3.3 ‗External‘ Chain Governance5  
 
Raikes et al (2000) were among the earliest to question the role of ‗external‘ factors in shaping power 
relations within the GVC. Bair (2005) has put forward similar sentiments. She contends that in so 
far as Gereffi et al (2005) represent the latest version of a theory of GVC governance, the GVC 
approach focuses on how inter-firm relations are shaped by the internal logics of sectors, such as 
industry structure and production-process characteristics that are more technical or organisational in 
nature, with little attention to ‗external‘ factors, such as the broader institutional environment.  
 
Gereffi et al (2001), Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) and Kaplinsky (2000) were perhaps among the 
earliest to admit that ‗external‘ governance plays an important role in product and process parameters. 
They state that governors may include NGOs, and government agencies and international 
organisations setting and/or enforcing parameters on design aspects or physical characteristics of 
products to safeguard consumer safety.  
 
                                                     
5 While I will largely deal with the GVC strand of global chains/networks, I will take on board some literature that deals 
with the global chains/networks metaphor more generally.   
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Gereffi et al (2005) have themselves been open, acknowledging that the GVC approach is inadequate 
in dealing with this matter, and have insinuated that the approach can indeed be informed by other 
approaches.  
 
Our primary concern... is with organizational structures that span international borders and particularly in those 
that have a global reach. Nonetheless, local and national structures and institutions also matter. Geographers 
and planners have provided us with insights into how the spatial and social propinquity of local industrial 
agglomerations work to buoy organizationally disaggregated, and often highly innovative, economic activities 
….The varieties of capitalism literature, coming largely from political science… similarly argues that national-
level rules and institutions… profoundly affect the character of industries… It is also clear that global-scale 
regulations, the ‗rules of the game‘ as it were, have a profound effect on the shape and direction of change in 
global value chains... (Gereffi et al, 2005: 98-9) (my emphasis).  
 
Similarly, Spener et al (2002:9) state that  
 
…although we grant analytical primacy to the role of different types of inter-firm networks in determining the 
evolution of the textile-garment chain and the generation of wealth at different points along it, we recognise 
that the social-economic consequences of this process are embedded in a multilayered institutional setting that 
incorporates a variety of other factors as well (my emphasis). 
 
But perhaps none of these would match the force and detail of Gibbon and Ponte (2005). They not 
merely recognised the necessity to broaden the analysis; they also singled out trade agreements and 
policy regulation, and quality conventions, and argued spiritedly for their role in governance. They 
espy ‗external‘ governance of GVCs in the light of not only how lead firms configure ‗internal‘ 
governance as a response to this institutional framework, but also how they attempt to reshape it, 
through lobbying public agencies and influencing negotiation processes. 
 
Thus governance in GVCs involves more than how firms decide whether to make or buy something … and 
more than how they relate with their immediate suppliers and buyers. For example, the governance of the global 
clothing industry is also related to the Multi-fibre Arrangement…. At the same time, governance is not just an 
effect of changing trade agreements and public regulation either… (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005: 85) (my 
emphasis).   
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It could be argued that Gibbon and Ponte are making a similar argument as the present study. 
However, they present the role of trade agreements and policy regulation as subordinate to that of 
lead firms. In contra, this thesis sees lead firms as subservient to such agreements and regulations, and 
actually they are surrogates of a configuration of international regimes on production and trade in 
apparel, hence regimes are the ultimate chain governors.  
 
I also question Gibbon and Ponte‘s view on quality conventions. The authors have employed 
Convention theory, and forcefully argue for the role of conventions in process governance. The 
evolution of the role of quality standards in shaping access to GVCs, they argue, should be 
understood in relation to the changing features of consumption in the North. The key characteristics 
of this consumption sphere are food and/or safety awareness, ‗globalisation‘ of consumer tastes, and 
social and environmental concerns. These characteristics- as well as the fact that there is market 
saturation for goods with commodity traits- lead to product proliferation and differentiation, and the 
increased importance of issues of quality control management, traceability and certification. As 
quality requirements get more complex- that is, as consumers demand more of these characteristics- 
one would expect lead firms to coordinate and govern the chain in a more hands-on manner. 
Conversely, lead firms embed this information about quality in standards, labels and certification, 
and this enables them to have hands off coordination and governance of the chain. Gibbon and 
Ponte imply that because of this, quality conventions should be espied as ‗external‘ governors in the 
chain. However, throughout the authors see lead firms, and not such conventions, as the ‗real‘ 
governors.  
 
However, I submit that the fact that conventions are sources of parameters should prompt us to 
analyse in detail this wider terrain of conventions and their relationship with other actors in the 
chain. Firstly, the development of these conventions is usually not as straightforward as it may seem. 
Even Gibbon and Ponte concur on this point; they say, for example, that lead firms are the ones that 
indeed prompt consumers to question their preferences- through advertising, shelf positioning et 
cetera- and in so doing try to steer a ‗spontaneous‘ and gradual process of qualification and 
requalification of products to their (lead firms) advantage. They then attempt to reshape this 
institutional framework by making mandatory de jure or de facto the adoption of standards they 
already use (or have devised).  
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Secondly and even more importantly, Gibbon and Ponte acknowledge that quality conventions relate 
to ‗socio-structural trends‘ and involve more than consumers and lead firms:  
 
… [L]ead firms are by no means in complete control of the governance of consumption. Broad quality 
conventions relate to fundamental social-structural trends, and even modifications in their mix and hierarchy are 
shaped largely independently of the wishes of lead firms. The latter may occur, for example, via the rise of new 
social movements… or through the institutionalisation of new bodies of expertise concerning good taste, 
developed for example by lifestyle journalists and gurus, fashion scouts, property makeover consultants, and 
celebrity cooks…lead firms attempt to take advantage of changes in consumption and in governance via the 
(re)qualification of fashionable products in propriety forms (brands, patented products, and process) rather 
than trying to govern consumption as such (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005: 194) (my emphasis). 
 
I see, along Bernstein and Campling (2006), a fresh list of actors emerging, actors whose precise 
vocation is, as Bernstein and Campling note, to justify people‘s commitment to capitalism, and to 
render this commitment attractive. We can add that NGOs and the state are important actors 
missing from the above quotation. But these other actors, or at least some of them, also set chain 
parameters directly at production site.  
 
Restricting myself to labour standards, I argue that whether by directly setting parameters at 
production site or by influencing conventions from which lead firms draw and set parameters, these 
other actors, together with lead firms, represent a control-emergent GVC governance of the 
international regime on labour standards. The interests of lead firms and those of the regime as a 
whole may be slightly at variance, but in quintessence they have a shared interest in accumulation. 
Lead firms taking on board parameters from conventions might be driven simultaneously by their 
immediate interest in increasing profits at the expense of other actors (suppliers) upstream in the 
chain (located in poorer countries), by transferring the cost of managing the compliance with the 
conventions (for example costs of certification), and long term interests of accumulation. But the 
interest of the regime as a whole is mainly long term accumulation and international social stability.  
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Palpacuer implicitly confirms that accumulation is the overall interest of the regime. She does not 
theorise her work as regime analysis, but I argue that the three governance types she presents are 
merely variations on the role regime governance should serve.  
 
She rightly criticises what she calls ‗market based, shareholder oriented governance in mainstream 
GCCs‘ (Palpacuer, 2008: 406) for the assumption it makes; that maximising an individual firm‘s 
performance could serve to improve conditions for the economy and society as a whole. As a result, it 
would at least implicitly endorse the argument that ‗no corrective policies should be adopted 
regarding work conditions at the base of the chain‘ (Palpacuer, 2008: 407). Essentially, this is the 
Taylourist view of labour. Next, under ‗stakeholder governance‘, she argues that focusing on 
shareholder value is not only unfair ethically, but detrimental to firm performance. What she is 
referring to, in my opinion, is the NMSs, at least partly. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has 
become important to firms, she argues, and the direction it is taking is still similar to the Asian 
NMSs: that corporations should realise that the value of their products depends on consumers‘ 
perception of their endorsement of a socially responsible behaviour; but this should be purely 
voluntary hence retaining its liberal affinity. She implies that both governance types have not led (or 
are not expected to lead) to ‗humanised‘ supply chains. Finally, she says there is the institutional view 
of GCC governance, associated with the Régulation approach‘s view of capitalism, among others. 
This view calls for wealth redistribution in society, primarily through labour laws and collective 
bargaining to enable a ‗virtuous circle‘ of wealth-generation and redistribution of the Fordist model. 
Although the rise of GVCs and the ‗shareholder value doctrine‘ have erased this view and replaced it 
with unconnected and unequal institutional systems, primarily in the South, another ‗corporate 
accountability‘ movement emerged from at least the 1990s. Its agenda, under Multi-Stakeholder 
Initiatives (MSIs), resonates to a large extent with Fordist institutional systems akin to those that the 
Régulation approach propagates, and forms a reasonable counter power transnational network. The 
movement is also complex, for example, a social movement simultaneously campaigning against a lead 
firm‘s working conditions and at the same time cooperating with such a firm in devising the firm‘s 
code of conduct in a MSI. Unlike the first two, this governance has brought (or at least can be 
expected to bring) some ‗humanisation‘ of supply chains.  
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Let me be more specific regarding what I believe the difference, between Gibbon and Ponte and 
Gereffi‘s theorisation on the one hand, and between GVC analysis and my theorisation on the other 
hand, to be. Gereffi presents a governance dimension (that which I have called ‗internal‘ governance) 
and an institutional one. The latter encompasses dynamics both within chains (social and 
organisational dimensions of international trade networks) and outside them (local, national and 
international conditions and policies that shape the ‗globalisation‘ process at each stage in the chain). 
While Gibbon and Ponte recognise these two dimensions- ‗internal‘ governance and institutional 
framework- they restrict the label ‗institutional‘ framework to the dynamics within chains and label 
dynamics outside the chains as ‗external‘ governance. My argument is that, as far as issue areas are 
concerned, ‗internal‘ governance and ‗institutional‘ framework within chains are subsumed within 
‗external‘ governance/institutional framework outside chains. ‗Internal‘ governance is mainly lead 
firm control of chains. ‗Institutional‘ framework is the emergent facet of chains as a reflection of 
regime emergence. ‗External‘ governance is mainly control-emergent regime governance. That is, all 
‗external‘ governance is not necessarily regime governance, but the bigger part of it, particularly the 
international dimension of the two issue areas considered in this study, is. Gibbon and Ponte not 
only fail to theorise this subsuming, but also fail to theorise these regimes.       
 
Thus taking Gibbon and Ponte‘s attempt to theorise ‗external‘ governance, and restricting myself to 
the apparel GVC, trade agreements and public policy regulation fall within the governance of regimes 
on production and trade in apparel. Similarly, restricting myself to labour standards, lead firms and 
other actors who directly set parameters at production site or influence conventions from which lead 
firms draw and set parameters, constitute the international regime on labour standards.  
 
I will now present some of the main GVC analysis‘ empirical studies on ‗external‘ governance. 
 
2.3.3.1 Market Institutions in Chain Governance and Product Upgrading   
 
Bair and Gereffi (2001) show the role of market institutions in accounting for the emergence of full 
package firms (upgrading) in the Mexican Torreon cluster. This was as a result of the arrival of new 
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American buyers in the cluster following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in the mid 1990s, which resulted in reconfigured governance structures. Following 
Fligstein (1996), Bair (2005) defines market institutions as institutions that enable actors in markets 
to organise themselves, to compete and cooperate, and to exchange. These institutions include 
property rights, governance structures, conceptions of control and rules of exchange (NIE‘s ‗rules of 
the game‘). Bair and Gereffi‘s (2003) study of the Mexican, US and Caribbean Basin apparel 
industries had similar findings; that the governance that facilitated upgrading came from governance 
structures generated not by lead firms but by NAFTA-related dynamics. This thesis would see these 
NAFTA-related governance structures as the emergent facet of the US-centric international regime 
on production and trade in apparel. However, even after arguing for the role of these structures and 
going as far as stating that ‗we agree with those who point out that institutional environments are a 
critical factor in shaping international networks…‘ (Bair and Gereffi, 2003: 164) (my emphasis), the 
general thrust of Bair and Gereffi‘s work is that it is the lead firms that play central roles in governing 
and upgrading.  
 
Discussing upgrading in Asia, Gereffi (1999a) shows the role played by the information flow and 
learning potential associated with the buyer-seller links established by lead firms on the one hand, 
and the organisational succession among lead firms on the other hand, in factory and enterprise 
upgrading. On the links, manufacturers in production sharing arrangements with suppliers offer only 
assembly-relevant information, since that is what is needed by the supplier. However, retailers and 
marketers offer technological, logistical and market-related information because they need a supplier 
that can not only manufacture apparel, but also one that has the logistical capabilities to outsource all 
of the components needed for the finished apparel. Such suppliers may in turn subcontract part of 
the order to smaller local firms. Therefore, factories and enterprises in NICs upgraded from assembly 
of imported inputs to OEM and to OBM, through links with retailers and marketers. And 
concerning the succession: discount chains, such as Kmart, and mass merchandisers, such as JC 
Penny, were often the first to source production from Asia. However, they moved to lower-wage 
countries or less experienced factories as departmental stores and/ or speciality stores sourcing for 
higher quality versions of the same apparel came along. Finally, this process was repeated when higher 
status buyers came along sourcing for still more expensive apparel. The ‗information flow and 
learning‘ should be seen as the control, ‗internal‘, lead firm governance. The organisational succession 
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among lead firms is the emergent facet of chains, as a reflection of the emergent facet of the 
structural regime on production and trade in apparel. Thus this regime governed the geographical 
spread parameter and played a key role in upgrading. 
 
However, the spread of the chain was also determined by other dynamics: a ‗combination of domestic 
supply side constraints (labour shortages, high wages and high land prices) and external pressures 
(currency revaluation, tariffs and quotas, preferential access to overseas markets and social networks)‘ 
(Gereffi, 1999a: 57). I am arguing that the international aspects of these dynamics constitute regime 
governance. Currency revaluation relates to international monetary regimes. These are beyond the 
scope of this study. Tariffs, quotas and ‗preferences‘ constitute the regimes on production and trade 
in apparel, which are discussed in greater detail below. What would fall under market institutions 
here would be the social networks, which represent chain emergence, as a reflection of the emergent 
facet of the structural regime on production and trade in apparel. Labour shortages and high wages 
relate to labour regime emergence/‗hegemonic self-organisation‘. Thus these two regimes governed 
the geographical spread parameter and played a key role in upgrading. In spite of recognising this, 
Gereffi‘s general push is that lead firms were the central actors in governance and upgrading. 
 
2.3.3.2 Policy Regulation in Chain Governance and Product Upgrading 
 
Taking NAFTA as what it was- policy- what facilitated the networks was NAFTA‘s ‗yarn forward‘ 
rule (sourcing fabric from within NAFTA countries) (Bair and Gereffi, 2001)6. Lead firms 
reconfigured their networks to take advantage of this new RoO. Buyers shifted their interest from 
Asian suppliers to take advantage of the ‗preferential‘ access of fabric and apparel accorded to 
Mexico, and this accounted for the initial apparel export boom in Mexico. Therefore, NAFTA‘s 
RoO governed the quantity and the geographical spread parameters. It also led to export expansion 
upgrading, which led to value upgrading (see also Bair and Gereffi, 2002). Bair and Gereffi (2003) 
raise an additional issue, in relation to the Caribbean Basin version of NAFTA- the US-CBTPA of 
2000 that grants quota and duty free access to the US for apparel made with fabric from the US. 
                                                     
6 For examples of the role of policy regulation in the coffee sector see Ponte (2002a), Ponte (2002b) and Talbot (1997).    
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This version is shown not to encourage the development of the local supply base and hence for 
Caribbean Basin countries, unlike NAFTA, there was no value upgrading. Bair and Gereffi‘s research 
confirmed Kessler‘s (1999) earlier prediction that NAFTA would be an important intervening 
variable in North American economic integration in terms of Mexico‘s ability to effectively penetrate 
the apparel GVC. However, Kessler‘s conclusion that, as a consequence, the Maquiladoras system as 
a barrier to industrial upgrading will be eliminated as Mexico farms out Maquiladoras kind of 
industries to other low-wage countries, was disconfirmed. It is only in some clusters such as Torreon 
that upgrading took place.  
 
In spite of recognising the role of policy regulation, there is an implicit assumption in Bair‘s, Gereffi‘s 
and Kessler‘s studies that lead firms account for the governance and upgrading of firms. This thesis 
sees NAFTA‘s and US-CBTPA‘s RoOs as the control/instrumental facet of the US-centric 
international regime on production and trade in apparel. The governance structures that emerged out 
of this instrumentality made American buyers shift their sourcing from Asia to Mexico.  
  
Taking quotas and ‗preferential‘ access in Gereffi (1999a) as policy instruments, Gereffi states that 
‗quotas determined when the outward shift of production began, while preferential access to overseas 
markets and social networks determined where the firms…went‘ (Gereffi, 1999a: 57) (emphasis in 
original). Under the MFA, import restrictions by the United Kingdom (UK) in 1964 triggered 
Hong Kong manufacturers in the late 1960s to shift production to Singapore, Taiwan and Macao, 
aided by the cultural and linguistic ties with the Chinese population there. Macao benefited from its 
proximity to Hong Kong, while Singapore qualified for commonwealth ‗preferences‘ for imports into 
the UK. Triggered again by the MFA, in the early 1970s, Hong Kong firms went to Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Mauritius, for similar reasons. They went to Mauritius also because of the EU‘s 
‗preferential‘ access in terms of low tariffs. The last wave was to China in the 1980s and 1990s 
prompted by the opening of the Chinese economy in 1978. In South Korea, the relocation was still 
sparked off by the MFA. Initially firms went to Mariana Islands. Later waves were motivated by the 
domestic constraints of rising wages and worker shortages. Firms went to Guatemala, Honduras, the 
Dominican Republic, et cetera because of this region‘s proximity to the US market and easy quota 
access. They also went to SEA and South Asia, in such countries as Indonesia, Sri Lanka and 
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Bangladesh mainly because of the countries‘ low wage rates. In Taiwan, the relocation was in the early 
1980s, also initiated by the MFA.  
 
In my view, the structural regime on production and trade in apparel, reflected in this case by the 
MFA, and the EU-based regime on production and trade in apparel, reflected here by commonwealth 
and the EU ‗preferences‘, were the main control tools that were responsible for the governance of the 
spread of the chain and quantities exported, and primarily accounted for the achievement and 
hindering of upgrading outcomes that accompanied. They were, however, accompanied and/ or 
complemented by chain emergence (cultural and linguistic ties and proximity to the US market) as a 
reflection of the emergent facet of the structural and the US-based regimes on production and trade 
in apparel, other aspects of the structural regime emergence (one of the results of the opening of the 
Chinese economy) and labour regime emergence that takes the form of ‗hegemonic self-organisation‘ 
(wage dynamics). 
 
In SSA, Gibbon (2003) shows that in Mauritius, EU and US lead agents screen suppliers and their 
performance according to different principles (Table 2 below). The key point is that behind the  
  
Table 2: US & EU apparel chain governance structures 
                                                                                                US destined                                     EU destined                                                                                                    
Level of externalisation of functions to suppliers                      Lower                                               Higher 
Basis of supplier certification                                             Process + product                        Functional+product 
Nature of product specification                             Detailed, specified unilaterally;             Less detailed, negotiated; 
and of QC [Quality Control] system                       
                                                                          QC by customers‘ out stationed          QC contracted out to third  
                                                                                                employees                                                party 
Nature of critical path reporting                                      Frequent, detailed                    Less frequent, less detailed 
Procedure for resolving contractual differences                    Bureaucratic                                           Informal 
Level of suppliers‘ capacity typically occupied                         30- 100 %                                              10-15% 
Source: Gibbon (2003: 1813) 
 
differentiated governance structures was EU‘s double transformation RoO. Although not explicitly 
employing GVC analysis, Baissac (2004) argues that the Mauritian industry benefited from the RoO 
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because the country entered into the EOI race ahead of the rest in SSA, in the 1970s. This enabled it 
to develop local textile mills to supply fabric to some of its EPZs, and hence meet the RoO 
requirement. Without the RoO implementation, the development of the more economic rewarding 
EU-based governance structure as well as national upgrading, and hence a further development of the 
structure (for instance a further externalisation of higher value functions), would have been very 
limited (Gibbon, 2003). And my argument is that this policy is rooted in the EU-based regime. 
Despite his findings, there is an overall feel in Gibbon‘s study that chain governance is within the 
framework of assigning at least its primary component to lead firms.  
 
Gibbon then examines the five leading SSA apparel exporters in 2002, which accounted for 89 
percent of total SSA apparel exports to the US in that year (Author‘s calculations based on US 
Office of Textiles and Apparels (OTEXA), 2005). He contends that AGOA ‗succeeded‘ (elicited 
supply response) only in countries where it generated a highly specific apparel GVC that has evolved 
on a global plane in relation to much of US import trade. The fundamental features of this GVC are: 
scale, specialisation in long runs of a narrow and basic product range, and specialisation in an equally 
narrow range of functional activities (see Table 2). In short, the US-based regime governed the 
spread of the chain, and this generated assembly suppliers who import 100 percent of the fabric.  
 
This is how he elucidates it. South Africa and Mauritius had the largest and most advanced apparel 
industry in SSA, and were posed by many pundits as the likely prime beneficiaries of AGOA. To the 
contrary, the absence of this GVC dynamic in the two countries saw their AGOA exports easily 
overtaken by newcomers Kenya, Madagascar and Lesotho. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 
1990-2002, the US‘s apparel imports from SSA became more dispersed than the EU‘s, meaning that 
AGOA legislation dispersed export boom to new export enclaves, where the type of enterprise 
mentioned above sprung up. For example, in 1991–3 (before AGOA), the two leading SSA 
exporting countries to the EU (Mauritius and South Africa) accounted for 91.6 percent of all EU 
imports from the region, and in 1999–2001 (after AGOA) the two leading countries (Mauritius and 
Madagascar) accounted for 92 percent of such imports- no major change. By contrast, the joint share 
of the two leading suppliers to the US (Mauritius and Madagascar) in the first period (1991-93- 
before AGOA) was 90.7 percent, while that of the same countries (who were still leading) in 1999-
2001 was 57 percent (dropped further to 52.4 percent in 2002) - a major drop. In order to show 
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that the US supply base was indeed being dispersed from Mauritius and Madagascar to other 
countries, it is noted that the redirection of existing trade from the EU to the US was limited. Only 
in Kenya and Lesotho, and then only for relatively restricted periods (1992–94 for Kenya, 1992–99 
for Lesotho), is there evidence of direct substitution of US for EU exports.  
 
An important contribution of this study is the critique of Mattoo et al (2003) who were widely 
quoted by, among others, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The authors 
argued that the foremost reason why Least Developed Countries (LDCs) had by then recorded the 
most impressive gains, as opposed to South Africa and Mauritius, was that AGOA did not exempt 
the latter from the RoO requirement, which affected close to 90 percent of their exports. Mattoo et 
al do not use a GVC framework but conventional economic (partial) equilibrium model. What is 
important however is that the authors failed to recognise that SSA non-LDCs lacked the specific 
enterprise model Gibbon is talking about, which was generated by AGOA, and which accounted for 
the export boom in LDCs. Gibbon is obliquely saying that even if the RoO was exempted from the 
two countries, they would not have attracted AGOA-related investment. Why? Because such 
investment was looking for a non-integrated industry to exploit the RoO exemption, and South 
African and Mauritian industry was largely locally integrated, hence taking in investment that 
encourages them to switch to importing the fabric would be downgrading their industries. 
 
The critique is that in spite of recognising this US-based regime governance, Gibbon neither 
theorises it as regime governance nor assigns it the primary governance role.  
 
2.3.3.3 Labour Standards in Chain Governance and Labour Upgrading 
 
O‘Rourke (2003) asserts that lead firms have an upper hand in labour standards setting, but he also 
notes that NGOs are taking on activities that were previously the sole purview of state and 
international regulatory bodies. He analyses key regulatory programmes in the US and Europe: the 
Fair Labour Association (FLA), the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production certification 
programme, Social Accountability International (SAI), the UK Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), the 
Dutch Fair Wear Foundation, the Workers Right Consortium (WRC), private firm internal 
- 71 - 
 
 
 
monitoring initiatives and independent investigations and other ‗generic‘ initiatives, such as Global 
Reporting Initiative and Global Compact. The author unearthed that, while it is hard to determine 
how much improvement firm-led codes of conduct and monitoring programmes have achieved, they 
are generally seen as vulnerable to corporate manipulation. Even external monitors and certifiers, such 
as FLA, were shown to be selected and paid by firms. The WRC is, however, seen to be more 
‗socialised‘. O‘Rourke concludes that in spite of such shortcomings, under certain conditions, NGO 
regulation can influence factory practices.  
 
Hughes‘ (2005) main interest is to show how corporate culture, financial management and corporate 
restructuring shapes variations in corporate commitment to ethical trade as an ‗external‘ form of 
chain governance, and how the variations shape organisational approaches to ethical trade social 
auditing. She shows that out of the three approaches (arms length auditing through contracting 
specialist auditors, coordinated auditing which is passing the responsibility of auditing to producers, 
and developmental auditing which is MSI) it is the developmental approach that in theory ‗promises 
to deliver more improvements in terms of labour conditions, though further research is needed to 
investigate this claim‘ (Hughes, 2005: 1159). Even then, it ‗is still deeply rooted in a neo-liberal 
trading context in which retailers and brand manufacturers lead approaches to auditing… and that 
codes of conduct, modes of auditing and programmes for worker and supplier education still mirror 
Western models of development…running the risk of producing paternalistic approaches to ethical 
trade‘ (Hughes, 2005: 1159).  
 
Hughes (2006) shows how this ‗external‘ governance has introduced new research centres, ethical 
business texts and ethical consultancies. She argues that this commodification of ethical knowledge, 
rather than portraying progress, portrays some of the very limits of capitalism‘s moral turn, since the 
process itself becomes bound up in profit maximising circuits of capital. In tandem with O‘Rourke, 
she argues that it is mere displacing of politics from the state to the markets -who in turn enlist ‗civil 
society‘- rather than its decline. Again, there is no evidence that these latest efforts make any 
difference to labour conditions in practice, apart from fostering an emotional, committed sense of 
‗the other‘ on the part of the recipients of such knowledge.   
- 72 - 
 
 
 
 
Locke et al (2007) took a case study of Nike and explored whether monitoring compliance with 
corporate codes of conduct improved working conditions, and stepped up enforcement of labour 
rights. Their conclusion was that as far as it remained an external pressure (be it from NGOs, the 
state or unions) improvement of labour conditions was found to be ‗limited‘7.  
 
In agreement with O‘Rourke, Barrientos and Smith (2007) show that, while the role of corporations 
in setting labour standards is still superior, the role of NGOs is rising. While their core interest is the 
role of labour standards on labour, their study also has implications for how such standards mirror 
chain governance. This is because they address the tensions between a corporate approach focusing 
on compliance with technical/ outcome standards8 and a ‗civil society‘ one focussing on process/ 
universal/enabling standards9. The tension is still not completely resolved even when the two 
approaches come together under MSIs, such as the ETI in the UK and the SAI in the US. This is 
despite the fact that the general consensus among such MSIs is that, as a minimum, corporate codes 
of practice should include ILO core conventions which focus on process standards.  
 
They found that codes were having an effect only on outcome standards, but little or no effect on 
process standards. Regarding outcome standards, the clearest positive change was in health and safety 
provisions and reductions in working hours. Impact on workers income was mixed. There were no 
instances of wage increase as a result of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), and most instances 
of wage increase came as a result of national minimum wages implementation, which still did not 
constitute a living wage. Where suppliers paid into state insurance and pension, this was 
                                                     
7 They claimed that when it was combined within firms‘ NMSs such as those of continuous improvement of quality and 
efficiency, working conditions seemed to have improved. 
8 Entitlements and specific conditions of employment, such as health and safety, living wage and working hours.  
9 Such standards as freedom of association and non-discrimination policy. 
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accompanied by more poverty for workers in the event of childbirth or illness. Even then, such 
payment was made only for permanent contract or regular workers, as casual labour contract workers 
(often women) had least access to legal entitlements and were rarely represented in unions and 
worker committees. The only thing process standard significantly achieved was that there was no use 
of child labour.  There was least impact on freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining. The authors also highlight an interesting point: the double standards of corporations. 
The suppliers interviewed argued that it was more difficult to implement process standards because 
of lead firms‘ pressures of downward movement in prices, shorter lead times, increasingly stringent 
demands on product specification (often at the expense of suppliers) and insecurity of orders.  
 
Nadvi uses the case of Nike‘s termination of sourcing soccer balls from its lead supplier in Pakistan 
in 2006. One of his central research questions is whether standards make value chain ties more ‗close‘ 
(hence potential for industrial upgrading) or more arms length. He claims to bring on board the 
‗‗institutional and political‘ governance‘ (Nadvi, 2008: 331). While his finding was that in the area 
of labour standards it is not clear what ties develop (hence perhaps difficult to predict upgrading 
outcomes), his work clearly demonstrated the ‗external‘ dimension of chain governance.  
 
Finally, Carr et al (2000), Hale and Opondo (2005), Hale and Wills (2005; 2007), Knorringa and 
Pegler (2006), Nadvi (2004), Ngai (2004), Palpacuer (2000) and Rothenberg-Aalami (2004) have 
highlighted the ‗humanising‘ of supply chains theorised by Palpacuer. Others are Barrientos and 
Kritzinger‘s (2004), Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) (2005) and Nadvi and Thorburn‘s (2004).  
 
These empirical studies on labour regime governance have shown five main things. One, in contrast 
to the underlying implication of governance theory in standard GVC analysis that lead firms are the 
governors, labour standards are mainly set ‗externally‘ by the regime as a whole, and lead firms are 
only one of the actors. Two, none cites this explicitly as regime governance. Three, in agreement with 
the GVC analysis, the studies show lead firms still play a significant role even within the regime; at 
least in practice. Four, on upgrading, there is no scope of achieving process standards beyond 
‗humanising‘ of supply chains. At best labour standards chain governance achieves outcome 
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standards. And five, none of these studies regards, at least explicitly, impact on labour as part of 
upgrading the industry.  
 
Putting these studies together with the earlier ones on market institutions and policy regulation, and 
considering the GVC theoretical review, we are justified in concluding that, as far as issue areas are 
concerned, lead firms cannot be the primary governors in the chain, even if we restrict ourselves to 
control mechanisms, and ignore emergence. Now, it is proposed that one of the best ways to 
understand governance beyond the GVC approach is to turn to Regimes literature. Indeed IDS Asian 
Drivers Team (2006) states that, since there is, as yet, no widely agreed theoretical framework in 
economics for analysing GVCs, there exists a need to proceed by inter alia approaching the issues in 
an inter-disciplinary manner.  
 
2.4 INTERNATIONAL REGIMES  
 
2.4.1 Mainstream International Relations View  
 
2.4.1.1 Definition 
 
International Relations theoreticians‘ views on the significance of international regimes vary. 
According to Hasenclever et al (1997), there are three main schools of thought: realist, neo-liberal 
and cognitive10. Using the billiards table illustration, realists focus on power relationships, and 
assume that states care for both absolute and relative gains. They hold a minimalist view of causal 
significance to international regimes. Neo-liberals focus on individual interests, and see states as 
egoistic actors who care only for their absolute gain. Thus, while not completely turning a blind eye 
to the effects of power differentials, they nevertheless emphasise the role of international regimes in 
solving Prisoners Dilemma problems. In their view, international regimes are both effective and 
resilient. Cognitivists focus on knowledge dynamics, communication and identities, and therefore 
                                                     
10 See Haggard and Simmons (1987) for a slight variation of this classification into structural, game theoretic, functional 
and cognitive.  
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accentuate the role of causal as well as normative ideas. The strong version of this asserts that neo-
liberals provide only a truncated picture of the sources of regime robustness by failing to recognise 
the repercussions of institutionalised practices on the identities of international actors. Consequently, 
their embrace for institutionalism is much broader than realists and neo-liberals. Contrary to most 
realists and some neo-liberals, this school emphasises that international regimes can be interactive. 
 
Krasner (1982b) clarifies the realist view; that the billiards table is the traditional view, that it 
assumes only relative state gains and that it has almost no regard for regimes. He shows that the view 
that assumes both absolute and relative state gains is actually called neo-realism/systemic-centric 
realism/ structural realism. He contends that the billiards table metaphor of International Relations 
of the 1960s was replaced with the tectonic plates metaphor in the 1970s by some realists who began 
appreciating international regimes more. While in both images the outcomes are a function of the 
distribution of power in the system, the former is concerned solely with political interactions among 
states, while the latter is concerned with the impact of the distribution of state power on various 
international environments. In this latter model, Krasner asserts, conflict is not ignored, but the 
world is not zero sum. Relative power is not the only state objective. Other objectives such as 
economic wealth could be ends in themselves; hence one plate is the distribution of power among 
states, the other international regimes. In agreement with Krasner, Gilpin avers that under neo-
realism, initially popularised by Waltz (1979 cited in Gilpin, 2001), ‗although the state is the 
primary actor in international affairs, realism should acknowledge the importance of such non-state 
actors as multinational firms, international institutions, and nongovernmental organisation in the 
determination of international affairs‘ (Gilpin, 2001: 17).  
 
Put differently, neo-realists use neo-liberal philosophical model in order to understand the 
development of structure within international politics. The hidden hand, which is the equivalent of 
markets in neo-liberal philosophy, is the emergent international structure of the balance of power, 
and the actors are states not firms and individuals, as is the case with neo-liberalism. The crucial 
chasm is that neo-liberals emphasis the individual so much; that the national state would rather be 
transcended so that the individual consumer, firm et cetera is able to operate in a seamless 
international arena- a view structuralism would be wary of.  
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2.4.1.2 Sources, Autonomy/Resilience and Transformation 
 
According to Krasner (1982a), international regimes stand between basic causal factors and related 
outcomes and behaviour, acting as a function of five basic causal variables: egoistic self-interest; 
political power; diffuse norms and principles (that influence a particular international regime in a 
particular issue area yet such norms and principles are not directly related to the issue area); usage 
(regular patterns of behaviour based on actual practice) and custom (long standing practice); and 
knowledge. 
 
The first two causes are the most discussed in International Relations theory, and hence the ones that 
I will consider. Egoistic self-interest, usually economic, is the most dominant. Young says it takes 
three forms of calculation. It may be a spontaneous process that in turn gives rise to spontaneous 
emergence of regimes- ‗… the product of the action of many men but … not the result of human 
design‘ (Hayek 1973 cited in Young, 1982: 282). Such regimes do not involve conscious 
coordination among participants, do not require explicit consent on the part of the subjects and are 
highly resistant to social engineering. However, we need to be careful not to overemphasise this 
spontaneity. For example, ‗natural‘ markets are notoriously presented by neo-classical economists in 
this manner, and yet they are driven by a conscious coordination aimed at accumulating capital. 
Emergence of some regimes (mainly commons regimes such as naturally occurring industrial clusters) 
is mainly spontaneous, but that of the international regimes I am investigating is often weakly 
emergent.  
 
In contrast to spontaneity, international regimes may spring from a process of negotiation, giving 
birth to negotiated orders characterised by conscious efforts to agree on the major provisions, explicit 
consent on the part of individual participants and formal expression of the results. Negotiated orders 
could be constitutional contracts (where subjects are directly involved) or legislative bargains 
(subjects do not participate directly but are represented) (Young, 1982). Negotiated orders 
characterise the international regimes I am dealing with from the North‘s perspective.  
 
A third calculation is imposed orders. According to Young, these orders are fostered deliberately by 
dominant actors/ consortia of actors, do not involve explicit consent and work effectively in the 
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absence of formal expressions. This can take overt hegemony or de facto imposition. This form of 
calculation is a characteristic of the regimes I am analysing from the perspectives of both the North 
(hegemony) and the South (hegemony and imposition).  
 
Turning to political power, this could be either cosmopolitan and instrumental or particularistic and 
potentially consummatory. In the former, associated with neo-classical economics, it is argued that 
power secures optimal outcomes for the system as a whole, where, according to Adam Smith, it is 
necessary for the state to provide certain collective goods, such as defence, order, protection of infant 
industries, minimum welfare, public works, standards for commodities and property rights. In the 
latter, power is used to maximise the interest of specific actors, usually states, within the system 
(Krasner, 1982a). The milieu goals associated with cosmopolitan and instrumental power 
characterise the regimes I am analysing in a major way.  
 
The view of this thesis is that international regimes primarily stem from capitalism‘s desire to design 
superstructures to solve international Prisoner‘s Dilemma problems that threaten capital 
accumulation. Thus they are either oppressive, or capitalism hijacks them and turns them oppressive. 
In a sense, Young shoots himself in the foot. Having argued for spontaneity as yielding the best 
outcomes, he adds that international regimes do not necessarily need to yield equity, for even 
spontaneous orders involve intense power struggles, as the dominant actors finally co-opt other 
actors and drive the spontaneity in the direction that best suits them. In a word, international regimes 
are seldom developed under a veil of ignorance, as he concedes.  
 
Moving on from sources of regimes to their autonomy/resilience, Krasner (1982b) says that there 
are two ways in which international regimes acquire the latter. Firstly, it may arise out of lags; the 
relationship between basic causal variables and international regimes become attenuated, giving 
international regimes a leeway to impact independently on outcomes and related behaviour. For 
instance, contrary to Hegemonic theory, the decline of the hegemonic economic power since the 
1970s did not lead to disorder because post-War international regimes had by then grown great 
incongruence with the original causal variables and could run the system. Secondly, Krasner 
continues, international regimes may become interactive, not simply intervening, variables. Once an 
international regime is in place, it may develop a dynamic of its own that can alter, not only related 
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behaviour and outcomes, but also basic causal variables. This is as a result of four feedback 
mechanisms: alteration of actor‘s calculation of how to maximise their interests, alteration of interests 
themselves, evolution of international regimes into sources of power to which actors can appeal, and 
alteration of the power capabilities of different actors.  
 
Krasner shows that once international regimes acquire autonomy, they may experience changes in the 
latter period. Changes in rules and procedures are changes within international regimes, as long as 
principles and norms remain unaltered; and changes in principles and norms are changes of the 
international regime itself. For instance, Krasner argues that the inclusion of the SDT rule for LDCs 
in the GATT Articles during the Kennedy Round was a change in the rules that brazenly violated the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) norm under the liberal economic international regime. However, he 
continues, the danger posed to international regime change as a result of possible accumulation in the 
poorest countries was counterbalanced by the concept of ‗graduation‘ that was forced into the GATT 
by Americans during the Tokyo Round. The concept requires poor countries to abide by the liberal 
economic rules after reaching a certain level of accumulation. A change within regimes weakens it, but 
might or might not lead to its change.  
 
Finally, Young (1982) proposes three sources of international regime transformation. First are its 
internal contradictions. This might be either as a result of irreconcilable conflicts between its central 
elements, or where the contradictions, such as those of capitalism as a whole, assume a developmental 
character and deepen over time. Then there are shifts in the underlying structure of power, such as a 
major decline in the effective power of the dominant actor(s). Third are exogenous forces either 
coming from societal development as a whole- for example changes in technology, overall population 
growth, or changing tastes- or from pressure exerted by changes in another international regime. I 
hold that the primary source is contradictions within the international regime.  
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2.4.2 A Dependency View: Overall Theoretical Approach 
 
2.4.2.1 Introduction 
 
Having shown how the concept of regimes has been applied in International Relations theory, I now 
want to give my application of the concept within Dependency theory, my primary understanding of 
international relations and IPE throughout this thesis. I have four aims. The first aim is to show the 
relationship between Regime and Dependency theories. In other words, I aim to make clear the 
fundamental underpinning of this thesis; that, as far as issue areas are concerned, control-emergent 
regime governance of GVCs overrides control lead firm governance, primarily serves the 
accumulation interests of metropolitan capitalism, perpetuates dependency and promotes milieu 
goals. The second aim is to demarcate myself against mainstream International Relations scholars by 
highlighting the structural dimension of regimes, and showing the agency dimension in Dependency. 
This is because, although some mainstream International Relations regime scholars recognise 
emergence in regime-formation (for example Young, 1982), the general theorisation of the regime 
concept within this mainstream focuses on agency. And, International Relations theory as a whole 
has mistakenly seen Dependency as a purely structuralism theory. Thirdly, by advancing the regime-
dependency argument, I hope to bring to the fore the dependency aspect that none of the three main 
schools of thought within International Relations (realist/neo-realist, liberal/neo-liberal and 
cognitive) can adequately capture. Finally, I aim to contextualise the influence of contemporary forms 
of Northern state strategic selectivity on regime-formation. This will clarify further the first point 
regarding the relationship between regimes and Northern-driven global accumulation. 
 
I begin by noting that the structure-agency relationship is one of the key problems in social science, 
and it arises in a very interesting way with respect to our topic. This is because the relationship is not 
only a central problem with respect to our specific requirements in constructing a theoretical 
framework for the current research, but also because it has more general implications for an 
understanding of the IPE in a wider sense. In the following discussion, I will argue that elements of 
both structure and agency exist on both sides of the regime-dependency divide. By grasping these 
relationships, we will be able to map them out, thus enabling us to construct a link between the two. 
We will begin with Dependency, and then turn to regimes. 
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2.4.2.2 Agency and Structure in Dependency 
 
I take the general understanding of Dependency theory as defined by Dos Santos (1970: 231): ‗a 
situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion 
of another economy to which the former is subjected‘. I clarify this because it is obvious that the 
theory has never been homogeneous, and Hoogvelt‘s (1982) discussion of the relationship between 
different tendencies within the Dependency school, clearly indicates this. However, there are key 
authors who can be considered to define the Dependency trend (or who were its precursors, or who 
dialogued with it in a constructive way). They include Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, Walter 
Rodney, and the group clustered around the journal Monthly Review (led by Paul Baran and Paul 
Sweezy), as well as those who shared many common concerns with it, like Arghiri Emmanuel.  
 
Dependency theory is often, for example in the International Relations literature (Hout, 1993), 
equated with structuralism. This is too simplistic, however. Most fundamentally, Marxism, from 
which the dependency perspective derives its source, has always been opposed to determinism (Marx, 
1947 [1865]); the objective features of the mode of production constitute a basis upon which 
struggles occur. The struggles are purposive, but not in a merely idealistic sense: they seek to respond 
to, and develop, in an open-ended way, the possibilities inherent in a particular objective situation. 
Structure, therefore, does not define the outcome in any determinist sense, but it does provide the 
starting point for an understanding of the role of agency. 
 
Of course, it is true that 20th century forms of Marxism did sometimes fall into determinism, notably 
the mainstream Soviet trend. However the key authors mentioned above very much demarcated 
themselves against the mainstream Soviet orthodoxy. As with Marxism, the Dependency emphasis 
was very much on objective circumstances as an invitation to struggle.   
 
As an example, we could mention Frank‘s (1978) treatment of 18th century India, early 19th century 
Egypt or mid 19th century Latin America as an arena where social forces could seek to grab some 
autonomy in relation to the international organisation of production and trade (a mode of 
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organisation dominated by the systemic core, but a domination which could be challenged). It is true 
that dependency relationships also explain why such struggles might well be defeated, but there is 
nothing to say that in a new set of circumstances, such as the world of ‗globalisation‘ which we are 
addressing in this research, countries could not take advantage of the new set of circumstances 
offered, and escape in the direction of becoming less dependent. In his original formulation of 
Dependency, Dos Santos did after all say that the structural relationships create effects upon the 
periphery, which might be positive ones (Dos Santos, 1970).  
 
In Dos Santos‘ argument it is true that, the stimulus being external rather than endogenous, the 
periphery‘s position might appear somewhat passive. But if we incorporate the role of agency, 
fundamental to the Marxian origins of Dependency, we can arrive at a situation where the shifting 
global power balance may open up (and of course slam shut) windows of opportunity. In this 
context, it is interesting to consider a creative development of dependency thinking on the part of 
South Korean scholars in a work edited by Kyong-Dong Kim (Kim, 1987). In particular, Young-Ho 
Kim synthesised Dependency and Modernisation theories in an economic model that showed the 
‗spreading‘ and ‗backwash‘ effects of capitalism in the South, and in fact, ‗neither of the [effects] is 
likely to exist alone without the other‘. They ‗will also co-exist and interact with each other on a 
short term basis‘ but eventually ‗they will show a clear tilt either towards dependency or development‘ 
(Kim, 1987: 182, 199).  
 
According to Biel this is one of the most concrete illustrations of the mix of impacts that the 
capitalist structure has on the periphery, encompassed in Dos Santos definition of dependence. He 
argues that the terms should not necessarily be equated with ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘: ‗Spreading‘ means 
breaking up traditional structures, which can be ‗bad‘, but it can also mean the growth of local 
capitalism, which…[can be] something ‗good‘‘ (Biel, 2000: 202). Behind this spreading-backwash 
outcomes, Biel shows that there were actually two different imperatives: the political necessity, part of 
Cold War, of permitting some autonomous capitalism in Asia, and the economic one of 
subcontracting manufacturing of cheap consumer goods to the region. However, since imperialism is 
incapable of smoothly bringing the two together, he argues that the hole was sealed by NIC elites 
taking advantage of the situation and partly driving NIC development in their own direction. But the 
key issue remains the dialectical relationship between the ‗backwash‘ facet of dependency, which 
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sucks value into the core, and its ‗spreading‘ facet, which creates development opportunities. This is 
highly relevant to our research, because as we will see in Chapter Three on evolution of regimes, and 
concretely in the case of Kenya in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, it may precisely be the regimes 
which open the windows of opportunity, and make ‗spreading‘ possible (see also Biel, 2006). 
 
This is not to deny the qualitative differences between South Korea and Kenya, quite the contrary. It 
is precisely the relative autonomy of Asian capitalism in being able to seize advantages offered by the 
global economy which has enabled them to develop features of something which we might consider a 
secondary core, notably in our particular case, the textile-apparel industry; and it is precisely this 
factor which may make it more difficult for Kenya to follow in their footsteps in the direction of 
autonomy. I address this in Chapter Five. The point however is to see whether the ‗spreading‘ 
opportunities opened up by the dependency relationship in its very recent form (AGOA) act as an 
incentive for attempts by the more disadvantaged actors in the international system to negotiate in 
pursuit of their own interests. This is precisely what our research will reveal to be the case: the 
Kenyan actors (especially firm managers, bureaucrats, trade association and Cabinet) sense, and can 
respond with cleverness and alacrity to the parameters of a more complex IPE than that described in 
the classic Dependency literature of the 1970s, notably one where there is a new Asian sub-core. In 
effect, they respond to openings in the structure of the IPE, within which agency can operate. Such 
attempts may be doomed, and indeed our conclusions tend in this direction, but their failure is not 
pre-determined. It is precisely the actors‘ understanding of structure which makes such attempts 
interesting, even heroic. Of course, their understanding of structure is somewhat intuitive, and there 
would be scope to make it more analytical. This may indeed be one of the normative contributions of 
this research. 
 
In this regard, the work of the pioneer of the ‗scientific‘ division of labour, Charles Babbage, is 
central. Micro/meso institutional literature referred to in section 2.2, particularly Clustering 
literature, is clear that the reason why industrial production is growing in the South is because of the 
factors around tacit knowledge, networks and the embeddedness of industry in local milieu. A 
number of those studies refer to the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) thesis (Froebel 
et al (1980) to show that the transplanting of parts of the industrial production to the South is based 
on cheap labour. Froebel et al themselves were drawing from the work of Babbage to illustrate this. 
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Nearly two centuries ago, Babbage had a theory that you could fragment the production of pins so 
that you could get women and children to do parts of the work, which would be cheaper than if you 
used men. Since the criterion upon which these divisions are based is merely ascribed, capitalism 
discovered that it could be extended to cover nation and race, rather than just age and gender. 
However, this is still a very one sided interpretation of Babbage‘s work. This is because his central 
theme was actually that the changing division of labour results from advances in knowledge, or, 
rather, development happens through knowledge. 
 
The advantages which are derived from machinery and manufactures seem to arise principally from three 
sources: The addition which they make to human power.- The economy they produce of human time.-The 
conversion of substances apparently common and worthless into valuable products…. there are, however, other 
sources of its increase, by which the animal force of the individual is itself made to act with far greater than its 
unassisted power… (Babbage, 1832: 6) (emphasis in original). 
 
Using an experiment on the force necessary to move a stone along various surfaces, Babbage went on:  
 
the force necessary to move a stone along the roughly chiselled floor of its quarry is nearly two-thirds of its 
weight; to move it along a wooden floor, three fifths; by wood upon wood, five ninths; if the wooden surfaces 
are soaped, one sixth; if rollers are used on the floor of the quarry, it requires one thirty-second part of the 
weight; if they roll over wood, one-fortieth; and if they roll between wood, one fiftieth of its weight. At each 
increase of knowledge, as well as on the contrivance of every new tool, human labour becomes abridged 
(Babbage, 1832: 7-8) (my emphasis). 
     
This is a more qualitative definition of the contribution of the human element, rather than simply 
muscle power. Thus from the 1980s, IPE changed in the direction where the reason it was looking to 
the periphery was not just to get cheap labour, but also to co-opt networks, embedding and tacit 
knowledge. Subcontracting to OEM firms, for example, is based on the extensive knowledge of 
networks of these firms. Thus, although Clustering literature often refers to these factors, it rarely 
links them to Babbage. In Chapter Five, the knowledge that will interest us is not technical, but 
political-economic: the understanding of both the wider IPE of capitalism and the narrow workings 
of the GVC. Suffice to say that this is also somewhat related to one of the most under-researched 
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dimensions of the GVC analysis- the knowledge input-output structure. It could be argued that in 
the case of Kenya and SSA, this dimension is not important because of the low level of industry. My 
response is that Clustering literature has then failed to state explicitly that in the most peripheral 
parts of the South, IPE simply pursues cheap labour. However, this dimension might be deemed less 
relevant if our interest is only technical knowledge, which is not the case here.  
 
Let us now consider regimes.  
 
2.4.2.3 Agency and Structure in Regimes 
 
Here too, I would argue, there are elements of both structure and agency, of intentionality and 
emergent, self-forming order. The starting point is to recognise a fundamental ambiguity in the usage 
of the term ‗regime‘, that the two forms the term decomposes into are in fact both centrally relevant 
to our research and that they are situated in different regions of the structure-agency spectrum. 
 
On the one hand we have regimes whose essential characteristic is precisely that they embody 
spontaneous emergent order; they ‗happen‘ as a result of complex processes of social interaction, 
rather than being designed. This captures Young‘s (1982) spontaneous regimes. Commons regimes 
are the classic case: they have existed historically, and continue spontaneously to pop up today, in 
response to challenges of resource management, as shown by Bollier (2003), Dolsak and Ostrom 
(2003), Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al (1992). The cement which makes regimes work is 
typically an informal set of rules and practices; these may in many cases be translated into formal 
rules too, but the latter often do not capture the regime‘s soul or essence. An ‗institution‘, in the 
special way the term is used in the institutional theory applied in this thesis, can well be informal. 
 
On the other hand, we have designed institutions which incorporate a strong degree of agency. This 
captures Young‘s (1982) negotiated and imposed regimes, and it is the broad understanding in 
International Relations theory. At first sight, the latter institutional definition seems overwhelmingly 
to predominate in the area which is our concern, that of international trade. Nevertheless, a deeper 
analysis will reveal a more nuanced picture. 
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To begin with, let us consider whether there is a common area of overlapping meaning shared by the 
two definitions. I believe that there is. Most obviously, regimes reveal, and indeed, prove the existence 
and viability of, a non-Hobbesian form of societal order-formation: their rules are observed not (or 
at least not exclusively) because of sanctions which enforce them, but because they are useful to the 
participants. Alongside grassroots commons regimes, we find more elite-driven examples, which at 
the same time can legitimately be said to manage a ‗commons‘, in the sense of some good which is of 
value to the participants. Cases could include those institutions which survived the demise of the 
League of Nations (Universal Postal Union, Intercontinental Maritime Consultative Organisation).   
 
A reasonable argument can be made that structures such as the GATT/WTO, and those around the 
issue area of labour, such as the ILO, fall into this category. Take the GATT. Something was needed 
to regulate trade, and GATT somehow evolved to fulfil this function, and proved quite resilient. Of 
course, the GATT rules were formal, but still a strong case can be made that there is an informal set 
of procedures, customs and practices which are at least as important as the formal rules, and could 
well be argued partly to explain its institutional resilience. I will clearly show this in Chapter Three. 
 
2.4.2.4 Agency and Structure within the Regime-Dependency Debate 
 
By bringing in the case of GATT/WTO, we have immediately suggested an important point 
bridging our regime argument and the dependency debate. Although the GATT/WTO operates as 
an internal commons of the core participants, its operation is quite different with respect to the more 
peripheral countries: in this case, it may well embody, and act as an instrument of, the will of the core 
to dominate the system. Recall that I stated this in sections 1.2.3.2 and 2.4.1.2. In this context, it is 
extremely interesting to consider the ‗system of rules‘ governing the textile-apparel trade, in its 
various incarnations (STA, LTA, MFA, ATC and post-ATC). Arguably, this is an act of pure 
instrumentality on the part of the historic core: rather than permit an International Division of 
Labour (IDL) to self-engineer along the lines predicted by Ricardo‘s liberal theory, instrumental 
barriers are created to channel the system‘s self-ordering in a direction conducive to the historic core‘s 
interests. These incarnations of the international textile-apparel trade could be called a regime mainly 
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in the colloquial sense of a system of governance, but in the more technical sense employed in 
Regime theory as applied in this research, they are a regime only inasmuch as they articulate the 
agreed collective interests of the core countries.  
 
It is important to note that in the Dependency analysis, the default position might well be for even a 
self-engineering IDL to reproduce the unequal structural relationships which were (owing to 
colonialism) placed at its point of departure. Nevertheless, there is no reason prima facie why the 
periphery could not unfold a Southern-centred form of agency to counteract this. The latter could be 
either collective (as in the New International Economic Order movement of the 1970s) or more 
individualist, as in the case of Kenya presented in Chapter Five.   
 
The Southern producers‘ struggle to challenge the dependency relationship has elements of agency, 
but it is not necessarily a pure product of the old style voluntaristic national development tradition.  
It can be highly decentralised, as in the ‗guerrilla capitalism‘ thesis (Lam and Lee, 1992). At the same 
time, it is important to note that a Southern drive to autonomy is not limited to a choice between, on 
the one hand agency in the conventional sense of industrial policy, or on the other, scattered and 
individualist responses. On the contrary, it can itself enlist forces of self-organising systems with 
elements of regime-formation.   
 
The clearest case of this would be industrial clusters. Some of the classic examples addressed in early 
Clustering literature (see Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999), such as Sinos Valley in Brazil or Sialkot in 
Pakistan, were indisputably emergent phenomena: they happened through self-reinforcing processes 
without in a significant sense being designed; and there is some identifiable ‗commons‘ (consumers‘ 
expectations of reliability of delivery et cetera) which had to be managed, typically through 
reciprocity (see section 2.2). Being both emergent and with a clear fund of mutual benefit and 
informal rules, clusters are a classic case of regimes in the strictest sense addressed by the Regime 
theory as applied in this thesis. None of this is to deny that they could be drawn into a subordinate 
role within GVCs, and indeed in this case, far from being exempt from the dependency relationship, 
they could indeed be one of its main embodiments. There is no doubt that the IPE has adjusted to 
incorporate clusters. However, the outcome of the question of whether they counter or reinforce 
dependency is not pre-ordained.   
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It is precisely in this context that, in the industrial policies of the last couple of decades, clustering 
often interacts with more purposive and state-centric uses of agency: it has become commonplace to 
seek to stimulate cluster-formation through appropriate state incentives, thus supposedly working 
with spontaneous emergent processes rather than ignoring them (as in old-style modernising 
approaches). In the overall argument I am making this clear: it is my interpretation of one of the 
major roles of EU PTA and AGOA. What factors influence the success or failure of such attempts? 
 
It is in this context that we should introduce the final piece of the jigsaw: accumulation regimes.  
Although this branch of theory developed somewhat separately from the Dependency literature, there 
are very strong interactions, notably in the works of Wallerstein and Lipietz (see Wallerstein, 1983; 
Lipietz 1987a). The Dependency literature always reflected an understanding that the notion of long 
cycles must be part of the model somehow. The notion of accumulation regimes constitutes an 
interesting response to this problem. Again, the structure-agency relationship is interesting. In the 
post-War regime the role of agency appears very strong, if we think of the role of Keynes or Bretton 
Woods, and more generally the centralised role of corporations and even of their subcontracting 
networks. Nevertheless, there are very important elements of emergence: the relationship between 
technologies, energy sources, labour relations et cetera are too complex entirely to be managed. This 
is even more the case with the regime of accumulation which issued from the crisis of the 1970s and 
is currently on its deathbed.  
 
The regime had its roots in the 1960s when TNCs increased their production sites in the South 
(Simai, 1990). There were cooperative politicians in the South (Lipietz, 1987a: 72), but 
metropolitan capitalism was also in a fix! If Southern demand was to continue to depend entirely on 
the wealth generated by exporting raw materials, it would fall as the price for these kept declining. At 
the same time, capitalism had to keep the prices of raw materials low to facilitate growth in the 
North (Biel, 2000). In addition to this paradox, the rate of profits in the North had begun to fall 
under post-1945 Keynesianism (Lipietz, 1987a). This forced capitalists to delay investments, or in 
the case of companies, to invest for the purpose of building competitiveness rather than expanding 
the underutilised capacity, resulting in a crisis of over-accumulation and/ or under-consumption 
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(Amin, 2003). The solution was to export capital as long prophesied by Imperialism theory (see 
Hobson, 1938; Lenin, 1996 [1916]). In addition, the relocation gelled with the political task of 
overseeing the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism because it portrayed capitalism‘s 
apparent respect for nationalism in the South. Also, it was an indirect route to export promotion of 
cheap manufactures from the South (Biel, 2000). Re-technologising and commercialising brands 
halted the relocation in the ISI form for a while (Biel, 2000), but the 1970s technological revolution 
made it technically possible to split the production process giving birth to the New IDL (NIDL) 
(Froebel et al, 1980), within which GVCs operate. Thus neo-liberalism established a certain playing 
field conducive to the emergence of structures like GVCs, but did not design them. 
 
This structure-agency interplay within the post-1970s regime of accumulation helps us to 
contextualise the influence of contemporary forms of Northern state strategic selectivity on regime-
formation. The Régulation approach has shown the relevance of the notion, originating from 
Gramsci and Poulantzas, of the inclusive capitalist state. Access to the capitalist state is not restricted 
to the bourgeoisie, and repressing the masses is not the only function of the state. Rather, the 
capitalist state is both an institutional site to be managed, and ultimately ‗a given form of [state] 
regime will be more accessible to some forces than others‘, and an agent of managing capitalism, or, 
better put, the generator of diverse strategies, in so far as ‗it serves as an institutional base through 
which diverse societal forces mobilise accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects‘ (Jessop, 1990: 
260 cited in Neil, 2004: 87) (see also Jessop, 1999). ‗This means that the state is not equally 
accessible to all social forces… and is not equally available for all purposes‘ (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 
98). Within this frame, in the post-1970s regime of accumulation, the metropolitan capitalist state 
generated four forms of strategic selectivity: neo-liberalism, neo-statism, neo-corporatism and neo-
communitarianism. Only the general principles and/or norms that embody these forms will be 
discussed, as given by Jessop and Sum.  
 
The principle and/or norm that embody neo-liberalism is economic intervention by promoting 
markets (privatisation, liberalisation et cetera) even when this conflicts with the creation and/or 
maintenance of a coherent national Northern industrial core that can provide an enduring base for 
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international competitiveness. The approach for social intervention is neo-corporatism, and the 
principle and/or norm embodying it is structural competitiveness as opposed to the Fordist 
Keynesian concern with full employment. Neo-statism is the principal form of compensation for 
market failure, and the principle and/or norm that embody it is the promotion of a state guided 
approach to economic organisation through intervention from outside and above market 
mechanisms. Among other policies, the state intervenes directly and openly to restructure declining 
industries. Lastly is neo-communitarianism, which is shrouded in ambiguity, since its principles 
and/or norms are its promotion as a supporting measure for neo-liberalism as well as an alternative 
to all forms of capital-friendly economic and social policy.  
 
However, Jessop and Sum‘s coupling of the correction of market failure and a state guided approach 
is confusing because there is a contradiction between the two. The former is a mainstream liberal 
economics of a certain kind, which is regulating markets in the manner of Keynesianism. The latter is 
similar to the Developmental State strategy followed by Japan to industrialise, where the state 
replaces the markets‘ work. In this thesis, neo-statism is used in reference to the Northern state, 
Keynesian or developmental. The Southern equivalent is Developmental State or enabling state. 
Kenya is an enabling state, in the sense of facilitating the integration of the country within 
‗globalisation‘. In my research, an enabling state stimulates raw material linkages rather than 
specifying local content (see section 5.2.4.1). The more typical form of neo-liberalism, such as 
Douglas North‘s (1990) NIE, or the ‗good governance‘ form of World Bank state theory that came 
in the 1990s (World Bank, 1992), affirms an enabling state. A Developmental State, as it applies to 
NICs, for example, is quite nationalist. It assumes a very strong kind of harnessing of state policy 
behind national economic interests, something that has been anathema to neo-liberalism. In fact, the 
market fundamentalism form of neo-liberalism repudiates the state altogether.  
 
These forms enabled, rather than designed, post-1970s regimes; Northern agency, drawing on 
specific principles and/or norms, generated a state strategic selectivity conducive for structure to 
emerge. Since the selectivity came from the Northern state, it served Northern accumulation interests, 
and hence regimes flourishing under it perpetuated dependency.  
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Similarly, Southern agency might respond to openings within regimes as emergent structures, in 
search of autonomy. True, we earlier depicted the ‗sets of rules‘ around international trade in apparel 
as instruments of dependency. This is how it would appear with respect to the South. Nevertheless, 
they are not the pure emanation of the will of some unitary actor. They are the product of bargaining 
processes, and crucially these are both domestic and international (Odell, 1993). An example of the 
former in the textile-apparel industry is given by Heron (2002). Although international bargaining 
processes do not necessarily result in a regime in the strict sense of true reciprocity, nevertheless we 
cannot prima facie assume that such a process cannot result in regime-formation. Consider Odell‘s 
(1993) study. Threats of economic retaliation, issued to Brazil in 1985 by President Reagan if it 
refused to scrap a programme designed to promote its computer industry, and hence displace US 
firms, flopped. Why? Brazil hardened its stance when it learnt that US computer firms were divided 
at best, or even largely opposed to Reagan‘s coercion. The crux of it is that a few days after the 
threats, IBM and Burroughs officials, attending a private symposium with Brazilians in Washington, 
passed word that they had not asked for the threats. Brazilians were also advised of this disunity by 
former US policy-makers. In short, there is no unified definition of the national interest in the core. 
Although in a Thatcherite reading one might embrace de-industrialisation and re-deploy in the 
direction of financial services, many economic actors, including elite ones, would strongly disagree 
(see Krugman, 1991; Krugman et al, 1999).  
 
In addition, neo-liberalism and neo-communitarianism are particularly double-edged. Potentially, 
they can facilitate Southern accumulation and labour upgrading respectively.  
 
Thus international bargaining processes, conducted in a context where a unified definition of the 
national interest in the core lacks, and within the context of the principles and/or norms embodying 
contemporary forms of Northern state strategic selectivity, may arguably provide room for 
manoeuvre for the South. In the context of this thesis, ‗humanising‘ the GVC in the South is 
possible. That is to say that, although it would be classic for the social responsibility argument to be 
co-opted as a disguised protectionism, we cannot foreclose the possibility of its being seized upon by 
interests in the South to benefit increased embedding of development in the form of the increased 
development of the human resources of the industrial workforce. Product upgrading is less feasible, 
- 91 - 
 
 
 
since Kenya and SSA are further limited by a new Asian sub-core. Even then, this limitation is not 
pre-determined. 
 
2.4.3 The Relevance of a Dependency Framework for the Upgrading Debate 
 
The relevance of a Dependency framework for the upgrading debate can be summarised as follows. 
On the one hand, firstly, it helps us to see international regimes as institutions that embody, and act 
as instruments of, the will of the core to dominate the system. Thus, contra to the voluntarism 
associated with mainstream approaches to industrial upgrading, especially the GVC approach, a 
Dependency framework shows us that product upgrading in the South, especially in LICs and LDCs, 
is a Herculean task. This thesis is in agreement with the GVC analysis and related literature, that lead 
firm upgrading is not entirely incompatible with the demands of the contemporary IPE. However, a 
Dependency framework reveals that capital has a ‗lower grade‘ for LICs and LDCs. Thus, while lead 
firms can promote (and of course hinder) upgrading in LICs such as Kenya, this happens within a 
wider framework of regime governance that perpetuates dependency.  
 
What has changed is that, contrary to the classic Dependency literature of the 1970s, the parameters 
of contemporary IPE are more complex than those it described. However, far from necessarily 
facilitating upgrading, this factor may undermine it: in particular, the dependency of the apparel 
industry of a number of LICs, especially those of SSA, which include Kenya, on a new Asian sub-
core, may further limit such LICs in their pursuit of product upgrading.  
 
On the other hand, a Dependency framework helps us to see possibilities inherent in this objective 
situation, and hence it inspires Southern agency in its struggle to embed industry. As pointed out 
above, in many of the cases, including that of Kenya considered in this study, such struggles to 
upgrade products will be seen to be unsuccessful. However, even with product upgrading, failure is 
not predetermined. More inspiring still is that, when we turn to labour upgrading, possibilities within 
the current IPE under neo-communitarian ideology often exist, at least in theory.  
 
- 92 - 
 
 
 
2.5 HYPOTHESIS 
 
The central theorisation is that control-emergent regime governance of the GVC dominates over 
control lead firm governance of the GVC, serves the accumulation interests of metropolitan 
capitalism, perpetuates dependency and promotes milieu goals. The specific hypothesis is that the 
governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, while not a necessary condition, was a 
sufficient condition to undermine product and labour upgrading in Kenya between 1992 and 2007.  
 
2.6 SUMMARY  
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed theoretical approaches to industrial diffusion, detailed the GVC 
approach and theorised regime governance. As far as issue areas are concerned, it is clear that lead 
firms are not the primary governors in the chain. Rather, they are only one of the actors. We have 
argued that this ‗external‘ governance is mainly regime governance. Taking a Dependency reading of 
Regimes theory, we contended that elements of both structure and agency exist on both sides of the 
regime-dependency divide. The resulting control-emergent regime governance overrides, as far as 
issue areas are concerned, control lead firm governance. It primarily serves the interests of Northern 
accumulation and perpetuation of dependency. It is also overlaid with the control dimension issuing 
from contemporary forms of Northern state strategic selectivity. We have identified the relevance of 
a Dependency framework for the upgrading debate as follows. On the one hand, firstly, it helps us to 
see international regimes as institutions that embody, and act as instruments of, the will of the core to 
dominate the system, and hence product upgrading in the South, especially in LICs and LDCs, is a 
Herculean task. Secondly, it shows us that the parameters of contemporary IPE are more complex 
than those described in classic Dependency literature of the 1970s. However, far from necessarily 
facilitating upgrading, this factor may undermine it: in particular, the dependency of the apparel 
industry of a number of LICs, especially those of SSA, which include Kenya, on a new Asian sub-
core, may further limit such LICs in their pursuit of product upgrading. On the other hand, a 
Dependency framework helps us to see possibilities inherent in this objective situation, and hence it 
inspires Southern agency in its struggle to embed industry, especially in its struggle to upgrade 
labour. We then hypothesised that the governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, 
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while not a necessary condition, was a sufficient condition to undermine product and labour 
upgrading in Kenya between 1992 and 2007.  
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3 BACKGROUND TO REGIMES AND TO KENYAN APPAREL 
EXPORTISM  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I show how apparel international regimes, and the Kenya apparel industry, have 
evolved. In part one, first, I will deal with the GATT/WTO regime, the three regimes on 
production and trade in apparel, and the regime on labour, in that order. While the three regimes on 
production and trade in apparel are fully nested within the GATT/WTO regime, the regime on 
labour is only partially nested within it. Second, I will emphasise regime instrumentality within the 
framework of North-South relations. Third, major trends in global production and trade in apparel 
in the last 50 years will be directly and indirectly related to these regimes. In part two, I will give the 
evolution of the Kenyan apparel industry. First, I will show its birth and growth under ISI (1960-
85). Second, I will show the birth and growth of apparel exportism under EOI (1986 to date), and 
the influence of neo-liberalism in the shift. Finally, I will show the existing apparel export industry.  
 
Although this chapter‘s primary aim is to provide a factual background, it is crucial that we recognise 
the key theoretical points that surface amongst the factual narrative. In part one, I am stressing that, 
in international regimes, there are elements of both strong Northern agency and spontaneous order. 
As in the dependency model, existing power relations create forces which encourage the benefits of 
emergent order to flow to the historic core. Nevertheless, that mechanism could slip out of control, 
which is why the ongoing adjustment of institutional structures needs to create a framework which, 
on the one hand, encourages self-organisation of the trading regime, and, on the other hand, channels 
that self-organisation in a manner conducive to the North‘s interests. This goal is partly embodied in 
the structures of the institutions themselves, notably in the relation between formal and informal 
rules. In contrast to classic dependency, where the structures of core-periphery relations were 
premised upon, and acted to reinforce, industrial dominance of the core, the new set of relations 
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enables overall dominance to be maintained under conditions of a partial de-industrialisation of the 
core and shifting of manufacturing capacity to the periphery. Alongside the issue of informal rules, 
we can consider Gramscian hegemony as an additional informal/systemic function which acts to 
channel spontaneous order in directions conducive to existing power relations. Although this is a 
major function of the labour regime, the role of ‗regional spheres of accumulation‘ is also 
significantly ‗hegemonic self-organisation‘; it was not planned by the historic core, but it embodies 
their continued dominance under conditions of their own partial de-industrialisation. In a temporal 
sense, regimes signify the long cycles globally orchestrating the production relations of the capitalist 
mode of production; in a structural sense they are the institutions embodying those relations.  
 
In part two, I am showing- although somewhat indirectly in most instances- the fact that the relation 
between regimes and states is a key locus of power relations within regime institutional structures. 
The history of Kenya‘s apparel industry has unfolded against the background of these shifting 
structures. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, these structures are not foolproof, and there are 
factors which could be seized upon to promote autonomy. However, these are difficult to mobilise in 
the Kenyan case, because of, inter alia, Kenya‘s somewhat reactive rather than proactive approach, the 
ubiquitous insertion of Asia in value chains, Africa‘s marginal bargaining position, and the 
contradiction between product and labour upgrading and the need to compete in markets.  
 
3.2 APPAREL REGIMES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT ON GLOBAL APPAREL TRADE 
 
3.2.1 Main International Regimes in the Apparel Industry  
 
3.2.1.1 The GATT/WTO 
 
The GATT traces its roots to December 1945 when the US invited 14 countries to negotiate on 
trade liberalisation. There were two tracks: a broader attempt to set up the International Trade 
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Organisation (ITO) (alongside the IMF and the World Bank) that included inter alia tariffs, 
employment, subsidies and reconstruction, and a narrower one to reduce tariff levels for 
manufactures. Concerning the former, four preliminary conferences took place: in London (1946), 
New York (1947), Geneva (1947) and Havana (1947-8). The US Congress rejected the Havana 
recommendations for, inter alia, their UN-type of one nation-state, one vote democracy, leading to 
the death of the ITO initiative in December 1950. The narrower track had arrived at the GATT on 
30 October 1947 with 23 signatories. Governments were forced to revert to the GATT (O‘Brien et 
al, 2000; Peet, 2003). In essence, ‗the GATT merely codified aspects of the treaties that the United 
States had negotiated since 1934‘ (Barton et al, 2006). The Interim Commission for the ITO within 
the UN coordinated eight rounds of GATT multilateral trade negotiations (Peet, 2003). The first 
seven rounds (Geneva- 1947, Annecy- 1949, Torquay- 1951, Geneva- 1956, Dillon- 1960-1, 
Kennedy- 1964-7 and Tokyo- 1975-9) had a limited participation (an average of 25 countries), and 
excluded agriculture and textile-apparel (Jawara and Kwa, 2003). The last of the rounds (Uruguay- 
1986-94) integrated textile-apparel, and also transformed the GATT into the present WTO in 
1995 in Marrakech, Morocco (Peet, 2003).  
 
The WTO was established by 124 countries. Its 144 Members by 2002 accounted for over 97 
percent of world trade (Das, 1998b; Jawara and Kwa, 2003). It has six Agreements, among them the 
Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, which has two main components: the general GATT 
1994, and twelve other Agreements in the area of goods, including one covering textile-apparel (Das, 
1998a; 1998b; Peet, 2003). The Ministerial Conference, which meets at least once every two years, is 
the main decision-making body (Peet, 2003; Narlikar, 2005). The WTO has a secretariat based in 
Geneva, and except for about 22, most countries send delegations to their permanent missions in 
Geneva to enable participation in negotiations. NGOs or interest groups do not have direct access, 
but can be accredited to access some Ministerial Conferences and meetings. The principle of 
enforcement, borrowed from the GATT, was strengthened through surveillance by the Secretariat 
through regular Trade Policy Review Mechanisms (Narlikar, 2005). This is the principle that, on the 
whole, set apart the WTO as a more legal organisation than the GATT. 
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In this thesis, regimes are both ‗designed modes of governance‘ and non-compulsory and emergent 
structures. Therefore, it is crucial we see how capitalism has managed the GATT/WTO regime, to 
the interests of the great powers, within interplay of rules and voluntarism. Under GATT, each 
member government was in theory equal, but there was no majority voting. Agreement was reached 
by a consensus dominated by the governments of the strongest economies who set the agenda and 
drafted documents. The basis of consensus was Article XXV.5: that ‗Except as otherwise provided 
for in this Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES will be taken by a majority of 
votes cast‘. Consensus, which became the norm rather than the exception, was reached in the 
invitations-only Green Room meetings, which would in turn be extended to all contracting members. 
This process excluded the South (except Brazil and India who were regularly invited) from all 
decision-making and agenda-setting. Industrial powers therefore excluded products which had 
potential for accumulation in the South, and imposed that decision on the South (Narlikar, 2005).  
 
This management offered capitalism sufficient flexibility to innovate and adapt to changing 
circumstances. The first four rounds were concerned primarily with tariffs on goods. Beginning with 
the Kennedy Round, and more extensively in the Tokyo Round, non-tariff barriers to trade were 
brought into purview. Most notable, however, was the Uruguay Round which created a more formal 
judiciary with an Appellate Body, and brought under the GATT‘s liberalisation agenda ‗new issues‘ 
(services, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Trade-Related Investment Measures) (Barton 
et al, 2006). Since these areas were advantageous to the North, it dangled their liberalisation as 
carrots in exchange for a promise to liberalise those that were supposedly advantageous to the South 
(agriculture, textile-apparel and industrial goods) (Narlikar, 2005; Westhuizen, 2006).  
 
On the whole, the WTO system is more oppressive to the South than the GATT. WTO‘s decision-
making is characterised by voting, consensus and informal procedures, all of which were inherited 
from the GATT. But as stated, the norm is consensus, codified in Article IX.1. It states that there 
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shall be consensus ‗if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects 
to the proposed decision‘ (Narlikar, 2005). Narlikar argues that first, 22 countries of the South have 
no delegations at Geneva, and most of those with one can only afford a small one compared to a 
Northern one, which is normally twice as large. Several parallel meetings means that Southern 
delegations cannot voice their opposition at each and every decision. In addition, exclusive behind-
the-scene meetings still go on. This is in turn based on the preference for informal diplomatic 
procedures rather than formal ones. And according to Jawara and Kwa (2003), corporations play a 
major role in lobbying for agreements, both informally and through industry members of government 
delegations. What is more, they add, coercion of poorer countries has intensified in the WTO; they 
are arm twisted and threatened by, inter alia, aid cuts and loss of ‗preferential‘ trade programmes.  
 
Second, the two main principles inherited from the GATT- non-discrimination and reciprocity- 
remain oppressive to the parts of the South that compete with central capitalism. Non-discrimination 
is based on violation of two principles. MFN (extending concessions between two parties to the rest) 
is violated by the exceptions of regional agreements, ‗preferential‘ agreements and exceptions to a new 
acceding country. National treatment (all parties extended to reciprocate) is violated by excepting 
services. Third, the GATT comprised only industrialised countries, and, although most members 
signed up to all Agreements, it was voluntary. But the WTO was launched as a single undertaking, 
meaning that Members must be party to all its Agreements. Fourth, the benefits extracted by the 
North, especially under the ‗new issues‘, far outweigh those that the South can possibly extract. 
 
3.2.1.2 ‗Voluntary‘ Restraints/STA/LTA/MFA/ATC/ Post-ATC 
 
Under protection in the late 19th century, the US textile-apparel industry began to challenge the then 
leading British industry. After World War I, the US Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930 made this 
protection even higher: in 1930 the average US tariff on cotton and woollen goods was 46 and 60 
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percent respectively. The Great Depression forced trade in the sector in these two leading countries 
to slow down, giving Japan some leeway11. The UK used the Imperial Preferences System to manage 
the Japanese threat, while other affected countries used quotas. On its part, the US, in 1936, forced 
Japan to ‗voluntarily‘ restrain its exports. By the 1950s, these restrictions had been extended to 
Eastern Europe and a few other countries in the South (Cline, 1987).     
 
US restrictions on Japanese cotton textile-apparel exports were renewed in 1955 and 1957 
(Aggarwal, 1985). As a result, the Japanese share of US imports of cotton textile-apparel fell from 
63 percent in 1958 to 26 percent in 1960, while that of Hong Kong rose from 14 to 28 percent 
(Cline, 1987) (see also Keesing and Wolf, 1980). In 1959 India, Pakistan and Hong Kong were also 
forced by the UK, under the Lancashire Pact, to restrict their exports12. Other European countries 
used Articles XII and XXXV of the GATT to impose these restrictions. Even then, flooding of 
Northern markets by imports was only an excuse; there was no evidence. The primary cause of the 
protectionism was to build an artificial comparative advantage in the industry. In the US, producers 
were relocating to the south of the country for cheaper wages, while in other Northern countries the 
development of synthetic fibres was leading to intra-industry competition and a solution was needed 
(Aggarwal, 1985).  
 
When Hong Kong was ‗asked‘ to restrain itself by the US, it refused, forcing Undersecretary of State 
Douglas Dillon, under direct instruction from President Kennedy, to push through the GATT for an 
agreement. The agreement was negotiated between 1959 and 1960 and became the basis of the 1961 
STA. The STA was followed by the LTA in 1962 (Aggarwal, 1985) (see also Das, 1998a; 1998b). 
Also, in 1960, US negotiators pushed for the adoption of the concept of ‗market disruption‘, which 
was defined as instances of sharp import increases associated with low import prices not attributable 
to dumping or foreign subsidies (Cline, 1987). This concept remained a cornerstone for the STA, 
LTA, and, later, the MFA. The LTA was monitored by the GATT‘s Cotton Textiles Committee 
                                                     
11 Japan became the leading world exporter of cotton textile-apparel in 1933 (Aggarwal, 1985). 
12  Indian, Pakistan and Hong Kong exports into the UK had mainly grown under the Imperial Preferences system. 
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where GATT allowed the North to conclude bilateral agreements with the South, or impose 
unilateral restraints if they could not secure them. Much of the North chose the agreements route, 
with the US concluding 18 of them by 1966 (Aggarwal, 1985; Das, 1998a; 1998b). The LTA was 
extended for three years in 1967, and for another three years in 1970 (Das, 1998a; UNDP, 2003). 
The automatic rise of quota for STA and LTA was 5 percent (Cline, 1987).   
 
Manmade fibre and wool-based products had to be restricted too. The US attempted to restrict them 
in 1969 but this was resisted by Europe. Europe feared restriction of its own exports to the US, 
instead preferring a unilateral and bilateral approach without deference to the GATT (Aggarwal, 
1985). Japan had also refused to ‗voluntarily‘ restrain its manmade and wool exports. President 
Nixon threatened a unilateral restriction under the ‗Trading with the Enemy Act‘. Before the day of 
enforcement, however, Japan agreed to comprehensive restraints. By 1972, the US had further 
bilateral agreements restricting these products- with Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan. Diversion of 
exports to Europe exerted pressure for Europeans to agree to the comprehensive MFA (Cline, 1987). 
 
The MFA came into effect on 1 January 1974. Its automatic rise of quota was 6 percent. In going 
for the MFA, the US wanted a multilateral approach so as not to dampen the GATT, to share out 
the import ‗burden‘ with Europe, and to avoid burdening Congress with regular legislation (Cline, 
1987). MFA‘s monitoring mechanism was the GATT‘s Textiles Surveillance Body, a subsidiary 
organ of another GATT subsidiary organ, the Textiles Committee. African-Caribbean Pacific (ACP) 
countries (hence Kenya) did not sign the MFA, although caution is necessary because in theory they 
were covered: the arrangement was to be ‗open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by 
government contracting parties to the GATT, or having provisionally acceded to the GATT and by 
the European Economic Community‘ (GATT, 1974: Article 13).  
 
The MFA was extended for four years in December 1977 (MFA II), with the protectionism being 
tightened further. Europe was now leading the drive. First Europe complained that its imports had 
surged more because it had dragged its feet behind the US in bilateral restraints (the first European 
restraint was in 1975- on Hong Kong and Korean exports). However, a greater issue at hand was 
actually European inter-regional trade associated with rising specialisation in the region during that 
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time. Over opposition from the South, Europeans replaced the relatively difficult to demonstrate 
clause of ‗market disruption‘ with one permitting ‗jointly agreed reasonable departures‘ (Cline, 1987; 
Keesing and Wolf, 1980).  
 
The MFA was renewed for another five years in December 1981 (MFA III). The ‗reasonable 
departures‘ clause was removed but still another one on ‗anti-surge‘, which provided for restraint in 
the face of sharp increase of imports of sensitive products with previously underutilised quotas, was 
inserted. In July 1986 the MFA was extended through July 1991 (MFA IV), and the ‗anti-surge‘ 
clause retained, among other even more tightening clauses, such as expanded coverage and anti-fraud 
measures (Cline, 1987). Finally, the MFA was renewed indefinitely in July 1991 (MFA V) pending 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round (Das, 1998a; UNDP, 2003). The round mandated a 
transitional ATC to phase it out in four stages between 1995 and 2005 (16 percent in 1995, 17 
percent by 1998, 18 percent by 2002 and 49 by 2005). The ATC was monitored by the WTO‘s 
General Council through its Goods Council and Textiles Monitoring Body surrogates.  
 
Looking at Table 3 below, contra to this protectionism, apart from Japan, trade among industrial 
countries, estimated in 1984 at 43 (textile) and 35 percent (apparel), took place unfettered. The 
estimated MFA restraints of the Japanese and the rest of the South‘s imports into industrial countries 
was 3 and 11 percent (world textile trade) and 1.4 and 38.5 percent (world apparel trade) 
respectively. The remainder of world trade in the sector was restricted through other means. Also, the 
approximate South‘s imports were only 30.8 and 12.8 percent of textile and apparel trade 
respectively (Cline, 1987). 
 
The ATC did not set a clear benchmark for integrating products. This gave Northern importers 
(apart from Norway) the opportunity to effectively back load the integration process. As a result, 
while integration targets and quota growth were met, restrictions were not effectively eliminated as 
scheduled. Back loading was made easier by the lack of specification regarding the choice of the 
products (from the four groups of tops and yarns, fabrics, made up products and apparel) at  
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Table 3: Shares of world trade in apparel subject to MFA and other restraints (%) 
 Importing Area Supplying Area % 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
3. 
Free of restraints 
Industrial countries 
 
MFA restraints 
Industrial countries 
 
 
Bilateral or national 
restraints 
Industrial countries 
Developing countries 
Eastern area 
    Subtotal 
Subtotal, restrained 
Total 
Memorandum: value (US$ 
billions) 
 
Industrial countries except 
Japan 
 
Japan 
Developing countries 
    Subtotal 
 
 
Eastern area 
All sources 
All sources 
 
(2+3) 
 
 
 
35.1 
 
1.4 
38.5 
39.9 
 
 
5.0 
12.8 
7.2 
25.0 
64.9 
100.0 
 
46.0 
Source: Adapted from Cline (1987) Table 6.1 
 
different stages. Selection of the products for integration was left to the discretion of the restricting 
countries (Das, 1998b; Hayashi and Bauer, 2004; Nordas, 2004). For example, it is the less sensitive 
products, such as tire cords, tampons and tents that were liberalised by Canada, the EU and the US 
during the first stage (Baughman et al, 1997 cited in UNDP, 2003). However, when it came to 
apparel imports, which is a ‗sensitive‘ item, the EU liberalised a mere 1 per cent of the quotas rather 
than the targeted 17 per cent, and it was a similar story for the US (UNDP, 2003). Removing what 
were still high export tax equivalents in 2005 automatically led to an export surge from the world‘s 
leading supplier, China. Chinese exports to the US increased by 39 percent in 2005, exports of 
formerly quota constrained products inching up by 270 percent (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). 
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The North managed this by introducing safeguard measures against Chinese textile-apparel, under 
China‘s WTO accession protocol provision that expired on 1 January 200913. 
 
The liberalisation of the sector is also phoney because tariff escalation remains (Blackhorse et al, 
1996 cited in Hayashi and Bauer, 2004). Tariffs for the sector‘s products remain much higher than 
for most other manufactures; the Uruguay Round only reduced the trade-weighted tariff average in 
industrial countries from 15 to 12.1 percent (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). 
  
My intention is to show the interplay of agency and spontaneous emergence, and hence I want to 
state that we need not over-emphasise agency as it seems I have done so far. With regard to the 
MFA/ATC, perhaps what demonstrates this interplay best is that a spontaneous response to the 
protectionism arose where some Asian countries applied false labelling (to change the apparent 
country of origin) and/or relocated some production to non-MFA signatories or countries whose 
quotas were not fully utilised (Dicken, 2003). However, this was short-lived: soon central capitalism 
was in control of profits in the sector once again through brand identities and re-technologising the 
industry (Biel, 2000). In Germany, for instance, physical capital per employee increased considerably 
faster for the apparel industry than for the manufacturing sector as a whole between 1970 and 1984 
(Spinanger, 1992). In addition to branding, from 1980s, neo-statist regimes, which we shall consider 
in the next two sections, arose spontaneously to counter the threat of the efficiency of the Asian 
industry following its spontaneous expansion. These regimes received a boost from agency, in the 
form of government policy on outsourcing of the most labour intensive aspects of production, while 
retaining the higher added tasks. In the US, this ‗served to undercut the protectionist coalition that 
had sustained the MFA up until this point‘ (Heron, 2006b: 5).  
 
The relocation to non-MFA signatories, the innovation of branding and the emergence of neo-statist 
regimes were primarily spontaneous responses to remain afloat. These combined with more explicit 
agency roles given above, and others, such as the fact that some industrialised countries had export 
                                                     
13 For example, some Chinese apparel categories were limited by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed 
between Washington and Beijing on 8 November 2005 (see Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), 2005).  
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interests, in particular the EU countries‘ export interests to the US for higher value apparel (Croome, 
1999), to hasten liberalisation. The North was also explicitly using liberalisation as a sweetener in 
return for the introduction of services and intellectual property rights in the WTO. Moreover, 
Francois et al (1997 cited in Nordas, 2004) show that by the time of the liberalisation, much of the 
liberalisation welfare gains had been calculated to be concentrated among importing countries, and in 
one projection, exporters would experience a welfare loss, since ‗the rise in exports is not sufficient to 
compensate for the loss of quota rents‘ (Nordas, 2004: 25) (see also World Bank, 2005a). Thus 
overall, it is because of the interplay of these dynamics, rather than either of them, that international 
trade in the sector switched from protectionism to relative liberalisation in 2005.  
 
The systemic structure broached here is dovetailed into regional spheres of accumulation- with much 
tension because of the contradiction inherent. Regional spheres of accumulation stem from a 
development in 1965 (Kennedy Round) when the GATT formally recognised a GSP under Article 
XXXVI: 8. However, there was a precursor to the GSP, namely the first negotiations launched under 
GATT auspices in the early 1940s. Initially, the US forced the British Empire to scrap its Imperial 
Preferences System granted to its dominions. It was ‗agreed‘ that no additional margins of 
‗preferences‘ were to be granted, that the then existing ‗preferences‘ were not to stand in the way of 
action with regard to US tariff ‗preferences‘, and that reduction in tariffs was automatically to reduce 
or eliminate margins of ‗preference‘. These three, in America‘s lexicon, were by design to confine and 
eventually eliminate the system (Gardner, 1969). However, the principle was returned, first in the 
Haberler Report of 1958, the Ministerial Declaration of 1961, the Action Programme of 1963, and 
the Trade and Development chapter added to the GATT Articles in 1965.  
 
GSPs cover products with a MFN duty below ten percent. However, it contradicted Article 1 (the 
MFN principle); hence the Enabling Clause was adopted in 1971, initially for ten years. When the 
MFA came to be crafted, the preamble had made allowance for GSP (GATT, 1974: Preamble, 
Paragraph 7). In 1979 (Tokyo Round), the Enabling Clause was amended to run indefinitely. The 
GSP was pushed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and 
only eleven countries or country groups implemented it.  
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However, GSPs excluded textiles-apparel products. These were among ‗sensitive‘ products policed 
through closely monitored bilateral PTAs that were more detailed than the GSP- because of the 
threat of Southern accumulation that they posed. The key point is that, just like GSPs, they were not 
‗preferential‘ as they seemed. In manufacturing, the North‘s intention was to simultaneously stimulate 
their declining industries by subcontracting only basic assembly (through the restrictive RoO), while 
maximising on cheap Southern labour by importing cheap products- the so-called production 
sharing/ outward processing arrangements. I deal first with EU PTA.  
 
3.2.1.3 EU-based Regime: the Case of EU PTA  
 
Building on technical aid programmes towards ACP countries initiated by the Treaty of Rome 
(1957), Yaoundé I Convention (1963) and Yaoundé II Convention (1969), the EU developed its 
GSP under Lomé I Convention (1975), renewed as Lomé II Convention (1979), Lomé III 
Convention (1984) and Lomé IV Convention (1990). The conventions offered ‗preferential‘ quotas 
and duty reduction of ACP apparel imports. While the conventions were generally restrictive, 
requirements for ‗sensitive‘ products (essentially apparel) went ahead to require a double 
transformation RoO.  
 
A product could be considered to be an export of a beneficiary country only if: a transformation within the 
country had taken place between tariff headings and there had been a minimum of 60 percent domestic value 
addition. Rules of origin for clothing were even tighter. A process criterion (two distinct stages of production 
had to be undertaken in the beneficiary country) was applied, and third country raw material content could not 
exceed 15 percent of the ex-factory price of an exported good. In other words, in the case of clothing, weaving 
or spinning had to take place in the country of origin (or in another beneficiary country) for the product in 
question to command duty-free status (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005: 52). 
 
For Kenyan apparel, for example,  
 
EC Directive 3817/81 dated 23.12.1981 defines ―goods originating in a preferential-treatment country‖ as 
follows, within the framework of the WTA [World Textile Agreement/MFA]: goods completely produced in 
the country concerned; goods produced in the country concerned by using materials which had not been 
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produced locally, however, which had been processed locally to a sufficient extent. With regard to cotton knits 
in list A of the above mentioned Directive, ―sufficient extent‖ is defined as follows: ―Chapter 60 ―knits- 
Manufacture from carded or combed natural fibres…i.e. cotton may be imported in the form of carded sliver 
or combed sliver; all other process steps, such as spinning, knitting, dyeing and sewing, must have been carried 
out in Kenya and proof of this must be submitted‖. Only if this is the case, cotton knits or finished goods made 
thereof can be given a Kenyan certificate of origin… (Nacken, 1982: 47-8).   
 
In 2000, the Cotonou Agreement replaced Lomé Convention IV. The agreement set a ‗legal‘ basis to 
initiate fresh negotiations between the EU and non-LDC ACP countries, which were to culminate in 
the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with various groupings of such ACP 
countries by 1 January 2008. This means that, since the Agreement was a transitory one, SSA 
continued to trade more or less under Lomé IV rules. In any event, the Agreement was ratified much 
later, in April 2003, and the EPAs are yet to materialise for most ACP members14.  
 
3.2.1.4 US-based Regime: the Case of AGOA 
 
The US GSP was instituted in 1976. With regard to SSA, until 2000, 48 countries enjoyed 
‗preferential‘ access to the US market15. According to Mwega and Muga (1999), they would pay 
essentially zero tariffs but were subjected to a battery of conditions; inter alia, duty averaging 17 
percent of landed value (for apparel products). And according to Mattoo et al (2003), their margin 
of ‗preference‘ over other MFN suppliers was a mere five percent. However, European colonial ties 
with SSA also accounted for the American GSP‘s lack of supply response from SSA. Either way, to 
give a fillip to the response, this GSP was improved by AGOA, effective 1 October 2000. The Act 
added to the GSP approximately 1 800 duty free product tariff lines, among them those on apparel, 
to make a total of approximately 7 000 product tariff lines at present. Apparel became the most 
                                                     
14 The EPA (and the Cotonou Agreement) excludes LDCs who instead can ‗benefit‘ from the Everything But Arms 
(EBA) of 2001 (took effect in 2005). EBA resembles the Lomé conventions, and accommodates nine more beneficiary 
non-ACP LDCs (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Yemen). For a more 
comprehensive review of the Cotonou Agreement and EBA see Gibb (2006). 
15 GSPs are regularly reviewed, and the latest US review extends through to 31 December 2009. 
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important export to the US, partly because of the high duties imposed earlier on (McCormick et al, 
2006). AGOA was initially to run through to 30 September 2008.  
 
These were the major AGOA rules. There would be no quantitative limitations for articles assembled 
from fabric wholly formed and cut in the US from yarns wholly formed in the US, and those 
assembled from fabric wholly formed in the US but cut in a SSA beneficiary country, as long as the 
yarn is wholly formed in the US and the thread is American. If the yarn is either African or 
American, but the fabric is formed in SSA, a cap of 1.5 percent of the aggregate Square Meter 
Equivalent (SME) of all US apparel imports in the preceding year would be imposed. This would be 
for the first year, which would be subsequently increased in each of the seven succeeding years, to 
reach 3.5 percent in the last year (2007). LDCs (based on 1998 World Bank measurement and 
classification of countries with less than US $ 1 500 Gross National Product per capita) were 
allowed to get fabric- wholly formed or even cut- from wherever in the world through to 30 
September 2004, but they were not exempted from the caps. There were also two important special 
rules. There was the de minimis rule; that products with limited non-US/ non-African fibres and 
yarns will be given duty free status, as long the weight of such fibres and yarns does not exceed seven 
percent of the total weight of the product. The second rule was the discretion of allowing duty free 
articles containing non-US/ African findings and trimmings (sewing thread, buttons, zippers, labels 
et cetera), as well as interlinings, as long as they do not exceed 25 percent of the total cost of the 
components making the article. Finally, folklore/ hand loomed/ handmade articles were also to be 
allowed duty free, as well as articles cut/ knit-to-shape and sewn from non-US/African fabric or 
yarn not available in commercial quantities (US Congress, 2000).     
 
A 2002 amendment (‗AGOA II‘) raised the cap of non-third country fabric exports from 1.5 to 2.17 
percent for the year beginning 1 October 2002, to rise by equal increments, and by 7 percent in 
2007. This was not of benefit to Kenya because all its exports are made from third country fabric. 
The amendment also lifted quantitative limitations for articles assembled from components which 
are knit-to-shape (such as sweaters, Tee-shirts and socks) in the US using US yarn or those knit to 
shape in a SSA beneficiary country, as long as the yarn is wholly formed in the US and the thread is 
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American. Moreover, it allowed for cutting of fabric/ knitting of yarn to occur in the US and SSA, 
rather than one or the other, and LDCs‘ RoO exemption was retained (US Congress, 2002).  
 
‗AGOA III‘ extended AGOA ‗preferences‘ to 2015 and LDCs exemption from adherence to the 
RoO to 30 September 2007. It also raised the de minimis rule from seven to ten percent, and 
demanded that African beneficiary countries should support WTO liberalisation agenda. Certain 
machine-made articles were also included under the folklore/hand loomed/handmade category. The 
other important amendment was the addition of a third special rule allowing duty free imports of 
articles with the following non-US/ African components: collars and cuffs, drawstrings, padding, 
waistbands, belts attached to article, straps containing elastic and elbows (US Congress, 2004). 
‗AGOA IV‘ extended the LDC exemption to 30 September 2012 and set the limit for commercial 
quantity availability of denim articles at 30 million SME (M2) (US Congress, 2006).  
 
AGOA came with a battery of eligibility criteria. First, the beneficiary SSA country was not to stand 
in the way of US foreign and security interests. Second, it was to respect human rights, and cooperate 
in the fight against terrorism. Third and most important for this thesis, it was to show evidence for, 
or should have been making continual progress to show evidence for, acceptance of markets, political 
and judicial ‗good‘ governance, friendliness to US investment, poverty reduction (partly through 
market mechanisms such as micro-credits), anti-corruption and upgrading labour standards. 
Regarding the last, it should have shown evidence for, or progress towards  
 
protection of internationally recognised worker rights, including the right of association, the right to organise 
and bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour, a minimum age 
for the employment of children, and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work and occupational safety and health (US Congress, 2000: 4).    
 
But what is AGOA? As I will show in Chapter Five, AGOA‘s basis is partly economic, partly 
political. Economically, the US is competing with other great powers and AGOA is meant to 
stimulate the US textile-apparel industry and/ or expand the sphere of influence of US TNCs. 
Politically, the US is taking from Europe the latter‘s hegemony in Africa (see Biel, 2003). Biel makes 
it clear that AGOA is also meant to reconcile the demands of improved governance (some limited 
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and policed accumulation and/ or poverty reduction) through low-wage employment, creating a self-
maintaining system of international level order, which leaves crude military intervention as a last 
resort. We can add that such stability secures systemic social reproduction of labour. This leads us to 
the final regime on labour.  
 
3.2.1.5 The Regime on Labour 
 
Within the regime on labour there are two interests for capitalism as a whole: maintaining low-level 
international social order and protecting Northern industry. The first interest is a broad interest of 
the system not restricted to regimes, let alone to this one. What I broach here, therefore, focuses 
more on the second interest- regime evolution as a protective device for metropolitan profitability of 
industry, including apparel, and for maintaining the balance between class forces in the North. The 
regime revolves around two forms: a ‗public‘ one revolving around the state, and a more recent 
‗private‘ one that excludes the state to some extent. 
 
First the ‗public‘ form. This is the main one, and hence the one I will detail. It revolves around the 
ILO, which was formed in 1919. True, the ILO was predated by six ‗public‘ developments, namely 
the 1886 First International‘s proposal for an international labour policy agenda, the 1890 Berlin 
Conference on international labour legislation, the 1901 establishment of the International Labour 
Office, the 1904 First bilateral labour treaty between France and Italy and the 1906 first multilateral 
treaties on night work by women and use of white phosphorous (Stevis and Boswell, 2008). 
However, this ‗public‘ face first crystallised in 1919.    
 
ILO decisions are taken at its annual general assembly (International Labour Conference (ILC)), and 
at its executive council (Governing Body). Each of the national delegations at ILC has two 
government representatives, one representative for employers and one for workers. All four may vote 
and may take different positions (O‘Brien et al, 2000). Thus the ILO brings together governments, 
capitalists and international union confederations. The latter bring national union confederations 
together. The largest and most active of these confederations is the International Trade Union 
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Confederation (ITUC). ITUC, previously existing as the International Free Trade Union (IFTU), 
split from the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1948. The World Confederation of 
Labour (WCL), which stresses spiritual and humanistic aspects, is a much smaller union with greater 
affinity to IFTU/ITUC than to WFTU (O‘Brien et al, 2000). It is imperative that we understand 
why this split took place. 
 
Contemporary trade unionism traces its roots back to Robert Owen‘s formation of the Grand 
National Moral Union of the Productive and Useful Classes in 1833, and, the consequent official 
birth of the English working class movement in the same year (Heilbroner, 1969; Taylor, 1982). 
Unlike modern unions, its goals were not limited to hours and wages or to management prerogatives 
and other general working conditions. Rather, it was to be an instrument of not only social 
betterment but also of social change. The collapse of this movement was followed by the Communist 
League in 1836 which died in 1848. The International Workingmen‘s Association of 1864 (First 
International) had modest success before winding up in 1874 (Heilbroner, 1969). Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000) argue that the zeal for social change caused internal strife within the International: 
Marxists wanted to conquer the state, anarchists wanted its destruction. Thus Stevis and Boswell 
(2008) label 1864-76 as the period of challenging the state and capital.  
 
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) add that it was after the overthrow of Marxists and anarchists by 
Fabian Socialism during the Second International (1889-1914), that unions shifted focus from the 
nationalisation of the means of production to the improvement of wages and working conditions. 
Stevis and Boswell (2008) label this as the period of reforming the state and capital. They show that 
this is the time that Northern labour protectionism was born, and also the context in which the 
contemporary architecture of the global union network came into existence. They show that first 
came the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) (called Global Union Federations (GUFs) since 
2002), which bring together unions in a particular sector. ITSs were soon followed by umbrella 
national union federations- national organisations of various sectoral unions. Next, the exclusion of 
unions from the Second International, led to the formation of the International Secretariat of 
National Trade Union Centres in 1901, renamed IFTU in 1913, chiefly to marginalise anarchists. 
111 
 
 
 
Unlike this union network, the Second International had membership from Latin America and Asia, 
but like the network, it also marginalised anarchists. IFTU was reconstituted in 1919. Communists 
were excluded and Christian unionists stayed away, forming WCL. It was IFTU that represented 
labour interests at ILO formation. The Third International, formed in 1919, formed the 
International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions in 1920-1 (Stevis and Boswell, 2008). The 
key point is that the pre-War shift of unionism ideals leaves us with little wonder as to why its co-
option in the ILO by capitalism during the Versailles negotiations was not as difficult.  
 
Now, the split occurred at the beginning of what Stevis and Boswell (2008) call the period of 
fighting along with the state (1945-69). The vehicle for fighting was WFTU, formed in 1945 to 
replace IFTU, by the merging of the US Congress of Industrial Organisation (CIO) with British and 
Soviet trade unions, as a grand alliance of labour to mirror the grand alliance of nations against 
Germany and Japan (Cox, 1977). The disagreement was therefore about sympathy for communism 
that was coming from Soviet unions- against ILO‘s interest. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) are clear 
that a major concern behind establishing the ILO was that as capital gets internationalised, the race 
to the bottom might fall into the hands of communism agitators, who might use it to accumulate. 
Thus the WFTU was left to unions sympathetic to communism, and IFTU became the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1949. Stevis and Boswell (2008) add that ICFTU 
remained weak in the 1970s and 80s. They also add that in 2006 ICFTU joined with the second 
largest union, WCL, and others, to form ITUC, while GUFs formed the Council of Global Unions 
in 2007. 
 
In addition to the tripartism above- what Cox (1977) calls ‗centralised‘ corporatism- the ILO also 
works with corporations directly- what Cox (1977) calls ‗enterprise‘ corporatism. This originates 
from World Company Councils (WCCs) that were set up in the 1970s by ITSs to coordinate 
unions within the same corporation. Although WCCs were unsuccessful, and were abandoned by the 
end of 1970s (Stevis and Boswell, 2008), their successors have contributed in managing labour as the 
ILO prompts them. The Group of Seventy Seven‘s (G 77) efforts from the early 1970s to gain a 
UN Code of Conduct for TNCs were effectively vetoed by the US. Instead, in 1976, the 
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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, and in 1977 the ILO adopted a Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. These initiatives culminated in ILO‘s 1998 
International Labour Conference downsizing the number of standards to four (freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, forced labour, child labour and discrimination in employment) 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). These four become manifest in eight conventions which Kenya has 
ratified, with the exception of Convention 87 on freedom of association.  
 
But what is ILO? It is primarily the expression of the corporate state, the dominant streak being the 
internationalisation of American capitalism, an expression that is complemented by enterprise 
corporatism. I will use Cox‘s case study of American withdrawal from the ILO in 1975 to 
demonstrate this. Cox (1977: 394) shows that the reason given for the notice to withdraw- 
‗fundamental concern‘ with the ‗erosion of tripartite representation‘- was a mere ideological statement 
whose ‗real meaning can be seen to be impatience at resistance to the expansion of American 
capitalism…American labour‘s foreign policy has stressed American interests first, international 
labour solidarity second‘. However, to understand the ILO more fully, we have to grasp the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony as summarised by Cox (1977: 387, 415). It is the  
 
unity between material forces and ethico-political ideas- in Marxian terms a unity of structure and 
superstructure- in which power based on dominance over production is rationalised through an ideology 
incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups. In the hegemonic 
consensus, the dominant groups makes some concessions to satisfy the subordinate groups, but not such as to 
endanger their domination. The language of consensus is a language of common interest expressed in 
universalist terms, though the structure of power underlying it is skewed in favour of the dominant groups. 
 
And tripartism is, Cox continues, an ideology based upon a dominant historical tendency, namely the 
emergence of a corporate form of state in both developed and underdeveloped countries. It was 
perpetuated as a global hegemonic model by the American Federation of Labour-CIO (AFL-CIO) in 
concert with US business interests and the Central Intelligence Agency. This was initially through 
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AFL during World War II and shortly thereafter, but it gained momentum from 1954 (when AFL 
and CIO merged) under both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations. The focus in the 
pre-1954 period was Western Europe, while that of post-1954 was the rest of the world, particularly 
Latin America where the only way to penetrate and install such corporatism was to execute a number 
of coup de tats in countries such as Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1963-4), British Guiana (1963), 
Dominican Republic (1965) and to some extent Chile (1973). The US was initially not a member 
of the ILO, but it took a domineering role when it joined it in 1934 and began internationalising the 
New Deal. Hence both the ILO and international union confederations, such as ITUC, have 
sometimes been at odds with AFL-CIO‘s unilateralism. Nevertheless the unilateralism has often 
succeeded because hegemony in international organisations works through bureaucratic controls 
rather than majority voting. The conclusion Cox comes to is that the ILO lacks the capacity to 
confront the real issue area around labour, as such initiatives have ended up being diverted into 
programmes consistent with the hegemonic ideology and power relations. Cox (1977: 393-4) also 
adds that tripartism works because  
 
organised labour- broadly representing the upper half of the work force- shares in the fruits and, through its 
union leaders, shares in the management of the economy… the lower half of the workforce has no secure status 
with the hegemonic coalition. In good times, the upper half supports social welfare to provide some solace for 
the most vulnerable among the lower half while keeping an eye on them. But in time of crisis, these social 
programmes are pared according to the exigencies of an economy conceived in terms of the interests of the 
dominant groups.  
 
Cox contends that, in fact, ILO‘s tripartism is ambiguous. In one sense it can mean 
institutionalisation of conflict, the recognition of class struggle in the production process which can 
be regulated and moderated by collective bargaining. In another sense it means production is non-
conflictual and workers can be harmoniously integrated with management through public policy, a 
corporatist interpretation. It is the latter however that has been pre-eminent in post-War capitalism. 
Cox also argues that in the South, it is state corporatism that predominates against enterprise 
corporatism, and that within this state corporatism, there are no authentic voices of labour as unions 
are either manipulated by metropolitan unions or politicians in the South.  
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O‘Brien et al (2000) show capitalism‘s recent failed attempt to increase the effectiveness of policing 
the regime through the IMF, the World Bank and UN Summits (see also Stevis and Boswell, 2008). 
The IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus attempted to lure ICFTU to cooperate in view of 
SAPs during ICFTU‘s 16th World Congress. This was later dismissed by delegates. IMF wanted 
unions to limit government corruption and the misspending of SAP loans, whereas the unions 
wanted a change of SAPs to stop the race to the bottom. They could not agree. On the part of the 
World Bank, its privatisation of government services and the non-consultation of unions in the 
implementation of SAPs has always been in conflict with the unions. Also, there is no department in 
the Bank that is concerned with labour. However, in 1995 the Bank included labour issues in its 
World Development Report, and following the Asian crisis, the Bank started to include labour rights 
and limited social security to those thrown out of work (see also Stevis and Boswell, 2008). O‘Brien 
et al (2000) also show labour‘s influence on the 1995 UN World Social Development Summit in 
Copenhagen, which resolved to support basic labour rights and ILO conventions. This formed the 
basis for the attempt to include a social clause in the WTO.    
 
Thus the WTO is currently perhaps the next most formal route of managing the labour regime (the 
failed ITO had something akin to social clause) (Stevis and Boswell, 2008)). Since the WTO is a 
more legal entity than the GATT, some have argued that this shift displayed a change from an 
informal club to a rule-based, legal international organisation. My view is that the shift displaced 
exercise of power on informal consensus building on actual international trade to exercising it on 
informal consensus building on rules that would govern such trade (see also O‘Brien et al, 2000). It 
is within this context that we need to understand the attempt by the North to bring labour 
surveillance on board the WTO rules since the 1996 Singapore Ministerial. The social clause was an 
attempt to commit states to respect seven ILO conventions (87, 98, 29, 105, 100, 111 and 138) 
around the four ILO core standards (ILO, 2009).  
 
Policing the labour regime through the clause is one of the clearest indications of the contradictions 
in capitalism that will never be resolved within the system. WTO‘s primary mandate of liberalising 
trade is responsible for the race to the bottom in the South. This is advantageous to the North 
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because it facilitates continuous global and Northern accumulation. It is also advantageous to the 
South because in theory the region can exploit such cheap labour to accumulate. But it is 
disadvantageous to Northern labour because it takes jobs to the South. Therefore the North, and 
hence the WTO, will in general push for liberalisation and exclusion of the social clause. Most 
Southern countries will also reject the clause. However, the North, or at least sections of it, will at 
times be seen to support the clause, in association with metropolitan unions. The way I interpret 
O‘Brien et al (2000)‘s chronicle of the Singapore Ministerial is that the clause could not be adopted, 
not because of Southern opposition (supported by some Northern states in particular the UK and 
most Northern businesses), but because overall Northern interests prevailed upon Northern labour 
demands (with France, Norway, Denmark and US in support). However, in another sense this was 
an achievement for Northern labour and for the regime on labour as a whole because there was a 
mention of core labour standards in the final declaration, as well as enshrining cooperation with the 
ILO. O‘Brien et al (2000) conclude by saying that this enshrinement provided ground for ICFTU to 
follow up and keep the issue alive by continually inserting labour issues into the trade policy review 
mechanism hearings. However, it could not go beyond this enshrinement, partly because the Bush 
Administration lacked the verve of Clinton, effectively leading to the exclusion of labour issues from 
the Doha Round, which merely restated the Singapore enshrinement and the ILO cooperation 
(Barton et al, 2006; Stevis and Boswell, 2008).  
 
The intention of this thesis is not to downplay the positive flipside of maintaining minimum 
standards, but to show how the regime‘s working partly contributes to the undermining of 
accumulation in the South. This thesis supports labour upgrading, but not for the reasons given by 
capitalism. ICFTU, for example, cajoles the South to support the social clause on the grounds that 
trade sanctions will be applied only to the most obstinate offenders, and after years of reports, 
consultations and multilateral assistance. It also argues that, since there is no attempt to legislate wage 
rates, the North will still be subject to cost competition. Also, at its World Congress in 1996, it told 
the South that the greatest competitive threat to low wages is fellow countries in the South, where the 
Indian delegate accused China of such low-wage competition. The other reason given was that ILO‘s 
monitoring activity needed to be complemented by the WTO‘s enforcement capability (its dispute 
settlement mechanism and the threat of sanctions) (O‘Brien et al, 2000). None of these makes sense: 
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Southern labour needs to be upgraded, not for these reasons, but because it is the most exploited 
segment within global capital-labour relations; in Gramscian concept of hegemony, the most 
subordinate of the subordinated groups.        
 
There is a third ‗public‘ route: PTAs and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). This has been explained in 
AGOA‘s eligibility criteria in the preceding section. The fourth successful ‗public‘ route, which is 
purely an informal way of running the regime, is that of categorising countries, as explained in 
sections 2.4.1.2.  
 
The major developments that mark ‗private‘ policing of the regime are as follows. Firstly, within the 
mainstream, there were three developments. We had a development driven by unions in 1960s and 
70s in which we mentioned WCCs. The 1970s witnessed the second development driven by TNCs 
themselves under what is today called CSR. However TNCs were prompted by the ILO, in 1972, 
1977 and 1998. There was OECD‘s prompting also in 1976, and the G 77‘s efforts also bore fruits 
when the parallel Global Compact code was embraced by the UN in 2000. The third development 
was the adoption of the European Social Charter in 1992 (Stevis and Boswell, 2008). Secondly, 
there is the more effective ‗private‘ route of the loose social movement around which one finds the 
work of independent research institutes, NGOs and unions not recognised by governments and 
international union and organisation structures above.  
 
It is important that we grasp the manner in which capitalism juggles with the issue area at various 
fronts. Take the kneejerk reaction to revitalise the ILO when the WTO social clause failed. 
According to O‘Brien et al (2000), ILO‘s post-Singapore response was a new declaration and 
supervisory mechanism through annual reviews of the four core labour standards, as well as their 
status of ratification. This was pushed by employers‘ group, opposed by workers‘ group, given muted 
support by governments from industrial countries, and not only opposed by most Southern 
governments (exceptions included India and China) but Asia, including Japan, pushed for a review 
(and weakening) of existing ILO mechanisms. In this balancing of contradictory interests, those 
opposing lost, and the ILO adopted a new declaration on core labour standards in its 1998 
Conference. There was also a proposal for institutionalising social labelling (see Basu et al (2002)) 
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where the ILO could oversee and regulate it. This shoving of the fulcrum of the regime from the 
ILO to the WTO briefly and quickly back to the ILO is very interesting!    
 
3.2.2 The Unchanging Role of the Periphery within Regime Instrumentality 
 
Let us briefly look at the role of the periphery within regime instrumentality. I will use ‗preferences‘ 
under EU PTA and AGOA to make my point. ‗Preferences‘ do little good to recipients and actually 
bring harm. Brenton and Ikezuki (2006) and Hoekman and Kostecki (2009) agree. I will use 
Hoekman and Kostecki‘s (2009) summary.  
 
Firstly, the RoO may be so strict that it might be cheaper to pay MFN tariffs (the RoO has a 3-5 
percent ‗tariff equivalent‘). Secondly, products eligible are almost invariably those seen as ‗sensitive‘ 
by the North. Thirdly, there is uncertainty: eligibility and administrative rules can be changed any 
time by the granting power, or the power can erode the value of these ‗preferences‘ any time by 
undertaking MFN liberalisation or concluding PTAs with countries competing head-to-head with 
the beneficiaries. Fourthly, ‗preferences‘ often come with non-trade conditionality (environmental, 
labour-related and political), which is a form of reciprocity. Fifthly, a share of the rents is captured 
by importers (retailers and distributors). Caribbean Basin exporters capture only two thirds and those 
captured under AGOA are estimated to be lower. Sixthly, they can result in a country not exiting a 
sector, or not upgrading, because there is no need to do so. Finally, they divert trade and often bring 
harm to recipients when they are withdrawn.         
 
There has been a recent discourse within the WTO on the issue of replacing ‗preferences‘ with aid 
for trade. The latter focuses directly on the reasons poor countries cannot compete in world markets 
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). Aid to increase their capacity to trade, it is argued, is the solution. 
Such aid is targeted at building and/ or upgrading physical infrastructure (roads, airports, power 
generation et cetera), reforming institutions (for example increasing performance of customs), 
mitigating adjustment costs associated with liberalisation (for example giving fiscal support and 
policy advice), technical assistance (for example giving advice and expertise on trade matters), and 
capacity building (for example training government officials) (Nielson, 2006). The idea dates back 
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to the establishment in 1964 of the International Trade Centre (ITC). The centre was said not to 
have delivered, and in the 1996 WTO Ministerial a need to fan the idea arose (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2009). This need did not arise out of the blue: the devastating effects of the top-down 
Washington Consensus, particularly the effects of unbridled liberalisation, were getting out of hand.  
 
Amin‘s (1974) theory of Accumulation on a World Scale has demonstrated that the chief 
characteristic of IDL is the laws of unequal specialisation as between the centre and the periphery, 
which keeps the periphery constantly in the same role, though in changing forms. The constant role 
is to supply the centre with cheap commodities, initially cheap food, later raw materials and most 
recently cheap manufactures. The post-War changing forms were through the GSP and other related 
‗preferences‘. However, at a higher level, liberalisation is more beneficial to the North and the system 
as a whole. However, it also undermines the capacity of the periphery, particularly LICs and LDCs, 
to deliver on its constant role because it entails scrapping ‗preferences‘ which contradict it. The 
ingenuity of this is that liberalisation combined with aid for trade can sustain more or less the same 
capacity that peripheral countries possessed under ‗preferences‘. But whether capitalism continues to 
offer ‗preferences‘ or replaces them with aid for trade, none of these can on its own make any 
fundamental impact on the accumulation interests of the periphery. 
 
3.2.3 Major Trends in Global Trade in Apparel  
 
It is important for me to state two points regarding this section on trends. First, while I will at times 
refer to the textile-apparel industry, my focus will remain the apparel industry, since this is the 
interest of my thesis. Second, I am aware that there are two almost distinct ‗sub-industries‘ within the 
apparel industry. There is the low-wage industry often found in EPZs in the South which focuses on 
mass production of lower-quality and/or standard apparel. Then there is the dynamic, innovative 
industry targeting high quality fashion characterised by modern technology, relatively well-paid 
workers and designers and a high degree of flexibility. The bigger part of the latter is located in the 
North, often in clusters such as Emilia-Romagna in Italy (Nordas, 2004). This thesis is concerned 
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with the former ‗sub-industry‘, but in this section I will consider both ‗sub-industries‘ as one 
industry.   
 
Table 4: 13 Leading textile-apparel exporters: 1965-97 (shares of world trade and rankings) 
 1965 1973 1983 
    
China 2.0 (12) 2.1 (13) 6.3 (5) 
Italy 16.8 (1) 11.7 (2) 11.0 (2) 
Hong Kong 12.0 (2) 12.4 (1) 11.3 (1) 
US 6.8 (6) 2.6 (12) 2.1 (9) 
Germany 8.1 (5) 8.2 (4) 6.2 (6) 
Turkey 0.0 (47) 0.5 (31) 1.6 (15) 
France 9.6 (4) 9.3 (3) 4.2 (7) 
UK 5.5 (8) 3.9 (8) 3.2 (8) 
India 05 (22) 0.9 (25) 1.6 (13) 
Republic of Korea 0.8 (17) 6.7 (5) 9.0 (3) 
Taiwan 0.8 (18) 6.4 (6) 7.2 (4) 
Belgium/Luxemburg 5.8 (7) 5.1 (7) 1.8 (10) 
Japan 11.3 (3) 3.3 (10) 1.6 (14) 
Total (sum of shares) 80.1 73.1 67.1 
World (billions US$) 2.53 11.15 41.30 
Source: Adapted from Spinanger (1999): Table 2 
 
Global trade in the apparel industry has grown tremendously in the last 50 years, from US$ 3 billion 
in 1965 to US$ 200 billion in 1998 (Spener et al, 2002) and to US$ 345 billion in 2007 (Morris 
and Barnes, 2009). In addition, the South‘s share of the industry‘s manufactures has increased. In the 
1960s the North dominated exports. Today the South accounts for three quarters of world apparel 
exports; for example 60 percent in 2000 (Hayashi and Bauer, 2004). Thus the North still controls a 
substantial part of the industry. What we want to highlight in this section is the fact that in the post-
War era, the apparel industry developed in five phases. Taking the 13 largest textile-apparel exporters 
in 1997 (Table 4 above), Spinanger (1999) shows the first three of these phases. 
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The chief characteristic of the first phase (up to 1960s) is that Japan, which had emerged in 1933 to 
challenge the dominance of Western Europe and the US, begins to be displaced by NICs. It is 
already overtaken by Hong Kong by 1965. The chief facilitator of this dynamic is Japanese 
‗voluntary‘ export restraints. The second phase (1970s) is the reign of the NICs, who in 1973 
occupied the second, third and fourth largest exporters‘ positions, collectively accounting for 27 
percent share of world apparel exports. This is facilitated by the MFA. In the third phase (1980s) 
China begins to emerge and to challenge two of the NICs. In 1983 China accounted for 6 percent of 
world share against Taiwan‘s 7 percent and Korea‘s 9 percent. The dynamics are still conditioned by 
the MFA. The performance of SSA and Kenya are insignificant as far as the table is concerned, but 
one of the developments during this phase is that the first SSA country (Mauritius), under a 
combination of MFA and EU PTA dynamics, begins some noticeable participation in the industry.  
 
Table 5 below shows the latter two phases. Phase four (1990s) saw the emergence of India, Turkey, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan and Tunisia. Since it is India and Turkey that sustain this 
dominance up to 2007, their emergences are the most significant mark. In 1990, India accounted for 
2 percent of world share, Turkey 3 percent. While the dynamics dictating the emergence of most of 
these countries remained those relating to the MFA, Turkey‘s and Tunisia‘s emergence is conditioned 
by the MFA and accelerated by EU‘s outward processing arrangements.  
 
I will highlight two developments that cannot be captured by the table due to their insignificance, yet 
they are relevant to this thesis. The first is that the spontaneous response to the MFA under which 
Asia relocated production to cheaper wage sites (see section 3.2.1.2) was responsible for the first 
main wave of apparel exportism in Kenya. In 1980, there were over 50 EPZs in the world, but only 3 
in SSA- in Mauritius, Senegal and Liberia (UNIDO, 1980). Kenya was hit by the first MFA-related 
EPZ investment wave from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 1993 (GoK, ca. 2000). The other 
development is that in SSA, only Mauritius, Madagascar and South Africa made use of EU PTA 
(Mauritius was the most successful). In 1992-3, Mauritius and South Africa were leading, both 
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accounting for approximately 92 percent of the leading six SSA countries‘ exports and 89 percent of 
all 48 SSA exporters in 1992. Mauritius alone accounted for 69 percent and 66 percent respectively. 
Kenya‘s three percent share of the leading six SSA suppliers in 1992 progressively fell down over the 
years to reach below one percent at present (both for the leading six suppliers and for 48 SSA 
suppliers) (Author‘s calculation based on UNSD-COMTRADE database). Thus, while post-2005 
competition has pared down SSA exports under this regime, the effect on Kenya is irrelevant.      
 
Table 5: World apparel exports by top 10 countries in 2007 (millions US$)  
Country 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 % Change 
1990-2007 
% World 
Total 
1990 2007 
China 1 625 9 669 24 049 36 071 74 163 95 388 115 
238 
1 092 9 33 
Hong 
Kong 
4 976 15 406 21 297 24 214 27 292 28 391 28 765 87 14 8 
Italy 4 584 11 839 14 424 13 384 18 655 20 035 22 771 92 11 7 
Germany 2 882 7 882 7 530 7 320 12 394 13 910 16 020 103 7 5 
Turkey 131 3 331 6 119 6 533 11 833 12 052 14 001 320 3 4 
France 2 294 4 671 5 659 5 414 8 500 9 250 10 647 128 4 3 
India 673 2 530 4 110 6 179 8 595 9 465 9 655 282 2 3 
Belgium - - - 3 941 6 715 7 236 8 338  0 2 
Mexico 2 587 2 731 8 631 7 306 6 323 5 150 777 1 2 
US 1 263 2 565 6 651 8 629 4 998 4 876 4 297 68 2 1 
World 40 
590 
108 
129 
158 
353 
197 
498 
276 
822 
309 
593 
345 
301 
219 100 100 
Source: Morris and Barnes (2009): Table 5 
 
The main characteristic of the current phase (since 2000) is that China takes the lead and Mexico 
emerges as a dominant exporter. China begins the lead in the 1990s, accounting for 15 percent of 
world exports in 1995, while its closest rival Hong Kong accounted for 13 percent. By 2007 China 
accounted for 33 percent of world exports, while its closest rival (still Hong Kong) accounted for 8 
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percent. Mexico accounted for 2 percent of world exports in 1995, and following the passage of 
NAFTA in that year, this rose to 4 percent in 2000. Another less significant development is the 
emergence of Vietnam, Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Morocco, Mauritius and about five Caribbean Basin countries exporting apparel worth at 
least US$ I billion. An even less significant development, although relevant to this thesis nonetheless, 
is that five more SSA countries, among them Kenya, start exporting apparel worth a few hundred 
millions of US dollars. The MFA fuels the emergence of all these, but the process is accelerated by 
liberalisation (China), EU outward processing arrangements (European countries and Mauritius) and 
US outward processing arrangements (Mexico, Caribbean Basin and the five SSA countries).  
 
Therefore, the US outward processing arrangements represented by AGOA marked the second 
investment wave in Kenya; AGOA was more liberal than both the previous US GSP and Lomé 
conventions. The inclusion of apparel was missing in previous US GSPs, while the complete removal 
of landed duty, and the RoO exemption were missing from both the previous US GSP and the Lomé 
conventions. Availability of cheap labour was another attraction. However, the component of duty 
free access was ineffectual because SSA countries are not the only ones accorded this. For example, 
out of the six countries with which the US had entered into a FTA with by 2003 - Canada, Chile, 
Israel, Jordan, Mexico and Singapore- only Chile and Singapore are yet to fully enjoy zero duty 
‗preference‘ on products also benefiting SSA under AGOA. The same applies to regional unilateral 
PTAs similar to AGOA- the Andean Trade Preferences Act covering Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) including Central American and Caribbean Basin 
beneficiaries (Corporate Council on Africa, US Department of State, 2003).  
 
In countries where there was apparel assembly going on, AGOA elicited supply response. In 1999, 
SSA apparel exports to the US stood at US$ 584 million. At their peak in 2004, this figure had 
grown by 301 percent to US$ 1.8 billion. However, the lion‘s share is taken by six countries. In 
2004, for instance, about 90 percent (by value) was taken by these six in the following order of 
decreasing share: Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa (Author‘s 
calculation based on USOTEXA, 2005). The 2005 liberalisation brought in stiff Chinese 
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competition, but so far the effect is minimal. In 2005, exports declined 21 percent (by value) and 19 
percent (by volume) from their 2004 level. In 2006, the further decline was 12 percent (by volume) 
and 13 percent (by value) from their 2005 levels (Author‘s calculation based on USOTEXA, 2006). 
The nominal Chinese effect is explained by its temporary export restraints by the North.  
 
Gibbon (2003) claims that the first wave of AGOA-related investment boom in Kenya came in 
2000, originating from the Gulf States, and that the second came in 2001, originating mainly from 
Sri Lanka and China. This is not entirely true. As I will have occasion to show in section 3.3.3.5, 
EPZA data shows that the first wave came from Sri Lanka in 2001, while the second was in 2002, 
and was dominated by Indian capital. Especially because of AGOA‘s RoO exemption, nearly 100 
percent of apparel exports from the country since 2002 go to the US, for example, 99 percent in 
2002 (see Gibbon, 2003).  
 
Between 1992 and 1999, Kenya exported an average of US$ 32 million annually and was ranked 
third in the years 1992-4, and fourth in the period 1995-9. When AGOA came, from a base of US$ 
39 million in 1999, Kenyan apparel exports to the US had grown by 607 percent by 2004- the peak 
of this export growth- when the country exported 73 M2 valued at US$ 277 million. This ranked the 
country second (by volume) and third (by value) SSA apparel exporter to the US with a SSA share of 
16 percent (by both volume and value) (Author‘s calculations based on USOTEXA, 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008). Moreover, the number of firms grew from 6 in 2000 to 35 in 2003. Employment also 
rose from approximately 10 000 direct jobs in 2000 to nearly 40 000 in 2004 (EPZA, 2005a). Like 
in SSA, the Kenyan growth has slowed following liberalisation of the sector in 2005. In 2005, the 
country had an insignificant increase of 0.7 percent (by volume), but a slightly marked drop of 3 
percent (by value) from 2004 levels. And in 2006, the drop was 11.4 percent (by volume) and 3 
percent (by value) (Author‘s calculations based on USOTEXA, 2006). 
 
Finally, it is clear that the North has contained the threat of losing the industry to the South. Italy, 
Germany and France have constantly remained among the world top ten exporters. Similarly, for the 
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bigger part of this period, the US, the UK and Belgium were in the list. And although the tables do 
not reveal them, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are substantial exporters as well.  
 
3.3 BACKGROUND TO KENYAN APPAREL EXPORTISM 
 
3.3.1 General Political and Economic Background  
 
Kenya lies on the east coast of Africa. In 2007, the country‘s population was 34.7 million and its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in real and purchasing power parity was US$ 29.3 
billion and US$ 58.9 billion respectively (IMF, 2008). Following the scramble for and partitioning 
of Africa in 1884, Imperial British East Africa Company took charge of British East Africa in 1888. 
The company transferred administration to the British Foreign Office in 1895, which, in turn, 
transferred it to the Colonial Office in 1905, with Nairobi replacing Mombasa as the headquarters in 
1907. The country gained ‗independence‘ in 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as Prime Minister. In 1964, 
it became a Republic with Kenyatta as the first President (see Coger, 1996).  
 
Kenyatta‘s reign was a 15 year one party de facto dictatorship. Between 1964 and 1973, the country‘s 
annual real GDP growth averaged 7 percent. After the oil crisis, between 1974 and 1979, it was 5 
percent (GoK, 1997). Kenyatta died in 1978, and Daniel Moi took over and ruled for 24 years, until 
2002. Under his reign, real GDP grew annually at an average of 3 percent (see Chart 5 below). The 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) removed Moi‘s party from power. NARC produced Mwai 
Kibaki as the third President. Kibaki has received the US and International Financial Institutions‘ 
(IFIs) backing despite irregularities with his re-election in 2007 (see McIntire and Gettleman, 2009), 
apparently for achieving an average of 5 percent annual GDP growth during his first term (Chart 5 
below) and increasing Kenya‘s real GDP from US$ 13 billion in 2002 to US$ 29 billion in 2007 
(projected to be US$ 52 billion in 2013), compared to Moi who had raised it from US$ 11 in 1980 
to US$ 13 billion in 2002 (IMF, 2008).        
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Chart 5: Kenya‘s annual GDP % growth (constant 1980 prices), 1992-2007 
 
Source: IMF (2008) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Annual GDP growth -1.1 -0.1 2.5 4.3 4 0.2 3.3 2.4 0.6 4.7 0.3 2.8 4.6 5.8 6.1 7
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3.3.2 Industrial Background with Specific Reference to the Apparel Industry 
 
3.3.2.1 ISI: Colonial Times to 1985   
 
Following the laying down of basic infrastructure, particularly the Kenya-Uganda railway between 
1895 and 1903, ‗white‘ settlement commenced with about 1 000 settler farmers in 1915 (Leys, 
1975)16. Their consumption needs were met by import-export houses established in Kenya as early as 
1905. Soon the houses were replaced by ISI firms. These were mainly primary processing firms 
associated with the first phase of ISI, and were first set up in 1922 (beer), 1924 (tea and coffee), 
1932 (wattle bark and extract), and 1935 (meat) (Swainson, 1980). Others were set up in 1909 
(flour), 1922 (sugar), 1938 (blanket, soap and leather goods), 1948 (canned fruit and vegetables), 
1958 (cigarettes, tobacco and matches) and 1960 (apparel) (Ogonda, 1992). 
 
Post-War competition in Britain, especially from rising US TNCs in the late 1950s, drove more 
British capital into the market of British East Africa (Livingstone 1956 cited in Nyong‘o, 1988). 
Nyong‘o laments that this meant expanding internal markets at the expense of colonial 
administration enforced saving, which is one of the sources of national accumulation. He cites 
Livingstone‘s (1956 cited in Nyong‘o, 1988: 18) contribution to the East Africa Royal Commission 
1953-5 Report, which noted ‗a natural conflict between the desire to encourage the African 
population to save and the desire to encourage new industry‘. Livingstone settled for the latter. Lord 
Hailey was later to endorse this idea; that the British premier interest was to nip in the bud US 
economic influence in SSA (see Hailey, 1957), not Kenyan accumulation. At any event, the colonists 
had an extreme low opinion of indigenous Africans‘ saving propensity, believing that they could only 
contribute to capital formation through taxation and spending. Livingstone blamed it on  
 
The conservatism of the average African who is more given to sitting in the sun outside a leaky and ill-
furnished mud hut, chatting to his wives, smoking Player‘s cigarettes and quaffing Allsopp‘s Pale Ale, than to 
                                                     
16 By the 1930s, settler farmers had taken over more than half of the productive land in Kenya (over eight million acres) 
from indigenous Africans (Sayer, 1998). 
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foregoing these latter extravagances and putting his house into a pattern more akin to Western ideas of 
civilisation. And who is to say he is wrong, apart from the competitors of Mr. Player and Mr. Allsopp? It may 
sound obvious to say that the African way of life is indefensible and that he should change forthwith to a 
Western pattern. But it is by no means obvious to the African, who could, if he knew, point to the high 
incidence of ulcers and thromboses in Nairobi European Hospital, and retire, content, to his hut, his wives, his 
Players and his Allsopps (Livingstone, 1956 cited in Nyong‘o, 1988: 19). 
 
Leys (1975) notes a brief disinvestment between 1955 and 1964 when settlers sold their land to the 
state, and left. But according to Nyong‘o (1988), following ‗independence‘ in 1963, between 1964 
and 1975, capital began coming back. This third wave was marked by a diversion of investment from 
agriculture to manufacturing. Nyong‘o attributes this to the Kenyan elite‘s demonstration to 
imperialism that they genuinely respected private property. He is referring to the Government‘s 
passing of the Foreign Investment Protection Act (GoK, 1964) guaranteeing ISI firms the right to 
repatriate profits, loans, interests on their loans and the approved proportion of the net proceeds of 
sale of all or any part of the approved enterprise. As a result, anti-nationalisation was widely reflected 
in Kenya‘s first ‗post-independent‘ development masterpiece: Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (GoK, 
1965). The Act, and later the Paper, showed Kenyatta‘s contradictions as one of the crusaders of 
African Socialism, a contradiction that whetted the appetite of foreign capital. Even before the Act 
was passed, Kenyatta never shied from expressing these contradictions (see Kenyatta, 1964). 
 
Narrowing down to the textile-apparel industry from this point onwards, it is noted that the 
disinvestment Leys is talking about was in the economy generally. As for the textile-apparel sector, 
investment was actually growing. According to Helmschrott, the first investment in the sector was in 
1960, a spinning and weaving mill called Nath Brothers Ltd. Then came United Textile Industries 
Ltd (UTI) in Thika town (1964), Kenya Rayon Mills Ltd in Mombasa City (1964) and Kisumu 
Cotton Mills (KICOMI) Ltd in Kisumu City (1965). There were also blanket weaving mills, among 
them the Nakuru Industries Ltd in Nakuru town, established in 1963 and which was, and remains, 
the biggest in East Africa. There was also Shah Bhagwanji Kachra (E.A.) Ltd (1965) and Blanket 
Manufacturers (Kenya) Ltd (1966), both in Mombasa. With the exception of the blanket industry, 
the textile industry at that time was essentially limited to the manufacture of coarse cotton fabrics 
and, to some extent, rayon fabrics. Cotton fabrics were mainly bleached and dyed and served as bed 
linen, curtain materials, table linen, for the making of women‘s and girls‘ dresses and in the form of 
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khaki cloth for jackets and trousers/ shorts for men and boys. Rayon materials were chiefly coloured 
women fabrics and were used for traditional apparel, such as Kikoi (Helmschrott, 1970).    
 
There was minimum link between the textile and apparel subsectors before 1970, and the latter is 
older than the former.  
 
As yet the textile industry is only loosely associated with the garments industry. It is true that knitwear and 
hosiery factories are already purchasing a notable proportion of the necessary yarns, particularly rayon yarns, 
from spinning mills, but the rest of the garment industry (predominantly shirt manufacture) uses foreign 
materials almost exclusively. This is because the coarse fabrics offered by the East African weaving mills are not 
suitable for shirt making. Not until early 1967 did some of the weaving mills reluctantly extend their 
production programme to fine poplin shirting, with the result that, in so far as domestic products can compete 
with imports as far as quality and price are concerned, the East African garments industry will rely more on 
domestic fabrics in future…  
 
The tailoring trade and to some extent also the garments industry in East Africa are older than the textile 
industry. Even today they still procure a large proportion of their materials from abroad. This demonstrates 
that the tailoring trade and the garment industry by no means owe their existence to the textile industry. They 
were rather placed at a disadvantage than benefitted by the building up of a domestic textile industry. It has 
repeatedly been stressed that a large-scale textile industry in East Africa could be established only because the 
domestic price level for fabrics was raised sharply with the help of high duties and quantitative import 
restrictions as towards third countries. So the materials purchased by the tailoring trade and the garments 
industry- regardless of whether they are imported or domestic materials- have become more expensive. From 
this it follows that the building up of a textile industry in East Africa had no stimulating effects on the tailoring 
trade and the garment industry (Helmschrott, 1970: 36, 60-1). 
 
O‘Connor (1966) corroborates Helmschrott‘s findings. He argues that by 1964, the small textile 
mills in Kenya, enjoying a textile-apparel industry import tariff protection of about 33.5 percent and 
engaged in the production of cloth from imported artificial fibres, sent only a small proportion of 
the output to be used in about 20 factories in the whole of East Africa to make underwear and shirts. 
Much of their local production was instead used by innumerable tailors and dressmakers.  
 
1977 was the watershed for the ISI textile-apparel sector: the Government took drastic measures to 
protect it. Until then, Kenya‘s industrial protection policy was generally liberal with moderate tariffs 
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complemented by refunds and remissions of duty on raw materials, and further supplemented by 
quantitative controls through import licensing, import quotas and allocation of foreign exchange. In 
the case of the textile-apparel sector, imports, especially of apparel, had been permitted, but had now 
to be restricted further- especially new ones from SEA as well as second-hand ones from elsewhere- 
following complaints from local industries. Other raw materials, such as fabrics, were also being 
dumped in Kenya. Kenya argued that if the North was protecting itself through the MFA, the 
country could also do the same unilaterally. The idea was bolstered by a prediction that, although in 
1976 local fabric production could only meet 40 percent of local demand, projections showed that 
this would rise to 83 percent by the end of 1977 and 100 percent by 1980. Therefore, Kenya raised 
the rate of import duty during the 1976/7 Budget from 45 to 60 percent for woven fabrics, from 45 
to 55 percent for knitted fabrics, and from 50 to 70 percent for new apparel, while 100 percent duty 
was levied on imported second-hand apparel (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1977). 
 
In addition to these ad valorem import duties, in the same year, imports of fabrics costing less than 
Kenya Shillings (KShs) 15 per metre and apparel costing less than KShs 75 per piece were banned as 
an anti-dumping strategy. Additionally, a quota allocation of foreign exchange with a ceiling of KShs 
20 million was recommended, of which 75 percent was meant for existing importers, while 25 
percent was to be reserved for new comers (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1977). 
 
This move paid off (Table 6 below). Although by the time the East African Community (EAC) had 
atrophied in 1977 Kenya‘s 6 major integrated mills‘ contribution of fabric to the country‘s domestic 
apparel subsector had risen to 60 percent (43 million meters of woven fabric), to meet the 40 
percent shortfall, two more mills were set up: Nanyuki Textile Mills equipped with second-hand 
spinning and new Northrop looms, and Rift Valley Textile Mills Limited (RIVATEX) equipped 
with new machinery from Europe. Also, African Synthetic Fibre Limited specialising in yarn 
manufacturing and Sunflag Textile Mills which had spinning, weaving and knitting capacity all under 
one roof were added. The total number, by around 1980, rose to 14. Four (KICOMI, RIVATEX, 
Thika Cloth Mills (TCM) and UTI) were major firms and 12 of the 14 had total production 
capacity of about 14 000 tonnes spun yarn (GoK, 1983). KAM claims that in 1983, Kenya had a 
total of 52 operational textile mills (presumably integrated and non-integrated) (KAM, 2006).  
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Table 6: Imports of new & second-hand apparel, 1972-80 (000s KShs) 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Ready-
made 
garments 
36 780 49 862 73 341 91 000 117 000 160 000 89 000 52 000 69 000 
Second-
hand 
clothing 
9 610 10 844 21 389 22 000 41 000 15 000 6 360 2 927 2 320 
Total 
value of 
imported 
clothing 
46 390 60 706 94 730 113 000 158 000 175 000 95 360 54 927 71 320 
Source: GoK (1983:18) (original data from Annual Trade Statistics 1972-1980) 
 
The 14 integrated mills directly employed about 15 000 people, which was about 18 percent of 
manufacturing employment, and the gross product for 1980 was in excess of KShs 500 million (see 
Appendix C). In addition, while some such as RIVATEX had modern machinery imported from 
Germany all with the same date of manufacture, others were equipped with second-hand spinning 
machinery and old power looms. One of them, UTI‘s carding and drawing machinery was 48 years 
old, while its Japanese made looms were 18 years old. KICOMI had five different looms from three 
different manufacturers with manufacturing dates ranging from 1965 to 1978. TCM had four 
different types of draw frames by different manufacturers with manufacturing dates ranging from 
1950 to 1976. Overall, however, the Government was satisfied that ‗the significant economic 
contribution of the textile sector has been the virtual full realisation of the Government policy on 
import substitution, as increased local production of a wide range of textile and garment product 
have reduced importation thus led to savings of scarce foreign exchange‘ (GoK, 1983: 2).  
 
In addition to the 1977 policy, particular attention was paid to the textile-apparel industry in the 
fourth Development Plan of 1979-84 (GoK, 1979). This improved production capacity, particularly 
for polyester and nylon textile mills, which became composite. At its peak in the early 1980s, the 
textile-apparel industry was the leading manufacturing industry, accounting for 30 percent of 
manufacturing labour force, and, owing to its composite nature, employing 200 000 farming 
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households. It was also the fifth largest foreign exchange earner (EPZA, 2005a; KAM, 2006). ISI 
policies offered effective rates of protection ranging between 72 and 93 percent (EPZA, 2003a).  
 
Let us narrow down further to the apparel subsector. Firstly, concerning the number and substitution 
level of firms, around 1980, there were about 350 apparel making units across Kenya, excluding 
tailors (GoK, 1983; Nacken, 1982). Although population had risen from 11 million in 1972 to 16 
million in 1980, it was thought that these units could meet local demand for apparel. Therefore, as 
late as 1983, the Government was insisting on further protection by restricting imports. It argued 
that, since  
 
Kenya grows the cotton fibre, the textile industry holds out the prospect of accumulating foreign exchange for 
use in other areas of industrial development, because far more foreign exchange will be saved by the reduction 
in cloth imports than could be earned through exporting the amount of fibre consumed in textile production, 
even after allowing for the import cost of textile machinery (GoK, 1983: 1).  
 
It produced the data in Table 6 above as evidence that over the 1972-80 period apparel imports were 
growing and needed to be curtailed because Kenya could meet its demand.  
 
It is important this point does not bypass us: from producing 40 percent of the fabric needed to 
integrate the industry locally in 1976, to 60 percent in 1977, to a projection of 83 percent at the end 
of 1977 and 100 percent in 1980, and now this resolve here to create 100 percent local apparel 
consumption demand, Kenya was on course to build a classic ISI model in SSA.  
 
Secondly, according to GoK (1983: 11), the estimated annual production capacity of the main units 
was as follows: 
 
2.5 million dress shirts 
750 000 sports and Tee shirts 
700 000 trousers 
213 000 jeans 
50 000 suits (worsted) 
3.5 million pieces of men‘s inner wear 
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900 000 ladies outwear 
1.5 million pieces of ladies inner wear 
250 000 pieces of children wear 
300 000 dozen socks 
250 000 pieces of sweaters, pull-overs and cardigans 
   
Thirdly, the subsector‘s sales turnover was substantial. In the early 1980s Germany was the leading 
apparel importing and exporting country in the world (see appendix D). In 1982, the country 
commissioned Nacken to study the Kenyan apparel industry with the hope of increasing its 
investment in Kenya and acquiring cheap imports. He compiled data from 129 apparel companies 
employing approximately 10 000 people, although only 24 were visited. He worked on approximate 
figures for the annual sales turnover of the apparel industry in 1979-80 as follows: 
 
Domestic        KShs 914 million 
Exports        KShs 14 million 
Total        KShs 928 million 
Possible turnover with 30-50 % unutilised capacity   KShs 619 million 
Possible total turnover under full capacity    KShs 1 547 million17 
 
Again, this is a classic case of successful ISI in SSA- 98 percent local consumption! 
 
Fourthly, we have the share of apparel exports in total exports, their nature and their destination. 
Apparel exports were 0.7 percent of total Kenya exports, and they were for the articles shown in 
Table 7 below- mainly tariff line 846, the bulk of which was Tee shirts as shown in Table 8 below. 
Except for Tee shirts, exports were restricted to Africa, mainly to EAC before its collapse. Tee shirts 
                                                     
17 In 1981, 1 US$ was equivalent to 7 KShs.  
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were destined mainly for Europe; over 80 percent went to Germany, which was 42 and 38 percent of 
total apparel exports in 1979 and in 1980 respectively. From 1980, German buyers stopped orders, 
citing low quality, components not being guaranteed due to local supply inadequacy and import 
problems, widths of local fabric being uneconomical leading to high wastage, and high production 
costs due to poor work organisation, and hence prices 30-50 percent above the European ones  
(Nacken, 1982).   
 
Table 7: Apparel exports, 1979-80 
 1980 1979 
Article Quantity (000 units) Value (000 KShs) Quantity (000 units) Value (000 KShs) 
842: Outer garments, 
Men 
20 1 219 9 743 
843: Outer garments, 
ladies 
 1 792  1 045 
844: Undergarments 145 891 202 1 089 
845: Knitted 
garments 
120 1 186 66 739 
846: Tee shirts, shirts 
and others 
830 7 131 1 001 8 375 
847: Handkerchiefs, 
shawls, ties, others 
 1 110  840 
848: Others  986  688 
Total  14 315  13 519 
Source: Nacken (1982: Appendix IV) 
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Table 8:  Export statistics for Tee shirts, 1979-80 
 1979 1980 
Total garment exports KShs 13.5 million (100%) KShs 14.3 million (100%) 
 
Tariff item 846  KShs 8.4 million (62 %) KShs 7.1 million (50 %) 
Sub item 846.211 (T-shirts  & 
shirts)  
KShs 4.7 million (35 %) KShs 5.4 million (38 %) 
846.211 exports to Germany  690 000 pieces 
KShs 5.7 million 
598 000 pieces 
KShs 5.4 million 
846.211 exports to UK 141 000 pieces 60 000 pieces 
846.211 exports to 15 Residual 
countries 
11 000 pieces 24 000 pieces 
 
Total export of 846.211   842 000 pieces 682 000 pieces 
Source: Adapted from Nacken (1982: 28-9) 
 
Fifthly, on the demise of the nascent exportism, Nacken concluded that European investment in 
Kenya was not feasible for the following reasons: better incentives elsewhere; Kenya had banned 
import of used machinery; Kenya had a complex custom clearance; longer geographical distance 
between Kenya and Europe compared to less distant countries, such as Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Turkey; European businesses wanted to use existing production capacity; and there was lack of 
suitable fabric and fashionable trimmings. A close look at this list shows two types of constraints. 
There were those that related to the failure of Kenya as an enabling state (complex custom clearance 
and failure to provide good quality and competitively-priced fabrics) and as a Developmental State 
(banning import of used machinery). Then, there were those that related to the fact that the GVC 
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spontaneous spread had not yet reached Kenya. These are represented by the ‗presence of better 
incentives elsewhere‘ and Europeans‘ lack of interest in expanding production capacity. 
 
According to Nacken (1982), there were limited possibilities for subcontracting. Although no 
bonded warehouse production could be traced in 1982, such production was permitted for 
companies intending to export 100 percent of their products. It had to be cleared by the New 
Projects Committee18, customs security had to be in the form of bank guarantee, there had to be 30 
percent minimum net value added in Kenya, and handling fees were 0.25 percent of the Freight on 
Board export value. One of the few bonded manufacturers who existed in 1980-1 stopped export 
production citing administrative difficulties, and started producing for the local market. Another one 
also closed shop when the German contractor complained of poor quality and uncompetitive prices. 
The only possibility was for Kenyan industrialists to independently supply Germany and Europe 
with exports under EU PTA.  
 
However, since the GVC spontaneous spread had not yet reached Kenya, even if the country dealt 
with the enabling state and Developmental State constraints, exportism would not have been 
possible. AGOA simply exploited the spread of the chain in Kenya in 1993: it addressed one of the 
enabling state constraints (lack of fabric), by exempting Kenya from the RoO requirement.  
 
Before we turn to the revival of apparel exportism in 1989, let us finally look at industry-labour 
relations under ISI. This reveals that labour repression played a key role in sustaining the model. 
Without confuting the validity of Nyong‘o‘s argument that the return of capital in the 1970s was 
due to Kenyan elites‘ demonstration to imperialism that they genuinely respected private property, I 
believe that a more important reason was the struggle of capitalists in the North to salvage industry 
                                                     
18 An inter-ministerial committee established in 1968 to bargain with TNCs to secure protection through tariffs/ bans, 
duty exemptions, Government shareholding, Africanisation et cetera (Langdon 1978 cited in Nyong‘o, 1988).  
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because of the stagflation of the time, owing to the un-sustainability of Keynesianism. It would have 
been foolhardy for capitalism to allow rising wages in the South.  
 
Unionism in Kenya began in the 1930s with Asian construction workers under Markhan Singh. 
Their first strike was in 1937. Later unions of indigenous Africans sprang up led by Chege Kibachia. 
In 1950, a general strike of both Asians and indigenous Africans under the East African Trade 
Union Federation led by Fred Kubai and Markhan Singh took place. This, coupled with the uprising 
of the main anti-colonial movement, Mau Mau, led the Attlee Labour government in Britain to send 
experts who colluded with part of the union leadership to craft a ‗guided unionism‘ pact (Chege, 
1988). In the first pact, African elites were to abandon rebellion in exchange for political 
responsibility, while the empire benefited by setting up more ISI (Nyong‘o, 1988: 15-6).  
 
Tripartite agreements continued in ‗post-colonial‘ Kenya. One was formulated in 1964. Private 
employers and local governments were to increase workforce by 10 and 15 percent respectively, and 
unions were to carry a total ban on strikes and freeze demands for higher wages for 12 months. In 
1965, the Government published the Trade Disputes Act to reflect these agreements. In 1970/71 
another agreement was made. Government and the private sector were to increase labour force by 10 
percent, and unions were to extend the same goodwill as in the 1964 pact (Nyong‘o, 1988).  
 
The acme was in 1971 when the Government amended the 1965 Act to close in on striking workers. 
The amendment provided for a more or less permanent freeze on wages, and instituted a complicated 
and crafty negotiation process that reduced strikes to mere theoretical weapons (Leys, 1975; 
Nyong‘o, 1988). In particular, the 1965 Act prohibited strikes in ‗essential services‘, and unions in 
such sectors were instead to report the dispute to the Labour Minister, who would settle the matter 
in 21 days or refer it to the Industrial Court that had been created the same year for the purpose. 
The trick is that the Industrial Court judge/magistrate sits with four other appointees, two from 
Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU) (a Government controlled umbrella union formed 
in the same year, see below) and two from the Federation of Kenyan Employers (FKE). The 1971 
amendment empowered the minister to appoint the COTU and FKE representatives! There was 
another tripartite agreement in December 1978 (Chege, 1988). 
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Total demobilisation of active unionism came in 1966 when the right-wing Kenya Federation of 
Labour and the leftist Kenya African Workers Congress formed COTU. It was FKE that lobbied 
Government to form COTU. FKE was originally founded in the 1950s by TNCs led by East 
African Tobacco Company. The TNC wanted to influence Government in its favour, clamp on 
workers (Leys, 1975) and create an African comprador bourgeoisie by appointing state functionaries 
and politicians as directors and board members in subsidiaries of TNCs (Nyong‘o, 1988). KAM, 
which began in 1959 and concerned with the East African Common Market, complemented FKE. In 
1963, KAM‘s concern was focused on exerting pressure on the Government to increase 
protectionism. The association did not achieve the status of FKE in industrial relations, but by 1969 
it had overshadowed the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry which was left to 
small scale African businesses engaged mainly in merchant capital (Nyong‘o, 1988).  
 
The demobilisation suited Kenyatta who disparaged the participation of masses in active politics and 
the activism of the unions (Leys, 1975; Nyong‘o, 1988). COTU‘s constitution gave the President 
powers to appoint top officials (or confirm their election). This put the final seal on the 
‗bourgiesification‘ of union leaders, and went well with international capitalism as the World Bank 
urged Kenya to keep wages low (Nyong‘o, 1988).  
 
Looking back over this pre-1986 background, in a nutshell, from the 1970s to about 1985, Kenya 
was pursuing a successful ISI strategy. An attempt to foster exportism in the early 1980s through 
MuB flopped. Finally, we have seen that unions were demobilised by, above all, being forced to join 
the umbrella state-controlled COTU in 1966.  
 
Apparel exportism began in 1989, following the introduction of SAPs. SAPs followed the dogma of 
market liberalisation. As a result, apparel ISI collapsed. It was replaced with export promotion, which 
operates under the GVC model. Kenya would henceforth be exposed to the stringent RoO when 
acquiring inputs. The whole point is that ISI was based on domestic inputs into the apparel industry, 
while today‘s exportism is based on foreign inputs. This undermined the embedding of the industry 
within Kenya. It also exposed the country to accusations that it is a transhipment point for Asian 
exports. It took the 2000 RoO relaxation by AGOA for the country to overcome this accusation. 
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This exportism is our concern from this point onwards, both in this chapter and the rest of this 
thesis. 
 
3.3.2.2 EOI: 1986 to Date 
 
To start with, it is important to be unequivocal about the nature of EOI strategies in the South. On 
the one hand, there are countries (Developmental States) which employed export promotion as an 
instance of industrial policy, that is, on the basis of a sturdy state guidance, the most successful ones 
being those that followed the ‗flying geese‘ model (see Jessop and Sum, 2006). On the other hand, 
and for the majority of the South, including the case I am analysing in this study, there are open and 
internally liberalised economies where the factors of production supposedly are meant to seek out 
their niches purely spontaneously. In theory, both categories of EOI strategies use apparel as an early 
industry, but in practice it is the former category that has reaped significant fruits. This is the context 
under which contemporary apparel exportism in Kenya should be understood. 
 
EOI in Kenya was presaged by SAPs. The first World Bank SAP loan for Kenya was prepared in July 
1979 and approved in March 1980. Under pressure from the Bank, Kenya interrupted its five year 
Plan released earlier in March 1979 by preparing Sessional Paper No. 4 of April 1980 on Economic 
Prospects and Policies. This Paper was the first to explicitly express the limitations of ISI; although 
there were traces of SAPs in the 1979 Plan (Hecox, 1988). The Bank had urged Kenya to produce 
intermediate goods for export by making their prices competitive in the international markets. Thus 
local production costs had to be lowered through currency devaluation (Ogonda, 1992).  
 
In tandem with Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1980, Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1982 on Development 
Prospects and Policies explicitly stated, with regard to industrial policy, that ‗…it has become clear 
that the scope for further import substitution is limited and that future industrial growth must 
depend more on export markets‘ (GoK, 1982: 11). Ultimately when SAPs are fully implemented, the 
Paper went on, import duty concessions and quantitative restrictions were to be eliminated for their 
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inefficiency. In lieu, reasonable and equivalent tariffs were to be initially arranged and then gradually 
reduced, and incentives for export were to be devised. Some had begun to be implemented already.  
 
The [SA] programme was initiated in… 1980. The initial steps were the removal of bans on imports and no 
objection certificates, tariff increases on over 200 items to ensure reasonable protection, and the imposition of a 
10 percent tariff surcharge…. export compensation was increased from 10 to 20 percent and interest rates were 
one percentage point. Since that time… [f]irst, a significant revision of price controls was introduced during 
1981 as a means of promoting industrial efficiency….Second, two adjustments of the foreign exchange rate 
amounting to approximately 22 per cent were introduced during 1981….Third, increases in tariffs ranging 
from 2 to 90 percent were introduced on over 1 400 items in the Budget message of 1981…Finally, a new 
system of import licensing has been introduced with full effect from November, 1981 (GoK, 1982: 12-13). 
 
In summary, on trade, the Government converted quantitative restrictions to tariff equivalents, raising 
the average tariff from 40 to 46 percent. However, in 1990, it reduced and rationalised the tariff 
level so that by 1997/8 the simple average tariff rate had declined to 16.2 percent, while the 
weighted average tariff had fallen from 25.6 to 12.8 percent. Between 1990 and 1998, tariff bands 
had been reduced from 15 to 4. Import licensing requirements were also abolished. On foreign 
exchange, exchange rate restrictions were lifted in 1993 (Ikiara and Odhiambo, 2001).  
 
The liberalisation agenda culminated in the publication of Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on 
Economic Management for Renewed Growth (GoK, 1986) (the second master plan after Sessional 
Paper No. 10 of 1965), which had been reflected in the Development Plan (Fifth) for the Period 
1984-1988 (GoK, 1984). The Paper introduced a reform package of price decontrol, financial 
market modernisation, parastatal reform, export promotion and tariff rationalisation.  
 
According to Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1994 on Recovery and Sustainable Development, the basic 
cause of the slowdown in the rate of growth of the industrial sector- which led to the collapse of ISI- 
was ‗clearly‘ the fact that ‗given the small size of the domestic market, it did not take long for the 
most obvious import substitution possibilities to become saturated‘ (GoK, 1994; 56). Thus 
industrial sector liberalisation was formally inaugurated in 1988 through the Industrial Sector 
Adjustment Programme (Mireri, 2000). By around 1989, MuB firms, most owned by local 
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industrialists and exporting mainly apparel, had been established19 (Himbara, 1994). GoK (ca. 2000) 
shows that there were about 6 apparel firms in 1989, exporting 24 000 dozen of men‘s and boys‘ 
shirts. Himbara argues that a 1 000 percent increase in application fees, and bottlenecks in customs 
clearance and issuing of export licences, stalled the scheme. In 1990, the World Bank approved a 
US$ 30 million credit (80 percent of the required funds) to cover investment in infrastructure for an 
EPZ and direct assistance to exporters. This was used to fund Phase I of the main EPZ in Kenya, 
Athi River. The remaining 20 percent was provided by GoK (Mireri, 2000)20. The EPZ 
programme21 was inaugurated in 1990 by the EPZ Act (GoK, 1991) that established EPZA.  
 
EPZ production began in 1993. In that year, there were 35 apparel companies exporting to the US. 
About 30 were under either the EPZ or MuB. 85 percent of the surged EPZ investment came from 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka because of the quotas placed on these countries under the MFA. This 
surge exasperated Americans, who in 1994 and under the MFA imposed quotas on Kenyan men and 
boys shirts, bed sheets and pillow cases (GoK, ca. 2000). Mauritius is the only other SSA country 
that was affected. The two countries were accused of being used as a transhipment point for Asian 
exporters (Mwega and Muga, 1999). Apparel exports to the US that had risen steadily from US$ 2.5 
million in 1990 to US$ 35.2 million in 1994, fell to US$ 34 million and US$ 27.1 million in 1995 
and 1996 respectively. Thus the spontaneous spread of the chain, as a reaction to the MFA 
instrumental barriers within the structural regime in apparel, reached Kenya in 1993. 
 
The impact of Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996 on Industrial Transformation to the year 2020 (GoK, 
1996a), which more or less re-stated the 1986 Paper, was not felt amid these restrictions.  
 
                                                     
19 The main objective of MuB is export promotion, the main incentive being removal of import tariffs on equipment and 
production inputs.  
20 The Bank gives only a tepid approach to the EPZ approach. Its official position is overall liberalisation of a country‘s 
economy. It sees EPZ more or less as a protectionist policy (Rolfe et al, 2004). 
21 Unlike MuB, firms must be located in designated areas where they enjoy special infrastructure and tax breaks. In the 
case of Kenya, the tax holiday is 10 years followed by a 25 percent tax rate (Rolfe et al, 2004). 
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As EOI firms were being promoted, stringent restrictions on some imports to control the foreign 
exchange problem (Ogonda, 1992) meant that ISI firms could not import spare parts, and began 
crumbling (Ogonda, 1992; Nyong‘o, 1988). By 1997, the production index for apparel firms was 
barely higher than its level before the 1977 protection (EPZA, 2003a). By 2001, the fabric and 
apparel from these ISI firms accounted for only 45.3 percent of the total 183 M2 textile-apparel 
consumed in the Kenyan market (EPZA, 2002). 17.5 percent was accounted for by imported fabrics, 
20.8 percent by imported new apparel and 16.4 percent by imported used apparel (KAM, 2006). 
The country was left with an estimated six integrated mills (producing yarn, fabrics (knitted and 
woven), canvas, blankets, sweaters, shawls, uniforms, towels, baby nappies and knitted garments) and 
two spinners (producing yarn and sewing thread) (KAM, 2006). It took the 2000 RoO relaxation 
by AGOA for substantial apparel production to resume, this time for US export. Thus the US-based 
regime governed this new spread of the chain and these increased quantities Kenya could now export.  
 
It is crucial that I state that the switch to EOI was not due to domestic market limitation as 
conventional economists within Government bureaucracy argued, as seen in the policy documents 
above. Rather, it was due to the birth of a regime of accumulation that relied on exportism, which I 
clearly described in section 2.4.2.4. It is instructive that a Kenyan interest in EOI was ignored by 
central capitalism in the 1970s. As early as 1973, KAM was pushing the Government to usher in 
EOI ‗to take the place of Hong Kong‘ (KAM 1979 cited in Himbara, 1994: 128). However, 
Nyong‘o (1988) argues that the Government industrial policy advisor in the 1960s, Van Arkadie, 
had vehemently discounted the export possibility. He had instead encouraged the East African 
market to be exploited for British Imperial interests, whether that be through production or imports, 
endorsing the view of Livingstone and Lord Hailey. As a result, Kenya gave up the thought of 
carrying a feasibility study for an Industrial Free Zone, after toying with the idea between 1972 and 
1973 (Ryan, 1974).  
 
On the one hand this overturns the argument of market limitation in Kenya as the basis for EOI. 
Indeed, the preceding section has not shown any market limitation in the textile-apparel industry. On 
the other hand, it shows that, partly, this agency role was responsible for delaying Kenya‘s, and SSA‘s, 
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adjustment to the demands of the new regime of accumulation. This is because only a few countries‘ 
accumulation can be accommodated in every regime of accumulation. NICs were meant to be the 
main beneficiaries of the post-1970s regime. SSA still remains a reserve region, and Kenya was 
invited to exportism too late, and at the convenience of central capitalism. We have seen that elite 
arms of capitalism imposed EOI in the 1980s, too late for a country to reap any significant benefits 
from the regime.  
 
This thesis is concerned with apparel exportism, and much of this is concentrated in the EPZs. The 
rest of this chapter and Chapters Four to Six have this sector and dimension in mind. In this section, 
I present the existing apparel industry. I will demonstrate the role of EPZ apparel firms and AGOA 
in national apparel exportism, after which I will demonstrate the role of apparel firms in the EPZ 
programme, and finally show their role in manufacturing sector and the national economy. However, 
I will first briefly show the role of the whole textile-apparel industry in the Kenyan economy. 
 
3.3.3 Existing Apparel Industry with Specific Reference to the Export Dimension 
 
3.3.3.1 Textile-Apparel Sector in the Kenyan Economy 
 
Looking at the textile-apparel sector as a whole, it is currently the fourth largest segment of the 
industrial sector. It contributed 11 percent to the number of manufacturing enterprises in 2004 and, 
excluding EPZs, had a production turnover of KShs 6.1 billion (approximately US$ 88.4 million, 
November 2007 exchange rates) per annum between 2002 and 2004. Out of this turnover, 
manufacture of apparel accounted for approximately 27 percent. The sector (including EPZs) 
comprises 255 formally registered enterprises. This figure excludes the estimated at least 1 000 
informal establishments, usually of approximately ten employees, which manufacture only apparel. 
Despite having lost its composite nature that reached its peak in the 1980s, the textile-apparel sector 
as a whole (including EPZs) is now the second biggest formal employer in the manufacturing sector 
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(after food and beverages) at 42 646 employees in 2003, which was 18 percent of formal 
manufacturing employment (KAM, 2006)22.    
 
All we need to bear in mind are the following points. First, production in all the large enterprises in 
the EPZs relies on foreign fabric, and almost all is for export. Second, production in Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SME) is for either domestic consumption (non-bonded ones) or domestic 
consumption, export or both (bonded ones). Third, production in informal establishments is for 
local consumption.  
 
3.3.3.2 The Size of Kenyan Apparel Exportism and the Role of EPZ Apparel Firms and AGOA in It 
 
According to UNSD-COMTRADE, there is no evidence that any substantial exports from SSA and 
Kenya go outside the US and the EU. Gibbon (2003) corroborates this by showing that for Kenya, 
nearly 100 percent exports go to the US.  
 
At approximately two percent of both world exports and US apparel imports, SSA‘s (and hence 
Kenya‘s) participation in the industry has been, and remains, dismal. For example, in 2005, the US 
imported US$ 68 713 million worth of apparel. From Chart 6 below, China was the leading source 
of the imports, accounting for 22 percent, followed by CBI countries at 14 percent and then Mexico 
at 9 percent. These three accounted for 45 percent of the imports. SSA accounted for a mere two 
percent! Looking at exports of at least 1 US$ billion, there were 15 single exporting countries ahead 
of SSA as a region23. Kenya‘s 19 percent contribution to SSA exports to the US in 2005 was 0.4 
percent of US imports. The country‘s share of SSA exports to the EU and the US rose from 3 
percent in 1999 to 12 percent in 2005 (Chart 7 below). Therefore, whilst Kenya‘s industry is small 
                                                     
22 The sector‘s employment was previously 27 243 in 1999, 26 563 in 2001 and 34 933 in 2002. It indirectly employs 
an estimated 140 000-150 000 in cotton growing (KAM, 2006). 
23 The figures in Chart 7 add up to more than total US imports due to rounding up. 
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Chart 6: Exports, leading world suppliers to US, 2005 (millions US$)24 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on USOTEXA (2006) 
                                                     
24 ‗Exports‘ in this chart and in subsequent charts means ‗apparel exports‘. 
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Chart 7: Exports, 48 SSA countries & Kenya to EU & US, 1999-2005 (millions US$) 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on UNSD-COMTRADE 
 
by global standards, it plays a significant role in SSA, and it is in favour of the US. 
 
EPZ firms have been the lifeline of apparel exportism. According to KAM (2006), non-EPZ textile-
apparel export earnings in 2003 were KShs 1.8 billion (approximately US$ 26.1 million, November 
2007 exchange rates). Much of it was most likely for yarn because Kenya exports substantial yarn to 
India and China (Mugambi, 2006). Even if we accept for a moment that the whole earnings were 
from apparel, EPZ enterprises earned KShs 13.8 billion (approximately US$ 200 million, November 
2007 exchange rates) that year (EPZA, 2004b). This means that EPZ apparel exports took at least 
88 percent share of textile-apparel exports (KAM, 2006). 
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As stated already, nearly 100 percent of EPZ apparel exports go to the US. In 2005, only four firms 
exported outside the US: one firm to Canada and Netherlands, another to Germany and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), a third to UAE, and a fourth to Canada, making a total of KShs 219.1 
million (EPZA, 2005b). Although EPZA does not account for an extra KShs 1.9 million, it argues 
that, in total, non-US exports for that year amounted to KShs 221 million (approximately US$ 3.2 
million, November 2007 exchange rates). This was a mere 1 percent of the KShs 14.9 billion 
(approximately US$ 216 million, November 2007 exchange rates) EPZ exports for that year.  
 
EPZ apparel firms are the main players under AGOA. In 2001 and 2002, US imported from Kenya 
US$ 65 million and US$ 125 million worth of apparel respectively (Chart 8 below). AGOA 
accounted for US$ 52 million and US$ 121 million respectively (USOTEXA, 2008). Apparel 
EPZs firms exported KShs 4.29 billion and KShs 8.15 billion worth of apparel respectively (US$ 55 
million and US$ 104 million respectively, 2001 and 2002 annual exchange rates respectively).  
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from USOTEXA (2005) and EPZA (2005b) 
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Chart 8: Exports, Kenya to US, 2001-2 (millions US$) 
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The chart shows that EPZs‘ contribution to AGOA apparel exports was presumably 100 percent in 
2001 (since EPZ‘s US$ 55 million is higher than the US$ 52 million under AGOA) and 86 percent 
in 2002. On the one hand, this might not be true because other firms outside EPZs export to the US 
under AGOA. However, this can be solved as we know total Kenyan exports to the US. Subtracting 
EPZs‘ contribution from total apparel exports, we get that non-EPZs firms contributed US$ 10 
million and US$ 22 million in 2001 and 2002 respectively. But, on flipping this, not all non-EPZs 
apparel exports were exporting under AGOA! (There is even a possibility that little or nothing was 
under AGOA). However, for the purpose of substantiating the argument that EPZs are the main 
players under AGOA, it can be assumed that all non-EPZs apparel exports were under AGOA. In 
that case, EPZs firms contributed at least US$ 42 million and US$ 100 million to AGOA apparel 
exports for the two years respectively. This is at least 81 and 83 percent share respectively. For the 
two years respectively, the share in total apparel exports works out to be at least 65 and 80 percent25. 
 
3.3.3.3 The Role of Apparel EPZ Firms in the EPZ Programme 
 
The number of EPZ apparel firms reached its peak in 2003 (53 percent of all EPZs firms) (Table 9 
below). It is important to bear in mind that EPZA surveys are carried out at a particular point during 
the year and therefore this is not a reflection of the highest number of firms ever established. For 
instance, an unpublished MoTI paper shows that at some point, most likely early 2004, there were 
36 firms (MoTI, Department of Industries, 2006). My interview with the General Manager of the 
case study firm showed that at some point there were 46 apparel firms in operation (Isinga, 2007). 
At their peak performance in 2004, EPZ firms accounted for 76 percent of EPZ sales. But their 
contribution to EPZ workers reached its acme in 2002, at 96 percent. While much of the data for 
exports and investment is missing, that which was available shows that apparel firms contributed 74 
and 53 percent respectively in 2005.    
                                                     
25 Rolfe et al (2004) quote EPZA explicitly stating that more than 80 percent of the exports came from EPZs, a figure 
which corresponds to my calculations here.  
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Table 9: Contribution of EPZ apparel firms to the EPZ programme, selected indicators, 1998-2005 
 Total 
firms  
Apparel 
firms 
Apparel 
firms % 
share 
Total 
sales 
(US$ 
millions)  
Apparel 
firms 
sales 
(US$ 
millions) 
Apparel 
firms 
% 
share 
Total 
workers 
Apparel 
firm 
workers 
Apparel 
firms 
% 
share 
Total 
exports 
(US$ 
millions) 
Apparel 
firms 
exports 
(US$ 
millions) 
Apparel 
firms 
% 
share 
Total 
investments 
(US$ 
millions) 
Apparel 
firms 
investments 
(US$ 
millions) 
Apparel 
firms 
% 
share 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
66 
74 
68 
- 
- 
6 
17 
30 
35 
30 
25 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
53.0 
40.5 
36.8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
149 
224.8 
314.5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
195.2 
305.3 
200.8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
76.3 
73.6 
63.8 
3 645 
5 077 
6 487 
13 444 
26 447 
38 199 
37 723 
38 051 
- 
- 
5 565 
12 002 
25 288 
36 348 
34 614 
34 234 
- 
- 
85.8 
89.3 
95.6 
95.2 
91.8 
90.0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
265 
- 
- 
30 
55 
104 
146 
221 
197.2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
74.4 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
247.1 
- 
- 
16 
48 
88 
128 
108 
132 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
53.4 
_ Data missing 
Sources: Wolfe et al (2004) (data for 1998-2002); EPZA (2003b; 2004a) (data for 2003-4); EPZA (2005b); MoTI, External Trade Department (ca.2006b) (data for 2000-5) 
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Firms were becoming efficient before liberalisation struck. Before 2003, exports were growing at 
a faster rate than firms, grew while firms decreased in 2004, and declined at a slower pace than 
firms in 2005. This efficiency is also shown by the fact that, while the number of firms and the 
level of investment grew at the same rate up to 2002, the rate of investment increased against that 
of number of firms in 2003, decreased at a slower rate than that of firms in 2004, and even 
increased when that of firms decreased in 2005. The 2005 investment dynamics also suggest that 
despite the liberalisation challenges, entrepreneurs were optimistic that they would prevail against 
the difficulties. The other interesting thing is that the size of firms is relatively large- at least in a 
LIC context. The average is 1 150 workers (EPZA, 2003b). As I said in Chapter One, the case 
study firm had 1 064 workers in 2007, which is close to this average.  
 
3.3.3.4 The Role of Apparel Firms in Manufacturing and National Economy 
 
EPZs‘ contribution to manufacturing and the national economy is given in Table 10 below (also 
see appendix E).  
 
Table 10: EPZ % contribution to manufacturing & national economy, selected indicators, 1997-2003 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
National GDP 0.24 0.3 0.47 0.53 0.84 1.30 1.53 
National exports 1.05 1.49 2.46 2.7 4.04 5.75 7.15 
National 
employment 
Missing 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.39 0.52 
Manufacturing 
GDP26 
1.8 2.26 3.56 4.05 8.57 13.27 15.77 
Non-food 
manufactured 
exports 
4.93 8.63 14.72 15.86 21.65 29.93 39.75 
Manufacturing 
employment 
1.60 2.03 2.77 3.56 7.35 13.47 18.30 
Source: Adapted from EPZA (2002) (data for 1997); EPZA (2004b) (data for 1998-2003) (see also Glenday and 
Ndii, 2000) 
  
                                                     
26 Share of EPZ in national GDP divided by share of manufacturing GDP (see GoK, 1996b; 2001, 2006 in 
appendices F to H).   
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Comparing data in Tables 9 and 10, apparel firms contributed 29.57 and 5.32 percent to non-
food manufacturing and national exports respectively in 2003. Also, they contributed 16.47 and 
0.47 percent to manufacturing and national employment respectively in the same year. 
 
3.3.3.5 EPZ Firm Ownership and Insertion into GVC  
 
Although the GVC analysis understates the role of international regimes in the spread of the 
chain, its descriptions of the sourcing patterns of lead firms can be used here. Gereffi (1999a) 
identifies four types of lead firms who source through various organisational channels: the giant 
cost-driven discount retail chains, such as Walmart, Kmart and Target; upscale branded 
marketers, such as Liz Claiborne, Nike, Disney, Tommy Hilfiger and Nautica (these were 
previously manufacturers); apparel specialty stores which combine both retailing and marketing- 
such as The Limited and The GAP (most speciality stores were also previously manufacturers 
before switching to brand marketing and retailing); and private labels among mass merchandising 
retailers, such as JC Penny and Sears (these are retailers who own production sites to manufacture 
their own brands). Typically, discount retailers, marketers and speciality stores rely for supply on 
OEM firms, primarily in Asia, either directly, or through a network where Asian OEM firms 
coordinate the subcontracting of low-assembly operations to other countries in Africa, Latin 
American and Asia where labour is cheaper. OBM of private labels, by contrast, use imported 
inputs and rely on regional sourcing where US firms go to Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, 
European firms go to North Africa and Eastern Europe and Japanese and NIC firms go to lower-
wage regions within Asia (see also Hale and Wills, 2005; Gereffi, 2003).  
 
As shown in Chart 9 below, the contemporary Kenyan apparel industry is highly vertical, with 
very few backward linkages with the national textile industry. Firms in such LICs as Kenya 
agglomerate in the most elementary form of EPZs. Protex EPZ Ltd General Manager confirms it. 
 
…our factory‘s head office is in Taiwan… first of all the costing will be done there… They are the  
ones who do all the sourcing of raw materials. They also have agents based in the same country who will 
look for orders. … they send the samples here… then we check the quality [and] we have to send it 
directly to the buyer in the US. [Then the buyer says] ‗this is fine, now can you start production‘… The 
buyer will send the quality assurance [persons]… once you get the approval then you can ship. But if there  
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Chart 9: Insertion of Kenyan apparel EPZ firms into GVC- a GAP model 
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is some defects on the garments then you will have to re-do it or rather you will have to negotiate for a 
discount… (Isinga, 2007). 
 
The Protex General Manager added that EPZ firms subcontract to firms both within Athi River and 
Nairobi EPZs, as well as outside the EPZ to smaller MuB firms, and that the EPZ firms at times use 
their social networks to link the smaller firms with the US market (Isinga, 2007). However, links 
must be with small boutiques, as US lead firms do not make any direct orders. They are usually too 
large for the Kenyan industry to handle. KHRC (ca. 2006) argues that, while GAP engages 65-70 
percent capacity of firms in Lesotho and Madagascar, it has had minimal engagement with Kenya. In 
2000, it had assessed 16 companies prior to sourcing, and only 3 qualified. By 2005, only 7 had 
qualified. GAP argued that such a qualification rate was too low, and hence there are only two firms 
who are known to have had orders from GAP US. Even then, GAP occupied only one to six percent 
of their production capacity. However, KHRC is not explicit about whether GAP‘s engagement is 
direct or indirect. It is likely that GAP has no direct links with Kenya and perhaps much of the rest 
of SSA. Its lower-end orders, archetypal of Kenya, are conducted through Asia.     
   
KAM also corroborates the above description of how the chain ‗touches ground‘ to small MuB firms: 
 
We team up with the other agencies in Kenya to promote [apparel exports] in the US by exhibitions. That is, 
pushing from below people who are not able to find markets themselves… When they [buyers] place the order 
here they place the order with, say, one firm. That firm we are telling it since it is a big order and it is needed in 
a short time, you subcontract to others. So that through subcontracting you are giving or sharing that benefit 
with others…. So, after subcontracting all the apparel is exported by the firm that subcontracted. But we know 
ourselves who manufactured for that firm (Kariuki, 2007). 
 
It is also instructive that there are no home workers in Kenya as is the case elsewhere, particularly in 
much of Asia. This is interesting given that the more upstream you analyse the chain, the more you 
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expect to find such workers. This is perhaps because Asian industry is embedded in social structures 
(albeit exploitative ones), while for SSA, industry seems not yet wholly part of society. 
 
Other characteristics of this insertion- according to a survey I had carried out in 2005 independently 
of the this study (see Kindiki, 2009)- are as follows: foreign owned firms in Kenya are either sole 
investments in the country or duplicates of similar ‗portable‘ firms in other countries with a central 
owner/parent company in Asia; the majority of firms maintain regular suppliers of Asian fabric; the 
most popular source of fabric is India, followed by Taiwan, Hong Kong and Pakistan, United Arab 
Emirates and Macau in that order; the most common way of securing orders comes through a buying 
office located in Asia; and discount chain stores are the most popular end market destinations.  
 
This kind of GVC insertion is what has been called ‗captive‘. ‗Captive‘ suppliers are frequently 
confined to a narrow range of tasks, mainly the simple assembly of imported inputs. Also, they are 
not dependent on lead firms for design, logistics, component purchasing or process technology 
upgrading (Gereffi et al, 2005).   
 
A final point- and perhaps following this insertion- is that ownership of firms is dominated by 
investors of Asian origin, or at least Kenyan nationals of Asian origin (Table 11 below). In 2003, for 
example, India and Sri Lanka were top on the list, which contradicts Gibbon‘s (2003) allusion that 
Kenyan apparel capital is dominated by the Gulf States, Sri Lanka and China. The dominance of 
Indian and Sri Lankan capital is not surprising. There is the fact that the business community in 
Kenya has traditionally been dominated by South Asians, particularly of Indian origin. Their 
dominance in the Kenyan industrial sector is traced to the building of the Kenya-Uganda railway. 
According to Sayer (1998) the British Empire had brought in 31 983 labourers from India. Most of 
them returned to India. However, 6 724 chose to stay on in East Africa, and most became traders, 
opening shops and small factories drawing on the experience of the Indian merchants and middlemen 
who had long operated on the East African coast (Sayer, 1998). Sayer goes on to say that as the 
country‘s modern economy expanded, some of them came to play a dominant economic role 
alongside the earlier Indian merchant class that had arisen out of East Africa‘s contact with Arab 
Peninsula traders in the 8th century AD.  
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Table 11: Apparel EPZ firm ownership, 2003 
Region/ Country  No. of Firms % Representation 
South Asia 
      India 
      Sri Lanka 
      50 % Bangladesh/ 
      50% India 
East Asia 
      Taiwan 
      China 
      Hong Kong 
US 
West Asia/Gulf (Bahrain) 
Kenya 
55% Kenya- 45% Qatar 
33% Kenya-67% India 
15% Kenya- 85% Taiwan 
16  
8 
7 
 
1 
6 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
55 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
7 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Source: Adapted from EPZA (2003b) 
 
Now, while most of these are Kenyan nationals, they still maintain strong family and other social 
connections with Asia, and this aided in pulling fellow Asians to take advantage of AGOA. Rolfe 
and Woodwands (2005) have also noted this. This strong connection with South Asia in general and 
India in particular could not be completely erased even by the fact that East Asian capital dominates 
the apparel industry globally, particularly where ‗preferential‘ provisions exist, or in the case of the 
MFA, where quota windows existed, as I showed in Chapter Two, particularly in section 2.3.3.2. In 
addition, the investment waves do not seem to have come in 2000 and 2001 as Gibbon asserts.  
Rather, they seem to have come in 2001 and 2002. Out of the 25 firms operating in 2005, 1 began 
operation in 1997, 8 in 2001 and the rest (16) in 2002 (EPZA, 2005b). 
 
What is more, the South Asia connection has some sort of diaspora links. This is an important 
dimension of IPE because such links constitute a kind of counterweight to the effect of the North 
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within GVCs. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Chinese economy has been successful is because of 
these linkages, which operate on principles which are not entirely those of normal capitalism (see 
Lam and Lee, 1992). They are therefore in many ways more resilient and adaptable. For example, the 
same capital was able to come back to Kenya after an initial trial somewhat failed. In the MFA-
related wave of 1993 investors came from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, while the AGOA wave of 
early 2000s was dominated by India and Sri Lanka. It has been argued that similar linkages can give a 
fillip to development in other regions of the South. The Kenyan link with South Asia therefore has 
this potential. The other side of the coin is that in Chapter Two I presented the Dependency leaning 
of this study, and I have to emphasise here that even if this could happen it would still be somewhat 
dependent on Asia.  
 
3.4 SUMMARY  
 
We have first seen how regimes on apparel have evolved. The GATT was born in 1947 and 
transformed into the WTO in 1995. Under the GATT, agreement was reached by a consensus 
dominated by the strongest economies. The WTO system is even more oppressive to the South than 
the GATT: consensus is still the norm, the WTO was launched as a single undertaking, the benefits 
extracted by the North far outweigh those the South can possibly extract, and non-discrimination 
and reciprocity remain oppressive to parts of the South that compete with central capitalism. The 
structural apparel regime took shape in the 1930s when the North began restricting cotton apparel 
imports mainly through Japanese ‗voluntary‘ exports. It was later replaced with the STA and the 
LTA under the GATT, in 1961 and 1962 respectively. The more comprehensive MFA that added 
manmade and wool products came into effect in 1974, still under the GATT. The ATC, under the 
WTO, phased out the MFA between 1995 and 2005. The EU neo-statist apparel regime, also 
nested within the GATT/WTO, began with technical aid programmes towards ACP countries in 
1957, followed by the GSP in 1975. In 2000, a transitional Cotonou Agreement initiated 
negotiations for EPA for non-LDC ACP countries by 2008. And, while the US neo-statist apparel 
regime, still nested within the GATT/WTO, was instituted in 1976, its effect in SSA was given a 
fillip by AGOA in 2000. Three further amendments to improve AGOA‘s effectiveness followed in 
2002, 2004 and 2006. However, AGOA came with a battery of eligibility criteria. The most 
important to this thesis is evidence for, or continual progress towards building evidence for, 
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upgrading labour standards. The regime on labour revolves around two forms: a ‗public‘ one 
revolving around the state, and a more recent ‗private‘ one that excludes the state to some extent. The 
‗public‘ form revolves around the ILO, and its most successful route is ILO‘s tripartism since 1919, 
as well as ILO‘s direct workings with corporations since 1960s. The other route, since the late 
1990s, is the WTO. The third ‗public‘ route, the PTA and FTAs, has also experienced relative 
success in the last few decades. The fourth successful ‗public‘ route, as old as the beginning of post-
War re-ordering, is that of categorising countries. The major developments that mark ‗private‘ 
policing of the regime are two. Firstly, unions formed WCCs in 1960s and 70s, TNCs instituted 
CSR in 1970s and the European Social Charter was adopted in 1992. Secondly, the loose social 
movement on labour has been vocal in the last few decades.  
 
Second, we argued that under regime instrumentality facet of these regimes, central capitalism‘s 
interest is keeping the periphery constantly in the same role, though in changing forms.  
 
Third, major trends in global production and trade in apparel in the last 50 years were shown to have 
developed in five phases: up to the 1960s under Japanese ‗voluntary‘ export restraints, the 1970s 
under the MFA, the 1980s under the MFA, the 1990s under the MFA and EU‘s outward processing 
arrangements (where, under the MFA, the first main wave of apparel exportism in Kenya was 
witnessed), and since 2000 under the MFA, liberalisation and US outward processing arrangements 
(where US AGOA was responsible for the second investment wave in Kenya). That was part one. 
 
In part two, we turned to the evolution of the apparel industry in Kenya. From the 1970s to about 
1985, the country was pursuing a successful ISI strategy. An attempt to foster exportism in early 
1980s through MuB flopped. Beginning in the mid 1980s, apparel ISI firms began collapsing. In 
their place, a second foundation of apparel exportism relying on foreign fabric under MuB and EPZs 
was built, beginning in 1989. A 1993 investment wave from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, escaping 
MFA quotas, and one following the 2000 RoO relaxation by AGOA, marked the two export 
oriented investment waves. Much of the apparel export segment is concentrated in the EPZs, nearly 
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100 percent of EPZ exports go to the US, and EPZ firms are the main players under AGOA. Whilst 
Kenya‘s exportism is small by global standards, it plays a significant role in SSA. Finally, apparel 
firms are inserted into the GVC in a ‗captive‘ way and are controlled by South Asian capital.  
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4 PRODUCT AND LABOUR UPGRADING 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter Two showed that the GVC analysis fails to theorise regimes. We then contended that 
elements of both structure and agency on both sides of the regime-dependency divide result in 
control-emergent regime governance that, as far as issue areas are concerned, overrides control lead 
firm governance. Such governance serves systemic interests of Northern accumulation, perpetuation 
of dependency and attainment of milieu goals. We saw the evolution and impact on global trade of 
these regimes in Chapter Three. In Chapter Five, we shall test both the extent to which actors 
demonstrate this governance, and the hypothesis that it was a sufficient condition to undermine 
upgrading in Kenya. This chapter will seek to answer our first key question: is there upgrading? In 
Dependency terms, have the opportunities offered by the ‗spreading‘ of capitalism been maximised? 
 
Part one will be on product upgrading, as export expansion, and as increased unit values. The latter 
will involve an analysis of local integration of the industry (analysing EU PTA RoO implementation 
and availability of local fabric and accessories), the extent of fabric value addition (by way of unit 
price comparison in the destination market, and an assessment of process technology) and an 
assessment of the success of folklore/ hand loomed/handmade product exports. Finally, integration 
into the GVC will be analysed; the extent to which the share of groups of products with higher 
values expands in the destination market, while that of products with lower values contracts. In part 
two, labour upgrading will be assessed in terms of implementation of AGOA labour conditionalities.  
 
4.2 PRODUCT UPGRADING: EXPORTS EXPANSION  
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
I will be engaged here in analysing product upgrading as export expansion. I will use data from the 
USOTEXA and UNSD-COMTRADE databases, and an extremely insignificant portion from 
Gibbon (2003: 1814). There are discrepancies between the two sources, but they are minor and are 
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unlikely to change the facts in any fundamental way. For example, USOTEXA has Kenya‘s 2005 
exports to the US as US$ 271 million, while UNSD-COMTRADE gives them as US$ 286 million.  
 
4.2.2 Exports Expansion  
 
Over 90 percent of apparel exports from SSA are accounted for by six countries, Kenya taking the 
fifth position (cumulative exports). Chart 10 below is based on UNSD-COMTRADE, and goes 
only as far back as 1999, the only available data covering all the 48 SSA countries‘ exports to the EU 
and the US. Exports to the US rose between 1999 and 2004, while those to the EU fell between 
1999 and 2002, and only rose in 2003 and 2004. All exports fell from 2005. Chart 11 that follows 
is based on data for the leading six suppliers. It has been enlarged to cover the whole period under 
study by incorporating data for 1992-1998. The chart confirms that over 90 percent of the imports 
in any given year shown in chart 10 were accounted for by the leading six countries. They accounted 
for between 93 and 96 percent for the period 1999-2005. Little wonder that the chart also shows 
the trajectory of trade between them and SSA as a whole in the previous chart to be almost identical.  
 
Mauritius accounts for the largest share of total SSA exports (Chart 12 below); for example, 40 
percent of cumulative exports between 1999 and 2005. Its leadership should be understood within 
social Darwinism in capitalism. However, at least at the time Mauritius‘ export oriented apparel 
industry was nascent in the 1970s, it was not Mauritius that was primarily involved in this social 
Darwinism but Hong Kong. It is in the context of the social Darwinism of the South of 
circumventing the restrictions in the North imposed by the MFA- as explained in section 3.2.1.2- 
that Mauritian apparel exportism emerged: Hong Kong moved part of its apparel production to the 
SSA island country (Cable, 1990; Gibbon, 2003; Morris, 2006).   
 
Following Mauritius at 18 percent is Madagascar. Since 1995, Madagascar has been SSA‘s second 
largest exporter. The dynamics surrounding Madagascar‘s emergence are similar to those of 
Mauritius: Mauritian firms relocated to Madagascar partly to look for quotas, and partly to get lower  
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Chart 10: Exports, 48 SSA countries to EU & US, 1999-2006 (millions US$) 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on UNSD-COMTRADE 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU  1012.2 1000.9 965.6 818.6 894.8 957.1 861.5
US 597.1 791.8 987.5 1174.9 1615.2 1864.1 1538.5 1330.8
EU & US 1609.3 1792.7 1953.1 1993.5 2510 2821.2 2400
0
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1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
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Chart 11: Exports, 6 leading SSA suppliers to EU & US, 1992-2006 (millions US$) 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on USOTEXA and Gibbon (2003:1814) (data for 1992-1998); UNSD-COMTRADE (data for 1999-2006) 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU 661.3 647.8 705.4 781.1 846.8 904.5 983.7 974.4 954.6 916.3 782.4 855.1 915.9 832.2
US 191.9 278.2 358.1 377 353.4 418.9 503.4 567.9 752.4 967.9 1137.3 1518.6 1701.6 1402.8 1257.9
EU & US 853.2 926 1063.5 1158.1 1200.2 1323.4 1487.1 1542.3 1707 1884.2 1919.7 2373.7 2617.5 2235
0
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Chart 12: Distribution of exports, leading SSA suppliers to EU & US, 1992-2005 (millions US$) 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on USOTEXA (data for 1992-1998); UNSD-COMTRADE (data for 1999-2005) 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Mauritius 655.3 674.2 718.8 774.7 790.8 854.3 940.9 914.9 889 852.2 854.4 910.6 880.2 726.4
Madagascar 18.7 48 95.5 129.2 159.4 193.4 241.5 277.2 357.7 428.2 229 357.6 543 518.4
Lesotho 69.6 69.7 76.2 74.5 77.9 90.8 100.9 111 148.1 227 344.3 420.2 482.9 409
South Africa 75.8 89.2 111.1 123.9 128.1 133.6 148 170.7 229.3 255 260 332.1 222.9 123.2
Kenya 26.2 35.4 46.5 44.1 32.6 36.2 39.5 44.7 48.4 70.7 136.4 203.3 298.9 289.4
Swaziland 23.8 34.5 51.1 95.6 149.9 189.6 168.64
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wages. While both indigenous and foreign firms relocated, it is mainly the latter that were involved in 
this relocation (see Gibbon 2003). Therefore, while Madagascar was more or less a beneficiary of the 
social Darwinism of Mauritius, the country‘s benefits are still connected to Hong Kong‘s movement 
in capitalism. This connection with Hong Kong is reflected in direct substitution of exports between 
Mauritius and Madagascar. While exports from both countries were growing at almost the same rate 
since 1992, a 9 percent drop in Mauritian performance between 1998 and 2001 is contrasted by a 
rather sharp 77 percent rise in the case of Madagascar.  
 
After Madagascar are Lesotho, South Africa, Kenya and Swaziland in that order. Kenya comes before 
South Africa in 2004 and 2005. The key point is that Kenya has upgraded as far as export expansion 
is concerned. Between 1992 and the peak of the growth in 2004, the expansion was 1 041 percent, 
and between 1992 and 2005- when all conditions of liberalisation had set in- the growth was 1 005 
percent.  
 
In Chart 12, while Mauritian and Madagascan exports (and to some extent South African) grew 
considerably for much longer than those of Lesotho and Kenya, the latter group accelerated 
beginning in 2001 (Madagascar falls in both groups). To unravel the distinction, I show how the 
leading countries share out the US and the EU markets. For this analysis, I will follow the periodic 
divisions A, B and C (see conceptual model).  
 
4.2.2.1 Phase A (1992-2001): Growth and Dominance of EU-Destined Exports 
 
Total exports to the EU and the US rose in Phase A. They grew cumulatively by 21 percent in the 
1999-2001 period (Chart 10), while those of the leading six countries grew by 121 percent in the 
1992-2001 period (Chart 11). Dynamics for each of the destination markets, however, diverge 
greatly.  
 
Between 1992 and 1998, EU imports from the leading SSA suppliers rose by 49 percent. With 
initial arrangements to have AGOA in place sometime around 1998, however, these imports began 
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experiencing a decline. This is because AGOA favoured SSA countries exporting to the US market in 
terms of both duty and double transformation RoO exemption. Between 1999 and 2001, the 
imports dropped by six percent, and between 1992 and 2001, their growth was 39 percent (Chart 
11). To locate Kenya in this trade, I will disaggregate the data even further.  
 
Chart 13 below shows that the Lomé Conventions were responsible for the emergence of Mauritius 
and Madagascar- through the dynamics explained earlier on Hong Kong‘s social Darwinism- and to 
some extent South Africa, in that order of importance. However, Mauritius is far ahead of the other 
two. For Madagascar, however, the conventions are not entirely responsible for all of its growth: the 
role of Hong Kong firms in Mauritius and Madagascar in the substitution of exports can be seen 
here as well. A 7 percent drop in Mauritian EU exports between 1998 and 2000 is contrasted with 
an 11 percent rise on the part of Madagascar in the same period. However, this is not by any means 
the expected sharp rise that corresponds to the 77 percent rise in total exports between 1998 and 
2001, despite the fact that the drop in Mauritian exports is slightly more severe than its drop in total 
exports. It is therefore definite that much of the 77 percent growth in total Malagasy exports was on 
account of AGOA‘s expectations, and therefore directed to the US. The cases for the other countries 
are as follows. South Africa is the third best performer in this set of exports and its performance 
remained almost constant. Next is Lesotho. While its emergence could be attributed to the Lomé 
Conventions, Lesotho exports an insignificant quantity. Concerning the focus of my research, Kenya, 
the trend is quite similar to that of Lesotho; as it is for Swaziland. The point: Kenya is not a 
beneficiary of the EU-based regime in this phase. 
 
Let us now deal with US-destined exports. One of the most striking observations is that, while trade 
for the two set of exports had been rising between 1992 and 1998, US-destined exports were 
growing faster than EU-destined exports. Between 1992 and 2001, US-destined exports from the six 
leading suppliers rose by 404 percent, compared to the EU‘s 39 percent. Further, while the latter 
dropped by 6 percent between 1999 and 2001, the former increased even more, by 92 percent (see 
Chart 11). What explains this dynamic? Among other reasons, LDCs were exempted from the 
double transformation RoO. During this period, the LDCs were Madagascar, Lesotho and Kenya. 
Thus the changes (rise) in exports for the US-destined exports should be understood within this 
context.  
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Chart 13: Distribution of exports, 6 leading SSA suppliers to EU, 1992-2006 (millions US$) 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on UNSD-COMTRADE   
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Lesotho 18.3 14.7 13.5 12.6 12.7 4.5 0.8 0.2 1.7 3.4 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.8
Kenya 17.4 10.3 7.1 6.3 3.3 2.6 2.3 2.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.5 3.3 3.1
Madagascar 18.5 46.3 92.6 122 147.7 177.1 218 228.5 242.3 240.1 132.3 145.8 197.2 224.7
Mauritius 533.9 501 518.8 573.3 616 658 693.2 668.9 629.6 599.8 582.4 624.3 640.4 550.8
Swaziland 0.6 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.04
South Africa 73.2 75.5 73.4 66.9 67.1 62.3 69.4 73.5 78.2 70.5 64.4 82.1 72.8 52.8
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Chart 14: Distribution of exports, 6 leading SSA suppliers to US, 1992-2006 (millions US$) 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on USOTEXA (data for 1992-98) and UNSD-COMTRADE (data for 1999-2006)  
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Lesotho 51.3 55 62.7 61.9 65.2 86.3 100.1 110.8 146.4 223.6 342.4 419 481.8 408.2 407.1
Kenya 8.8 25.1 39.4 37.8 29.3 33.6 37.2 42 46.7 69 135.2 201.8 295.6 286.3 278.6
Madagascar 0.2 1.7 2.9 7.2 11.7 16.3 23.5 48.7 115.4 188.1 96.7 211.8 345.8 293.7 253.8
Mauritius 121.4 173.2 200 201.4 174.8 196.3 247.7 246 259.4 252.4 272 286.3 239.8 175.6 125.3
Swaziland 7.6 9.5 15.4 11.7 11.4 15.1 16.3 23.2 33.4 50.3 95.4 149.7 188.5 168.6 142.1
South Africa 2.6 13.7 37.7 57 61 71.3 78.6 97.2 151.1 184.5 195.6 250 150.1 70.4 51
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On distribution among leading countries (Chart 14 above), Mauritius is still dominating, but there is 
substantial challenge from Lesotho and South Africa, and, between 1999 and 2001, Madagascar. 
Mauritian exports slump in 1995 as a corollary of US quotas (as we saw in section 3.3.2.2, Kenya 
was also affected by these quotas). While Kenya and Swaziland suffered a slowdown between 1995 
and 1996 they are on their recovery path in 1997, if somewhat sluggishly. A casual projection of the 
graph indicates that, if Kenya had not been slapped with quota restrictions, it would have overtaken 
Lesotho in 1999 to emerge as the second leading exporter to the US. As will be seen below, Lesotho 
overtook Mauritius when AGOA set in. As will be seen later, dynamics surrounding Lesotho‘s rise 
are similar to those surrounding Kenya, except for the 1994 quota restrictions, and hence there is no 
reason why Kenya could not have ultimately emerged as the leader. The point is that Kenya‘s early 
dynamism under the US regime was curtailed by the quota restrictions.       
 
4.2.2.2 Phase B (2002-2004): Growth and Dominance of US-Destined Exports 
 
Total exports to US and EU continued to rise in Phase B and reached their peak (Chart 10), a 44 
percent cumulative growth between 2001 and 2004. A slip in Madagascar in 2002 slowed the 
growth. Madagascar was affected by contested election results in 2001. This development reinforces 
my earlier contention of export substitution between Mauritius and Madagascar, signalling the 
connection of these two countries‘ apparel firms with the expansion of Hong Kong apparel firms 
since at least the 1970s. When the crisis hit Madagascar, leading to a drop, Mauritius, which had 
been experiencing a decline since 1998, arrested its slowdown until at least 2003. Madagascan firms 
transferred orders to Mauritius where they had sister factories. This can be seen in Chart 12. 
However, as I have showed already and as will continue to emerge, there is evidence that a Mauritius 
gain in that year was attributed partly to this crisis and partly to AGOA. Moreover, this substitution 
means that had Kenya had strong links with Asian social Darwinism and arrested its drop like 
Mauritius did, there are chances that Kenya would be the leading SSA apparel exporter to the US by 
2004. Between 2001 and 2004, the leading six countries‘ exports grew by 39 percent (Chart 11).  
 
EU-destined exports dropped slightly in 2002, and recovered slightly in 2003 and 2004 (Chart 11). 
Again, the drop in 2002 is due to Madagascar‘s poor performance. On distribution among the six 
leading countries, Mauritius still leads, followed by Madagascar and South Africa (Chart 13). 
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Lesotho is overtaken by Kenya in 2003 and Swaziland is still last. There is no substitution between 
Mauritius and Madagascar. Thus the substitution observed in total EU and US exports was 
restricted to the US. South Africa‘s performance is still constant between 2002 and 2004. In 2002 
Kenya experiences a further drop, but this is reversed in 2003 and 2004. Lesotho‘s performance is 
poor and is on a par with Swaziland in 2004. Swaziland exports an insignificant amount in 2002 and 
2003 (below US$ 1 million). We see here that Kenya is still not making use of the EU ‗preferences‘. 
 
US-destined exports had a rapid 76 percent growth in three years (2002-4) (Chart 11). In contrast 
to the previous phase, changes in country share are dramatic (Chart 14). Mauritius was recognised as 
an LDC in 2004. Even then, it is outshined by Lesotho, Madagascar and Kenya. Swaziland also 
overtakes South Africa. The catalyst for these dynamics was AGOA‘s RoO exemption. The rates of 
growth for the dynamic countries were quite high. Lesotho grew by 115 percent, Madagascar by 84 
percent and Kenya by 329 percent. Mauritius dropped by 5 percent, Swaziland grew by 278 percent, 
while South Africa dropped by 19 percent. Conclusion: Kenya gets a reprieve from the US quotas, 
and takes advantage of AGOA‘s RoO exemption to top the rate of growth.    
 
4.2.2.3. Phase C (2005-2007): Decline of both EU and US-Destined Exports 
 
The greatest effect felt in this phase is the decline of both EU and US-destined exports. Under the 
10-year transitional ATC, global trade in apparel was ‗liberalised‘ in 2005. This gave a competitive 
edge to low-cost producers in Asia and elsewhere, in particular China. SSA began losing its share of 
exports, affecting the operations of the two sets of exports. In 2005, SSA exports dropped by 15 
percent (Chart 10). Leading suppliers‘ exports also dropped by 15 percent (Chart 11).  
 
Declining exports to the EU seen in the previous phase continued in this phase; in addition to the 
post-ATC effect. Imports into the EU slipped by 9 percent in 2005 (Chart 11). All leading suppliers 
except Madagascar experienced a drop (Chart 13). Swazi‘s drop was 96 percent, South Africa‘s was 
28 percent, Lesotho‘s was 27 percent, Mauritius‘ was 14 percent, Kenya‘s was 6 percent and 
Malagasy‘s growth was 14 percent. Also, Swaziland relinquished its tie with Lesotho to take the sixth 
position. The point: even under liberalisation, Kenya is unable to export under the EU-based regime.  
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While US exports continued to dominate, they dropped by 26 percent (Chart 11). Kenya overtakes 
Madagascar to emerge the second largest SSA exporter, and Swaziland overtakes Mauritius to emerge 
the fourth largest exporter. Lesotho and South Africa retain their rankings as the largest and the sixth 
largest exporters respectively. Ranking corresponds to the rate of slump: the top three countries, 
enjoying the largest share, experienced a lesser drop. Lesotho‘s drop was 16 percent, Kenya‘s was 6 
percent, Madagascar‘s was 27 percent, Swazi‘s was 25 percent, Mauritius‘ was 48 percent and South 
Africa‘s was 66 percent (Chart 14). The average drop for the first three countries was 16 percent, 
while that for the last three was 46 percent. Therefore, in 2007, Kenya was the second most dynamic 
country in respect of US-destined exports, with the highest rate of growth. In addition, it is the most 
resilient to post-ATC competition, experiencing the least slump from among the leading six.  
 
4.3 PRODUCT UPGRADING: MOVEMENT FROM ASSEMBLY TO OEM 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, I will employ four approaches to analyse product upgrading as increased unit value. 
The overall proxy will be movement from simple assembly of imported inputs to OEM. I will be 
using proxies because it is virtually impossible to calculate the actual value added. Rolfe and 
Woodward attempt to do so, but reach a cul-de-sac. They note that, while EPZs import data in 
Kenya is available, unlike for much of SSA, it is not separated into components, and plant and 
equipment. Since the latter could be substantial, especially if a company is still being set up, this can 
warp the results greatly. Instead, they assess ‗local input expenditures‘, which ‗better indicate an EPZ 
company‘s contribution to the Kenyan economy (along with wages)‘ (Rolfe and Woodward, 2005: 
18). In a word, EPZ firms do not divulge the important information necessary for this exercise. 
  
Firstly, I will consider the extent to which the apparel industry is locally integrated in Kenya. One 
proxy will be a general assessment of whether or not the EU PTA RoO was implemented. This will 
be supplemented by another proxy, the assessment of the extent to which the local supply chain is 
supplying the EPZ export firms with fabric and accessories, the main raw materials. Local integration 
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might be questioned by some by arguing that the North has, at least in the earlier forms of IDL, 
dominated the global system because it was processing imported raw materials. However, unlike 
LICs, the North controlled technology, and hence it appropriated value. Others may say that this 
may be different today when most of the value accrues to brand holders; that what counts is 
occupying a strategic place within the overall process, not necessarily uniting all the phases within 
your frontiers. However, while local integration might not be the most competitive upgrading option, 
firms in LICs are excluded from both pre-assembly chain functions and post-assembly ones that 
possess much of product upgrading. Therefore, one of the options left for such firms is to upgrade 
their local supply chain, however limited upgrading this might be. 
 
Next, I will consider the extent to which the fabric is added value, even if it is imported. This 
somewhat flips the above argument. While both local integration and fabric value addition are less 
lucrative upgrading options, the former has better prospects. This is because ideally, the assembly 
stage is assigned very little value in the chain, and that is why export enclaves, such as EPZs, are 
established- to add this minimum value. Value addition is also bound to be fraught with technology 
transfer restrictions. Therefore, what Rolfe and Woodward mean by local input expenditures being a 
‗better indication‘ of EPZs‘ contribution to the Kenyan economy than assembly stage value addition 
calculations is, I believe, that, while the value created at assembly stage would be the same whether 
inputs are local or imported (assuming their cost would be the same), additional value would be 
created within a country‘s textile-apparel sector if inputs were local. But, since I am also interested in 
a proxy for value addition at assembly stage, I will carry out a unit price comparison with other 
supplier countries in the destination market, taking into account the cost of production. To 
complement this, I will also assess the state of technology of machinery, as it tells us the extent to 
which the fabric can be transformed. However, we will not assess the extent to which technological 
changes have taken place. We only wish to avoid introducing another dimension- process upgrading 
seen as ‗introduction of superior technology‘, which is outside the confines of this thesis.  
 
The third way I will look at it is the possibility of the export of indigenous products that are wholly 
Kenyan in raw material composition and technology of manufacture. The argument for this proxy is 
the same as for local integration.  
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Finally, I will examine the rise/ decline of the share in the destination market of the top half of 
products ranked in value, vis a vis that of the bottom half. This is upgrading/ downgrading 
irrespective of whether a country is exporting low or high value products. The margin of upgrading 
for the leading five products in each of the halves will also be shown, and a comparison with Chinese 
categories limited in the North carried out. This last approach is primarily concerned with 
approximating a country‘s changing integration into a GVC (see UNCTAD, 2007). I will use 
USOTEXA data because UNSD-COMTRADE data is not as disaggregated as USOTEXA data for 
this purpose. I believe it is safe to rely on data from USOTEXA and still make a strong case for the 
upgrading trend in the Kenyan industry because, as I have pointed out severally, as a corollary of 
AGOA‘s RoO exemption, Kenyan exports grew disproportionably in favour of the US.  
 
4.3.2 Local Integration  
 
4.3.2.1 RoO Implementation  
 
To receive duty reduction, exports to the EU had to meet the RoO condition. Implementation of the 
RoO means that products have greater value added, which, according to the upgrading model, is 
upgrading seen as ‗increasing unit value of products as a result of RoO implementation‘. It is 
reasonable to believe that the rule was enforced. For instance, at one point Germany had warned 
Kenya that ‗[t]he EC is concerned to protect its textile and garment industry against excessive 
imports…. Repeated attempts have been made in the past to undermine the WTA by manipulating 
certificates of origin. Strong measures are used to combat such manipulations…‘ (Nacken, 1982: 
48). This simply means that exports from SSA under the regime had higher local value added given 
that the material for the apparel was processed in Kenya to a ‗sufficient extent‘, that is, spun, knit, 
dyed and sewed in the country (see section 3.2.1.3). When AGOA introduced such a ‗preference‘ for 
US-destined exports, LDCs were exempted from the RoO. Most countries, including Kenya, chose 
to import all the fabric, and hence their exports had less value compared to EU-destined exports. 
 
It is clear that during Phase B of the above analysis three distinct groups of countries emerged: those 
gaining from only the less lucrative US-destined exports (Lesotho, Kenya, Swaziland and South 
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Africa), those gaining from both the more lucrative EU-destined and the less lucrative US-destined 
exports (Madagascar), and those gaining mainly from the more lucrative EU-destined exports 
(Mauritius). The overall conclusion therefore is that, since Kenya was gaining from only the US 
regime, the country‘s exports were generally lower-added value products, since it was importing the 
fabric (from Asia). This leads us to the complementary assessment of the source of the fabric.  
 
4.3.2.2 Local Fabric and Accessories Supply 
 
We saw in section 3.3.2.1 that during the ISI era in the 1960s and early 1970s, there was minimal 
link between apparel making and fabric making, although both existed. Government intervention in 
1977, however, integrated the textile-apparel sector, an integration that peaked in the early 1980s 
when the integrated sector accounted for 30 percent manufacturing labour force and employed 200 
000 farming households. In section 3.3.2.2 we saw that as a result of liberalising the economy, ISI 
firms began crumbling, beginning in the mid 1980s, so that by 1997, the production index for 
apparel firms was barely higher than its level before the 1977 protection, and by 2001 the textile-
apparel sector had only six integrated mills and two spinners.  
 
What this means for this section is that by the time exportism arrived, the link initiated in 1977 had 
atrophied. According to KAM, all the cotton fabric used in manufacturing export apparel today is 
imported. All other raw materials for fabric, such as wool, viscose, polyester, nylon and acrylic are 
also imported, except for some quantity of wool (KAM, 2006).  
 
This is corroborated by USOTEXA data by calculating the reliance of exports on foreign fabric 
(measured as the ratio of apparel exports from foreign fabric to total apparel exports). The reliance 
has been increasing over time. It was 80 percent in 2001, 96 percent in 2002, 94 percent in 2003 
and 98 percent in 2004. According to Table 12 below, it was 98 percent in July 2005, and had 
reached 99 percent by November 2005. When apparel exports under AGOA are considered (ratio of 
row six against row four), all such apparel has invariably relied on foreign fabric. This fabric is Asian, 
and this reliance undermined possible initiatives for local integration. 
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Table 12: Apparel exports, Kenya to US, 2005-7, selected aspects 
     YE* 
Dec 2006 
YE 
Jan 2006 
YE 
Dec  
2005 
YE 
Nov 2005 
YE  
Jul 2005 
Total imports of apparel     262.905 261.446     270.557    275.344 275.098 
9802.00.8065 Articles 
assembled from any  
fabric cut in the US (807) 
  
 
 
 
 
#     
  
0.000 
 
0.000      
 
 
0.000      
  
0.000 
(AGOA) imports under the Trade and Development Act of 2000... (total of items below)     
 
## 
 
258.113     
 
266.599     
 
271.263 
 270.219 
9819.11.09 Apparel from regional fabric from US or African yarn   
 
 
 
#      
 0.000 0.000       
 
0.000      
 0.000 
9819.11.12 Apparel from foreign fabric made in a lesser developed country     
 
## 
 
258.113    266.599    
 
271.263 
 
270.219 
* Year Ending #Data missing at the time of writing but most possibly 0.000 ##Data missing at the time of writing  
Source: Author‘s based on USOTEXA  
 
Because EPZs do not use local fabric, investigating what happens upstream in the chain is not very useful. This is because our focus is the export segment, 
and EPZs dominate the segment. For example, EPZs accounted for at least 83 percent of AGOA and 80 percent of total exports in 2002. However, we 
will endeavour to assess what public policy-related initiatives on the issue have achieved. Although this will touch on the role of local institutions, 
particularly the state, in upgrading, that will not be the focus. The focus will be to ascertain progress in developing local supply of fabric. I will also assess 
domestic input expenditure focussing on accessories (labels, ravels, thread, dyes, buttons, zips et cetera). My research unearthed that over the period under 
study (1992-2007) there have been three main studies to investigate the extent of integrated apparel production in Kenya with a view of informing policy.  
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In 1991-2 MoTI commissioned Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS)- an arm of World 
Bank‘s International Finance Corporation- to conduct a diagnostic study of the backward linkage 
environment in Kenya. FIAS looked at four sectors, textile-apparel among them. In the textile-apparel 
sector, it observed broken linkages in three areas relevant to this study. The provision of cotton to 
manufacturers was uncertain. Cotton crop yields had declined because farmers had been unable to 
access improved seeds, sprayers and insecticides. Then there was a split between inward oriented 
manufacturers who engaged in substantial backward linkages and those who were export oriented, 
engaged in little backward linkages. A key reason for the split was that Kenya produces medium 
staple, medium strength cotton of lower quality, resulting in the production of lower quality fabrics 
and linen. Consequently, MuB firms imported higher quality fabrics for their exports. The third 
broken linkage was the tendency to export yarn because it fetched higher profits through a 20 
percent export compensation scheme27 rather than sell it to the domestic market as input to the 
production of fabrics and increase the local value added (FIAS, 1992).  
 
In the second study, the EU programme for Kenya (EU, 2003) carried out an assessment of the 
international competitiveness and value adding opportunities in the Kenyan cotton industry. It also 
identified the first two broken linkages above and added lack of cost advantage. On cost advantage, 
regarding the textile chain segment from spinning to production of fabrics, the report noted that 
labour is of minor importance and contributes less than 10 percent to total costs. More important 
factors were given as raw materials and other inputs like dyes and electricity. Electricity is more 
expensive in Kenya than in competing countries, such as China or India. In addition the productivity 
in such countries is higher than in Kenya; hence a further lower unit costs there. The report 
concluded that Kenya has no comparative cost advantage to produce yarn or dyed fabrics, 
audaciously recommending that ‗it makes no sense for the Government to intervene in this sector or 
for example to subsidise the electricity‘. Concerning apparel production, AGOA benefits were seen to 
be able to, for the time being, offset the low labour productivity, which was 10 to 30 percent lower 
in Kenya than in India and Sri Lanka. It recommended also that there was no need to intervene in 
                                                     
27 Between 1974 and 1980, the compensation was 10 percent, and before 1974, refunds were made in certain 
circumstances (where the final product was exported, total duty remission was possible) (Ryan, 1974). 
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apparel manufacturing. Instead, the Government should have been concentrating on lobbying for the 
prolongation of AGOA. 
 
The third and final study was conducted by researchers from the state public policy think tank- 
Kenya Institute for Public Policy and Analysis- and it has been reproduced in Ikiara and Ndirangu 
(2004). Most of the findings are similar to those of FIAS and the EU, the additional issue being 
Northern cotton subsidies. The authors carried out a survey among 133 cotton farmers and their 
input suppliers in different parts of the country. The results showed that, since the collapse of the 
textile-apparel integrated sector following liberalisation of the economy in 1986, cotton production 
is still very low, and ginneries have very low utilisation rates. The bottlenecks were found to be low 
yields (compared to those of West and Central Africa, Africa generally, Pakistan, Mexico, Israel and 
the world average), high cost of production, and low and declining prices (mainly due to subsidies to 
cotton farmers in the North). The same was found with lint production. 11 ginneries were surveyed. 
Although they meet the minimum technology requirements, some lack drying and moisture 
restoration devices, and hence the lint they produce is of poor quality, with imperfections and lack of 
smooth appearance. Obstacles faced included high cost and the unreliability of electricity. Regarding 
yarn spinning and fabric manufacture, there is inadequate investment in spinning, weaving, and fabric 
finishing operations. Technology is also poor, and the locally produced fabric is of low quality with a 
high price. 2 spinning firms, 7 integrated mills and 13 apparel firms were interviewed in Nairobi, 
Mombasa, Nakuru, Nanyuki, and Athi River. Among the most important constraints included high 
cost of electricity, contamination of local lint and lack of qualified labour. Lastly, they looked at 
apparel manufacturing. 13 firms were interviewed in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Nanyuki and Athi 
River. This part of the chain was the only one found to be thriving, thanks to AGOA and its 
‗generosity‘ in the RoO exemption. Obstacles cited were high cost of electricity, poor infrastructure, 
interruption of electricity and water supply, poor quality and inadequate supply of skilled labour, 
transport costs, uncertainties concerning AGOA, and political and economic uncertainties. Buyer 
control of the chain was also cited, as Kenyan firms lack the power to decide on price and design.  
 
The study concluded that in theory, the alternative to local production of fabric would be sourcing it 
from the US or SSA, as the RoO will demand, once implemented. The authors argued that in 
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practice, sourcing it from US would double its current cost. Sourcing it from the rest of SSA 
wouldn‘t be possible either. This is because SSA countries with more developed textile industries, 
such as South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana, are not able to meet even their own demand, along 
with the fact that their fabric lacks the variety and quality required for international markets. The 
study proposed regional division of labour within EAC and/or the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), where Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi could concentrate on seed 
cotton production, which they are efficient in, and leave the textile-apparel sector to Kenya. However, 
they precipitately added that Uganda may offer a challenge to take manufacture of textile-apparel, 
given its relatively lower electricity cost. In summary, their recommendations were two: capacity 
building in the lower parts of the local chain, and exploitation of the different comparative 
advantages in the region. The former would involve the establishment of a representative apex 
institution to coordinate the chain, strengthening institutional support and cost reducing 
interventions, including research and development, and addressing the key cost drivers at each part of 
the chain, among others. The latter include strategic alliances with regional partners, regional 
frameworks to facilitate sharing of expertise, information and infrastructure, and general commitment 
to regionalism.   
 
These studies are not encouraging because UNIDO's position is that the nature and extent of 
linkages between industrial activities in the zones and those in the domestic economy is probably the 
key issue concerning EPZs. In theory, the linkage with the local fabric supply chain is the most 
important. However, the studies seem to ignore that UNIDO had long ago, in 1980, identified that 
the nature of production processes in EPZs will always be expected to limit backward linkages, 
noting that the only ‗major linkages with the host country economy concern…service-oriented 
activities… [and] multiplier effects through the expanded incomes of the labour force, primarily 
through the purchase of host country consumption goods‘ (UNIDO, 1980: 25). UNIDO explained 
that EPZ backward linkages with domestic production activities are limited partly due to the special 
concessions for importing inputs, the close affiliation with foreign capital, the type of manufacturing 
activity and the undeveloped character of most host economies. However, UNIDO adds that this 
situation can be improved. 
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However, it seems GoK has failed to improve it. As said before, the quality of Kenyan cotton does 
not meet international standards. That is why it is processed in local ginneries and sold to local 
textile industries for use as fibre. Even if it did meet the standards, while in the 1980s cotton lint 
production stood at 70 000 bales per annum, currently the country produces only about 20 000 
bales of lint per annum (2002 figure), yet the 24 local ginneries in existence have an installed 
capacity of 140 000 bales (KAM, 2006). Since local requirements stand at 120 000 bales, the 
shortfall is met by imports from Uganda and Tanzania (KAM, 2006; see also Mugambi, 2006).  
 
The only tangible initiative is that from 2005, GoK has been allocating KShs 250 million (about 
US$ 3.3 million, October 2008 exchange rates) annually for the revival of cotton farming. It was 
expected to improve cotton production in 2006 to 40 000 bales per annum (MoTI, Department of 
Industries, 2006). The rest of the efforts, according to the Industrial Officer in charge of AGOA at 
MoTI, have remained as mere proposals, including a vital one of setting aside a credit scheme for 
indigenous capitalists to invest in upgrading the entire local supply chain (Rono, 2007). 
 
Finally, my interview with the case study firm General Manager revealed that most accessories are 
imported from Asia, mainly from China (Isinga, 2007). I corroborated this finding from EPZA data. 
From among the 25 firms operating in 2005, 8 had literally no local input expenditure. Of the 17 
that had this component, none sourced fabric (and capital goods) locally. All that was sourced were 
accessories, amounting to KShs 559 million (approximately US$ 8.1 million, November 2007 
exchange rates), which is four percent of total exports for that year (see Kindiki, 2009; appendix I).   
 
4.3.3 Fabric Value Addition 
 
4.3.3.1 Comparison of Prices at Destination Market 
 
Whether or not the fabric is imported, we can still evaluate the extent to which it has been added 
value by carrying out a price comparison in the destination market. For all products, I will investigate 
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wholesale prices (volume earnings) in the period 2004-6, concentrating on 2005-6. In 2005, the 
average value per M2 ranked Kenya fifth. Mauritius had the highest (US$ 5.7 million), followed by 
Madagascar (US$ 4.4 million), then Lesotho (US$ 4.1 million) and South Africa (US$ 4.0 million) 
in that order. From the leading 6 suppliers, Kenya‘s value (at US$ 3.7 million) was only higher than 
Swaziland‘s (at US$ 2.9 million). In 2006, Kenya‘s value moved from 3.7 to 4.0, but still remained 
at position five, with a value only higher than Swaziland‘s (see also Kindiki, 2006; 2009).  
 
The above findings corroborate Rolfe and Woodward‘s (2005) argument that Kenya‘s leading 
products are definitely of low value. The authors compared US retail prices per one dozen of the 
leading category in Kenya, Mauritius and Swaziland- Women‘s Trousers (Other Cotton, Not Knit) 
(see appendix J for the categories with at least 1 000 M2 between 2003 and 2005). A dozen from 
Kenya was US$ 68.30, which, although higher than Swaziland‘s US$ 60.57, was lower than 
Mauritius‘ US$ 80.69. They also show that the unit prices for Kenya‘s leading 152 subcategories 
were 74.6 and 91.6 percent of China‘s and India‘s respectively.  
 
This may seem to suggest that Kenya was producing apparel at lower costs than Mauritius, China 
and India. However, the authors refute this possibility. Their view is supported by my fieldwork data 
in the views expressed by EPZA officials (Chesang, 2007; Bii, 2007), entrepreneurs (Isinga, 2007), 
business association (Kariuki, 2007) and MoTI (Rono, 2007). They confessed that the cost of 
production in Kenya is higher than in most Asian countries, and that the main reason why most firms 
were operating in the EPZ was to take advantage of AGOA provisions. If that is so, it is unlikely that 
the country would be more competitive than Asia in this respect, keeping all other factors (including 
duty concessions) constant. The plausible explanation is that, as established by Rolfe and 
Woodward, Kenyan apparel exports involve simpler design, with less embroidery and minimal 
ornamentation. This is corroborated further by the next section on the state of production process 
technology. 
 
4.3.3.2 State of Process Technology    
 
UNIDO (1980) advises that only a limited transfer of technology can be expected through EPZs. 
This is because the zones are involved in assembly activities using general machinery, leaving behind 
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both the pre-assembly stages requiring advanced technology and related research, and development 
activities, in the centre. And even if complex modern techniques are used in EPZs, UNIDO submits 
that the host country does not automatically have access to them.  
 
According to my research (Kindiki, 2006), firms have only the basic technology for assembly, with 
minimal flexibility. The research suggested that whenever there has been a major investment in new 
technology, it has been as a way of catching up with the basic technology at the start up stage for any 
apparel firm to effectively participate in lower-end assembly of inputs. The only apparent evidence of 
superior technology is EPZA‘s statement that a 12 percent decrease in EPZ exports to US in 2005, 
accompanied by a 22 percent increase in investment, was ‗as a result of [apparel] enterprises investing 
in value adding machinery such as fashion, washing capacity, sandblasting embroidery and others‘ 
(EPZA, 2005b: 17) (see also MoTI, External Trade Department, ca. 2006b). This technology still 
falls within the confines of assembly operations. To this end, therefore, Kenyan firms constantly 
update their assembly process technology, and are competitive in this respect. Indeed according to my 
survey, some firms had bought new assembly machines as recently as January 2006. Hence their 
assembly role seems not to have been affected by the MFA phase out.  
 
Considering labour as part of production process, my survey (Kindiki, 2006) revealed that its 
flexibility is mixed. Labour flexibility in capitalism is double faced. One face is the maximisation of 
skills of the labourer to increase productivity; without necessarily increasing wages. The survey 
unearthed that lack of flexibility has contributed to low productivity. This is to say that Kenya 
apparel EPZs have not maximised the exploitation of a multi-skilled labour force. While there is 
regular training of production workers and supervisory staff, there exists no specialised training for 
technological skills transfer. Even for the existing product lines, training takes place immediately after 
recruitment as an induction, to familiarise the workers with the operations in the factory.  
 
EPZA reports cite training in such areas as production management, financial management, in house 
training in stitching, sewing, cutting, screen printing, formulation of apparel washing chemicals, fire 
fighting and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (EPZA, 2003b; 2004a). Appendix K 
has these details. These skills range from some relatively technical ones (such as production 
management) to basic ones (such as sewing) to those obliquely related to production (such as fire 
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fighting). From EPZA‘s list, it can be argued that the main training is in basic skills. There was a 
promise by the US to fund an AGOA manufacturing centre for East Africa, whereby among other 
things, workers would be trained (see Kathuri, 2005). My survey underscored the fact that it is still 
unclear what the centre would be training in, but there is great likelihood that it might not go any 
further beyond such basic skills. This is because low apparel assembly may not require any special 
skill levels. Also, the survey showed that, related to this face of flexibility, unlike in Asia and perhaps 
elsewhere, Kenyan firms do not employ the piece rate system. Instead, they argued that they would 
rather increase production efficiency among the labour force by administering attendance bonuses, 
strict supervision and correct reward system.  
 
However, Protex attempts to motivate labour by setting wages just above the statutory minimum. 
 
…it is better even to pay well and give good quality… a place whereby you find that the workers are not well 
paid, or are paid below the minimum wage, it will be very difficult for you to sustain the buyer… Because the 
moment the buyer receives the finished garments in the USA, and they are of poor quality, that is the end of 
it… Cheap labour can be very expensive…if you are not being paid well there is no motivation… for you to 
succeed…pay above the minimum… Number two, if you are not paying well it lowers the productivity. 
Because somebody is working assuming that even if I work very hard these people are still underpaying me… 
we pay above that because we have what we call grading allowance… (Isinga, 2007). 
 
The other face of flexibility is the hiring and retrenching of labour. According to KHRC, GoK 
collaborated with IFIs by formulating flexible labour laws in response to the institutions‘ labour-
related conditionalities and recommendations, such as those contained in the SAPs. Among other 
things, GoK embraced ‗suppression of trade unions…[as the recommendations] circumvented the 
requirement of union involvement in the redundancy of workers…[for they] introduced the concept 
of retrenchment and gave employers exclusive, unequivocal and unbridled power to hire and fire 
workers‘ (KHRC, 2005: 4-5, 18). This was effected through the amendments in the Finance Act 
No. 4 of 1994, which effectively led to amendments of provisions of the Employment Act and the 
Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act. Hence my 2006 survey showed that 
Kenyan EPZ labour is flexible in this respect; workers are hired and fired regularly, and when they 
lose their jobs, in most cases, it is on flimsy grounds.  
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With such a state of process technology, it is clear that value addition is minimal. Still, if folklore/ 
hand loomed/handmade products could be exported, materials for such products would generate 
substantial value addition, especially if the products are marketed as niche. Has this happened? 
 
4.3.4 Export of Folklore/ Hand loomed/ Handmade Products 
 
MoTI and KAM are right in asserting that liberalisation increases opportunities for such folklore/ 
hand loomed/handmade products as Maasai Shuka and Kikoi. The market does not have to be 
exclusively Northern (Manyara, 2007; Kariuki, 2007). 
 
Despite these rather positive ideas about Kenya developing niche folklore/ hand loomed/handmade 
products, a close examination of USOTEXA data reveals a totally different picture. The US 
Harmonised Tariff Schedule (HTS) has 35 folklore/ hand loomed/handmade categories. Out of 
these, Kenya has exported under only three. Furthermore, the last one, which is the most dominant, 
does not fall under Textile and Textile Articles (Chapter 52 to Chapter 63) (see Table 13 below). It 
falls under Chapter 65 (headgear and parts thereof), which is under Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, 
Walking sticks, Seat sticks, Whips, Riding-crops and Parts thereof; Prepared Feathers and Articles 
made therewith; Artificial Flowers; Articles of Human Hair. However that is beside the point. The 
point is that Kenya has so far exported insignificant amounts of its niche folklore/ hand 
loomed/handmade products under AGOA. 
 
However, there has been some effort: ‗The Ministry of Trade and Industry is encouraging players in 
the textile sector to work in associations; through such effort the Handloom Weavers Association 
was registered…‘ (MoTI, Department of Industries, 2006: 1). Whilst this is not enough, what is 
encouraging is that at least some of the constraints in developing this category seem as though they 
can be overcome- if there is enough mettle. In a workshop organised by the Kenyan Export 
Promotion Council (EPC) and Japanese International Cooperation Agency in Nairobi in 2002, five 
constraints were given. Firstly, there is lack of enough information that an opportunity to enter the 
American market exists. Secondly, the market for handmade items is rather sophisticated with regard 
to consumer tastes and fashion, market entry strategies, specifications on fabric content, standard  
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Table 13: Folklore/hand loomed/handmade exports, Kenya to US, 1992-2007  
Category Phase 
exported 
Year(s) exported Value (US$) Quantity 
(SME) 
6205201000 (certified hand-loomed and 
folklore men‘s/boys‘ shirts) 
A 1993 5194 193 
5209513000 (woven fabrics of cotton, 
containing 85 percent or more by weight of 
cotton, weighing more than 200g/m2, printed, 
plain weave, certified hand-loomed) 
A 2000 476 3 
6505902060 (certified hand-loomed and 
folklore products; and headwear of cotton except 
for babies, not knitted)  
A, B and C 1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
342 
3744 
3300 
4488 
26772 
37 575 
62122 
21854 
2608 
2212 
4785 
- 
9025 
31092 
8 
405 
371 
711 
2603 
3163 
8841 
6329 
75 
25 
90 
- 
355 
2269 
Source: Author‘s adaptation of US International Trade Commission (2008a; 2008b)  
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garment sizes and others. Thirdly, their strong ethnic characteristic is unlikely to appeal to the 
contemporary American consumer. Fourthly, there is a challenge to meet large orders (Namu, 2003). 
In addition to the possibility of overcoming these challenges, Washington‘s position is itself 
encouraging. In the words of none other than Anna Flaaten, the International Trade Specialist 
overseeing the implementation of this category at USOTEXA, ‗there are many niche markets in the 
United States…. With a focused effort, such African articles could be very successful…this aspect of 
AGOA remains underutilised‘ (Flaaten, 2005: 27).  
 
What about the country‘s integration into the GVC?  
 
4.3.5 Integration into the Apparel GVC 
 
In this section, I will present the results for product upgrading by US market share percentage. 
According to USOTEXA (various years), during this period, the US imported 5 661 product 
categories from the world apparel market. Kenya participated in only 879 of these. However, I will 
analyse only the 304 categories that were exported into the US in at least two of phases A, B and C. 
This is because it is not possible to analyse categories that appear only in one phase. In each phase, 
the products are ranked in value and then divided into two equal halves.     
 
4.3.5.1 Possible Scenarios for Share Upgrading 
 
There are three possible scenarios for upgrading. One of them is that the share of the top half goes 
up, while the bottom half is losing its share (scenario I). Alternatively, the share of the top half goes 
up, while that of the bottom half remains constant (scenario II). There would also be upgrading if 
the share of the top half goes up strongly, while that of the bottom half rises weakly (scenario III).  
 
Downgrading has four scenarios. One of them is that the share of the bottom half goes up, while the 
top half is losing its share (scenario I). Alternatively, the share of the bottom half goes up, while that 
of the top half remains constant (scenario II). There would also be downgrading if the share of the 
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bottom half goes up strongly, while that of the top half rises weakly (scenario III). Finally, there is a 
downgrading scenario where the shares of both halves either falls, or remains constant (scenario IV). 
 
4.3.5.2 Share Upgrading, Products Responsible and Future Prospects  
 
Tables 14 and 15 below tell us four things. First, when we consider the change between phases A and 
B (Table 14) (band A being products ranked 1-101, product 1 valued US$ 271 and product 101 
valued US$ 2.9, and band B being products ranked 102-202, product 102 valued US$ 2.9 and 
product 202 valued US$ 0.2), integration into the GVC is poor. It needs to be noted that I am 
making the assumption that the country at a point, that is earlier than 1992, began with zero exports. 
The dynamics for period A are therefore germane to me only as far as I use them as the basis on 
which to evaluate phase B. Between phases A and B, therefore, while the average upgrading for all 
products was 0.2 percent, the average for band A was higher (0.4 percent) than for band B (0.1 
percent). Hence the dynamics here are denoted by upgrading scenario III. For Table 15, the 
upgrading analysed is that between phases B and C, and the reference point of upgrading is products 
exported in phase B (band A1 being products ranked 1-152, product 1 valued US$ 326 and product 
152 valued US$ 2.3, and band B1 being products ranked 153-304, product 153 valued US$ 2.2 and 
product 260 valued US$ 0.2)28. While the average for all products was 0.5 percent, band A1 
upgraded weakly (0.1 percent), and band B1 upgraded strongly (0.9 percent); hence the dynamics 
here are denoted by downgrading scenario III. The combination of these two scenarios is poor 
integration into the GVC.  
 
Second, and dovetailed into the above point, a comparison between product value ranking and that 
of its margin of rise shows that the margin for the more valuable products was smaller than that for 
the less valuable ones, buttressing the poor integration into the GVC argument. In Table 14, while 
the value for the leading product in value ranking in phase A was US$ 271 per SME, the leading 
product in share upgrading between phase A and B, at 8 percent, had a phase A value of US$ 9.2 per 
SME.  Similarly in Table 15, while the value for the leading product in value ranking in phase B was  
                                                     
28 Products 261-304 were not exported in the reference period for ranking (2002-4). For convenience, they are assumed 
to fall within the lower band.     
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Table 14: Products experiencing < 1 % share upgrading, 1992-2001 & 2002-4  
 
1992-
2001 
value 
ranking 
Cumulative % 
rise/fall between 
1992-2001 & 
2002-4 
% rise/fall 
per 
category 
Products with at least 0.01 upgrading % 
margin 
of rise 
% margin 
of rise 
ranking 
1992-
2001 
value 
ranking 
1992-2001 
value 
($/SME) 
Chinese categories 
limited by US & EU 
which affect leading 
Kenyan products 
1-202 43.6 0.2 
1-101 
(band A) 
36.4 0.4 6208110000 (women/girls slips and petticoats, of 
manmade fibres) 
4.5 2 13 20.5 652 
6104120030 under heading 6104 (women/girls 
suits, ensembles, suit-type jackets, blazers, dresses, 
skirts, divided skirts, trousers, bib and brace 
overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear), 
knitted or crocheted) 
8.1  1 26 9.2 Not easily identifiable 
because the HTS no 
longer exists  
6204624005 under subheading 620462 
(women/girls trousers, bib and brace overalls, 
breeches and shorts, of cotton) 
3.7 3 48 5.9 348 (subheading) 
6203424005 under subheading 62034240 
(men/boys trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches 
and shorts, of cotton, other) 
1 16 60 5.0 347 (subheading) 
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6204624020 under subheading 62046240 above  1.8 8 72 4.3 348 (subheading) 
6203424045 under subheading 62034240 
described above 
1.2 15 79 3.8 347 (subheading) 
6204624050 under subheading 62046240 above 3.3 4 89 3.4 348 (subheading) 
6204624065 under subheading 62046240 above 1.45 13 96 3.1 348 (subheading) 
102-202 
(band B) 
7.2 0.1 6204624030 under subheading 62046240 above 1.48 12 102 2.9 348 (subheading) 
6204624055 under subheading 62046240 above 1. 9 7 103 2.9 348 (subheading) 
6203432010 (men‘s trousers, bib and brace 
overalls, breeches and shorts, of synthetic fibres, 
other) 
1.7 9 136 2.0 659 
6207220000 (men‘s/boys‘ nightshirts and pyjamas, 
of manmade fibres) 
2.9 5 169 1.4 None 
6204423030 (women‘s dresses, of cotton, with two 
or more colours in the warp and/or the filling) 
1.3 14 167 1.4 None 
6104622030 (women‘s shorts, of cotton) 1.617 10 171 1.3 348 
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6203191020 (men‘s/boys‘ trousers, breeches and 
shorts imported as parts of suits, of cotton) 
2.4 6 172 1.3 347 (subheading) 
6204633532 (women‘s shorts, of synthetic fibres) 1.614 11 173 1.3 648 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on USOTEXA  
 
Table 15: Products experiencing < 1 % share upgrading, 2002-4 & 2005-7 
2002-4 
value 
ranking 
Cumulative 
% rise/fall 
between 
2002-4 & 
2005-7 
% rise/fall per 
category 
Products with at least 0.01 upgrading % 
margin 
of rise 
% 
margin 
of rise 
ranking 
2002-4 value 
ranking  
2002-4 value 
($/SME) 
Chinese 
categories 
limited by 
US & EU 
which affect 
leading 
Kenyan 
products  
1-304 160.0 0.5 
1-152 
(band A1) 
  6204624005 under subheading 620462 1.469 18 40 5 348 
(subheading) 
6203434010 (men‘s trousers and breeches, of synthetic fibre) 1.1 22 61 4.1 647 
6203424055 under subheading 62034240 described in the 
previous period (2002-4) 
3.1 6 68 3.9 347 
(subheading) 
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6203424030 whose subheading is still 62034240 as above 2.3 7 74 3.8 347 
(subheading) 
6204624030 under subheading 620462 5.1 3 94 3.5 348 
(subheading) 
6204624055 whose subheading is still 62034240 as above 1.456 19 107 3.2 347? /348? 
(subheading) 
6111205000 (babies‘ trousers, breeches and shorts as knitted or 
crocheted garment and clothing accessories except those 
imported as parts of sets, of cotton) 
2.032 9 116 3 None 
6104532020 (girls‘ skirts and divided skirts, of synthetic fibre, 
other) 
1.47 17 121 2.9 None 
6204624065 under subheading 620462 already described 1.98 10 125 2.8 348 
(subheading) 
6110303045 (women/ girls sweaters, pullovers, sweatshirts, 
waistcoats (vests) and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of 
manmade fibre, other) 
1.033 24 131 2.6 639  
6203424020 under subheading 62034240 also described 
already 
1.518 16 137 2.5 347 
(subheading) 
was 6103431540 (boys‘ trousers and breeches, of synthetic 1.0 23 152 2.3 647 
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fibre, other) 
153-304 
(band B1) 
  6104632028 (girls‘ trousers and breeches, of synthetic fibres, 
other) 
1.887 12 156 2.2 648 
6105202030 (men/boy‘s shirts, knitted or crocheted, of 
manmade fibres, other) 
1.707 14 164 2.1 638 
6106202030 (women/ girls‘ blouses and shirts, knitted or 
crocheted, of manmade fibres, other) 
1.626 15 165 2.1 639 
6107920040 under the heading 6107 (men‘s/boys‘ 
underpants, briefs, nightshirts, pyjamas, bathrobes, dressing 
gowns and similar articles, knitted or crocheted) 
1.924 11 166 2.1 None 
6209203000 already described in the previous period 1.795 13 180 2.0 None 
6104622026 (girls‘ trousers and breeches, of synthetic fibres, 
containing 5 percent or more by weight of elastomeric yarn or 
rubber thread) 
8.645 2 182 1.9 348 
(subheading) 
6104632030 (women‘s shorts (other than swimwear), knitted 
or crocheted, of synthetic fibre, other) 
1.443 20 183 1.9 648 
6112120050 (men‘s/boys‘ track suits trousers, knitted or 
crocheted, of synthetic fibres) 
3.712 5 186 1.9 647 
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6109901025 (boys‘ tank tops and singlets, of manmade fibre) 2.28 8 214 1.4 638 
6104622060 (girls‘ shorts, of cotton, other) 1.179 21 217 1.3 348 
(subheading) 
6104631030 (girls‘ bib and brace overalls, of synthetic fibres, 
other) 
12.959 1 241 0.9 659 
6109901049 (men‘s/boys‘ garments similar to T-shirts, 
singlets and tank tops, knitted or crocheted, of manmade fibres) 
3.851 4 251 0.6 638 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on USOTEXA  
 
US$ 326 per SME, the leading product in share upgrading between phase B and C, at 13 percent, had a phase B dismal value of US$ 0.9 per SME.  
 
Third, AGOA ‗preferences‘ are not sufficient to guarantee a continued existence of the industry in Kenya outside manmade fibre and woollen apparel 
exports that have high import duties in the US. When AGOA expires in 2015, the high import duties will grossly undermine Kenya‘s integration into the 
GVC. In Table 15, for example, out of 24 products, 13 were from manmade fibre. Morris (2006) had made a similar observation for SSA (Table 16 
below). Chinese competition in the same categories exacerbates the situation. In the recent past, China has been complementing its growth in manmade 
fibre production with imports. It imported US$ 14.2 billion worth of yarns and fabrics in 2003 alone, some of which were certainly manmade (Africa and 
Middle East Textiles Editor, 2005a).  
 
- 191 - 
 
 
Table 16: US customs duty rates for selected product categories 
Item General duty rate (%) 
Cotton garments 
Knit men‘s shirts 
Knit T-shirts 
Woven men‘s trousers 
Woven women‘s dresses 
Synthetic knit/ woven garments 
Knit women‘s skirts 
Knit sweaters 
Woven men‘s suits 
Woven women‘s dresses 
 
19.7 
16.5 
10.3 
8.4 
 
16.0 
32.0 
27.3 
16.0 
Source: Adapted from Morris (2006) 
 
Finally, most of the products where Kenya had a share upgrading of at least 1 percent were among 
Chinese categories which the North limited in 2005 (at least 82 percent); hence beginning in 2009 
this upgrading is likely to have been undermined. At least 13 of the 16 products in Table 14 (81 
percent) were covered by the 2005 Beijing-Washington MoU (Office of USTR, 2005) (see 
appendix L). In Table 15, only 4 of the 24 were not in the MoU (83 percent were). I submit that 
the MoU mitigated the Chinese effect only temporarily; up to 2009. At any event, the move was 
seeking to help the US‘s own textile manufacturers, and not AGOA beneficiaries (Kelly, 2005).  
 
Table 17: Incidence of quotas and Kenyan apparel exports to US 
Description Exports with… 
Quotas for China 
alone 
       No Quotas for 
       China or India 
     Quotas for  
      China  & India 
       Total exports 
Value (US$) 294 368         212 380        187 380 696      187 887 444 
% of Total 0.16         0.11        99.73            100.00 
Source: Adapted from Rolfe and Woodward (2005) 
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Rolfe and Woodward (2005) had also shown that Kenya‘s dominant lower-end products were to be 
one of the most vulnerable to shifting trade in the liberalisation period; they were to be crowded out 
(Table 17 above). 99.89 percent were covered by quotas placed on China and India in 2004. At any 
rate, the current 17 percent AGOA tariff ‗preferences‘ is considered to be non-prohibitive. It has 
been estimated that it will require an average tariff of 40 and 20 percent in the US and the EU 
markets respectively to have the same restrictive effect on China as quotas had (Appelbaum, 2004).   
 
As the conceptual model showed, our conceptualisation of upgrading goes beyond industrial 
upgrading to meeting minimum working conditions for labour. In this regard, we propound that, 
while you can develop by either emancipating labour or suppressing it, the old model of suppressing 
labour should now be considered anachronistic- this is the concern of the second part of this chapter.  
 
4.4 LABOUR UPGRADING 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
World EPZ labour force rose from 22.5 million in 1997 to reach 66 million in 2006. Of the 66 
million, 40 million were in China, 6 million in Indonesia, 5 million in Central America (mainly in 
Mexico) and 3 million in Bangladesh (Palpacuer, 2008). While there may be variations, the 
conditions of these workers are deplorable. 
 
To recapitulate on the conceptual model, conventional upgrading recognises only industrial 
upgrading. Labour upgrading is only implicitly considered in process upgrading as a means to 
improve efficiency. While analysing labour upgrading is out of step with the conventional GVC 
industrial upgrading model, it is in tune with the overall conceptual model incorporating the other 
two concepts of regimes and systemic governance. At systemic level, labour upgrading is useful to 
industrial capitalist production through improved working conditions, to boost its reproduction, 
limit Southern accumulation and attain low-level international social order. The regime on labour 
was shown to be in operation throughout the period under study. However, the real labour upgrading 
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opportunity in Kenyan EPZs came in 2003 as a result of a more democratic government winning 
elections and the enactment of AGOA.  
 
This thesis acknowledges that even this form of upgrading covers only a sliver of ideal labour 
upgrading. UNIDO warns that EPZ strategy ignores indirect social costs. The unstable and 
temporary employment can lead to substantial social disruption and costs. For example, the labour 
force is uprooted from its traditional setting into the industrial sector, and then dismissed after a few 
years without significant upgrading of skills (UNIDO, 1980).  
 
Even without going into such social calculations, we need to begin by assessing the extent to which 
the so-called ILO standards flaunted by the regime on labour (see section 3.2.1.5) have been 
achieved. For the purpose of this research, we will take minimum labour standards enshrined in 
AGOA (see section 3.2.1.4). Each of these is considered in turn.  
 
4.4.2 Minimum Age for the Employment of Children 
 
There is no child exploitation among apparel EPZs firms in Kenya. Initially, social auditors used to 
include workers‘ age in their social audit questionnaires, but with time they dropped the question 
after they established that child labour does not exist in the Kenyan apparel industry. My fieldwork 
showed that the age for most workers was between 24-26 years, and almost all fell between 21 and 
29 years (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).  
 
4.4.3 Acceptable Conditions of Work: Wages 
 
On 20 January 2003, all EPZ firms in Kenya were engulfed in strikes. This was triggered, in one 
respect, by one apparel firm that had forced workers to work on a public holiday (Protex EPZ Ltd 
Workers, 2007), but more so, as said before, by the Government transition of 2002. Other sectors 
also experienced strikes. The Minister of Labour visited striking workers in EPZs. Later, 28 worker 
representatives held meetings with the Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry, and the EPZA 
Chief Executive. For the first time, all EPZ firms adjusted wages to reflect the statutory minimum 
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wage, and an annual percentage increase was put at eight percent in 2003, to rise by one percent 
thereafter until a ‗living wage‘ is attained. Also, normal overtime was to be paid at 1.5 times the 
normal rate, and holiday and Sunday work was to be paid at double the normal rate (KHRC, ca. 
2003; Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
In 2007, wages for permanent contract machinists were a basic monthly pay of KShs 5 479, KShs 
822 house allowance and approximately KShs 500 grading allowance (for example 550 Grade B 
allowance, which is the use of a slightly heavier machine from the ordinary sewing machine), making 
a total of KShs 6 851 (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). This, according to July 2009 exchange 
rates (which will be used for the other figures in this section as well), amounts to US$ 89. This is 
slightly above the current statutory minimum wage, which was raised to KShs 5 195 (US$ 67) in 
May 2006, and further up to KShs 6 130 (US$ 80) in May 2009 (Saulo and Rajab, 2009). 
However, firms keep an additional counterfeit payslip which shows that workers earn more salary- 
KShs 8 000 (US$ 104). This counterfeit slip is what firms sometimes present to the auditors who 
are not keen to interview workers in detail.  Workers further confessed that other categories such as 
helpers earn less. Helpers earn KShs 180 daily, which ranges from KShs 4 796 to KShs 5 200 
depending on tasks allocated, and an additional KShs 750 as house allowance. This brings the total 
to between KShs 5 546 and KShs 5 950 (US$ 72-7).  
 
The social audits that intensified in 2003 have not improved wages fundamentally. Firms increase 
wages only if the statutory minimum wage rises, and not necessarily immediately. The higher pay for 
overtime and holiday work is rarely implemented, and only about eight hours in a week of such work 
are paid, yet workers often work for longer hours (see below) (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). 
Furthermore, while what would constitute a ‗living wage‘ in Kenya is a moot question, trade unions 
in Kenya are emphatic that the figures above are nowhere near such a wage (Saulo and Rajab, 2009).  
 
4.4.4 Acceptable Conditions of Work: Hours of Work 
 
Making all allowances, an EPZ worker‘s week is, at the very least, 52 hours. This is a violation of 
Kenyan law where the working week is 45 hours. It is even a violation of their contract with the 
firms. According to the contracts, workers are supposed to work 48 hours per week, 8 hours per day, 
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Monday to Saturday. Before 2003 some firms had 120 hours in some weeks (KHRC, ca. 2006), but 
on average overtime was five hours per day. Also, most of the extra hours were never paid. Firms 
would pay only eight hours for weekdays, about five hours for Saturday and no pay for Sunday. 
Rather than punch their cards on Sunday, management would put down the hours worked on a piece 
of paper, and that was it. When auditors enquired about it, they would be shown the cards punched 
Monday to Saturday. A worker claimed he worked for Global EPZ Ltd on a public holiday and on a 
Sunday, each eight hours, and when he asked to be paid he was threatened with the sack. Another 
claimed that the firm only ever pays about half of overtime hours. Yet another worker argued that, 
while working for Rolex EPZ Ltd, management would record all overtime hours, but at the end of 
the month workers were able to trace only a fraction of it, as little as a fifth of the total. Some firms 
also put into account the minutes a worker has spent in answering calls of nature (Protex EPZ Ltd 
Workers, 2007).  
 
The audits since 2003 could be credited with some improvement. After 2003, firms were forced to 
record all overtime on a separate card, although not all is paid. Management also present overtime as 
a request, rather than as a demand, as was the case before (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). 
  
However, some issues remain. The extra hours have only reduced from an average of five per day to 
three. At any rate, this improvement is only in some firms such as Protex, because some such as 
Global and Rolex are still overworking workers. It was claimed by one of the workers that Rolex 
workers still work from 07:00 hours to even 23:00 hours (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). 
Another case in point is when a firm wants to relocate, often after the initial 10-year tax holiday. It 
contrives a crisis to justify failure to pay workers the last month worked. The crisis is soon followed 
by news that the firm is under receivership, and before workers are aware of it, a new investor has 
taken over.  
 
From what I see, it is like these Indians come to use Africans to enrich themselves, so that after a short period 
of time, say two or three years, they close shop and leave. I think they carry billions of Kenyan shillings with 
them, and leave people behind suffering…They pretend that something has happened to the company, and 
then leave. Then comes this story that another investor has taken over…it happened recently at Rising Sun. I 
heard that the workers were later given some [KShs] 1 000, although I am not sure about the source of the 
money. We wonder whether this is happening with every company because there is a time even Mirage  had 
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such a story- I don‘t know it is under receivership, it is under new management- that kind of language (Protex 
EPZ Ltd Worker code 6M, 2007) (translated from Kiswahili by the Author).   
 
Another worker described the Mirage case as follows (although she was not working for the firm). 
 
They found a notice: ‗come on the 15th‘. Two days to 15th they found another one ‗come on the 22nd‘. Two days 
to the 22nd, another notice read ‗the company is closed until further notice‘. The following day, yet another one 
read ‗the company is under a receiver‘…When they asked…how come, if the Indians have taken off and left 
workers empty handed, who is putting up these notices? They were told that it is EPZA. It seems that these 
EPZA people are being bribed to leave us dying…God help us! (Protex EPZ Ltd Worker code 7F, 2007) 
(translated from Kiswahili by the Author).   
 
In a similar case (MRC EPZ Ltd), workers found the firm closed when they returned from 
December 2006 holidays. It was soon under receivership and was guarded by police officers. 
Workers went on strike for nearly a week. The Receiver Manager paid them each KShs 1 000 (US$ 
13), awaiting further developments (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). The firm was yet to open by 
the time of the fieldwork. 
 
4.4.5 Acceptable Conditions of Work: Occupational Safety and Health 
 
According to my own observation of the case study firm, most of the issues on occupational safety 
and health have been addressed. It is ventilated, well lit, fire extinguishers and basic First Aid kits are 
installed, and drinking water is supplied. However, some critical issues remain unaddressed. There is 
overcrowding, and sanitary conveniences are lacking. Also blatantly ignored is protective apparel and 
appliances. For example, workers claimed that protective masks are issued only shortly before 
auditors conduct an audit. These are made of paper and therefore, although they are not withdrawn 
after the audit, they wear off after a few days and are not replaced until there is another round of 
audits. Also, it is up to the individual worker to choose to put them on or not after the audit.  
 
From interviewing workers, the firms also put workers at other high health risks. A case in point is 
where a worker went into labour while working (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). This is in spite 
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the fact that one of the agreements in the post-2003 strike truce was for workers to henceforth get 
two months consecutive paid maternity leave, and an extra one month unpaid leave, in consultation 
with management (KHRC, ca. 2003).   
 
However, the audits could also be credited with improving the situation. EPZ firms were forced to 
provide the First Aid boxes and fire extinguishers. This was not the case before, particularly before 
2003. Also, workers injured on duty are taken to hospital, and the bill is usually paid by the firm 
concerned. Sometimes management improves sanitation, particularly after an audit has pointed it out 
(Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).  
 
4.4.6 Forced Labour 
 
Before 2003, most of the overtime, as well as Sunday working, was forced. This has not improved 
much since then. The production target is so high that workers cannot meet it. On average, they are 
given a target of at least 850 pieces per day, or 100-200 pieces per hour, which means handling at 
least 2 pieces every minute. Workers explained that, since this is practically impossible, management 
forces them to work more than eight hours per day, whereby the extra hours are not paid (as already 
said). They are told that they are completing the target set for them. A study by KHRC (2005) 
shows that at Protex, once a worker completes his/her assigned target he/she is not allowed to leave 
at will. The story changes and he/she is informed that that constituted only 80 percent of the target. 
He/she is asked to do the remaining 20 percent for an incentive of KShs 1 (US$ 0.01) per piece! 
One worker lamented that she attended the interview late because she was only allowed to leave 
Rolex at 19:00, and she would still not have met the target even if she worked until midnight (Protex 
EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). It is noteworthy that one of the outcomes of the 2003 after-strike 
bargaining was that workers were to be given at least two days notice for overtime (KHRC, ca. 
2003), which, it seems, has been ignored.  
 
Another example: workers were given a one day notice that the following day, despite being a public 
holiday, everybody was to report to work as a normal working day. They went on a go slow. At 
lunchtime management reversed the decision. However, after workers went back to work in the 
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afternoon, managers intimidated workers by threatening to sack them if they failed to report for 
work that particular holiday. Workers succumbed to the intimidation, and those who did not report 
for work were indeed relieved of their duties (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
4.4.7 Right of Association and Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively 
 
Before 20 January 2003, workers were not allowed to join a union, associate with ‗suspicious people‘, 
such as NGOs and unions, or organise and bargain collectively. But after the strikes they were 
allowed to join KTTWU for the first time (KHRC, ca. 2003; Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
Table 18 below has Government data on strikes for the period 1992-2005. It requires explanation. 
First the huge figures for the number of workers involved in 1997, 1998 and 2002 are accounted for 
by the Kenya National Union of Teacher‘s strikes. The union has about 200 000 members. It is for 
the same reason that, also, although 1997 and 2002 had respectively 271 000 and 259 000 workers 
participate, the man days lost vary greatly: 317 000 for the former and 4 567 for the latter. This is 
because there can be a huge difference in man days lost between such a giant union‘s one day strike, 
and a one week strike. Having clarified that, I am justified to argue that 2003 was the year that the 
country experienced the highest number of strikes-108- despite the number of workers involved 
being 40 000 and the man days being 79 000, which is far less than the figures for the years above. 
My sector of concern is manufacturing, which was the third highest hit by the strikes. 
 
Following the 2003 strikes, examples of improvements on right of association and right to organise 
and bargain collectively include the fact that at Protex, most of the workers are now unionised. Also, 
before 2003, a firm called Tristar which closed shop later, sacked all workers who were interviewed 
by a Ministry of Labour official during a strike, an extreme that would be difficult to envision today 
(Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).  
 
Apart from such minor improvements, these rights are still brazenly violated. For example, the 
graduation from a casual labour contract to a permanent contract is still a mirage. The 2003 
bargaining following the strikes fixed the maximum duration for a continuous casual labour contract 
at three months, from which time a worker is qualified for a permanent contract with its benefits, 
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Table 18: Stoppages of work caused by industrial disputes in Kenya, 1992-2005 
Industrial group 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Man-days lost 
Private sector 
Agriculture & forestry 
Mining & quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity & water 
Construction 
Commerce 
Transport (other than docks) 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Public sector 
Total 
No. of strikes 
No. of workers involved 
 
 
  5,131 
     695 
32,506 
- 
  8,674 
     326 
     222 
  1,882 
49,436 
 
49,436 
      97 
 9,684 
 
 
 
10,650 
  1,384 
29,507 
     143 
  9,250 
     324 
  1,530 
  3,693 
68,039* 
- 
68,039* 
       69 
20,349 
 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
40,351 
- 
40,351 
       53 
18,549 
 
 
  9,978 
     163 
21,838 
     169 
.. 
  1,319 
  1,781 
     286 
35,534 
- 
35,534 
       42 
  9,407 
 
 
44,589 
     592 
19,752 
.. 
         9 
.. 
.. 
.. 
64,942 
         7 
64,942 
       44 
16,084 
 
 
104,681 
       592 
   32,650 
.. 
.. 
.. 
     2,478 
     1,214 
141,615 
175,711 
317,326 
         97 
270,660 
 
 
     71,930 
 
     77,441 
.. 
     44,977 
     15,852 
       1,075 
       2,042 
   213,317 
2,780,463 
2,993,780 
           105 
    214,867 
 
 
   9,111 
 
   5,041 
 
     966 
     210 
     112 
       19 
15,459 
12,385 
27,844 
       38 
  9,094 
 
 
11,598 
     272 
17,211 
        9 
 1,615 
    157 
      51 
  1,024 
31,937 
19,230 
51,167 
      41 
17,194 
 
 
  5,821 
.. 
14,701 
.. 
      40 
     150 
.. 
     197 
20,909 
.. 
20,909 
       22 
  4,632 
 
 
     2,880 
        306 
      9,471 
.. 
          83 
        836 
 
      1,489 
     15,065 
4,567,375 
4,582,440 
           47 
  258,788 
 
 
36,098 
     122 
22,684 
.. 
  5,080 
  1,549 
     912 
  5,040 
71,485 
7,184 
78,669 
     108 
39,598 
 
 
28,549 
  1,329 
  5,371 
.. 
     152 
  6,146 
  2,010 
  1,715 
45,272 
94,798 
140,070 
        41 
31,699 
 
 
13,509 
.. 
  1,219 
.. 
     126 
     237 
     228 
  1,439 
16,758 
.. 
16,758 
       17 
  9,393 
 *Includes 11,560 for docks 
..Figures not available 
-Nil or negligible (less than half the final digit shown) 
Source: Adapted from GoK (2001: 312) (data for 1993-2000); GoK (2006: 290) (data for 2000-2005) 
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such as union representation (KHRC, ca. 2003). A worker who was once working for Rolex, claimed 
that the firm makes this graduation impossible by continuously changing the payroll number every 
time a three-months contract approaches its end (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). Also, while the 
extremism of management has been minimised, striking is still fraught with much witch hunting from 
management, and the state and the union has not helped in any way.  
 
A case in point was in 2006 with Rising Sun EPZ Ltd workers. The firm had, for a couple of years, 
refused to implement the annual statutory increments for minimum wages, would delay payments, 
forced workers to work on Sundays without pay, and would threaten workers when they complained. 
A delay in salaries sometime in mid 2006 triggered workers to grab the opportunity and stage a 
strike. On the 5th of the month (official deadline for pay) a memo was circulated to the effect that 
they would be paid. Furthermore, the Sales Manager explained that the delay was occasioned by non-
sale of a delivery which had delayed, and reiterated that workers would be paid on the 7th. On the 7th 
they were not paid and went on a go slow. A Line Manager of Indian descent hit one of the female 
workers with a fabric, while hurling racist insults. When she reported the case at the EPZ Police 
Station, no action was taken. On the 8th of the month her comrades went on a full blown strike for 
three days. Other EPZ firms joined them in solidarity. On the third day of the strike anti-riot police 
were called in to flush them out of the factory premises (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
Workers were astonished by the gagging by the state. The Minister for Labour came and spoke to 
them. Although he was playing ball, he was less virile with workers, unlike his strident Trade and 
Industry counterpart who joined him.  
 
He asked the employers, ‗why did you spare these people when they were striking?... they are…class 8 [primary 
school] drop outs and form 4 [O level] failures  … There are many people in Kenya who need jobs…‘.  People 
got very angry with him. They surged forward to confront him, but he left through that backdoor on the Athi 
River town side- because he spoke nonsense… (Protex EPZ Ltd Worker code 7M, 2007). 
 
The striking workers went to the union, but did not get any help. Later the firm re-opened and 
promised to re-absorb them on condition that they terminate their contracts, receive some terminal 
benefits for their service, and apply on a new contract. About 500 workers succumbed to the threats. 
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The rest, about 1 500, were never employed there again. Over the December 2006 holidays, the firm 
closed shop without having paid workers their December salary (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
The majority of workers believe strikes can be effective only if they addressed one issue at a time. For 
example, on improving working conditions, nearly half felt strikes pressurise buyers to improve 
working conditions. What is more, more females than males hold this view. An even greater 
majority- slightly more than half- felt that strikes play a central role in minimising forced labour. 
Again, it is mainly females who hold this dominant view. However, overall, workers largely feel that 
strikes achieve little. This is derived from responses to two questions: one on the overall usefulness of 
strikes and the other on their overall sufficiency. Regarding the former, nearly half argued that strikes 
are not useful in addressing overall labour upgrading. Here it is largely males who hold sway. 
Regarding the latter, slightly more than half believe that strikes are not sufficient, and it is males who 
mainly hold this dominant view. 
 
4.4.8 Lead Firm Auditing  
 
I have already given nuances that lead firm monitoring of conditions of work is flippant. I now give 
specific details. First, auditors concentrate on safety and health conditions, and not wages and hours 
of work. At the forefront is protection against dust by wearing masks, gloves and aprons, and 
drinking milk. Also at this level there are safety measures, such as emergency exit doors. It is at a 
secondary level that wages and hours of work are considered, alongside health care, sanitary 
conditions, maternity leave conditions and sexual harassment. But most importantly, process 
standards, such as the right to organise and bargain collectively, and the right to join a union, are 
usually not prioritised by lead firms‘ auditors (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). Yet these so-called 
process standards are the most crucial because they lead to outcome standards, such as better wages.  
 
Next, workers are never sensitised on labour codes of practice by management, and lead firms do not 
seem to question this. It is only a few NGOs that have sensitised workers through seminars. Posters 
displaying labour codes of practice from lead firms have been displayed, but not strategically. For 
example, in 2005, the Russell Corporation insisted on displaying a poster of its codes of conduct. 
However, this was displayed at the reception of some firms such as Global (and the Human 
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Resources Manager‘s office at MRC). This was preferred by management because workers do not get 
into the factory through the main reception, but through a rear entrance. Furthermore, the posters are 
only put up when auditors are about to carry out an audit (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
A third point is that auditors are not bothered to find out who actually works in the firms. Those on 
casual labour contract are locked up in their section until the audit is over. Should auditors ask about 
the locked building, management usually explains that it is a different firm dealing with different 
products. Auditors are usually satisfied with such an explanation (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
A fourth point is that those to be interviewed are sometimes picked by management in advance, and 
coached on what to say. Management avoids those likely to resist the coercion and spill the beans. 
However, to deal with auditors who randomly pick interviewees, all workers are coached in advance. 
They are instructed to deny all the injustices regarding the condition of workers as shown in this 
study. The language varies from entreating them to toe the line, since the firm might lose orders, to 
threats of being sacked. And when occasionally ambushed, workers claimed that management is still 
able to alert workers in the few minutes between the time auditors report to the office, and the actual 
commencement of the audit. If orders are not stopped, management normally reports to workers that 
they can celebrate because ‗we have passed the test‘ (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
A final point related to the above is that most of the time management is present during the 
interviews. Other times, it is only workers‘ representatives who are allowed, or, on occasion, nobody 
is allowed. However, the exclusion of management makes no difference because of the coaching 
argument above (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
4.5 SUMMARY  
 
This chapter on upgrading has shown that, firstly, there has been export expansion as a form of 
product upgrading. Between 1992 and the peak of the growth in 2004, the expansion was 1040.8 
percent, while between 1992 and 2005, when all conditions of liberalisation had set in, the growth 
was 1004.6 percent. Indeed, from among the leading six countries in SSA, Kenya experienced the 
highest growth (329 percent) at the acme of the AGOA boom (2002-4), and was the most resilient 
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in the post-boom hold up (2005-7), experiencing the least slump (6 percent). Moreover, a casual 
projection of its dynamics indicates that, had the country not been slapped with quota restrictions in 
1994, it would have emerged as the second leading exporter to the US much earlier, in 1999, and 
would have gone on to take the lead as soon as AGOA set in, in 2001. Also, Kenya would have 
picked up with better speed following the slowdown occasioned by these quotas, had it been 
connected to a more advanced apparel manufacturing country in Asia. This came in handy for 
Mauritius, the other SSA country that was slapped with quotas.  
 
Secondly, the industry has not seized the opportunity of expanded markets during the AGOA period 
to get locally integrated. Throughout this period the country has relied entirely on Asian fabric. Also, 
one third of firms have no local input expenditure, and the remaining about two thirds source local 
accessories amounting to less than 10 percent of total apparel exports. Thirdly, fabric value addition 
is minimal. Unit price comparison with Chinese, Indian, Swazi and Mauritian products in the US 
market reveals that Kenyan products have minimal ornamentation. Also, technology is suitable for 
assembly-only production, and there has been a failure to maximise the exploitation of a multi-skilled 
labour force. Fourthly, Kenya has exported only 9 percent of eligible folklore/hand 
loomed/handmade products that are 100 percent local value. Fifthly, integration into the GVC is 
poor. Overall, the top half of products arranged in order of value had a lesser share upgrading than 
the bottom half. In addition, there is no evidence that AGOA ‗preferences‘ are sufficient to guarantee 
a continued existence of the industry in Kenya in the near future outside manmade fibre and woollen 
apparel exports that have high import duties in the US. This means that when AGOA expires in 
2015, the high import duties will grossly undermine Kenya‘s integration into the GVC. Moreover, 
most of the products where Kenya had a share upgrading of at least 1 percent were among those 
Chinese categories that the North limited in 2005 (at least 82 percent); hence beginning 2009 this 
upgrading is very likely to have been undermined. Sixth and finally, while there is no child 
exploitation among apparel EPZs in Kenya, none of the other AGOA labour conditionalities on 
wages, occupational safety and health standards, compulsory labour, and rights of association/right 
to organise and bargain collectively, have been met fully.  
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5 INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, CHAIN GOVERNANCE AND 
UPGRADING 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the lack of upgrading seen in Chapter Four. Chapter Two showed that 
the GVC analysis fails to articulate the role of control-emergent regime governance on which the 
control lead firm governance the analysis is engaged in is nested within. We saw the evolution and 
impact on trade of regimes in Chapter Three. In this chapter, we want to first find out the extent to 
which actors demonstrate this regime governance. Second, we want to link it with the hypothesis 
that, while the governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel was not a necessary 
condition, it was a sufficient condition to undermine upgrading in Kenya. By demonstrating regime 
governance and linking it to the hypothesis, we will be linking this chapter with the findings of 
Chapter Four.  
 
In short, the chapter entwines analysis and discussion. The general pattern will be to first analyse 
regime governance, then link it with upgrading. The parameters of governance in view are the 
quantity of products, the geographical spread of the chain and labour standards. The regime actors 
selected are the US/EU Governments, NGOs, and Kenyan actors of state bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, 
Cabinet, KTTWU and workers.  
 
In this entwinement, I shall be advancing the regime-dependency argument. We saw in Chapter Two 
that, at the level of agency in global capitalism as a whole facilitating capitalist structures, such as 
regimes, the post-1970s Northern state created four forms of selectivity- neo-liberalism, neo-statism, 
neo-corporatism and neo-communitarianism- under which contemporary regimes flourish. This 
selectivity was aimed at Northern accumulation and attainment of milieu goals. Hence, I shall show 
that the regimes flourishing under it were perpetuating dependency. This is the link between these 
forms and both the hypothesis and the findings of Chapter Four. Again, on the basis of our 
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theoretical model in Chapter Two, at the level of regimes as emergent structures, my analysis shall 
show that regimes on apparel operate as internal commons of the core Northern countries and are 
instruments of control from the periphery‘s perspective, although regime emergence makes Asia a 
sub-core. My discussion of this shall show how the operation of Northern agency, combining with 
Chinese emergence, means inhibition of product upgrading in Kenya. In addition, my analysis shall 
show how the labour regime is an internal common of the North that is ironically beneficial to the 
South, and my discussion of this shall show how the North‘s lack of verve in pursuing the commons 
that is the labour regime- since it contradicts the race to the bottom that drives the regimes on 
apparel- means inhibition of labour upgrading in Kenya. The inhibition of product and labour 
upgrading is, however, not pre-determined. For NGOs and Kenyan actors, particularly bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs, and Cabinet will reveal, in both the analysis and discussion, that there is potential for 
Southern manoeuvres to embed development. At any event, analysing Kenyan actors‘ intuitive 
understanding of structure will leave us more informed. Since the hypothesis is not that the 
governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel was a necessary condition, but rather that 
it was a sufficient condition, to undermine upgrading in Kenya, this analysis and discussion is the 
direct link between this chapter, the hypothesis and the findings presented in Chapter Four. 
 
5.2 INTERNATIONAL REGIMES ON PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN APPAREL   
 
5.2.1 The Structural Regime: The Case of Post-ATC  
 
Here we consider perceptions, actions and strategies of the Cabinet, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats in 
the light of structural international regime governance influenced by neo-liberal form of Northern 
state strategic selectivity. The point is, a systemic structure of international regime determines the 
maximum quantity a particular country or region can export, and this has implication on the 
geographical spread of the chain. Consequently, it leads to selected countries becoming dominant 
producers at a given time. Within it the US-based and the EU-based neo-statist regimes operate. 
Initially, ‗voluntary‘ Japanese restraints between the 1930s and 60s, and MFA-related NIC quotas in 
the 1970s, were the main instruments used to limit quantities into the North. However, the liberal 
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project continued after the NICs began hitting their quota ceiling; they transferred their production 
to other cheaper sites around the world, particularly SSA, the rest of Asia and Latin America, and 
metropolitan capitalism enjoyed even cheaper imports from the global South. The quotas, now given 
an impetus by neo-liberalism, facilitated a further expansion of the chain, particularly in China in the 
1980s, in India and Turkey in the 1990s, and further in China since 2000 (see section 3.2.3). The 
argument this thesis is making is that the system which calls itself free trade is not really free trade. 
Rather, it is a hierarchical system where quotas placed mainly on NICs stimulate growth of value 
chains. This is the reason why regimes, rather than lead firms, are the more important governors. 
 
Entrepreneurs‘ perception is mixed. On the one hand, KAM showed knowledge of regime emergence. 
KAM conceded that the structural evolution of the global apparel industry is partly dependent on 
some sort of neo-liberal influenced dynamics, which have, however, been manipulated to Kenya‘s 
disadvantage. KAM renders Kenya as a regional capitalist hub for East and the Horn of Africa, and 
as one of the SSA countries where industrialisation through the apparel subsector has been toyed 
with for some time now (Kariuki, 2007). This ‗toying‘ backs up section 3.3.2.2. It was noted that 
full adoption of EOI strategy in 1986 took place about 20 years behind Asia. This is in spite of 
KAM‘s willingness in 1973 to make Kenya a hub of capitalist expansion, after wages in the apparel 
subsector rose in places such as Hong Kong and Japan. It was argued that these attempts never 
materialised because Van Arkadie, the Government expatriate advisor on industrial policy, argued 
that such a development would conflict with the role ISI were playing in serving British ISI interests 
in East Africa.  
 
On the other hand, KAM admitted that in spite of this knowledge, it was caught on the hop when 
the sector was liberalised. The association also conceded that the situation was to exacerbate with 
expiration of safeguards against Chinese apparel, beginning in 2009. But rather than see the structure 
and agency constraints above as the more important factors, KAM asserted that the problem was a 
failure of the state to tame the escalating cost of doing business (Kariuki, 2007). Partly this is true. 
We saw GoK‘s measures of trying to revive the local supply chain in Chapter Four, which were at 
best mediocre. Also, when the sixth Development Plan (1989-93) envisaged the introduction of 
EPZs alongside MuB, without further research, GoK went ahead despite the fact that MuB was not 
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being embraced enthusiastically by entrepreneurs (GoK, 1989). While this dimension of local 
institution failure has a role, it cannot be blamed wholly; there is a substantial lack of appreciation by 
KAM of not only the role of agency manipulation of the evolution of the regime, but also the 
unpredictable side of regime emergence, which is clearly seen here. 
 
Cabinet‘s perceptions reveal an attempt at circumventing constrains imposed by the emergent nature 
of the regime, but a poor one. In 2005, when many investors were threatening to relocate out of the 
EPZs following a slowdown in the sector in the wake of liberalisation, President Kibaki gave a 
directive to the Ministers of Cooperatives, Agriculture, Planning, Finance, and Trade and Industry, 
under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance to hold talks with the disgruntled investors 
(Presidential Press Service, 2005). That went only as far as that! Manufacturers rightly argued that it 
was already too late (Mugambi, 2005). When an inter-ministerial taskforce was set up as a follow 
up, rather than mounting a strategic response to the sudden international dynamics shaping the 
industry, the MoTI Industrial Officer in charge of the AGOA Desk revealed that he ‗fully 
participated in it, at least at the initial level… [and] Most of [the deliberations were] touching on the 
cost of doing business; especially the cost of power‘ (Rono, 2007).  
 
Consultation with entrepreneurs on positioning the economy in general, and the industry in 
particular, is lacking. Protex General Manager says that meeting ministers is difficult. In Swaziland, 
his Taiwanese boss- who also owns firms in that country- has unlimited access to King Mswati. The 
manager is convinced that the state is not interested in the apparel subsector after all, arguing that the 
Kibaki Government could afford to revive Uchumi (a state supermarket) when it went under, yet it 
has failed to revive KICOMI (a textile-apparel flagship of ISI) (Isinga, 2007). It is also recognised 
that the current Government relationship with the entrepreneurial class is an improvement of the 
Moi Government. For instance, the latter entered into trading commitments under the WTO 
without consulting KAM, while the former involved KAM in formulating Kenya‘s position papers 
for EAC and COMESA, and made the association part of the delegation to Cancun WTO (Mugwe, 
2003).  
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What I question here is whether concentrating on the cost of production and building a strategic 
alliance between state and capital can, on its own, anchor the industry unshakably within regime 
intentionality-emergence dynamics. Certainly these two are necessary conditions to secure lasting 
benefits of the ‗spreading‘ of capitalism. But deciphering the global dynamics of the regime cannot be 
eschewed.  
 
Another indicator of circumvention of international regime governance, and one that is more 
strategic at regime level, is that of initiating a common SSA strategy. It is reflected in the AGOA 
deliberations organised by MoTI bureaucrats. This was in a meeting in Nairobi on 27 and 28 April 
2005, the first of its kind. The agenda was how to deal with the Chinese threat. The huddle resolved 
to form a regional textile-apparel federation to push for SSA‘s agenda against that of China at the 
WTO (Mulama, 2005). This proposal resembles that given by Protex EPZ Ltd General Manager 
who suggested lobbying the US to restrict China on behalf of SSA (Isinga, 2007).  
 
Mulama does not detail the nature of the precise action to be taken. However, it can be guessed 
sanguinely that the only viable avenue through the WTO is for industrial countries to push for a 
clause that would restrict Chinese exports even more than the one that lasted till January 2009. But 
this would be to forget that, since the wider WTO trade regime‘s main interest is to guarantee 
continued global accumulation, the regime is more inclined to protect the interests of Chinese firms 
if that is what would guarantee such accumulation, given that China is today‘s global workshop (see 
Assistant USTR Liser‘s statement in section 5.2.4 below). China is the world‘s single biggest apparel 
exporter, projected to ultimately account for 50 and 29 percent of the US and the EU markets 
respectively (Nordas, 2004).    
 
Buttressing this argument, former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz asserts that the 
WTO‘s intellectual property is anti-development because the Uruguay Round‘s main agenda was to 
please pharmaceutical and entertainment industries rather than ensuring an intellectual property that 
is good for science, let alone for the South. That is why the Round went on to adopt it despite 
glaring evidence that such a move would condemn thousands of AIDS sufferers to death as they 
might no longer be able to afford generic drugs (World Bank, 2005b). Given that the option of the 
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South working within the system, including the latest attempt to reinvigorate the Bandung spirit in 
2005 (Anjani and Norton, 2005), has so far been feeble, the suggested SSA strategy needs careful 
coordination.  
 
Other survival tactics that might perhaps cushion Kenya‘s exportism include one suggested by EPZA. 
The Authority suggested that a possibility of the cost of production rising in China could turn 
Chinese threat into an opportunity- attracting Chinese FDI to Kenya to take advantage of AGOA 
(Chesang, 2007). Echoing this, the MoTI Trade Officer added that the Chinese Prime Minister had 
already visited Kenya, and part of the huddle centred on that proposal. The two countries are now 
exchanging trade and economic information, and the two ministries of trade and industry have 
hosted a joint website. The officer claimed that Mauritius, Madagascar and Lesotho used the same 
ingenuity with some measure of success (Nyakundi, 2007).  
 
There are two other alternatives related to this. One is simply persuading the US to continue 
sourcing from Kenya despite lack of competitiveness (Rono, 2007). An alternative is to make further 
concessions to attract investment and compete with China head on. The General Manager of Protex 
EPZ Ltd indicated that SSA countries, such as Malawi and Ghana, seeking to attract a second round 
of investment beyond the initial AGOA boom (whose primary beneficiaries included Kenya), had to 
broaden their incentives, especially after 2005 when Chinese competition became stiffer (Isinga, 
2007). The KAM Executive Officer claimed that his association should be credited for scouting 
around to widen its market access web (Kariuki, 2007). EPZA had the same view (Chesang, 2007). 
However, by 2005, there were only three firms who had succeeded in exporting outside traditional 
markets. EPZA reported that ‗some garment enterprises have diversified to other markets like 
Canada, Europe and the Middle East… a cumulative export value of KShs 221 million‘ (EPZA, 
2005b: 17) (see also MoTI, External Trade Department, ca. 2006b).  
 
Therefore, the Kenyan apparel industry is precariously tied to the apron-strings of the structural 
international regime on apparel. As the Senior Deputy Director of Industries at MoTI admitted, the 
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AGOA boom should be understood within the confines of this structural configuration. He argued 
that the objective of AGOA was to reduce poverty and perhaps add some value to Kenyan products 
(Kimuri, 2007). But we have also seen (and will continue to see) the struggle of actors in Kenya 
seeking to self-determine their destiny. That is the heroic bit. 
 
5.2.2 EU-based and US-based Regimes: the Case of EU PTA and AGOA 
 
We now turn to perceptions, actions and strategies of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs within the 
context of the EU-based and the US-based regimes. We will focus more on the latter. These regimes 
are influenced by neo-liberal and individual neo-statist forms of Northern state strategic selectivity. 
There is both a similarity and a difference between structural international regime governance and 
EU/US regime governance. Both govern the quantity of apparel and chain geographical spread. 
However, if the scope of the former is global, that of the latter is regional. Suffice to say that the 
GVC analysis has almost entirely failed to theoretically take cognisance of the interplay between 
these two governance modes, if Gibbon‘s (2003) response to Mattoo et al (2003) considered in 
Chapter Two is the best to go by. It is within this interplay that the six leading SSA apparel 
exporters, among them Kenya, came to occupy their ‗privileged‘ position.  
 
Thus the latest expansion of apparel exportism in Kenya was determined, not so much by local policy 
and the MFA, but by AGOA. Rolfe et al (2004) suggest the former. Also, the MoTI Trade Officer 
suggested so when he argued that the boom was occasioned by, inter alia, the pre-existence of the 
industry under the MFA and the general business climate in Kenya (Nyakundi, 2007). Somewhat, 
yes, but existing state policy and the MFA were not sufficient conditions. When other bureaucrats 
were asked to state the main incentives for investment in the EPZs since 2000, they gave state policy 
on EPZ tax exemptions as one and AGOA as the other (Rono, 2007; Chesang, 2007). Although 
another EPZA official added the low cost of labour (Bii, 2007) and Mr Rono added the logistical 
help that entrepreneurs get from EPZA, when asked to commit to two, they indicated the former two 
(tax holidays and AGOA). Above all, Mr Rono insisted that AGOA‘s terms were too attractive even 
for some Indian firms that enjoy access to an investment fund in that country, which is lacking in 
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Kenya. Overall, therefore, AGOA accounted for the expansion. At any rate, tax holidays are essential 
in establishing EPZs worldwide, and are not special to Kenya.     
 
Within the US-based regime governance, we see Kenyan struggles to anchor the ‗spreading‘ of 
capitalism. This was revealed by the interview with KAM when it shifted to the behind the scenes of 
the extension of AGOA‘s RoO exemption to 2012. 
 
We have been in close contact with some Congress people who advocated [for RoO exemption extension] - 
you think they are talking from there but they have all the background from here; sort of we as KAM paying 
for some of the action…we call [on] the Minister, give him the background, and the Minister goes [to 
represent our interests] when forums are called for Africa to speak in one voice… Then there is the Coalition 
for African Trade… [who] lobby for Africa…. The extensions are not [entirely] because of the US. It is 
[partly] because of the lobbying from Africa, and from Kenya, and from KAM (Kariuki, 2007). 
 
However, he was exaggerating the role of regime ‗takers‘; Kenya is very obsequious: 
 
When we are lobbying for extension, one of the arguments is that Kenya Government needs time to develop the 
supply chain… We come back and tell the Government, ‗this is what we have used to lobby… now, go to the 
US and beg on your kneels for an extension; and we are coming with you‘. And that is how it [the extension] 
came. Not that it came from the US. No. Campaigns have gone all the way to [Kenyan] State House, and to 
the [US] Congress… they said, ‗okay, final time, we are not telling you 2015‘. We wanted 2015, but they said, 
‗No. You go up to 2012‘. May be they are saying up to then we will see whether you need another three years 
to adjust… (Kariuki, 2007) (my emphasis). 
 
The sentiments of the MoTI Industrial Officer in charge of AGOA revealed similar struggles within 
EU PTA, but he similarly assigned Kenya and SSA an undeservedly role. He claimed that there has 
been a suggestion driven by KAM of initiating discussion with the EU to accept a single 
transformation RoO, as it is in AGOA, or at least allow percentage value addition (Rono, 2007). 
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The Senior Deputy Director of Industries suggested that Kenya even had some role in negotiating for 
AGOA I, not just the AGOA extension (Kimuri, 2007). He disclosed that before AGOA I was 
enacted, there were intensive negotiations between the US and many Government departments in 
Kenya, including MoTI, the office of the Attorney General, Customs, EPZA and EPC. 
Representatives of EPZ firms also participated. First were consultations between the Kenya 
Government and the US Embassy, before officials from the US visited Kenya twice. The US was 
particularly keen on political governance and child labour. The issue of labour was however adjusted 
informally. Nairobi explained that in principle children will not be employed in the EPZs, but 
should this happen, the US should understand that they are driven there by egregious poverty. 
Another issue of particular focus was that of Category 9 products. The MoTI External Trade 
Officer added that the idea of sensitising EPZ firms to have shop stewards came from Kenya and not 
from the US. He further revealed that Kenya was the first country to qualify because, having reached 
this labour agreement with the US, eradication of corruption in the Government barrier was an easy 
sail because earlier on in 1999 Kenya had established an anti-corruption authority independent of the 
AGOA qualification interest (Nyakundi, 2007). 
 
What confirms that the role of regime ‗takers‘ is at best modest is the sentiments of the Industrial 
Officer in charge of the AGOA Desk who refuses to be cagey. He openly disagrees with any notion 
that sees these negotiations as making Kenya an important actor in formulating AGOA. He insists 
that the US merely wanted to say ‗Hey, we are trying to come up with this programme- what do you 
think?‘ But like others he also argues that the country did play some role in negotiating post-AGOA I 
adjustments during AGOA Forums. In particular, he avers, Kenya (and presumably other SSA 
countries) negotiated after AGOA I (during the First AGOA Forum) for a broader range of products 
(such as bed sheets and towels- the home furnishings), as well as the hand-loomed category. On 
Category 9, the  official avers that the ministry prepared a list of about 42 articles, discussed them 
with the US, and out of these, 15 were accepted (Rono, 2007). He was corroborated by the MoTI 
External Trade Officer (Nyakundi, 2007). 
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The AGOA-in-charge official goes on to demonstrate the subordinate role of Kenya by insisting that 
the US-based state-centric international regime is subordinate to the interests of the structural 
international regime on apparel under the WTO. According to him- and this is confirmed by 
Assistant USTR Liser‘s statement in section 5.2.4 below- Americas‘ interest in AGOA might not be 
so much an upgraded industry in SSA, but currying favour with the region with WTO support in 
mind, presumably for wider issues beyond apparel. He was also cagey that given that the two regimes 
are in conflict with each other, AGOA-like agreements may not go far.  
 
Perhaps those are also the reasons [the conflicting interests of the two regimes] why there has not been any 
agreement in WTO; and it is not likely to be there. I have participated in WTO negotiations and I know the 
bigger countries- US, Europe or European Community- feel harmed by these other negotiations within other 
arrangements, and perhaps it [aligning AGOA with WTO requirements] may not even reach that level of 
negotiations (Rono, 2007). 
 
However, capitalism is relatively adaptive to its contradictions and his worries have been 
disconfirmed. WTO‘s Council for Trade in Goods approved the long-standing waiver request from 
the US on AGOA, on 24 March 2009. The US promised the council to get the waiver through 
WTO. The council agreed to forward its decision to the General Council, recommending its 
adoption (WTO, 2009). 
 
Thus although some bureaucrats and entrepreneurs propound an exalted place for Kenya as a regime 
‗taker‘, their overall perceptions, actions and strategies take into account regime governance reflected 
by AGOA, which is influenced by neo-liberalism and individual neo-statism. We had seen- in the 
preceding section- that the Kenyan apparel industry is also tied precariously to the apron-strings of 
the structural international regime on apparel, which is influenced by neo-liberalism. The relation 
between neo-liberalism and individual neo-statism is that the ‗preferences‘ are supposed to be merely 
temporary, giving industry in LICs, such as Kenya, time to become competitive. Paul Ryberg, 
President of the African Coalition for Trade, captures this well by saying that African apparel export 
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growth ‗is vulnerable to changes in the underlying regulatory framework unless and until African 
apparel manufacturers can become internationally competitive‘ (Ryberg, 2002: 27). Neo-liberalism is 
as much dialectically related to individual neo-statism/regionalism as it is to collective neo-statism, 
and hence we now seek to emphasise, in a single discourse, how regime actors illustrate these two 
relationships within the interplay of the structural regime, the US-based regime and the EU-based 
regime. 
 
5.2.3 The Interplay within Structuralism and between Structuralism and State-centric Regimes  
 
We will look at two dialectical interplays. One of them is between regimes, on the one hand the 
structural regime, and on the other hand the US-based and the EU-based regimes. The other 
interplay is between neo-liberal and collective neo-statist forms influences within the structural 
regime. We will also show the vulnerability of the Kenyan industry in these two interplays.  
 
Let us first consider the US-based and the EU-based regimes versus the structural regime. The 
manner in which AGOA III was enacted shows this relationship. AGOA III was meant to be 
introduced to the House of Representatives and the Senate either just before or after WTO‘s Cancun 
Ministerial, with the possibility of Congress enacting it before the end of 2003. However, there was a 
complete volte face when Cancun collapsed. America was angry: Africa was to blame for its collapse.       
 
Especially prejudicial was the perception that African countries view trade preferences as a right, entitling them 
to compensation when such preferences are eventually phased out as the world moves toward global free trade. 
The US delegation witnessed ACP demands for compensation from the EU for the erosion of their Lomé-
Cotonou preferences. Senior US officials came away from Cancun muttering ―Why should we extend AGOA if 
it is only going to generate demands for compensation when it eventually expires?‖… Instead of returning to 
Washington after the Cancun Ministerial to gear up for an active campaign to move AGOA III forward quickly 
to enactment, AGOA III was suddenly moved far down on the list of priorities in both the Bush 
Administration and Congress (African Coalition for Trade, 2003: 3-4).  
 
But in another sense the about face was a façade because at another level, AGOA is more of an 
American and capitalism‘s opportunity than an African one. Hence AGOA could not be left to peter 
- 215 - 
 
 
 
out. AGOA III, though slightly delayed, was enacted in 2004, and so was AGOA IV in 2006. 
Another AGOA could be on the way, if it remains beneficial to the US and capitalism as a whole.  
 
What is exciting is that Kenya was not naïve of this dialectical relationship. We see the country 
balancing the ‗preferences‘ with opportunities within regime emergence under multilateralism. To 
start with, Richard Lugar, the principal Senate sponsor of the AGOA Bill- alongside ten other co-
sponsors- laconically told Congress that AGOA would ultimately bring negligible benefits to SSA 
and presumably more benefits to the US, and hence America need not worry: 
 
Some have argued that granting quota-free and duty-free access to American markets will weaken our domestic 
textile industries. If that were true, I would not be advocating this provision. African imports of textile and 
apparel now account for less than one percent of our total textile imports. The International Trade 
Commission looked at this issue and concluded that enactment of our bill would increase US imports of 
textiles and apparel from Africa to between one and two percent of our total textile and apparel imports. In 
short, a negligible impact (Lugar, 1998: 2).  
 
Kenya was aware of these congenital limitations of AGOA. For a Cabinet Paper on AGOA expressed 
concern over the political limitations of AGOA; that there would be negative impact because of 
undue American influence. It interpreted the regular summits and SSA heads of states meetings as 
inordinate US influence. The Paper was patently sceptical of Washington‘s intentions.  
 
What would happen should the sub-Saharan African countries‘ exports to the United States exceed the 
stipulated quota levels for any commodity in any given year? Since the United States has bound her tariffs to as 
much as 500% would these high tariffs schedules be implemented? The Act is silent on this issue… The 
African Growth and Opportunity Act has come in the wake of the implementation of the World Trade 
Organisation Agreement, whose negotiations started in 1945, with the United States of America as a key 
founder member. How do these two documents compare and contrast? (GoK, ca. 2000: 3).  
 
To underscore the inveterate economic limitations of AGOA, the Cabinet Paper cited two key areas 
where the Act could possibly negatively impact on Kenya in the area of loss of business opportunity. 
One was disinvestment from the subsector, since the Kenyan subsector is dominated by Asian 
capitalists, who would relocate back to Asia once the sector was to be liberalised in 2005 and AGOA 
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expires in 2015. The Paper concluded that Kenya can only survive if: AGOA type of legislation is 
extended to Asia (presumably placing a cap on its apparel similar to that in AGOA); Kenya targets 
other international markets; or Kenya lowers production costs as much as possible.  
 
The country argued that with enough mettle, it can do better under multilateralism; because the other 
business loss the Paper cited was to be through quotas, yet Kenya has a huge potential.  
 
By some estimates, the annual demand for fabric by the United States in the form of garments, bed sheets and 
pillow cases amounts to about 30.0 billion square meters. Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
1.5% limit, the listed 48 sub-Saharan countries may export up to 270.0 million square meters of fabric 
equivalent annually. If each member were to be given an equal share of this allowance per country, over the next 
eight years, starting on 1st October 2000, these levels would rise to 630.0 million and 13, 124, 000 square 
meters of fabric equivalent annually. For comparison purposes Kenya‘s weaving capacity is approximately 120 
million square meters annually. In 1993, Kenya exported 226, 491 dozen men/boys shirts to the United States. 
The fabric equivalent of these items is about 4.1 million square meters. Had the import quota restrictions on 
Kenyan made products not been put in place, this amount would have about doubled in 1994 for another 35 
companies were awaiting commissioning. The weaving capacity for RIVATEX is approximately 13.0 million 
meters per annum. 
  
… over a million hectares of land in Kenya [are] suitable for cotton cultivation… Under irrigation, this land 
can produce about 600,000 tonnes of cotton lint a season. This lint would be enough to weave about 210.0 
million square meters of fabric. Since it is possible to harvest two crops a year, this amount can be increased to 
420.0 million square meters of fabric. With about 6.0 million sheep, Kenya can produce about 2,700 tonnes of 
wool annually; this would be adequate to weave about 1.2 million square meters of wool fabric annually. Thus 
in total, under an aggressive campaign, Kenya could easily produce garments whose fabric equivalent is within 
reach of what the African Growth and Opportunity Act allows the entire sub-Saharan African region (GoK, ca. 
2000: 14-5).  
 
Kenya might have embraced AGOA partly because systemic limitations are incorrigible, but we 
should not presuppose that such knowledge of regime dynamics seen here cannot be unleashed in 
whatever direction in future struggles to embed industry.        
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We now turn to neo-liberal form influence versus collective neo-statist form influence within the 
structural regime. We will first consider outright protectionism. Long before the 2005 restrictions 
imposed on Chinese exports to the EU and US, the EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy had said 
in 2004 that, while the EU was ready to scrupulously respect the WTO agreement to eliminate the 
210 quotas on 11 countries29, it was still to monitor imports closely and impose the restrictions once 
again under WTO provisions (Trade Watch, 2004). Eventually, the EU [and US] went ahead to 
impose the quotas. In the US, there was supposedly a conflict of interests among American domestic 
actors. Textile-apparel manufacturers were asking the government to stem Chinese surge in 2005, 
while retailers were simultaneously lobbying the same administration to allow more shipments from 
China (Associated Press Reporter, 2005d; Wahome, 2005). This seeming conflict is explained by 
the fact that American manufacturers benefit from the neo-statist regime reflected by AGOA because 
manufacturers sub-contract out only the assembly stage, while retailers benefit from the neo-
liberalism of the structural regime. The state must therefore delicately balance these two interests. On 
this particular occasion, therefore, it is manufacturers who won.  
 
In addition to outright protectionism, there is the promotion of liberalisation, while limiting 
accumulation in the South through categorising countries and ‗graduating‘ them. In view here is the 
International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (ITCB), a 25-nation Southern caucus of textile-apparel 
exporters set up in 1987, and controlled by middle income countries led by India. The two 
substantive issues I want to highlight here are how capitalism limits the South and Kenya‘s 
knowledge of IPE in the apparel industry.  
 
After ITCB‘s 39th Session in Delhi in 2004, the Kenyan delegate reported that the session  
 
lamented the fact that in contravention of its obligations under the ATC, the European Union had announced 
introduction of new quota restrictions in the markets of 10 more countries acceding to the Union from 1st May 
2004, and had determined the levels of these quota limits unilaterally…The Council, therefore, resolved to 
exercise the necessary vigilance during the remainder of the remaining ATC period… (Muraya, 2004:4-5).  
 
                                                     
29 Argentina, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand. 
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Such resolves as the one above are undermined by lack of unanimity. This is not surprising as 
capitalism‘s categorisation makes common interests from the South unfeasible; because central 
capitalism‘s manoeuvres are beneficial to some of the caucus members that enjoy ‗preferential‘ 
treatment. According to Muraya, Mauritius and Kenya refused to support India‘s push for 
elimination of quotas. India enticed them by suggesting strengthening South-South trade through 
PTAs and Regional Trade Agreements, and announced that it had begun providing much greater 
access to its own markets to other Southern countries.  
 
While it is not made clear whether or not the complainants were satisfied, confidential MoTI 
documents show that, instead, Kenya seemed to support another caucus within the WTO, led by 
Turkey (Nzusi, 2006)30. The latter caucus was calling for the industry to be governed post-2005 
under a Special Textile Sectoral under the WTO that is not subject to Non-Agriculture Market 
Access (NAMA) negotiations, incorporating the so-called Swiss Formula. The formula proposes 
harmonisation of tariffs across the board. But special governance outside NAMA could mean 
different things. In a communication circulated among Members in June 2005, the Delegation of 
Turkey at the WTO was asking that, in view of the lifting of quotas in the industry, there was need 
to protect smaller exporters from Chinese competition in the EU and the US. It proposed that the 
Council on Trade on Goods should periodically review the situation; the WTO Secretariat make 
recommendations on adjustments for countries affected, especially LDCs, and in particular the issue 
of price stabilisation; and the WTO collaborate with the World Bank and the IMF in stabilising 
prices, and also directing resources to diversification of economies heavily reliant on the industry 
(WTO, 2005). Kenya- through MoTI- supported these proposals (Manyara, 2005).  
 
But that was not all. The Kenya Association of Manufacturers and Exporters of Apparel (KAMEA) 
and KAM further suggested to MoTI that, while the Swiss Formula is to be exempted in the 
industry, there should be no further reduction in import duties in the EU and US markets where 
                                                     
30 Turkey was wooing into the caucus Kenya, Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Madagascar, Japan, Egypt, Benin, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Korea, US, Jordan, Sri Lanka, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Tunisia and Uganda. 
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LICs have ‗preferential‘ treatment (Bedi, 2006a). In short, chapters affecting ‗preferences‘ should be 
left untouched by both NAMA and this special arrangement. Turkey clarified that, while it 
advocated for exemption from NAMA negotiations, there should be harmonisation of tariffs within 
textile-apparel chapters (Bolukbasi, 2006)- although this is not stated explicitly in Turkey‘s 
communiqué. In riposte, KAM reiterated its above view (Bedi, 2006b), and MoTI stood by it.  
 
Kenya would support an approach that will allow member countries to seek a harmonization of tariff structures 
in a manner that protects important export market created for developing and LDCs through preferential trade 
programs while promoting market access for all Members. The approach should advocate no further reduction 
of import duties for the textile and clothing groupings in our export markets i.e. the US and the EU whereby 
we have competitive advantage on duty free entry basis (MoTI, External Trade Department, ca. 2006a) 
 
Kenya started dragging its feet and started seeking Turkey‘s interpretation. In one instance Kenya 
stated that ‗we are still consulting‘ (Makuu, 2006), and in another ‗our only concern is whether this 
harmonization will apply to all WTO members including paragraph 6 countries as indicated in 
Annex B of the July Framework‘ (Manyara, 2006). To date, this caucus has not succeeded. Turkey 
has gone only as far as submitting a paper to the Council for Trade in Goods in March 2009, urging 
the WTO to take a coordinated role in managing apparel liberalisation. Although the paper was 
adopted for future deliberation, China and India had inveighed against it (WTO, 2009).  
 
What is clear is that such disagreements as those depicted here lead to the South losing. The only 
proposal that possibly saw the light of day was the price stabilisation one, which was entirely an IMF 
idea; only that Turkey‘s proposal was in concurrence with the IMF. This is because long before, in 
2004, the IMF had introduced the Trade Integration Mechanism intended to assist countries to meet 
their balance of payments shortfalls resulting from such trade liberalisation. By November 2005 the 
IMF Resident Representative for Kenya confirmed that Bangladesh and the Dominican Republic had 
secured the facility with regard to their textile-apparel industry, and that the Fund was in 
consultation with more countries, some in SSA (Reitmaier, 2005).  
 
Beginning in section 5.2.1, and up to this point, we have summoned substantial evidence that the 
structural regime and the US-based and the EU-based neo-statist regimes, and not lead firms per se, 
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govern the quantity of apparel and chain geographical spread. Further, the former regime has a 
dialectical interplay with the latter two regimes, and within it, it has a dialectical interplay between 
neo-liberal and collective neo-statist forms of Northern state strategic selectivity. These interplays 
have given a glimpse of the regime-dependency relationship promised in the introduction to the 
Chapter. To show this relationship more clearly, we assess now the scope for the Southern 
Developmental State/ enabling state to upgrade industry within the governance of these regimes.   
 
5.2.4 Regime Governance and Product Upgrading  
 
5.2.4.1 Introduction 
 
There are two implications in LICs of apparel industry regime governance. One of them is that the 
industry in LICs is only constrained to pick up, particularly as a result of the instrumentality of the 
regimes. The other effect is that LICs are crowded out of destination markets by major players. This 
is mainly a result of the emergent facet of the regime: the overall effect is that a Southern country, or 
a selected few of them, emerge(s) as the global workshop for apparel. In the contemporary period, 
China serves this role. These two implications mean that product upgrading is inhibited. 
 
5.2.4.2 Regime Instrumentality and Product Upgrading 
 
5.2.4.2.1 The Special Circumstances Surrounding Mauritius‘ Partial Upgrading 
 
When we look at the first implication, that of the industry in LICs being constrained to pick up as a 
result of the instrumentality of regimes, the most obvious objection to our argument might be that 
EU PTA offers upgrading opportunities as it demands a double transformation of the fabric. 
However, the only SSA country that partly upgraded was Mauritius, as we saw in Chapter Four. But 
Mauritius secured an entry to the EOI race a little bit earlier than the rest of SSA, and was able to 
employ some elements of the Developmental State theorisation that combined with RoO 
implementation. It is essential to understand that the Developmental State ideology was being 
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preached at the time by central capitalism, not because the system believed in it, but as Cold War 
ingenuity. Baissac disputes the World Bank‘s perspective that the root of Mauritius‘ partial success 
lay in the adoption and effective implementation of IMF-backed stabilisation plans, and World Bank 
supported SAPs. He is categorical that the Mauritian experience reproduces important developmental 
characteristics. Apart from strategies targeting domestic institutions, such as convincing the sugar 
barons and the communist party who were opposed to the EPZ, one single most important measure 
was to limit capital flight by authorising investment by domestic firms in the EPZ. These firms were 
encouraged, directly through joint venture partnerships and subcontracting, and indirectly by external 
demonstration, to enter the export market. There was thus technology transfer and transmission of 
skills and expertise, at both the intra-firm and inter-firm levels. By the 1990s, there was a core group 
of domestic firms, leading to further demonstration and spin offs. They were therefore able to insert 
themselves in [more lucrative nodes in] the GVC (Baissac, 2004).  
 
All of these could be tolerated at the time in some countries- mainly what came to be NICs- as 
capitalism was creating capitalist growth poles of varying sizes with the aim of bringing communism 
to its knees. By the time the EPZ had an appointment with the rest of the SSA exporters, however, 
capitalism would not allow a replication of the NIC experience, which Mauritius had partially 
achieved. For Kenya, the structural regime emergence dynamics reached the country in 1993. 
Furthermore, by this time, the Kenyan local supply chain had atrophied.  
 
Even in the absence of a Developmental State strategy, one might expect that the state policy of an 
enabling state, such as Kenya, would at least seek less ambitious forms of embedding the investment 
or its benefits. This might include industrial incubation to create some kind of beneficial networks 
which the investors can assess, which might result in trust, reciprocity, knowledge of chain 
functioning et cetera. In practice, however, even such a modest quest is often deflated by regime 
instrumentality, and often leads to LICs pursuing a contradictory strategy; one that reflects a fantasy 
influenced by NIC sanguinity (banking on structural regime emergence), on the one hand, and one 
that is constrained by neo-statist regimes (banking on ‗preferences‘), on the other hand.  
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5.2.4.2.2 Replicating the NICs: Industrial Incubation   
 
The eighth Development Plan (1997-2001) was the first to reflect EOI strategy in full. Previous 
Plans had been geared to the ISI strategy before 1980, and a mix of ISI and EOI after 1980. Coming 
hot on the heels of Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996, and, indeed, designed to cover the first phase of 
the Paper, it departed from previous Plans by focussing on industrialisation as the engine to drive 
Kenya to NIC status by 2020. The aim was to raise Kenya‘s annual saving capacity from 17 percent 
of GDP to 30 percent. In this regard, product upgrading in the manufacturing sector was to be part 
of the strategy (GoK, 1997). The relationship between increased saving and upgrading was only 
implied, but could take many forms. For example, it could take the form of more private savings 
going into private value adding investments rather than going to finance Government deficit 
occasioned by its low savings. Suffice to say that even the country‘s current and third ‗post-
independence‘ economic blueprint (Vision 2030), although not part of the analysis of this thesis, sets 
similar targets by 2012. While apparel is not explicitly mentioned as a key target (the Vision focuses 
on agro-processing), upgrading in manufacturing sector is still envisaged (GoK, 2007).  
 
In line with the above strategy, when the NARC Government took power, it initiated a policy on 
developing an export business incubator with 30-40 SMEs. In a report prepared on its behalf by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, the Secretariat advised that the Government should focus on 
horticulture/food processing, information technology, textile-apparel manufacture, handicrafts and 
jewellery and leather products. These were to be selected on the basis of Kenya‘s competitive 
advantage, as well as the ability to maintain it, specifically the subsectors‘ competitiveness and value 
chain functioning (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003). The value chain functioning in the textile-
apparel sector is further emphasised in the EPZA strategic plan for the years 2004-9. The plan aimed 
to achieve 40 percent value in domestic expenditure in the EPZ within five years through enhanced 
backward linkages to the domestic market. The Authority was envisaging adding at least one cotton-
based textile mill and at least one synthetic-based one by 2007 (EPZA, 2004b).  
 
The Secretariat based its proposal on studies of success stories of subcontracting SMEs in Hong 
Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. According to the report, Kenya was among the first in SSA to explore 
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the incubator idea. Only South Africa had by 2002 some limited programme, and Nigeria had 
established a Technology Business Incubation Centre in 2003. Uganda was seeking to establish one, 
Mauritius had an Information Communications Technology one, and Mozambique has recently 
embarked on Mozambique Information and Communication Technology Initiative as part of the 
Maputo Development Corridor (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003).  
 
The idea to replicate NICs is riveted on a sanguine and undeniably reasonable hypothesis that 
realisation of long term benefits from EPZs can be achieved if the benefits from its initial enclave 
stage over any other industrial estate in an export oriented economy can be progressively reduced to 
zero. This is done by integrating the EPZ with the rest of the economy by encouraging participation 
of domestic companies in and around the zone. It is preferred to the alternative of specifying 
minimum levels of local content which might impair the viability of the zone rather than integrate it 
with the rest of the economy (UNIDO, 1980). At any event, I have just shown in this section the 
difficulty involved in pursuing such a Developmental State strategy as specifying minimum local 
content in contemporary capitalism. This is the reasoning behind the consideration of local 
integration as superior to value addition at assembly stage, as explained in the previous chapter 
section 4.3.1, a fact I had also clarified in Chapter Two section 2.4.2.4, showing that Kenya is an 
enabling state and not developmental. Of course, local integration and value addition at production 
stage are closely related, since there is nothing indigenous firms will learn if they are partnered with 
basic-assembly firms in EPZs. Chapter Four showed us that neither of these is happening. However, 
even if value addition was taking place in Kenya, AGOA‘s RoO restrictions mean that Kenyan firms 
cannot be relied upon to link SMEs with the global market. The firms rely entirely on Asian fabric, 
whose permission to import is granted up to 2012.  
 
That is why it was right for the Kenyan Government to see that, at least for now, the most viable way 
to follow in the footsteps of NICs is the enabling state route of promoting business incubation 
anchored in developing the local supply chain. The problem is that the possibility of developing the 
supply chain in Kenya is constrained not only by the failure of Kenya as an enabling state but also by 
regime governance. Let us first consider the former, although our interest is the latter.  
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5.2.4.2.3 State Failures 
 
First, we have seen already in Chapter Four the impediments to developing this supply chain in FIAS 
(1992), and in Ikiara and Ndirangu (2004). The minor steps to rejuvenate yarn and fabric 
production quoted in that section cannot be relied upon.  
 
The General Manager of Protex claimed that the Government had actually resisted their overture to 
partner with Taiwan in reviving the moribund textile mills. He claimed that the Taiwanese Minister 
for Trade had visited his firm in 2005, where he (the Minister) mooted the idea of government-to-
government project where Taiwanese investors would be supported to invest in textile mills in Kenya, 
which he claimed they had already done in Swaziland (see UN Integrated Regional Information 
Networks, 2004). The end result would have been to set up a Taiwanese trading centre in Kenya to 
oversee such Taiwanese investment. Unfortunately, the Kenyan Minister was not available. Instead, 
the issue was discussed with the Permanent Secretary, and it never went beyond that. This 
demoralised him (the manager). When uncertainty over the RoO exemption extension was looming 
in 2005, Protex EPZ Ltd was planning to relocate to Egypt with the possibility of switching to 
another product. The manager had gone as far as acquiring a visa to prospect the country, which he 
never actually used, when the extension was granted up to 2012. At the moment the firm is 
considering remaining in the EPZ but switching to another product come 2012 (Isinga, 2007). 
 
Second, suggestions for the future could fail. Let us dilate on EPZA‘s strategic plan 2004-9. EPZA 
has three suggestions. The first is pressurising the exchequer to set aside funds for the revival of the 
cotton industry. MoTI has already done this, albeit late, past the initial 2004 deadline for the RoO 
exemption. At any event, as we saw in section 4.3.2.2, the US$ 3.3 million is by all standards a very 
small figure for a serious resuscitation of the cotton industry, given its dilapidated state.  
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The other suggestion is to rely on cotton and/ or yarn from wherever, but especially from the rest of 
East Africa, and to encourage investors to invest in mills that would transform such raw materials 
into fabric. The Authority has come up with a promotional brochure (Chesang, 2007). However, it 
is doubtful that this will work out in practice. According to an EPZA internal report prepared for 
the Authority and availed to me, even before AGOA came, EPZA had similarly thought of importing 
textile fabrics from Mauritius, which would have made EPZ exports qualify for EU duty free access 
(Njage et al, 1996). There is no evidence this ever materialised. It is not understood why, despite 
such failure, this idea has been gaining currency among local actors, as the MoTI Industrial Officer 
in charge of AGOA Desk also embraced it. 
 
We are looking at being a regional centre for garment making, perhaps textiles to some certain extent. They can 
have the cotton that is in Tanzania brought here, make yarn here, then make garments exports… in fact, that is 
what the Minister for Regional Cooperation has been pushing for. We are at the moment slightly more 
developed in terms of manufacturing for the other countries (Rono, 2007). 
 
The idea was equivocally echoed by Protex EPZ General Manager; never mind that this contradicts 
his firm‘s plan to switch to another product come 2012 (Isinga, 2007). 
 
Then we came up with an idea in a meeting; that we have East African Community…Kenyans are very good in 
manufacturing, …Tanzania… can venture into planting the cotton, Uganda do what you call ginning and all 
whatever- ginning, spinning and everything- and Kenya stitches because we are somehow advanced, I mean 
manufacturing… if we can do it, then I am telling you we can save this industry… we have been having several 
meetings with the Ministry [of Trade and Industry] trying to sell that kind of idea… (Isinga, 2007). 
 
A regional project with such a goal- PANTEXPRO-AGOA Enterprise Project- was unveiled in 
Nairobi in 2005. It involves producers of such products as textile, apparel, arts and crafts, gemstones, 
coffee, cotton and soya beans. In the case of textile-apparel, it proposed cotton to be grown in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Southern Sudan. It could then be ginned 
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locally, and then transported to the African Textile Mills in Uganda for further processing (Africa 
and Middle East Textiles Editor, 2005b). Uganda was said to be setting up a US$ 20 million textile 
mill envisaged to be operational from 2006 (MoTI, External Trade Department, ca. 2006b). 
 
The third EPZA suggestion is the sheer persuasion of the US to extend AGOA, alongside attempting 
to incorporate more or less AGOA type concessions into the ACP-EU deliberations to phase out the 
Cotonou Agreement (that were ongoing in 2007) (Chesang, 2007). The success of the ACP-EU 
deliberations is in doubt, and it is not even fresh ingenuity. As early as 1996, EPZA was proposing 
that Kenya should lobby for a renegotiation or waiver of the EU RoO (Njage et al, 1996).  
 
Third, there is a contradiction in the strategy itself. For example, the Commonwealth report cautions 
on the volatility of relying on EPZ firms, and saw the idea of developing a local supply chain as 
unworkable. But in giving the policy recommendation to increase access to quality and internationally 
competitive input materials, especially yarn and fabric, by removing duties on them, as well as any 
tariff-based restrictions on exports of the outputs, especially finished apparel, it is contradicting the 
caution not to rely on EPZs.  
 
Let us now turn to regime constraints. 
  
5.2.4.2.4 Regime Constraints 
 
To start with, we had occasion to see in Chapter Three section 3.3.2.2 that the US slapped quotas 
on Kenya in 1994 under the MFA on accusations that some Asian countries were using the country 
as a transhipment point for exports destined to the US. As a result, most MuB firms, which were 
mainly owned by indigenous Kenyan capitalists, closed down. According to the Cabinet Paper 
assessing the potential perils of AGOA, 
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[i]t was alleged that one way in which Kenya could have achieved the growth in garment exports that it did 
could have been by means of transhipment of these goods using Kenyan documents. For this reason, 
between August 1996 and January 1997, customs officials from the Department of Treasury of the 
United States visited Kenya on three different occasions. To date, no evidence of wrongdoing by these 
companies has been presented to the Government of Kenya (GoK, ca. 2000) (my emphasis).  
 
This constraint is expected until a mechanism to supervise such an industry is devised. In the apparel 
industry, this is usually neo-statist regimes, in this particular case, the regime represented by AGOA.  
 
Thus the best way of understanding the constraints to the idea of replicating NICs through 
industrial incubation is to turn to regime governance as understood by regime ‗framers‘. I will take 
the US as a case study. Some might see some or all of such analysis, such as deliberations at the 
Congress, as mere political statements meant to solicit Congressional support, rather than statements 
of reality. This thesis argues that they serve both purposes.  
 
On the one hand they are statements of reality in two senses. The first sense is to the extent that they 
are supported with accurate statistics on current and future trade dynamics. In 1998 the lead Senator 
behind the AGOA Bill, Richard Lugar, had projected SSA apparel imports into the US to account 
for at most 2 percent, if the bill passed. After AGOA was adopted, this came to be so at the peak of 
the AGOA boom in 2004. Also, AGOA might not have brought about the economic growth capable 
of achieving the social order he envisaged, as we will see in a moment, but certainly it created jobs 
and reduced poverty, which he had emphasised. It has also benefitted American businesses, a point 
that was emphasised during its formulation. Moreover, we will see that the AGOA targets that the 
Senator had envisaged were confirmed later in Congress Committee hearings. The testimonies 
received by the committees were not mere political statements, but factual statistics on the 
performance of AGOA. The second sense in which they are statements of reality is that they are in 
tandem with one of AGOA‘s three principal aims- the milieu goals of achieving both social 
reproduction of labour and attaining low-level international social order.  
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On the other hand, this thesis concedes that, in the US political context, any policy has to justify 
itself as being conducive to the national interest. The fact that the Senator said that AGOA is in 
American national interest does not mean that that was the primary reason for adopting it. That is an 
indispensable argument for selling any US bill. Thus we have to read between the lines. That is why 
we are emphasising the milieu goals argument because, spot on, one of the US‘s primary interest in 
AGOA is to try to promote them. In this regard, the Senator‘s speech is simply window dressing to 
neutralise those lobbyists within US politics who were worried about the many forms of competition 
to domestic manufacturers that AGOA might bring, including putting US workers out of work. 
Although direct benefits to the US economy are of secondary importance, this thesis will highlight 
them.  
 
Beginning with what is only partly related to the US-based apparel regime, developing the local 
cotton supply chain is constrained by subsidised cotton in the North. The greatest culprit is the US. 
For example, in Mississippi it costs 82 cents to produce a pound of cotton, while in Mali it costs 
only 23 cents. Yet in 2002, the US subsidised its 25 000 cotton farmers to the tune of US$ 3.4 
billion. This depressed world prices. Reverend Leon Spencer, testifying before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on behalf of Advocacy Network for Africa, chided the US for this rapacious 
behaviour (see Spencer, 2003). In 2005, the EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson argued that 
the EU had not only led the way in removing export subsidies for the crop but also, beginning 2006, 
65 percent of EU support for cotton growers was decoupled from production (Africa and Middle 
East Textiles Editor, 2005a). The EU has been pushing for a similar policy to be adopted at the 
WTO, but this has been resisted by the US.  
 
We now move on to a major AGOA architect- so prominent to be christened the ‗Mother of 
AGOA‘- Rosa Whitaker. Whitaker served as the Assistant USTR for Africa in the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations and played a key role in lobbying for, developing and implementing AGOA- before, 
during and after her position as Assistant Representative. For instance, her role in AGOA III is seen 
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in the fact that she was the chair of AGOA III Action Committee which was behind it (African 
Coalition for Trade, 2003). Whitaker shows that AGOA was designed to meet mainly capitalism‘s 
milieu goals, and not intended for upgrading SSA apparel industry per se:  
 
The legislation we crafted was intended to help end Africa‘s dependence for export revenue on one or two 
commodities, not to create a new dependence, in this instance on mass-produced shirts and trousers, themselves 
effectively another form of commodity…. The principal thrust of AGOA was, and is, to assist reforming 
African countries diversify their economies, become more competitive and attract investment into a range of 
value-adding industries. To be sure, based on successful models of development in the Far East, there was a 
consensus that garment manufacture was a tried and true entry point for industrial diversification. And few 
would seriously question that it still has an important role to play, even in the post quota age. Nonetheless, the 
time has come to recognise Africa cannot outdo China by trying to be China (Whitaker, 2005: 18) (my 
emphasis). 
 
If we take- for the sake of argument- Whitaker‘s tendentious affirmation that diversification was the 
principal aim of AGOA, this thesis would not question diversification as a well meaning intention of 
AGOA. It would only argue that the apparel industry is one of the most low-technology in 
capitalism, and, if SSA has failed to upgrade it, the region might not, a priori, upgrade in more 
technology intensive ones. This diversification tune, matted with one of promoting apparel exports, 
is automatically reflected in Kenyan policy. The EPZA strategic plan for the year 2004-9 explicitly 
lays down as one of its objectives the ‗gradual, diversification and expansion of other industrial 
sectors away from garments‘. By 2009, the Authority hoped to have four call centre companies, 60 
agro-processing projects and 10 leather projects. Other targets were pharmaceutical and electronic 
industries each with 20 projects. The Authority was also considering motor industry parts (EPZA, 
2004b: 3, 24). The way the MoTI Industrial Officer in charge of AGOA Desk sums up everything 
portrays the international circumstances as being the source of confusion over a firm commitment by 
the state to considering apparel as the starter industry of industrialisation (Rono, 2007).  
 
- 230 - 
 
 
 
But diversification was not the principal aim of AGOA. One of the three major intentions of AGOA 
was to secure energy for the US. Oil exports constitute approximately 95 percent of total AGOA 
exports. However, that is beyond the scope of this thesis. The scope is an analysis of the apparel 
industry, which is the next sector of importance under AGOA after oil, constituting approximately 
three percent. Outside energy interests, AGOA‘s second and third principal aims were, respectively, 
to engender industrial emergence and to open up SSA for capitalism as a whole (as a milieu goal). 
There was also an American national economic interest, but this was of secondary importance. 
However, as we have noted, the latter was often exaggerated by the regime ‗framers‘ in order to 
convince sceptical politicians and capitalists. In spite of its exaggeration, it also does exist for real. 
 
We will concentrate on the milieu and the national-self interests, because they were more urgent with 
regard to AGOA. These are seen in Senator Lugar‘s speech on the Senate floor in 1998. The Bill had 
just passed the House of Representatives in March of that year and was now before the Finance and 
Foreign Relations committees.  
 
I introduced the Africa bill because I believe that… as important as our child survival, health, agriculture, 
educational and humanitarian programs have been, they have not promoted much [African] economic 
development, political stability or self-reliance [milieu goal to ensure social reproduction of labour and for 
grassroots stability]. Nor have they benefitted the American economy… [US self-interest] That is the purpose 
of the African bill (Lugar, 1998) (my emphasis).  
 
He went on to say that the real motive is eventually to sign a FTA with SSA with the twin aim of 
reducing African poverty (milieu interest), while exploiting its cheap labour (US self-interest).  
 
…it [AGOA bill] urges the President to negotiate free trade agreements with African countries with the 
ultimate goal of a US- Sub-Saharan Africa Free Trade Area… enactment of our bill would increase US imports 
of textiles and apparel from Africa to between one and two percent of our total textile and apparel imports. In 
short, a negligible impact…. While this amount is small in terms of our overall textile and apparel imports, it 
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can have sizeable benefits for Africa. It can help create jobs and export earnings in Africa [mainly a milieu goal 
to ensure social reproduction of labour and for grassroots stability, but can be US self-interest of market for her 
TNCs as well]. The lower costs of African textiles will also benefit American retailers and American consumers 
[US self-interest of cheap imports] (Lugar, 1998: 2) (my emphasis).  
 
Assistant USTR Liser‘s testimony is similar: 
 
Implementation of AGOA is a central component of the Bush Administration‘s effort to promote free markets, 
free trade, and free societies. AGOA is supporting this effort by stimulating economic growth, helping sub-
Sahara Africa integrate into the global economy [milieu goal of capitalist market expansion], [and] increasing 
opportunities for US exports and businesses… [US self-interest] AGOA is successfully promoting African 
efforts to…reduce poverty and strengthen labour and human rights [milieu goal to ensure social reproduction 
of labour and for grassroots stability]. Both the United States and sub-Saharan Africa are benefitting… (Liser, 
2003: 1) (my emphasis). 
 
Exploitation of cheap labour is further confirmed by the US Undersecretary for Economic Affairs: 
‗AGOA makes African countries more attractive, cost-effective sources for purchasing raw materials 
and finished products… [It] isn‘t just altruism on the part of the United States… There are benefits 
available for American businesses and consumers as well‘ (Larson, 2004: 2). On SSA as a market for 
US products, he said that ‗in many instances, new apparel factories have bought American 
equipment‘. He also reported that a US jeans manufacturer in South Africa is providing a market for 
US exports in the form of denim and thread from North Carolina, and that this is ‗a vivid example 
of how AGOA can benefit not only African economies, but the US economy as well‘ (Larson, 2004: 
2, 6).  
 
On SSA as a market for US products, American direct benefits increase substantially beyond the 
apparel industry; AGOA was meant to raise the continent‘s consumption wherewithal of American 
products in general. As Stephen Hayes, President of the Corporate Council on Africa says ‗until 
African countries are able to earn greater income, their ability to buy US products will be limited‘ 
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(Corporate Council on Africa, US Department of State, 2003: iii). American businesses have 
benefitted primarily by exporting aircraft, vehicles and wheat and other numerous industrial goods 
using American machinery, equipment and cotton and fabric inputs (Fisher-Thompson, 2003) (see 
also Liser, 2004). Even in the early days of AGOA ‗US merchandise exports to sub-Saharan Africa 
were just over $6 billion in 2002, greater than exports to the former Soviet republics, and nearly 
twice those to Central and Eastern Europe. US exports to South Africa alone were larger than our 
exports to Russia‘ (Liser, 2003: 2).  
 
AGOA was also a channel to dispose of ‗air traffic control equipment that is no longer in use‘ (US 
Congress, 2000: 22).  
 
There is also the intention of whittling down to size African opposition to the neo-liberal agenda in 
the WTO. This is both a US self-interest (because African states would support the superpower‘s 
economic interests in the WTO) and a milieu goal (because neo-liberalism is expected to bring about 
economic growth in Africa, which is expected to reduce poverty). There was the view that AGOA 
was developed at a time when there was no active WTO round, and that it needed to be amended 
now that the Doha Round had picked up. 
 
In that AGOA was developed, debated and enacted prior to the launch of the WTO‘s Doha Development 
Agenda in 2001, there is no reference in the Act to the importance for sub-Saharan African and other 
developing countries of multilateral trade liberalisation. In fact, some African countries have opposed tariff 
reduction efforts in the WTO because of concerns about ―erosion of preferences‖ and potential revenue losses. 
(The World Bank and the IMF are working with African and other developing countries to address these 
concerns.) Congress should consider including language in AGOA legislation calling on sub-Saharan African 
countries to support the larger objective of reducing trade barriers worldwide, even as they continue to benefit 
from preferential programs such as AGOA (Liser, 2004: 5).   
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To achieve this milieu goal more effectively, the US must have more direct control over Africa‘s 
industrial future. With the NICs project having fulfilled its twin goal of revitalising capitalism and 
defeating communism, the idea was seen as though it might spin out of control; hence the US must 
take European hegemony from Africa. In denouncing the French economic monopoly in 
francophone Africa, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, stated in 
Libreville, Gabon, in 1995, that ‗the African market is open to everyone…we must accept free and 
fair competition, equality between all actors‘ (Sek 2001 cited in Gerstenfeld and Njoroge, n.d.). 
Larson told Foreign Relations Committee that AGOA ‗has changed the attitude of many African 
firms and governments… [who now] begin to realize that the United States can be a partner for 
them- they don‘t have to rely solely on their traditional, usually former colonial, trading partners such 
as France and Portugal‘ (Larson, 2004: 2).  
 
Towards the end of his speech, Senator Lugar was somewhat overt. 
 
Africa is one of the last frontiers of untapped markets in the world (for milieu and US self-interests). There are 
nearly 700 million people in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, 33 of the world‘s forty-eight least developed countries 
are in Africa. Despite this, prospects for enhanced trade and investment are bright. Our exports to Africa are 
now twenty percent greater than our exports to all the states of the former Soviet Union combined. Economic 
growth in Africa will create new markets and new opportunities for US goods (US self-interest), but that won‘t 
happen if we don‘t act to make it happen (Lugar, 1998: 2) (my emphasis).   
 
He likens the US role in opening up Africa with a similar role it played in Taiwan and South Korea. 
 
If we had ignored Taiwan and Korea in the 1960s when they were at stages of economic development 
comparable to many African societies today, we would have missed out on enormous [US and milieu] 
opportunities in East Asia. … If the United States is a major player, a pro-active player in Africa‘s economic 
and political development, we will also be a major beneficiary [US self-interest] (Lugar, 1998: 3) (my 
emphasis).   
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Let us get our bearings. We are arguing that the Kenyan strategy to upgrade is fraught with internal 
limitations of lack of value addition at the assembly stage, lack of a serious effort to rejuvenate the 
cotton supply chain and inconsistencies in the policy. This contradicts the strategy‘s vision of 
emulating NICs. But apart from that, Northern subsidies to its cotton farmers aggravate the 
contradiction of rejuvenating the cotton supply chain. Since the Kenyan industry is mainly based on 
the regime represented by AGOA, we used AGOA as a case analysis, where this contradiction is seen 
to get worse because regime ‗framers‘ seem to be in a hurry to diversify industry before upgrading 
apparel manufacturing even to the very basic levels. Continuing with this case analysis, the greatest 
contradiction yet, however, is that the whole idea to replicate NICs is unlikely to be compatible with 
US economic self-interests and its milieu interests in the continent. This constraint issuing from 
regime instrumentality as showcased by the US-based regime was therefore a sufficient condition to 
undermine product upgrading in Kenya. Hence this analysis and discussion is the direct link between 
this chapter and both the hypothesis and the findings presented in Chapter Four. 
 
Let us now consider the implication of LICs being crowded out of destination markets by major 
exporters. It is based on the argument that a dominant country (ies) always emerge(s) in every regime 
of accumulation as a source of cheap apparel imports into the North, squeezing out the rest in the 
South. I clearly showed this in section 3.2.3. This is the effect of the emergence of the structural 
regime on apparel. Although not all countries can eventually industrialise, logically speaking, this 
route of admission into the industrial club can go on for a while. The role of the dominant exporter 
is currently played by China, and what is crucial for us at this juncture is that, at least in theory, 
Chinese rise precludes Kenyan product upgrading in the foreseeable future. 
 
5.2.4.2 Regime Emergence and Product Upgrading: the Chinese Factor  
 
There have been arguments in support of apparel industrial upgrading in SSA, partly based on a 
hazarded guess of a possible fall in textile price. This, it is argued, might allow countries in the South 
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that have no fabric industry, such as Kenya, to compete in the apparel subsector because of affordable 
raw materials (Stevens and Kennan, 2006) (for similar argument see Schmitz, 2006; Fleury and 
Fleury, 2006). This suggestion seems to be based on short term dynamics. However, there is another 
suggestion seemingly grounded in the Product Cycle theory. For example, Otiso (2004) contends 
that the entry of Asian NICs to OEM is a suggestion of the onset of declining Asian competitiveness 
in mass market apparel production due to rising labour costs and maturation of their industry. This, 
he argues, could create room for SSA on the basis of such arrangements as AGOA. This is echoed by 
Appelbaum (2004). Indeed, there could be a hypothesis according to the Product Cycle theory that 
China would launch its industrial drive on the basis of lower-tech products, and then it would move 
to higher-end products. This is buttressed by the fact that, according to the NIDL thesis, the apparel 
industry is very prone to separation between high-tech and low-tech processes. Technology at the 
level of manufacturing the fabric is extremely high in some cases, almost kind of space age 
technology. This is combined with quite primitive technology at the level of assembling apparel.  
 
This thesis argues that China is a competitive threat both in the short-term and in the long-term. 
There could be a possibility for LICs to upgrade within the long-term projection, but there could be 
changes in IPE which might alter the scenario before this happens. This is because, given its huge 
size, which is unlike other countries that have in the past occupied this enviable position in the 
system, China‘s effect is likely to be much more profound and long lasting.  
 
Undeniably little research has been done in this regard (IDS Asian Drivers Team, 2006). Therefore, 
it is still not very clear the extent of the threat posed by Chinese and other Asian producers in 
general. However, some useful observations have been made.  
 
On the short-term, a major area of effect is that China has considerably reduced prices in the North. 
This warps the prospects of small players further. In a word, the crowding out is not only in share 
upgrading, as we saw in Chapter Four, but also in price. There is evidence that the so-called Asian 
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Drivers have squeezed product prices in many sectors, notably in the global apparel sector (IDS 
Asian Drivers Team, 2006; Jenkins and Edwards, 2006; Stevens and Keenan, 2006). Kaplinsky 
(2006) argues that this challenges the early Prebisch-Singer thesis, questioned in Singer‘s revisiting of 
the terms of trade debate in the early 1970s and early 1990s (Singer, 1971; Sarkar and Singer, 
1991); that manufactures‘ prices would continue to rise. Kaplinsky is, however, quick to add that the 
causal link between the rising of Asian Drivers in general, and China in particular, and the fall in 
prices, is weak. For other factors such as higher energy prices, changing exchange rates, and the 
determination of global demand and supply, come into play. But concretely, recent research in Kenya 
showed that the average unit price in the EPZs dropped from US$ 4.26 in 2004 to US$ 3.66 in 
2005 (McCormick et al, 2006).  
 
On the long-term, Kaplinsky (2006) has shown that China (and India) has a large reserve army of 
labour in its interior. ‗If we run out of people we just go deeper into China‘, remarked the Managing 
Director of a Chinese subsidiary (quoted in Roberts and Kynge and cited in Kaplinsky, 2006: 50). 
There are 100-150 million people in China currently working at very low levels of productivity. 
These are waiting to be absorbed into the global economy and are not reflected in Chinese labour 
statistics. Further, India sits on a labour force of 470 million (compared with 770 million in China), 
not to mention Indonesia and other populated Asian economies (Kaplinsky, 2006). Jenkins and 
Edwards (2006) are right; it is unlikely that Chinese industrial upgrading in general will lead to a 
withdrawal from exports of un-skilled labour intensive products, which forecloses development of 
labour intensive industries in SSA in the foreseeable future.  
 
Although the Chinese threat is real, EPZA was at some point putting on a brave face. In 2005, it 
defended the closing down of six apparel firms in late 2004. It argued that their closing down was 
due to internal problems, and had nothing to do with the then impending elimination of quotas that 
unleashed Chinese competition (East African Reporters, 2005). The argument seems to be 
corroborated by data gathered by the World Bank in July 2005. According to the Bank, contrary to 
the widely held expectation for China to overrun other major Asian producers, while Chinese apparel 
exports to the US in dollar terms jumped 85.9 percent in the first 5 months of 2005, other low-cost 
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Asian producers were also enjoying unexpected double digit growth: Bangladesh‘s inched up by 25 
percent, Sri Lanka‘s rose by 20 percent and Cambodia‘s increased by 16.8 percent (World Bank, 
2005c).  
 
However, in a deeper sense, the argument is spurious. Firstly, other domestic actors contradict EPZA. 
KAM conceded that the relocation of some firms from Kenya to China was driven by Chinese 
competition, and that ‗those who remained… remained because the directors were Kenyans‘ (Kariuki, 
2007). Such firms might have reckoned that the US state-centric regime‘s decision to open up SSA 
for apparel production, though limited in time and extent, served Asian investors‘ interests before 
2005, but not anymore. With the liberalisation of the sector and the elimination of safeguards 
against China in 2009, it made more sense to start investing in China (or wherever in Asia the cost of 
production is lower) at the earliest opportunity.      
 
EPZ entrepreneurs themselves admitted the inexorableness of China crowding minor players out of 
the export markets. They cited the reason for reduction in the robustness of Kenyan exports after 
2005 as China‘s low production costs as opposed to Kenya‘s high production costs. Within the first 
four months after the liberalisation, one of the largest firms in Kenya, Upan Wasana, retrenched all 
but 275 of its 2 160 workers. When the Managing Director was asked the reasons for the move, he 
cited a reduction from US orders amounting to US$ 0.8 million within that period. He argued that 
US buyers preferred Chinese low production costs. The General Manager of United Aryan, another 
firm which was by then on the verge of closing down, and which had wound up by the time I carried 
out my fieldwork in 2007, argued that, with the reduction of orders from 300 000 pieces per month 
to between 130 000 and 150 000 per month in the first four months of 2005, coupled with the 
high water and electricity costs in Kenya, he was foreseeing them laying off workers (Mulama, 2005). 
 
The Industrial Officer in charge of the AGOA Desk also confuted EPZA‘s claims. He argued that it 
is liberalisation, coupled with the uncertainty over extension of the RoO exemption, which indeed 
drove out the firms to China. He argued that by May 2005, out of about 37 firms that were 
exporting under AGOA, there were only about 28 left. These firms then reduced to about 25 by the 
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end of 2005. He added that remainees were either Kenyan Asians or Asians who had been doing 
business in Kenya long before AGOA (Rono, 2007). This corroborates KAM. 
 
Furthermore, according to the Protex EPZ Ltd General Manager, the relocation was more profound; 
and it continued after 2005. He stated that from a high of 46 firms, only 20 were in operation in 
2007. I confirmed the latter figure during my fieldwork (see appendix M). However, he also said 
that, while some firms went to China, others were scouting around Africa for better conditions, 
where the industry had not picked up even with the advent of AGOA (Isinga, 2007). 
 
Secondly, the tension between Washington and Beijing in the wake of liberalisation, even leading to 
the temporary imposition of safeguard measures against Chinese apparel exports by the US and 
Europe in November 2005, restrained Chinese onslaught on the US and European markets; 
otherwise the effect would have been more intense.  
 
Thirdly, whilst the safeguards succeeded, they did not go unchallenged. China remonstrated when the 
EU took the dispute to the formal WTO regime rather than commodity specific informal route of 
trade and industry ministers between the affected countries (Associated Press Reporter, 2005a). The 
following day, China scrapped plans to increase export tariffs on its textile-apparel, a concession 
initially made the previous week, and meant to avert the trade war. China had announced it would 
quintuple export tariffs on 74 types of product categories in exchange for the EU and the US not 
imposing quotas. China argued that Chinese producers cannot face ‗double pressure‘. Scrapping of 
the plans was a flex of muscle in readiness for a visit by US Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez the 
following week. It also came amid pressure by the North for China to raise the Yuan exchange rate, 
as well as stamp out piracy of music, software and other products (Associated Press Reporter, 
2005b). Relations thawed significantly in the following months, but Gutierrez‘s visit did not yield 
any fruits as the two ministers engaged in counter accusations; and he himself had a major one with 
the Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi (Associated Press Reporter, 2005c). 
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Fourthly, even other Asian producers‘ competitiveness seems temporary. Major Asian garment 
exporters to the US, such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia and Bangladesh, have survived Chinese 
competition because giant retailers in the US still want to diversify their sources of supply. US 
retailers argued that the US [and European] safeguards against China posed a major risk to them if 
China remained their only supplier, a move that made some of these retailers diminish some of their 
sourcing from China that they might have been planning (World Bank, 2005c).  
 
Fifthly, Kenya is very weak in wooing investors. In 2001, an EPZA-led business delegation visited 
Colombo, Sri Lanka, to woo investors. It was indeed successful. It is from this visit that Protex EPZ 
Ltd, the case study firm, was set up. But a keener analysis reveals otherwise: the visit was prompted by 
a widespread strike in Pakistan (Isinga, 2007). EPZA was therefore merely taking advantage of a 
particular situation, rather than proactively wooing investors. In 2005, Kenya faced a lot of 
competition from Asian countries in convincing investors to stay behind in the wake of the 
liberalisation of the sector. Pakistan, for instance, through its commercial counsellor in Nairobi, was 
courting disgruntled investors in Kenya, promising them raw materials, infrastructure and a market. 
EPZA shrugged off the innuendo, arguing that they had done the same in Sri Lanka the previous 
month.  The investors had cited the delay in the acquisition of export visas and the 100 percent 
verification of EPZ containers destined for export at Mombasa port (rather than on site), among 
other issues (Sunday Standard Correspondent, 2005). Earlier, a Pak-Kenya Ministerial Commission 
had been established in the third quarter of 2004 to promote joint textile ventures, where Pakistani 
gray fabric exports could be value-added in Kenya, and exported to the EU (Anonymous, 2004).  It 
is possible this war began after the commission failed to bear fruit, but there is no evidence that 
Kenya is any better than Pakistan in wooing investors. 
 
The World Bank (2008) reported that the Chinese apparel exports surge that began in 2005 has 
begun to lose steam. A major feature of the surge was supposedly low-end production, which was 
reported to have shifted to other Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, Vietnam and India. Attributing 
the information to Leo Yung, Director of Central Textiles (HK) Ltd- a leading Chinese textile mill-, 
the report said that an expansion in textile investment in these countries around 2007 and 2008 had 
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caused an oversupply in the North. As a result, many Chinese mills had been forced to switch from 
exports to domestic sales, which then accounted for 79 percent of production. Quoting a report by 
Robin Anson, Editorial Director for Textile Outlook International, the Bank attributed the loss in 
Chinese competitiveness to several factors, including the downturn of the US market, regulations on 
Chinese producers, labour costs and the strengthening of the Chinese currency versus the US dollar. 
 
Certainly this evidence raises a crucial point with regard to the risk of Kenya of relying on one 
market (the US). In a sense, this risk, denoted in this report by ‗the downturn of the US market‘, and 
certainly a result of the fatigue of the current regime of accumulation represented by the current 
global economic recession, is more real for a country like Kenya that relies over 95 percent on this 
market.  
 
But the withdrawal could have been caused by safeguards against Chinese products contained in its 
protocol on accession to the WTO, which were lifted in 2009. In addition, there are product specific 
safeguards in Section Two of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards whose criteria is lower than the 
Agreement‘s, and which will be in place only until 2013 (Appelbaum, 2004).  
 
At any event, China is yet to give up. The Bank‘s report quoted Xinhua saying that China recently 
increased the tax rebate to 13 percent for textile-apparel exports to bail out its more than 60 000 
struggling smaller textile enterprises. It went on to quote one analyst saying that the effects of the 
new tax rebate policy were likely to take hold in October 2008. It was expected to help reduce costs 
and increase the profit margins of textile-apparel exporters. Also, Lande et al (2005 cited in 
Westhuizen, 2006) say that China has undervalued its currency, provided non-performing loans to 
manufacturers at 1.5 percent interest, and has provided possible input subsidisation. Furthermore, 
Appelbaum (2004: 32) reminds us that ‗50% of textile-apparel imports from China come from 
state-owned enterprises, which often operate at a loss (and hence provide a subsidy)‘.  
 
We are led to the irresistible conclusion that, while the local initiative to upgrade was weak, there is 
overwhelming evidence that, the instrumentality of the US-based regime on production and trade in 
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apparel, and the emergent effect of the structural regime on production and trade in apparel in the 
form of Chinese competition, were sufficient conditions to make Kenya‘s product upgrading efforts 
in the 1992-2007 period a mirage. Thus this regime governance is the overall context within which 
the poor upgrading outcomes of Chapter Four should be interpreted. The counter argument has been 
that the apparent systemic limitations might seem insurmountable, but there is still scope for success 
in future struggles, given the knowledge demonstrated by Southern actors.   
 
5.3 INTERNATIONAL REGIME ON LABOUR STANDARDS 
 
5.3.1 The Interplay within the Regime 
 
International regime governance of labour standards is premised on the contention that behind the 
setting of these standards by lead firms is a regime in the issue area. This regime is influenced by 
interplay of neo-statism, neo-corporatism and neo-communitarianism.  
 
Beginning with neo-statism, AGOA, as an individual country neo-statist instrument, supports ‗the 
development of civil society and political freedom in sub-Saharan Africa‘, and gives one of the 
eligibility criteria for a SSA beneficiary country as one that has established or is making progress to 
establish ‗protection of internationally recognised worker rights‘ (US Congress, 2000: 3, 4). WTO‘s 
failed social clause, as an instrument of collective neo-statism, seeks to enforce the four ILO core 
standards (see ILO, 2009). This thesis does not draw a line between AGOA conditionalities and the 
WTO‘s social clause because they represent the same aspect. Thus, while in Chapter Four AGOA 
conditionalities were used, I found the combination of AGOA labour conditionalities and the social 
clause in this chapter appropriate. 
 
The KAM Executive Officer, Mr Kariuki, supports the social clause, while the MoTI Industrial 
Officer in charge of the AGOA Desk, opposes it.  
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He [the investor] wants to pay cheaper… than the agreed minimum wage by arguing that your labour is cheap. 
So, we are telling them, look here, this is our standard price for our labour. We know our labour; if you are not 
ready to pay this don‘t complain- you take your factory back. But we know they need us here. So, we have 
refused the argument that Kenyan labour is cheap… No. You pay the price.  And it is very commensurate to 
the standards of labour we have in the country (Kariuki, 2007).  
 
KAM‘s Executive Officer reinforces this by stating that KAM‘s preference for labour standards is the 
international standards. But the reinforcement is also perhaps one of the most lucid indications of the 
instrumentality face of the regime. 
 
When you are promoting competitiveness you can‘t have your cake and eat it. You cannot dictate. Liberalised 
market is not Kenyan market. We are looking at international markets- understand their standards… So, we are 
moving from factory, local country standards to the acceptable market standards … And, we are liking the 
internationally proven ones. We are asking for European standards so that we can tell the factories to comply. 
We can tell that the factories in EPZs are now complying with US standards. Because, what do you do? …That 
is why we are members of the WTO. We are ascribing to the WTO and all other internationally acclaimed 
standards so that we are at the right step for the competitiveness (Kariuki, 2007). 
 
The KAM official not only fails to see this as a neo-statist instrument of protectionism for industrial 
powers, but also that such an idea is supported by central capitalism only when useful. For example, 
although AGOA calls for improved labour conditions, it also seeks to exploit the cheapest form of 
labour that can ever be available, through Category 9. The officer therefore contradicts himself 
almost immediately by glorifying American ingenuity in fighting African poverty through this 
category.  
 
The US market has tended to go beyond that and said that the money we are paying is not reaching the people 
themselves. And it‘s right because some of the poor people are not employed in the factories. Old people are 
not employed. We are employing young gradates from school, and some are trained, so they are very adaptive. 
But the bulk of the people are in the villages. So, AGOA was supposed to help even those. So they have come 
out [sic] with… hand loom, hand stitched- things made by hand, not machine. If you touch it with a machine 
it will not enter the US.  It is supposed to be hand finished, handmade from hand woven materials. So, who 
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makes those? Those are being made by women in the villages; you will find them stitching sitting under a tree. 
That is another big market and we are trying to promote that so that money can go directly to the poor 
people… we are happy about that… (Kariuki, 2007). 
 
His perception is, however, incongruent to that of the Officer in charge of the AGOA Desk. 
 
To a certain extent [I would support the social clause]… if it was offered towards development of manpower, 
in a manner that also takes into cognisance the developmental level of each of the countries…. You see, when 
you are negotiating at the WTO, for example, there will be LDCs. You cannot use the same measure for LDCs 
as you use for the other countries (Rono, 2007). 
 
The MoTI External Trade Officer expressed a contradiction similar to that of the KAM official. He 
argued that a minimum wage should be fixed, and that ILO standards are apposite. At the same time, 
he rooted for the recognition of different levels of industrialisation of countries when dealing with 
the issue area of labour (Nyakundi, 2007). 
 
Turning to the influence of neo-corporatism, regime ‗takers‘ consider the ILO as the central actor. 
We have seen above- in the interview with the KAM Executive Officer- that KAM is guided by the 
ILO or ‗international standards‘ in determining what labour conditions to allow in EPZs. Also, 
according to KTTWU, the ILO is the most important neo-corporate actor in setting labour 
standards, as it influences much of the legislation of national labour laws. Sometimes the ILO 
protests if the Government is too slow to enact such laws (Muga, 2007). Protex General Manager is 
in agreement (Isinga, 2007). However, the manager sees ILO standards as capitalism‘s double 
standards. He argues that he is always at a loss as to how American buyers still source from Chinese 
suppliers despite the fact that China employs the piece rate system, presumably without the ILO 
complaining. This is not allowed by Kenyan law, he argues, presumably through ILO interference, yet 
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this home workers system is more exploitative than exploiting workers at the factory. With this 
happening, he concludes, China will crowd out SSA in the American market.  
 
The manager says that the surveillance of the regime in Kenya through social audits particularly 
increased after the widespread strikes of 2003, which were preceded by the activities of NGOs. He 
reveals that today, apart from having its own internal social audits, his firm deals (sometimes 
simultaneously) with about five other groups of social auditors from buyers. He claims that the 
standards inside EPZs are better than some of the factories within the Industrial Area, and the audits 
presumably make them even better (Isinga, 2007).  
 
While his assertion over the piece rate system is not entirely true- because Kenyan law does not 
prohibit it- other actors, for example the MoTI Industrial Officer in Charge of AGOA Desk, concur 
that the standards represent the two-facedness of capitalism.  
 
If the conditionalities… were towards developing human rights… I think it would be good… in China the 
conditions are so bad but the US is currently moving most of its manufacturing to China… I see it sometimes 
as punitive…it discourages the investment…even in their countries…perhaps they have segregated their 
workers … The problem is that they are looking at it in the manner of where they [North] are, which is totally 
different from where we are (Rono, 2007). 
  
However, regime ‗takers‘ are aware that neo-corporate form influence does not come only from the 
ILO (through the state) as firms and unions are also active regime actors. Protex General Manager 
conceded that his firm regularly attempts to fold the threat to leadership arising from unions in 
setting labour standards. This is seen as being in the firm‘s interest in dealing with KTTWU, rather 
than the umbrella COTU; the former is a small underfunded organisation, and hence easier to 
influence (Isinga, 2007).  
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The mention of KTTWU and COTU completes tripartism. Initially the interview with KTTWU 
seemed to contradict tripartism. When responding to the challenge of unionism in Kenya, the 
KTTWU leader suggested that the union is at logger heads with the state. 
 
The major challenge is with the Ministry of Labour. To me let me say they are corrupt. Any dispute reported 
to them will take years. They don‘t process them in time, and as a result, some EPZ firms finally close down 
before the dispute is settled or processed… there are disputes we processed for workers in 2003 which are still 
lying at the Ministry of Labour… Time [deadline] is not there but once it is reported there is no reason why a 
document should stay for those years on one‘s desk (Muga, 2007). 
 
This apparent internecine conflict is deceptive because the interview also revealed that the union 
collaborates with the state, the ILO and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers 
Union (ITGLWU). For example, through COTU, it collaborates with the state to exploit workers 
through COTU‘s check-off system where workers‘ dues are deducted directly as soon as a union is 
set up (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007). This is an appallingly exploitative system, given that 
unionism has been more or less dead in ‗post-independent‘ Kenya. The direct collection of union 
dues before the formation of COTU could be controlled by workers because if the union stopped 
performing they would easily withdraw. But the workers have found it difficult to dismantle the 
check-off system despite the fact that they get no real service from the unions, at least before 2003. A 
KHRC report corroborates this. It quoted striking workers accusing the union of colluding with 
factory operators to make salary deductions from workers pay as contribution for union membership 
even before the union was operational in the EPZs in 2003 (KHRC, 2005). A novel state-union 
partnership is that the union has begun getting involved in Kenya (and ACP countries)-EU EPA 
talks.  
 
In this tripartism, KTTWU occupies the weakest position among the actors. This was divulged by 
its secretary; that the union follows very bureaucratic procedures to channel issues: whether through 
COTU to the state and then to the ILO, or through the African office of ITGLWU in South Africa 
to its headquarters in Geneva (Muga, 2007).  
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Finally on neo-communitarian form influence, one of the players is lead firms, as well as the specific 
firms doing the actual production, whatever their tier in the chain. Lead firms‘ role was shown in 
section 4.4.8. We will here show Kenyan firms, which are ordinarily at third tier supplier level. While 
the Protex General Manager had earlier on suggested that ILO standards are too high for his firm, 
and that ILO‘s insistence on them is double standards, as it does not do the same to China (at least 
not with the same verve), he now welcomes better conditions on neo-communitarian grounds. His 
firm‘s increase of wages, presumably above other EPZ firms (section 4.3.3.2), is not only meant to 
motivate labour and thereby increase production efficiency, but also enhance labour‘s commitment to 
capitalism. Even beyond that, it serves the neo-communitarian interests of social reproduction of 
labour and low-level international social order. 
 
But NGOs- both local and international- are perhaps the most active regime ‗intermediaries‘ on neo-
communitarian grounds. Their activities, according to the MoTI Industrial Officer in charge of 
AGOA, heightened during the AGOA period.  
 
Early 2005 [2003]… some of these US-based NGOs… were talking to first of all the Textile Workers Union 
officials… kind of incitement- you are being misused…you are supposed to negotiate, you should be paid this 
much- that kind of thing; indoctrination. Then thereafter of course the Textile Workers officials then go [sic] 
to their members. So a number of companies had just to close because what happened was that there was a 
strike…there were so many strikes… (Rono, 2007). 
 
The union leader exaggerates the role of the union in emancipating workers in 2003, which 
eyeshades that of NGOs.  
 
[Before 2003] even a Government minister could not enter into the EPZs. But when I took over- that is 2003- 
I managed to mobilise workers- we had a national strike. And as a result of that I managed to get recognition in 
Athi River [EPZ]. … It was I who went to them and told them what their rights were. And one of the things 
which I was actually emphasising was ILO Conventions 87 and 97[98]…one is for them to be allowed to form 
a union or join a union of their choice, 97 [98] gives them right to negotiate collectively… (Muga, 2007). 
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The reality, however, is as I have stated before: that the union‘s relative life and worker‘s relative 
freedom came after NARC won elections. To be sure, Mireri (2000) shows that there was an 18 
percent union membership for a survey he had conducted among all EPZs in 1998. Given my 
fieldwork‘s finding, including that of this interview with the union- that unionism among apparel 
EPZs was introduced in 2003- it is safe to conclude that apparel workers never constituted the 18 
percent.    
 
The union leader‘s revelation that the union has links with international NGOs lifts the veil behind 
his exaggerated role. He reported that the union uses various types of codes of conduct to guide it on 
the standards of labour expected in EPZs. He argued that this increases global contact with 
international NGOs, which comes in handy in case an entrepreneur closes shop and leaves the 
country without paying workers their dues; international NGOs are more likely to catch up with the 
investor in another country, which local NGOs are not capable of. He also revealed that the union 
cannot campaign for better wages unless it has first consulted widely, and has been assured of 
international NGO support; otherwise it would achieve little on its own (Muga, 2007). 
 
While the union collaborates with international NGOs, there is relative antagonism between it and 
the local NGOs. Two reasons were given. On the one hand, and as I have shown in the preceding 
paragraph, the union does not find local/national NGOs useful enough; it is international NGOs 
that can exert pressure on buyers (lead firms) because both international NGOs and lead firms are 
located in the North. Local NGOs have as little influence as the local unions. On the other hand, 
local NGOs discredit union leadership (Muga, 2007). The discrediting can be partly understood 
when it is considered that unionism in Kenya has been very docile since its ‗bourgiesification‘ in 1966 
by the creation of the umbrella COTU to the extent that even NGOs find it toothless. But it is also 
because of the fact that NGOs have greater liberty in dealing with investors and the state. For 
instance, unions sit with the state and entrepreneurs (represented by FKE) in tripartite committees, 
something NGOs are not involved in. This compromises unionism.  
 
This antagonism is confirmed by KHRC. KHRC impugns unions for refusing to embrace ‗other 
associations of civil society‘ beyond ‗the traditional social partners in the world of work‘ 
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notwithstanding that ‗the Kenya civil society movement …are appalled by the almost total collapse 
of [the tripartite] system‘ (KHRC, n.d.: 3, 4). On the one hand, by late 2003, unions were yet to join 
MSI on sweatshop labour in Kenya (Ouma, 2003). On the other hand, KHRC indicted unions for 
their ‗protectionist approach to the inclusion of other stakeholders‘ in protecting ‗industrial 
democracy‘ (KHRC, n.d. 4). 
 
The antagonism aside, there is also a chasm in terms of what each has achieved. This should be 
explained by the fact that NGOs are more aggressive in demanding full compliance of minimum 
standards; something difficult for unions as key members of neo-corporatism. Thus NGOs have 
shifted gear from pressing for poor working conditions (under which workers work, such as 
occupational safety, low wages and repressed unions- many of which are illegal but happen because 
the law is not enforced) to precarious employment (the way workers are employed- contractual 
status, basis of pay, benefits they can claim- many of which are legal, or in the process of being 
legalised) (see Kidder et al, 2003; Kidder and Raworth, 2004).   
 
Take the union first. KTTWU has pursued only 15 cases (Table 19 below). Although details given 
are scanty, it is clear the achievement of KTTWU in pursuing the cases is at best unimpressive. The 
table shows that the union began pursuing the cases in the AGOA period, only 5 out of the 15 cases 
have been taken to court, and none has been resolved yet.  
 
Now take the local NGO KHRC. It collaborates mainly with international NGOs CCC and the 
International Labour Rights Forum. Its Deputy Executive Director claimed that a major achievement 
has been that it has trained workers to do self-monitoring continuously (Ouma, 2007), which is 
confirmed by KHRC (n.d.). The latter adds that KHRC also collaborates with local NGOs Kenya 
Women Workers Organisation, Kituo Cha Sheria and Workers Right Watch. However, unlike the 
union, KHRC‘s anti-sweatshop campaign is more massive, sustained and better orchestrated. We will 
here consider in detail one of the major unpublished reports from KHRC. The report does not 
concern the apparel industry, but it is an excellent demonstration of not only the difference between 
contemporary unionism and NGOs in terms of what each can achieve but also how the regime works 
within the realm of NGOs, local and international. The NGO asserts that the report is prepared 
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because ‗the world must know about the miraculous results that can be achieved when the consumers 
of the North and the workers of the South become allies in the fight against the abuses of power 
perpetrated by multinational corporations‘ (Mutunga et al, 2002: 2). Although it is far short of 
miraculous as asserted, it is nevertheless commendable as compared to the union‘s campaign. The 
campaign was against Del Monte Kenya Limited, a pineapple production and preservation farm with 
about 5 000 hectares under its cultivation in Thika, Kenya. It has canning facilities on site and a 
labour force of over 5 000 permanent contract workers. 98 percent of pineapples are canned and- 
together with the additional juice concentrate- exported to Europe, the US and Japan.  
 
Table 19: Status of EPZ industrial relations cases, 2007 
Firm/organisation involved Issues/reference no. Status 
Blue Bird ML/IR/7/81/2003 Taken to court by Chief Industrial 
Labour Relations Officer  
Senior Best ML/IR/7/76/2003 Taken to court by Chief Industrial 
Labour Relations Officer 
Shin Ace ML/IR/7/80/2003 Under investigations 
Ashton Apparels ML/IR/7/38/2003 Taken to court by Chief Industrial 
Labour Relations Officer 
Sin Lane ML/IR/7/77/2003 Under investigations 
Mega Garment ML/IR/7/79/2003 Under investigations 
California Link ML/IR/7/80/2003 Under investigations 
Emke Garments (non-EPZ) ML/IR/7/140/2003 Under investigations 
Kapric Birch Apparels ML/IR/7/37/2003 Under investigations 
United Aryan ML/IR/7/57/2005 Taken to court by Deputy Chief 
Industrial Labour Relations Officer 
Upan Wasana ML/IR/7/15/2002 Received report 
Apex Apparels ML/IR/7/-/2003 Under investigations 
Rising Sun Unpaid terminal dues, unlawfully 
locked out employees 
Case in court 
MRC Unpaid benefits and salaries to 
employees after the company was 
placed after receivership 
Case at Provincial Labour Office 
KAMEA Stalled CBA negotiations Case in court 
Source: KTTWU (2007) 
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In 1998, KHRC prepared a report on violations of human rights by Del Monte, among them 
‗starvation‘ wages, egregious poor working conditions and controlled unionism. Then, it led a 
coalition of 10 local NGOs to partner with Centro Nuovo Modello di Sviluppo (CNMS) (Centre 
for New Development), a small but influential Italian NGO for ethically minded consumers. The 
aim was to implement CNMS‘s proposition to carry out a boycott campaign of Del Monte‘s 
products in Italy and the rest of Europe to force Del Monte to improve conditions for its workers. 
This growing coalition enlisted the Chief Shop Steward at Del Monte at Thika. He was first invited 
to Italy in 1999 to present the case of Del Monte to an international meeting. Importantly, CNMS 
had discovered that one of Del Monte‘s customers was one of the biggest supermarket chains in Italy, 
COOP Italia, and the Shop Steward confirmed this to the meeting. CNMS mapped a two pronged 
campaign: targeting Del Monte because it was directly responsible for working conditions, and 
COOP Italia because the supermarket had been SA 8000 certified in 1998.     
 
CNMS went ahead to prepare two postcards each for Del Monte and COOP Italia, printed 100 000 
copies, and with the help of other sympathetic groups and the media distributed them all over Italy 
to be sent by consumers. The letter to Del Monte demanded immediate improvement of wages, 
freedom of trade union activity, housing, training and provision of protective devices for plantation 
workers. The one to COOP Italia was mainly asking the supermarket to exert pressure on Del Monte 
in line with its SA 8000 certification.  
 
COOP Italia promised to investigate the allegations. It asked BVQI [today‘s Bureau Veritas 
Certification], the certification firm that issued it the SA 8000 certificate, to investigate the Kenyan 
case. Since BVQI lacked experience in Kenya, CNMS was asked to nominate another certification 
firm familiar with Kenyan capitalism to do a parallel inspection. SGS Italia in collaboration with 
SGS Kenya was agreed upon. CNMS accused BVQI of collaborating with Del Monte to some extent 
to hide the facts, while SGS‘s audit was seen as conforming to some basic standard of inspection. Del 
Monte denied the accusations through its parent company, Del Monte Royal Foods Ltd, by issuing a 
terse press statement in Milan and London. COOP Italia formally requested Del Monte to rectify 
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any violations that were not in conformity with SA 8000. Finally at the end of December 1999, Del 
Monte agreed that the allegations were true, but the commitment was vague. It also refused to 
cooperate with local trade unions and NGOs because it reckoned that, although it had been 
cornered, all it needed to do was to satisfy its Italian consumers. Del Monte seemed to be 
emboldened by support from the Kenyan Government.  
 
CNMS mobilisation abroad continued. It sent exposé letters to the European Commission on 
Human Rights and various Members of the European Parliament. The President of Del Monte 
International visited Nairobi in October 2000. Initially he was adamant and in support of Del 
Monte Kenya, but under pressure he opened up for talks with workers‘ representatives and other 
NGOs that were supporting their cause. However, the Kenyan Government resisted the inclusion of 
NGOs, citing its tripartite tradition. The first signs of the fruits of the campaign beckoned when a 
second audit, commissioned by Del Monte Italia and carried out by BVQI, resulted in the firing of 
Del Monte Kenya‘s Managing Director, who was a major road block. The New Chief Executive 
Officer (a post that replaced that of Managing Director) was more amicable; he began negotiations 
with the union and the NGOs in December 2000, which resulted in the campaign being suspended.  
 
Key concessions made by Del Monte were: assessment of all employees‘ performance and job 
evaluations, transformation of 1 500 casual labour contract workers into seasonal contract ones, the 
building of new houses to ease congestion, training on the working environment, the right of workers 
to organise was recognised (a union was born, and union leadership and shop stewards were provided 
with offices), workers who were being underpaid were compensated, and a monitoring structure was 
put in place to monitor the implementation of all of the above by the workers, the NGOs caucus, 
and the neighbouring communities. Del Monte also showed interest in re-examining the working 
conditions of casual labour contract workers. The neighbouring Ndula community was supplied with 
water, Kenya Police booths were donated to Thika municipality, medical policy was reviewed to fully 
cover all seasonal contract workers, and a primary school inside Del Monte was extended!        
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Beyond these differences, KTTWU and local NGOs were also shown to be working together in 
some aspects of regime governance. KHRC began monitoring EPZs in the AGOA period (Ouma, 
2007), the same time the activity of NGOs among EPZs intensified. KTTWU General Secretary 
also admitted that the union worked with local NGOs at least at the beginning of the partial 
unionisation of the EPZ in 2003. He also acknowledged that they were merely taking advantage of 
the change in Government, never mind that this contradicts his earlier assertion that it was all the 
work of unions, a point I have raised already. 
 
Before they went on strike they had to know their rights. So we worked in collaboration with some NGOs. So 
what we did was that we sensitised them on their rights. And when the NARC Government took over, there 
was euphoria that everybody would now take [the reins of power]… So we took advantage of that. So we 
mobilised workers in Nairobi, Athi River, Mombasa- there was a countrywide strike (Muga, 2007). 
 
Turning to workers‘ opinions, the view that NGOs are the main regime ‗intermediaries‘, would 
simply not go away. Most workers believe that NGOs are better at fighting for workers than the 
union. This is despite the fact that only a few workers had direct experience with NGO activities, 
and none had heard about the organisations before 2003. The few who had come into contact with 
the organisations named KHRC and Africa Now as the most active (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 
2007).   
 
If other perceptions have shown NGOs to be the most potentially effective neo-communitarian form 
standard setters in the regime, those of workers show how the union has totally failed, or has been 
made to totally fail, giving NGOs the much leeway as regime ‗intermediaries‘. The tales of workers 
are replete with union failure in the most mundane of matters.  
 
In 2006 a Factory Manager in one of the firms discovered that six female workers had been 
transferred by the Line Manager from one section to a different one. The Factory Manager reduced 
their salary on the spot from that of a machine operator to that of a helper, their explanation 
notwithstanding. He later sacked them and paid their terminal dues as helpers and not as machine 
operators as per their contract. They informed the union. Union officials called a meeting of the 
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entire firm and explained that the workers involved would be paid their terminal dues as per the 
original contract. Management agreed. But the following day, the workers in question were dismissed 
again. When they went to the union, the union explained that they had done their best, and that 
there was nothing more they could do (Protex EPZ Ltd Worker coded 2F, 2007). This is in spite of 
the fact that the 2003 post-strike truce had stated that there shall be no summary dismissal, 
suspension can only be for gross misconduct and can only be for four days, pending investigations of 
the alleged misconduct, and should the employee be proved innocent she/he should be paid for the 
days she/he was under suspension, and reinstated without loss of privileges (KHRC, ca. 2003).  
 
At Rolex EPZ Ltd, those who had worked for at least five years on a permanent contract and were 
either sacked or resigned were entitled to end-of-service dues. However, this firm would deduct any 
days that workers were on sick leave. When the union would be told about it, it would advise 
workers to take whatever was being offered (Protex EPZ Ltd Worker 7M, 2007).   
 
In another example, workers were waiting for the line to be fed with fabric. The style was new, hence 
the process was slow, and some workers were furloughed for a while. A manager accused them of 
idleness and sacked them. When they went to the union, the union asked them to apologise so as to 
get their jobs back! They all refused, except for the worker who provided these details; she apologised 
because she was new- and she got her job back! (Protex EPZ Ltd Worker coded 6F, 2007).   
 
Yet another worker argued that she had been on a casual labour contract since 2000, and that the 
union has never helped her secure a permanent contract. Another worker narrated how the union 
never came to her rescue when she was demoted in April 2006. 
 
I entered that company as an operator. It reached a time the company had a plan to reduce permanent contract 
workers… [in order] to increase casual labour contract workers… There were three go downs for casual labour 
contract workers…They said they would close one… we were distributed here and there… I was demoted to 
be a helper. …The Factory Manager came abruptly: ‗What is your job description?‘. [I answered] ‗I am an 
operator‘. ‗Right now, are you doing helping work?‘ [He went on]. ‗Yes‘ [I answered]. ‗You are a helper‘ [He 
said]… Those who reacted were dismissed from service. When I went to the union person, he said that the 
company had a plan to reduce people and he could do nothing about it. When I went to the supervisors they 
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told me that I would rather keep quite than be out of work because I will suffer more…my salary was reduced 
to that of a helper…our union representative sides with management! (Protex EPZ Ltd Worker 7F, 2007) 
(translated from Kiswahili by the Author).   
 
More interesting is a female worker who, while working for MRC, proceeded for four months 
unpaid leave in 2004 because she had underwent a caesarean operation. On returning to work she 
was sacked. She reported the matter to the union. After visiting the Human Resource Manager 
several times during her absence, the union official and this manager told her that her contract with 
the firm did not cover unpaid leave. They advised her to keep on checking for a future vacancy. After 
eight months of failed attempts to get her job back, she went to the union again. The union told her 
that there was nothing they could do about it (Protex EPZ Ltd Worker coded 21F, 2007).   
 
The union has succeeded only a few times in asking workers to strike, although even then, it was 
taking advantage of a situation where a strike was inevitable. In most of such cases, the union later 
colludes with management and persuades workers to return to work. The only known case is for a 
cotton lint production EPZ called Rupa where they bargained for the wages to be raised from KShs 
4 800 (US$ 62) to KShs 5 600 (US$ 73). The union also played a part in taking to the Industrial 
Court the Rising Sun strike case already highlighted, but this had not been resolved at the time of my 
fieldwork in 2007. A few workers believe that, while the union is not very helpful, its existence makes 
investors scale down their exploitation (Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, 2007).   
 
Contra to these perceptions of the union, workers have a high regard for NGOs. 
 
There is a certain lady… [who] was told to continue working after the fifth of the month. She refused… Her 
manager hit her phone against the ground. She went to the human rights people… The seniors told that 
manager to reinstate her immediately or else he would be sacked. He was also asked to plead with her not to 
bring those human rights people into the factory because it seemed they took up the case very fast. So those 
people are right…in fact they [NGOs] can [help] but these people [investors] don‘t want them (Protex EPZ 
Ltd Worker 7F, 2007) (translated from Kiswahili by the Author).   
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In conclusion, the regime is perhaps the most diffuse, but nonetheless, governance of labour 
standards in the apparel GVC takes place within this diffuse terrain. I argue that, in the periphery, 
neo-statist form influence of the Northern state, neo-corporate form influence of the ILO and neo-
communitarian form influence of NGOs are the major influences on regime-formation. Thus the 
Northern state, ILO and NGOs, and not lead firms, play the central governance role in this regime.  
 
5.3.2 Regime Governance and Labour Upgrading 
 
In theory, the demand to implement AGOA labour conditionalities and the attempt to introduce the 
social clause in the WTO implies labour upgrading in LICs, but there is a mismatch between this 
implication and the upgrading outcomes in Kenya in Chapter Four. This is in spite the fact that local 
political developments gave a fillip to this labour upgrading face of capitalism. In other words, 
regime governance provides for a Kenyan strategy to upgrade labour, yet the actual practice is that it 
is impossible to actualise it. Not even regime ‗framers‘ are able to resolve this mismatch. As we saw in 
Chapter Four section 4.4.8, as well as the case of Del Monte in this chapter, lead firms enforce the 
standards through choreographed social audits mainly to be seen to be doing so by consumers, and 
not to change the work conditions. This corroborates the empirical literature review on labour 
governance in Chapter Two. The contradiction is apparent even in GVC research. For instance, in 
analysing future trends in chain governance, Humphrey and Schmitz suggest that in LICs, industrial 
upgrading is elusive, and the accompanying improved labour standards elusive as well, since they 
admit that capitalism must continuously play a balance between implementing the labour standards 
to the full and scouting ‗continuously for new producers who offer lower labour costs‘ (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2001:11).  
 
What explains this mismatch is the fact that capitalism juggles the risk of Southern countries‘ 
industrial take-off on the basis of cheap labour, and hence it would support labour upgrading, with 
the benefits to Northern accumulation of maintaining a global dynamic of economic growth based 
on cheap labour, and hence it would undermine labour upgrading. Its demand for labour upgrading 
also ensures labour reproduction and attainment of international social order. However, the system is 
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more petrified by undermining the dynamic of growth than a failure to either counter the risk of 
Southern accumulation or achieve its milieu goals. That is why in practice labour conditions rarely 
improve. The US, for instance, forcefully linked intellectual property protection to the GATT using 
bilateral sanctions, but it has been reluctant to use similar militancy in forcing the WTO to enforce 
labour standards. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) cite an example in Indonesia in the mid 1990s 
where trade union officials were arrested for agitating for implementation of minimum labour 
standards. A US trade official told the authors that they (the US) told the Indonesian government 
that ‗we‘ll tilt the mirror if you‘ll just give an appearance of allowing a free trade union…You invite 
an ILO team in to audit what you‘re doing. Make it appear like that is their idea rather than yours‘.  
 
The natural vanguard for labour upgrading would be unions. However, post-War unionism has been 
rendered moribund, largely remaining a part of neo-corporatism. This was a major deviation from 
the original movement, as I showed in section 3.2.1.5. We also saw in section 3.3.2.1 that this took 
place in Kenya in 1966. What I want to do here is examine the exact scope of labour upgrading in 
the apparel industry within contemporary Kenya as a case study. I will do so partly by engaging with 
perhaps one of the best studies on Kenya on the subject.  
 
Chege (1988) has shown that the growth of formal wage labour in ‗independent‘ Kenya has been 
characterised by little structural change, falling real wages and an increase in inequality between wage 
earners. Despite this- and this is the crux of the matter- strikes had been a rare weapon of industrial 
action, and their effect had been confined to a few sectors. When they occurred, they merely dealt 
with welfare in a narrow sense without a serious questioning of the structural issues in production. 
These findings are in tandem with the views expressed by workers in the preceding section. It was 
expressed that strikes are neither a useful nor sufficient means of improving working conditions.  
 
Chege attributes his findings to the policy introduced in 1965 for such a compliant, if disaffected, 
labour force. This is despite the fact that unlike the rest of SSA, trade union leaders in Kenya (and 
Guinea) were also party leaders. Chege takes cognisance of the importance of this fact; that ordinarily 
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it is only in unions without militant intellectuals to bring on board the union‘s political articulations 
that such a labour force can be found. And this he bases on Lenin‘s (1972 cited in Chege, 1988) 
assertion that left on their own, workers are only capable of acquiring a ‗trade union consciousness‘ 
that articulates only their economic disadvantage, as opposed to a ‗revolutionary consciousness‘ in 
tandem with their assigned role as both the vanguards and beneficiaries of socialism.    
 
As shown in Chapter Three, there were three elements in this ‗bourgiesification‘: formation of 
COTU, tripartite agreements and a crafty mechanism for resolving industrial disputes. Thus it is not 
to be wondered that Chege‘s (1988) study came across no evidence that workers in Kenya saw 
industrial relations as a means of restructuring society or bringing in a new social order. According to 
him, this contradicted Sandbrook‘s (1981) view of unionised workers as constituting one of the few 
social forces championing the ideal of social equality. In my view, Chege fails to directly link this 
evidence with the ‗bourgiesification‘, which is surprising, since this ‗bourgiesification‘ is the core of 
his study. In the preceding section, we have seen that the apparent contradiction between the unions 
and the state (and NGOs) is not invariable; often there is relative harmony. But overall Chege is right 
in criticising Sandbrook. Sandbrook fails to take cognisance of the fact that since unionism was co-
opted into the ILO, it had to serve capitalism‘s rather than society‘s interests.   
 
However, Chege does not leave it at that. He goes on to repudiate Amin‘s (1974) Dependency 
theoretical proposition of auto-centric and self-reliant economies in the South with strong inter-
industry linkages, as the way to advance and minimise, if not avoid, exploitation by central capitalism. 
Instead, Chege argues, the South should ignore this and accelerate industrialisation and technological 
innovation, for such yields more aggressive, better organised and better paid labour. The position of 
this thesis is that Chege‘s proposition can only be a short term strategy at best. The long term 
strategy is what Amin proposes. Either way, to what extent can the regime on labour be seen to 
facilitate labour upgrading in Kenya today? 
 
I have made a protestation throughout this text that the regime of accumulation launched in 1980 
saw the Northern state and its allied actors, such as NGOs, being influenced increasingly by neo-
communitarianism. In the case of Del Monte, analysed in this chapter, for example, ‗Bertolli [the 
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Chief Executive who replaced the MD] decided to be the new human face of Del Monte. He agreed 
to engage in a series of discussions…. He knew that the key issue was to have Del Monte comply 
with the demands of the campaigners‘ (Mutunga et al, 2002: 48).  Why? Because:  
 
Bertolli was part of that new crop of business leaders who understand social issues as well as social 
responsibility in business. The company‘s reputation becomes an important part of the goal of profit 
maximisation. Listening and learning from all stakeholders is also important to these business leaders. These are 
members of Human Capitalism Campaign. They accept a new business paradigm of maximising profits while 
being lauded as sensitive and ethical corporate citizens (Mutunga et al, 2002: 47- footnote 20).  
 
This, in my view, provides the best opportunity so far to upgrade labour. Although NGOs cannot 
demand a complete realignment of social relations in capitalism, they have, together with unions 
under the anti-sweatshop movement, made substantial progress in improving labour conditions in the 
South. This is still protectionism as argued severally in this thesis. Bonacich (2002) vehemently 
denies this; that Frank‘s (1999) interpretation of the activities of American unions to mean 
protection for the American industry is not convincing. Such tendentious denials notwithstanding, 
the argument of this thesis is that it is protectionism, which nevertheless leads to labour upgrading.  
 
A watershed for the regime on labour within the apparel industry was in 1995 when the Clinton 
Administration formed a task force- the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP)- with representatives 
from manufacturers, unions, NGOs and the US Labour Department. It designed a code of conduct 
for apparel firms on age, hours of work and minimum wage. In 1998, AIP created the FLA as its 
monitoring arm (Gereffi and Mayer, 2004). It is mainly within this framework that the regime 
intensified demands for labour standards, reflecting some limited gains (labour intensive employment 
creation with minimal wages and minimum conditions of work as seen in AGOA, for example).  
 
This thesis asserts that the labour upgrading failures of Chapter Four should be seen in this light. In 
effect, we here encounter KAM‘s position that it supports implementation of ILO standards being 
cast in doubt for two reasons. First, given that in the South it is the state that has the necessary 
leverage to implement them, as a key member in the tripartite arrangement, in practice the state rarely 
implements them. We saw it gagging workers for demanding improved conditions- in Chapter Four 
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section 4.4.7. KHRC shows that Kenya has had several reviews under the GSP system, and, as late as 
2001, had a US delegation under AGOA. In all these, the country ‗passed‘ the test, but the reality is, 
as KHRC contends, the far below standards in the EPZs (KHRC, 2005). However, there is no need 
for KHRC to criticise the EPZ Act for being silent on workers. This would be to forget that the 
state is not neutral, and its prime interest is not labour upgrading but to facilitate the capitalist class 
to accumulate. Second, evidence from elsewhere suggests something different from that which was 
expressed by KAM during fieldwork; that manufacturers constantly nag the state to be allowed to 
pay as low as they can possibly pay to maximise their profits. They argue that apart from the Chinese 
threat, labour costs are also high and have not inconstantly made requests to the Government to be 
allowed to peg their wages on employee‘s performance/productivity rather than minimum wages 
(Mugambi, 2005). At some point in 2005, the Minister for Trade and Industry had even bowed to 
pressure and promised to work with his Labour counterpart so that in future minimum wages are 
arrived at by the Government only after consulting the private sector (Nyamache, 2005). 
 
We conclude that, while in theory the regime on labour, and to some extent neo-statist regimes, 
promotes labour upgrading in LICs, in practice the regimes on production and trade in apparel limit 
it. Overall, the balance invariably tilts in favour of the race to the bottom that drives the regimes in 
apparel, at the expense of the Southern labour upgrading interest of the regime on labour. 
 
Can the knowledge of Southern actors in the regime on labour be unleashed in future for the South‘s 
benefit? I suppose no one can tell clearly. However, their struggles as seen in this chapter give, at the 
very least, hope for success in the future. 
 
5.4 SUMMARY  
 
In this chapter, we have firstly examined the extent to which actors demonstrate the governance of 
regimes on production and trade in apparel, and the regime on labour, and secondly sought to link 
this governance with the hypothesis that the governance of regimes on production and trade in 
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apparel, while not a necessary condition, was a sufficient condition to undermine upgrading in Kenya. 
First, concerning structural international regime on apparel, entrepreneurs, the Cabinet and 
bureaucrats have shown regime governance and the influence of neo-liberalism. Second, bureaucrats 
and entrepreneurs have shown the US-based regime governance and the neo-liberal and individual 
neo-statist forms of Northern state strategic selectivity as influences. Third, the Cabinet and US 
government actors showed the US-based/ EU-based regimes versus the structural regime interplay, 
and the EU Trade Commissioner and entrepreneurs and bureaucrats showed neo-liberal form 
influence versus collective neo-statist form influence interplay within the structural regime. The 
implication of such governance on product upgrading in LICs is that, in pursuit of Northern 
accumulation, instrumental barriers in the three regimes on production and trade in apparel constrain 
LICs to pick up. Policy documents in Kenya, statements of US- and to a little extent EU- policy 
makers, and interviews with bureaucrats and entrepreneurs demonstrated this. It also implies that, in 
pursuit of global accumulation, emergence within the structural regime leads to the emergence of 
major players (currently China) who crowd LICs out of destination markets. Bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs and secondary sources demonstrated this. These two implications mean that product 
upgrading in LICs is a Herculean task. Nevertheless, because of the urgency to promote systemic 
milieu goals, the US-based regime has relaxed the RoO for SSA, until 2012, and hence Kenya has 
achieved limited volume upgrading. 
 
On the labour regime, neo-statist form influence was shown by entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. 
Entrepreneurs, the union, bureaucrats and workers showed the influence of neo-corporatism. Neo-
communitarian form influence was shown by bureaucrats, the union, NGO and workers. The 
interplay of this selectivity theoretically provides for a Kenyan strategy to upgrade labour. However, 
the above two implications on product upgrading also mean that regime governance on apparel leads 
to the race to the bottom in LICs. In juggling labour upgrading in the South (which restricts 
Southern accumulation, and ensures labour reproduction and attainment of international social 
order) with the race to the bottom-driven Northern accumulation, capitalism is more petrified by 
undermining the latter than a failure to achieve the former, and hence labour conditions rarely 
improve in practice. This is what unites the inhibition of product upgrading with the inhibition of 
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labour upgrading. It also shows regime governance as a determinant of both product and labour 
upgrading. Nevertheless neo-communitarian form influence provides some limited opportunity, and 
embryonic labour upgrading experimentation is ongoing in Kenya.  
 
Thus, although this chapter is limited by the number of selected actors, the perceptions, actions and 
strategies of those selected demonstrate regime governance that, as far as issue areas are concerned, 
overrides lead firm governance, and that is aimed at Northern accumulation, perpetuation of 
dependency and attainment of milieu goals. At the same time, this chapter has shown the potential 
for Southern manoeuvres to embed development. Above all, the knowledge possessed by Southern 
actors about the functioning of these regimes gives hope for success in future struggles to upgrade 
industry. 
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6 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis was focused on the role of international regimes in the governance of apparel GVC, and 
the implication of such governance on product and labour upgrading in Kenya in the period 1992-
2007. It has approached the issue from an inter-disciplinary perspective, primarily the GVC analysis 
and a Dependency reading of Regimes theory.  
 
In this final chapter, we will summarise the argument advanced, before drawing conclusions. We will 
first revisit our two principal research questions on international regime governance and upgrading, 
and summarise the main findings regarding them, as found in Chapters Four and Five. Before that, 
we will summarise Chapters One, Two and Three to familiarise ourselves with these questions. The 
second part will draw conclusions, based on the findings, on chain governance and upgrading in 
general, as well as giving specific recommendations on the shape that future upgrading strategy in 
Kenya might take.  
 
6.2 SUMMARY  
 
Chapter One raised two key research questions. The first question was practical: we wanted to know 
the upgrading trend portrayed by selected aspects in the Kenyan apparel export industry between 
1992 and 2007. These were volume of exports, local integration, fabric value addition, volume of 
folklore/ hand loomed/handmade exports, integration into the GVC and implementation of AGOA 
labour conditionalities. The second question was theoretical: why has the trend arisen? In the 
methodology section, we explained our research design as a longitudinal case study that has deductive 
reasoning as the overall strategy. We also defined a regime as partly a designed institutional structure 
and partly an emergent social institution of transnational scale that creates order at that level. 
Moreover, we broadened the GVC governance concept to include overall international structure of 
the specific issue areas affecting the chain. We went on to develop an integrated model to analyse 
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national product and labour upgrading. The final part explained how data was collected, selected, 
analysed and reduced.  
 
In Chapter Two, we reviewed theoretical approaches to industrial diffusion, detailed the GVC 
approach and theorised regime governance. As far as issue areas are concerned, it was clear that lead 
firms are not the primary governors in the chain. Rather, they are only one of the actors in a 
governance that is mainly based on regimes. Taking a Dependency reading of Regimes theory, we 
contended that elements of both structure and agency on both sides of the regime-dependency divide 
result in control-emergent regime governance that, as far as issue areas are concerned, overrides 
control lead firm governance in the service of Northern accumulation and perpetuation of 
dependency. These regimes are overlaid with the control dimension issuing from existing forms of 
Northern state strategic selectivity. We identified the relevance of a Dependency framework for the 
upgrading debate as follows. On the one hand, firstly, it helps us to see international regimes as 
institutions that embody, and act as instruments of, the will of the core to dominate the system, and 
hence product upgrading in the South, especially in LICs and LDCs, is a Herculean task. Secondly, it 
shows us that the parameters of contemporary IPE are more complex than those described in classic 
Dependency literature of the 1970s. However, far from necessarily facilitating upgrading, this factor 
may undermine it: in particular, the dependency of the apparel industry of a number of LICs, 
especially those of SSA, which include Kenya, on a new Asian sub-core, may further limit such LICs 
in their pursuit of product upgrading. On the other hand, a Dependency framework helps us to see 
possibilities inherent in this objective situation, and hence it inspires Southern agency in its struggle 
to embed industry, especially in its struggle to upgrade labour. We then hypothesised that the 
governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, while not a necessary condition, was a 
sufficient condition to undermine product and labour upgrading in Kenya between 1992 and 2007.  
 
In Chapter Three, we first saw how regimes on apparel have evolved. The GATT was born in 1947 
and transformed into the WTO in 1995. Under the GATT, the consensus norm was oppressive to 
the South, while under the WTO, consensus, the single undertaking and the benefits extracted by the 
North are similarly oppressive to the South. The structural apparel regime began in the 1930s under 
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Japanese ‗voluntary‘ exports, reincarnated under the GATT as STA (1961), LTA (1962) and MFA 
(1974), and further reincarnated under the WTO as the ATC (1995) and post-ATC (2005). The 
EU neo-statist apparel regime, nested within the GATT, began in 1957 and was reincarnated as the 
GSP (1975). It was nested within the WTO as the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and post-Cotonou 
EPAs (2008). The US neo-statist apparel regime, still nested within the GATT, was instituted in 
1976. Its African version was given a fillip by AGOA in 2000. The regime on labour revolves 
around two forms: a ‗public‘ one revolving around the ILO, formed in 1919, and a ‗private‘ form 
involving, firstly unions, since the 1960s and TNCs since 1970s, and secondly, the loose social 
movements in the last few decades.   
 
Second, we argued that under the regime instrumentality facet of these regimes, central capitalism‘s 
interest is keeping the periphery constantly in the same role, though in changing forms. Third, major 
trends in global production and trade in apparel in the last 50 years were shown to issue directly 
from the regimes in production and trade in apparel, and indirectly from the labour regime. The 
place of Kenya, though insignificant by global standards, was shown. The trends were in five phases: 
up to the 1960s under Japanese ‗voluntary‘ export restraints, in the 1970s under the MFA, in the 
1980s under the MFA, in the 1990s under the MFA and EU‘s outward processing arrangements 
(where under the MFA the first main wave of apparel exportism in Kenya was witnessed), and since 
2000 under the MFA, liberalisation and US outward processing arrangements (where US AGOA 
was responsible for the second investment wave in Kenya). That completed part one. 
 
In part two, we turned to the evolution of the industry in Kenya. From the 1960s to about 1985, the 
country was pursuing a successful ISI strategy. An attempt to foster exportism in early 1980s through 
MuB flopped. We also saw that unions were compromised beginning in the 1950s, culminating in 
their total demobilisation in 1966, which sustained the ISI model. However, beginning in the mid 
1980s, apparel ISI firms began collapsing. In their place, a foundation of apparel exportism relying 
on foreign fabric under MuB and EPZs was built, beginning in 1989. A 1993 investment wave from 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, escaping MFA quotas, and one following the 2000 RoO relaxation by 
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AGOA, marked the two export-oriented investment waves. Today, much of the apparel export 
segment is concentrated in the EPZs, nearly 100 percent of EPZ apparel exports go to the US and 
EPZ firms are the main players under AGOA. Whilst Kenya‘s exportism is small by global standards, 
it plays a significant role in SSA. Finally, apparel firms‘ insertion into the GVC is ‗captive‘, they are 
controlled by South Asian capital and have no home workers.  
 
In Chapter Four, we answered the first question of the thesis: the trend on selected aspects of 
upgrading in the Kenyan apparel export industry between 1992 and 2007. Firstly, there has been 
export expansion as a form of product upgrading. Between 1992 and the peak of the growth in 
2004, the expansion was 1040.8 percent, while between 1992 and 2005, when all conditions of 
liberalisation had set in, the growth was 1004.6 percent. Indeed, from among the leading six 
countries in SSA, Kenya experienced the highest growth (329 percent) at the acme of the AGOA 
boom (2002-4), and was the most resilient in the post-boom hold up (2005-7), experiencing the 
least slump (6 percent). Moreover, a casual projection of its dynamics indicates that, had the country 
not been slapped with quota restrictions in 1994, it would have emerged the second leading exporter 
to the US much earlier in 1999, and gone on to take the lead as soon as AGOA set it. Also, Kenya 
would have picked up with better speed following the slowdown occasioned by these quotas had it 
been connected to a more advanced apparel manufacturing country in Asia; this came in handy for 
Mauritius, the other SSA country slapped with the quotas.  
 
Secondly, the industry has not been locally integrated. Throughout this period the country has relied 
entirely on Asian fabric. Also, one third of firms have no local input expenditure, and the remaining 
about two thirds source local accessories amounting to less than 10 percent of total apparel exports. 
Thirdly, fabric value addition is minimal. Unit price comparison with Chinese, Indian, Swazi and 
Mauritian products in the US market reveals that Kenyan products have minimal ornamentation. 
Also, technology is suitable for assembly-only production, and there has been a failure to maximise 
on the exploitation of a multi-skilled labour force. Fourthly, Kenya has exported only 9 percent of 
eligible folklore/hand loomed/handmade products that are 100 percent local value. Fifthly, 
integration into the GVC is poor. Overall, the top half of products arranged in order of value had 
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less share upgrading than the bottom half. In addition, there is no evidence that AGOA ‗preferences‘ 
are sufficient to guarantee a continued existence of the industry in Kenya in the near future outside 
manmade fibre and woollen apparel exports which have high import duties in the US. This means 
that when AGOA expires in 2015, the high import duties will grossly undermine Kenya‘s integration 
into the GVC. Moreover, most of the products where Kenya had a share upgrading of at least 1 
percent were among Chinese categories the North limited in 2005 (at least 82 percent); hence, 
beginning in 2009, this upgrading is very likely to have been undermined. Sixth and finally, while 
there is no child exploitation among apparel EPZs in Kenya, none of the other AGOA labour 
conditionalities on wages, occupational safety and health standards, compulsory labour, and rights of 
association and right to organise and bargain collectively, have been met fully.  
 
In seeking to explain the upgrading trends of Chapter Four, in Chapter Five, we firstly examined the 
extent to which actors demonstrate the governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, 
and the regime on labour, and secondly sought to link this governance with the hypothesis that the 
governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, while not a necessary condition, was a 
sufficient condition to undermine upgrading in Kenya. First, concerning structural international 
regime on apparel, regime governance and the influence of neo-liberalism was shown. Second, the 
US-based regime governance was shown, and neo-liberal and individual neo-statist forms of 
Northern state strategic selectivity were shown to be influences. Third, the US-based/ EU-based 
regimes versus the structural regime interplay, and neo-liberal form influence versus collective neo-
statist form influence interplay within the structural regime, were shown as well. The implication of 
such governance on product upgrading in LICs is that, in pursuit of Northern accumulation, 
instrumental barriers in the three regimes on production and trade in apparel constrain LICs to pick 
up. It also implies that, in pursuit of global accumulation, emergence within the structural regime 
leads to the emergence of major players (currently China) who crowd LICs out of destination 
markets. These two implications mean that product upgrading in LICs is a Herculean task. However, 
because of the urgency to promote systemic milieu goals, the US-based regime has relaxed the RoO 
for SSA, until 2012, and hence Kenya has achieved limited volume upgrading.  
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On the labour regime, neo-statist, neo-corporate and neo-communitarian forms influences were 
demonstrated. The interplay of this selectivity theoretically provides for a Kenyan strategy to upgrade 
labour. However, the above two implications on product upgrading also mean that regime 
governance on apparel leads to the race to the bottom in LICs. In juggling labour upgrading in the 
South (which restricts Southern accumulation, and ensures labour reproduction and attainment of 
international social order) with the race to the bottom-driven Northern accumulation, capitalism is 
more petrified by undermining the latter than a failure to achieve the former, and hence labour 
conditions rarely improve in practice. This is what unites the inhibition of product upgrading with 
the inhibition of labour upgrading. It also shows regime governance as a determinant of both product 
and labour upgrading. Nevertheless neo-communitarian form influence provides some opportunity, 
and embryonic labour upgrading experimentation was shown to be ongoing in Kenya.  
 
Thus, the perceptions, actions and strategies of the actors selected demonstrated regime governance 
that, as far as issue areas are concerned, overrides lead firm governance, and that is aimed at Northern 
accumulation, perpetuation of dependency and attainment of milieu goals. At the same time, this 
chapter showed the potential for Southern manoeuvres to embed development. Above all, the 
knowledge possessed by Southern actors about the functioning of these regimes gives hope for 
success in future struggles to upgrade industry. 
 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.3.1 Limitations of the GVC Analysis  
 
This thesis concludes that the GVC analysis is ill equipped to analyse systemic chain governance in 
so far as it privileges control lead firm chain governance, and when it infrequently engages with 
systemic governance, concentrates on control aspects of such governance. The thesis posits that, as far 
as issue areas are concerned, control-emergent regime governance of GVCs overrides control lead 
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firm governance. It argues that the GVC approach is aimed at enhancing the efficiency of Southern 
countries‘ supply of cheap commodities to the North. As Bernstein and Campling (2006) note, all 
variants of ‗commodity studies‘- whether filiéres (Raikes et al, 2000), commodity systems (Friedland, 
1984), commodity chains (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986), supply chains (Porter, 1990), GCC 
(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994), value chains (Kaplinsky, 2000) or GVC (Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005)- while not united on purpose, object of analysis, theoretical framework or methodological 
approach, are concerned with commodity routes from the South to the North, and not the reverse.  
 
Some GVC theoreticians agree. Bair (2005) admits that the approach has neglected the structural 
theorisation, and cites Arrighi (1990; 1994), Arrighi and Drangel (1986), Arrighi et al (2003) and 
Arrighi and Silver (1999) to show World Systems literature‘s contribution in the matter. Gibbon et 
al (2008: 316) argue that the ‗GVC analysis has moved away from its world-system origins, focusing 
on the elaboration of a firm centred conceptualisation of governance instead of delineating a general 
capitalist or systemic logic driving commodity‘ (see also Gibbon and Ponte, 2008).   
 
6.3.2 Regime Governance and the GVC Analysis  
 
We also conclude that chain governance should be differentiated into two kinds. Firstly, systemic 
issue area chain governance. This is international regime governance. It is a tapestry of systemic 
emergent processes and control strategies. Secondly, chain level control, whose main focus is the 
control and distribution of economic rents in the chain. There are emergent processes here as well, 
but the control mechanisms take pre-eminence. This thesis has brought a contribution by 
highlighting the former type of governance. Taking cognisance of the fact that chain level control 
governance provided fodder for much of GVCs‘ mantra which identified lead firms as the core actors 
determining upgrading outcomes, this thesis has used control-emergent nature of regimes to show 
that, as far as issue areas are concerned, regimes are actors whose chain governance overrides control 
lead firm governance, and that the governance of regimes on production and trade in apparel, while 
not a necessary condition, was a sufficient condition to hinder product and labour upgrading in the 
Kenyan apparel industry between 1992 and 2007.  
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My approach is likely to elicit novel interest in the subject given that even the latest research on the 
Kenyan apparel industry still leaves out such a perspective. For instance, Phelps et al (2009: 314), 
despite referring to the ‗institutional structuring of countries‘ participation in the international 
economy which centres on the terms of international arrangements such as AGOA‘, the institutional 
mechanism in the form of the international regime represented by AGOA is not addressed at all. 
 
For the GVC analysis as a whole, attempts are being made to systemise ‗external‘ governance, but 
none has theorised it in the way I have done. A good example is Gibbon et al (2008). They aver that 
chain governance should be seen in three senses: governance as driving, governance as coordination 
and governance as normalisation. Governance as driving was the GVC approach‘s original 
conceptualisation of chain driving- as a function of lead firm type (manufacturers verses 
retailers/marketers, hence, producer-driven verses buyer-driven GVCs respectively). Governance as 
coordination was the product of the second and third stage in the development of the GVC analysis. 
It concerns itself with supply relationships- analysing governance types within particular segments of 
a chain. I discussed these two in Chapter Two under ‗internal‘ governance. Governance as 
normalisation partly refers to what I called ‗external‘ governance in that chapter; the governing role of 
conventions as denoted by Gibbon and Ponte (2005), for instance. Now Gibbon et al (2008: 324) 
define it as ‗a project of re-aligning a given practice so that it mirrors or materialises a standard or 
norm‘. Under this rubric, ‗capitalism is said to be striving not only to commodify new product 
qualities that arise in opposition to it, but also to commodify information about those products 
through the creation of systems to certify particular qualities…‘ (Gibbon et al, 2008: 325). While 
this latest presentation touches on systemic governance, it does it partially. Most importantly, it does 
not explicitly refer to international regime governance. Moreover, this version, much of which was 
earlier espoused in Gibbon and Ponte (2005), still fails to overcome the primacy of control 
dynamics. Overall, therefore, it does not upend the thesis being made in this study in any way.  
 
In my opinion, the GVC analysis should pay greater attention to the neglected issue of value creation 
and distribution, as suggested by Gibbon et al (2008). As they contend, its conceptualisation of the 
foundations of GVC governance recognises that economic globalisation is highly uneven, 
geographically and sectorally, is associated with increased levels of specialisation and differentiation, 
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and is associated with not only a disintegration of production, but also changing patterns of 
ownership. This is what Phelps et al (2009) have done by analysing firm ownership in Kenya.  
 
Put differently, the GVC analysis should concentrate on ‗internal‘ governance, and abandon the 
‗normalisation‘ strand- to use Gibbon et al‘s terminology- because it falls outside the approach‘s 
original understanding of governance. Indeed GVC analysts agree that ‗acceptance of a restatement of 
the foundations of GVC governance in terms of normalisation has implications that can be even 
more disintegrative to the idea of a unified GVC approach‘ (Gibbon et al, 2008: 329-30). In 
theorising the role of regime governance, this thesis‘ contribution has been to situate ‗normalisation‘ 
outside the terrain of the GVC analysis. Thus it has in a significant way responded to the question 
Gibbon et al (2008: 333) ask: ‗if both lead firms and their suppliers are subject to normalisation, i.e. 
they act out value chain roles within the shifting boundaries set by normative systems circulating in 
and shared by society at large, then what is the status of [governance as] driving?‘ And their answer to 
this question seems to acknowledge the argument I am advancing: ‗Specific lead firms do not choose 
this [normalisation] role, or at least most of its content. Rather, they simply give it a material 
form…‘ (Gibbon et al, 2008: 333-4). In a word, while some GVC analysts rightly impugn Gereffi et 
al‘s (2005) attempt, in the name of achieving parsimony, to ‗scale down the concept of governance 
from a characterisation of the chain in its entirety to a description of the mode of coordination 
prevailing at a particular link in the chain‘, having admitted that the GVC analysis also scaled down 
‗from the holistic chain construct of world system theory‘ (Bair, 2008: 354), they could as well be 
criticised for going too far by considering ‗normalisation‘ as part of their analysis.  
 
6.3.3 Regime Governance and Upgrading 
 
Our other conclusion is that international regime governance largely determines chain upgrading 
outcomes. The GVC analysis implies that there exists a possibility of industrial upgrading within 
lead firms governance (Gereffi, 1999a). The analysis has suggested that network ‗internal‘ governance 
is the optimum industrial upgrading choice in the South. However, it has said literally nothing on 
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upgrading choice in the context of ‗external‘ governance. This thesis is in agreement with the GVC 
analysis and related literature, that in certain circumstances, lead firms do promote upgrading, and 
that they do create growth poles within the South. Hence lead firm upgrading is not entirely 
incompatible with the demands of contemporary IPE. However, this thesis has shown that upgrading 
is not happening in Kenya and much of SSA. This is because capital has a ‗lower grade‘ for the 
region- the reserve army of labour thesis. That is, given the system globally, capitalism allows certain 
areas to upgrade, but these do not end up being in SSA, perhaps because the region is reserved to be 
exploited in future regimes of accumulation. It is argued that this is best explained by analysing 
regime governance. More directly, lead firms could have hindered upgrading in SSA and Kenya as the 
GVC analysis has shown- by contracting out assembly-only operations. However, this theorisation 
should not be divorced from that advanced in this thesis where lead firm governance is clearly within 
a wider framework of regime governance that perpetuates dependency.  
 
This thesis has shown that the instrumentality of interplay between the structural regime and neo-
statist ones has enabled the North to hang onto the sunset apparel industry, while encouraging the 
contracting out to its periphery of assembly-only operations through ‗preferences‘. The latter is 
meant to draw industrial emergence into a subordinate role within GVCs, and to promote milieu 
goals. In addition, the instrumentality of interplay within the structural regime between neo-
liberalism and collective neo-statism has led to the emergent spread of the chain within and beyond 
Asia. As a result, product upgrading in LICs is constrained because such countries often pursue a 
contradictory strategy that reflects a fantasy influenced by NIC sanguinity (banking on emergence), 
and one that is constrained by neo-statist regimes (banking on ‗preferences‘). A further impact of 
chain emergence on LICs is that the countries are crowded out of destination markets by major 
players. In particular, China has ubiquitously inserted itself into the chain. Regime analysis helps us 
to see that, as Biel (2000) has shown, not all countries can advance to the industrial level, on account 
of the contradiction inherent in capitalism between the national and the global dimensions of capital 
accumulation. He rejects the notion that Ricardian free trade was ever meant to be a blueprint for 
less advanced countries. He goes as far as to argue that even the actors envisioned in Ricardo‘s 
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international society in the ‗civilised‘ world under free trade cannot be national states (by analogy 
with citizens of a national society), but rather firms and individuals.  
 
Regime analysis also helps us to understand that, while all countries cannot advance to the industrial 
level, capitalism is likely to continue to promote low-value exports from SSA and from Kenya. In a 
word, value upgrading and export upgrading are two different things. This conclusion is important 
because some have doubted the viability of the industry in countries enjoying ‗preferences‘, such those 
of the Caribbean Basin and SSA, beyond the MFA phase-out. Heron (2006b), for instance, argues 
that liberalisation is unlikely to benefit them because of the restrictive RoO; to benefit from 
competitively priced yarns and fabrics, they will have to forego the ‗preferences‘. He suggests that the 
RoO exemption up to 2012 might be a temporary reprieve for SSA. He goes on to argue that, even 
with this exemption, the impact of MFA phase-out on Africa will still be negative. This is because of 
the highly footloose nature of its FDI, the fact that the region does not have the natural advantage of 
geographical proximity to the US market, and the possible erosion of ‗preferences‘ through tariff 
harmonisation under NAMA negotiations. Indeed, in section 5.2.4.2, I showed some Asian FDI 
relocating from Kenya in 2005, while in section 5.2.3 I showed Kenya‘s worry concerning possible 
erosion of ‗preferences‘ by NAMA negotiations. Moreover, in section 4.3.5.2 I showed that AGOA 
‗preferences‘ are not sufficient to guarantee a continued existence of the industry in Kenya outside 
manmade fibre and woollen apparel exports that have high import duties in the US. When AGOA 
expires in 2015, the high import duties will grossly undermine Kenya‘s integration into the GVC.  
 
However, my argument here is that, to achieve the milieu goals discussed in this thesis, the US-based 
regime is likely to consider geographical distance between SSA and the US, as well as SSA‘s lack of 
industrial embedding, as irrelevant, and continue promoting low-value exports from the region 
beyond 2015. And, since ‗preferences‘ were offered in the first place because SSA and Caribbean 
industry was not competitive, there would be nothing unusual if NAMA negotiations harmonised 
tariffs, while maintaining tariff ‗preferences‘. However, even if ‗preferences‘ are scrapped, whatever 
replaces them will in a sense contradict ‗free‘ trade, harmonisation et cetera. This is because 
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metropolitan capitalism must protect itself by categorising the South into LICs, LDCs and so on, in 
order to thwart any unified Southern strategy. This need combines with the one of continuously 
offering some form of ‗preference‘ to the remotest parts of the periphery, without which, the milieu 
goals would not be met. This mechanism is the global equivalent of the disorganisation of the masses 
at the national level by the capitalist state. The capitalist state prevents them from forming a unified 
front against it. ‗In particular it mobilises the petty bourgeoisie and the rural classes in support for 
the power bloc (either directly or through their support for the state itself) so that they are not 
available for alliances with the proletariat‘ (Jessop, 1999: 48).  
 
In other words, imperialism, and capitalism, have no economic model to balance the dialectical 
relationship between the ‗spreading‘ and the ‗backwash‘ facets of dependency, both of which drive 
capitalism. They must, therefore, continue to rely on these rudimentary and contradictory 
mechanisms. It is clear that in SSA, left on its own, this balance will tilt towards excessive ‗backwash‘. 
It is improbable that, in today‘s conditions of international terrorism, with a disturbing Al-Qaeda cell 
in Somalia, imperialism and capitalism will permit this. Some mechanism, whether that be aid for 
trade or not, will somehow be found, to enable some minimum ‗spreading‘, as ‗preferences‘ do. 
However, such a mechanism will inevitably contradict free trade, fair competition et cetera.  
 
Moreover, this thesis has shown that the regimes on production and trade in apparel are dialectically 
related to the regime on labour. The latter limits the South‘s maximisation of its cheap labour by 
demanding labour upgrading (as seen for example in AGOA labour conditionalities, the WTO social 
clause, ILO core conventions and anti-sweatshop campaigns through NGOs). It is also aimed at 
achieving milieu goals. From a Southern perspective, this is partly positive. The problem is that 
limiting Southern accumulation simultaneously entails undermining Northern accumulation because 
it slows down the race to the bottom that drives the regimes on production and trade in apparel. 
Hence, in practice labour upgrading in the periphery is minimal. Thus it is at regime level, rather 
than chain level, that we are able to contextualise the lack of labour upgrading in LICs such as Kenya. 
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6.3.4 Kenyan Actors‘ Knowledge and Upgrading 
 
Dependent development does not mean that Kenyan, and SSA, actors should cease to seek to embed 
industry; quite the opposite. I need to stress that what underpins this thesis is the Dependency 
perspective that opposes determinism, and takes objective circumstances as an invitation to struggle. 
It rejects the notion that structure should define the outcome in any determinist sense.  
 
In this regard, what comes across to us in reading Chapter Five is that actors in Kenya- in particular 
entrepreneurs, the trade association, bureaucrats, and the Cabinet- occasionally display relative 
intelligent adaptability in terms of readiness to seize whatever opportunities that are available in the 
global economy. In those instances where this adaptability is seen, it shows that human resources are 
capable of predicting thought into the future, analysing different futures and deciding what is the 
most favourable course for them. These Kenyan actors showcase a relatively sophisticated analytical 
capacity, and a certain level of knowledge, for example about the GVC, about the relationship 
between Kenyan and Asian industry, and about US legislation. Where you have diffuse capacity in 
human initiative there would be some kind of alternative which cannot be ignored. Whether the core 
of the global economy is expanding or coming into crisis, there is opportunity in either case. For 
example, the crisis of the 1930s provided a great stimulus for some Latin American countries, such as 
Brazil and Argentina, who seized the opportunity of a dysfunctional global economy and 
accumulated to some extent. The Kenyan actors have probably developed their mentality in such a 
way that they can seize the available opportunities. Even if we cannot predict exactly what the 
outcome would be, we should not be too determinist about the industrial future of SSA and of 
Kenya. We are absolutely justified to analyse the case of Kenya the way we have done in Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five, but ultimately we can rely, to some extent, on this parallel initiative to find a 
solution.  
 
Notably, we have seen that the room for manoeuvre within the regime on labour is greater than that 
which is within the three regimes on production and trade in apparel. This is because the regime of 
- 275 - 
 
 
 
accumulation launched in 1980 saw the Northern state and its allied actors, such as NGOs, being 
influenced increasingly by neo-communitarianism. We therefore finally make recommendations on 
future upgrading strategy within these limitations and opportunities.  
 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.4.1 Product and Labour Upgrading in General 
 
Failure of domestic strategies is not privileged in this thesis, but we cannot defend the indolence of 
Kenya at times. True, we have just shown Kenyan actors‘ adaptability under EOI. However, this has 
not always been the case. For example, in the 1970s and 80s, when the North was offloading its old 
machines to the South, Kenya failed to read the system and maximise on its weakness. Countries such 
as Tunisia and Morocco understood that, although potentially retrograde, welcoming old industrial 
machinery could be strategic in inserting firms into the GVC. They have now made relative industrial 
upgrading in the industry. Nacken showed us that Kenya blocked importation of used machinery in 
1981. As a result, the leading source of FDI in the industry at the time, Germany, withdrew its 
investment interests. While this protection was done in good faith, it had been overtaken by systemic 
evolution, which was now promoting export enclaves as the new arena of accumulation.  
 
Another example is where, although it is a degradation of labour, the country has failed to exploit its 
cheap labour to at least achieve industrial upgrading, and presumably achieve national accumulation, 
which might upgrade labour later. It is instructive from Chapter Five that Kenya was not able to give 
preference to labour disputes in EPZs. In the 1960s and 70s, Korea used such strategies to 
accumulate where, for example, the Minister of Health and Social Services would sometimes 
intervene and order an emergency mediation during strikes (Korean Industrial Estates 
Administration, 1974). This lack of strategic reading of the ever changing IPE needs to be overcome 
as a first step, given the prodigious systemic limitations imposed.  
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Future strategies to industrialise Kenya and SSA through the apparel industry should therefore not 
rely entirely on GVC research and conventional economic analysis. The GVC analysis has been 
gaining popularity on discussions over SSA industrialisation in the last decade or so (see for instance 
McCormick and Rogerson, 2004; McCormick et al, 2009). Outside the GVC analysis, research on 
industrialisation in Kenya and SSA has come from mainstream economic researchers who have never 
singled out the industry for analysis, and largely ignore international social institutions; at least they 
have not linked international regimes with their industrial upgrading analyses (see for instance Ikiara 
et al, 2004). In the case of AGOA, for example, the US-based regime‘s interest was granting SSA 
access to US market up to 2015. The aim was to generate an assembly-only apparel industry in SSA 
whose level of exports to the US must not exceed two percent of total US imports. This is limited 
time and a small quota. It was shown that the quota, for instance, could easily be filled up even by 
Kenya alone if only a sustained strategy to rejuvenate the local fabric supply chain to its earlier ISI 
status is pursued. Nevertheless AGOA is an opportunity that public policy can take advantage of by, 
for example, redirecting public resources to capitalise on the opportunity in less than five years rather 
than making a longer term strategy. This is a purely political decision.  
 
Moreover, covertly and overtly, I have emphasised that the apparel industry, as capitalism‘s historical 
low technology ‗starter‘ industry, is key to both industrial development and overall development. It 
should therefore be considered as a priority subsector in future public policy and research.  
 
6.4.2 Product Upgrading 
 
This thesis has argued that imperialism, and capitalism, are likely to continue to offer some form of 
SDT to LICs. Kenya and SSA can exploit this systemic weakness by lobbying for further 
modifications of the provisions of state-centric regimes. On AGOA, there is an option beyond the 
2012 expiration of the RoO exemption, first proposed at the fifth AGOA Forum, which can be 
pursued: AGOA to be re-modelled after the Egyptian FTA to accommodate a simple value addition 
of fabric, rather than a double transformation RoO (see MoTI, External Trade Department, ca. 
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2006b). The Egyptian FTA with the US created three Qualified Industrial Zones in Greater Cairo, 
Alexandria and Port Said to process products which include at least 11 percent Israeli components, 
and to export them duty free to the US. Alternatively, Kenya and SSA can lobby for a special double 
transformation RoO involving fabric coating. Either of these could be useful if America chooses to 
pursue its interests further through AGOA beyond 2015. They can potentially be used as a transition 
platform to reinvigorate the local supply chain to conform to a double transformation RoO. The 
point is that it should not be ‗either develop textile production capacity…or concentrate on clothing 
and import textiles‘ (Westhuizen, 2006: 260) but both. Development of the textile subsector can 
either be done nationally or it can be part of a regional SSA strategy as suggested in this thesis. 
According to Hoekman and Kostecki (2009), in the context of the 2007 EPAs, the EU has allowed 
a single transformation rule (as in AGOA up to 2012) to partners that have signed EPAs, not 
countries with GSP or EBA status. In my view, this can be useful to Kenya only if the country can 
firstly re-orient its US looking industry towards the EU, and secondly use it as a platform to link 
apparel exportism with the local supply chain. 
  
A regular product upgrading strategy should be coupled with a strategy to promote niche products. 
In Chapter Four we saw that out of US HTS‘s 35 potential niche categories, Kenya has exported 
only 3. However, this opportunity can be exploited before AGOA expires in 2015; the constraints in 
developing this category, as seen in Chapter Four, seem as though they can be overcome. 
 
But how can we cogently recommend such upgrading strategies in the light of the marginalisation 
that is the evidence of this thesis? Should countries like Kenya not trade down as proposed by 
Gibbon and Ponte (2005)?  
 
Since 2000, UNCTAD LDCs reports have been analysing the twin possibilities of LDCs either 
being marginalised further by capitalism, or the countries‘ slight integration into the system. Having 
substantially discussed the former in earlier reports, recent reports have focused on exploring the 
latter. The theme has been that LDCs must develop national productive capacities through policies 
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that promote the inter-related process of capital accumulation and technological process so as to 
experience a positive structural change. The 2007 report31 focused on promotion of transfer of 
technology to LDCs through international market linkages as the other alternative to the building of 
an endogenous knowledge base. While it discusses the four main channels such transfer may take- 
import of capital goods, exports and participation in GVCs, FDI and licensing- its emphasis is in the 
first three.  
 
How GVC linkages can influence transfer of technological capabilities relates to my investigation on 
product upgrading, since process upgrading is ordinarily the route to product upgrading (see my 
argument in section 1.2.3.4 and Chart 3 where I argue that in practice it is insuperable to achieve 
product upgrading without process upgrading). However, reminiscent of Gereffi (1999a), and the 
GVC analysis in general, the report argues that despite lead firms playing an important role in setting 
parameters to be implemented by all firms in the chain, they do not necessarily provide support or 
transfer knowledge and capabilities to firms far upstream the chain; because they outsource 
coordination primarily to first tiers. This results in what Gibbon and Ponte (2005) have labelled as 
the risk of such firms upstream getting either marginalised (relegated to less remunerative and more 
vulnerable segments of activity in the chain) or excluded completely from GVCs.  
 
Assuming exclusion does not occur, the report notes that, while it is not easy for LDC firms to 
escape marginalisation, strategic public policy can help such firms secure some form of ‗reward‘- to 
use Gibbon and Ponte‘s terminology- that guarantees their survival by taking some specific roles. In 
the apparel sector, these rewards are security of contracts and ability to compensate for secularly 
falling prices through larger volumes. LDC apparel firms are to order in advance of sales by trading 
houses and direct sales to retailers, become a recognised producers of a product type and meet special 
delivery conditions, such as delivery on call off. The example given is Mauritian firms‘ process and 
                                                     
31 Although UNCTAD removed Kenya from the LDCs list in its 2006 review, its 2007 LDCs report was written in the 
context of Kenya as an LDC. The country was in the three year transition period which is granted to LDCs before being 
formally confirmed as non-LDC. 
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product upgrading by expanding their operational scale by investing in Madagascar in order to 
occupy a more advantageous position downstream the chain, although it remains third tier at best. 
This is what Gibbon and Ponte mean by ‗trading down‘32. In their opinion, LICs and LDCs should 
aim at it rather than some other ambitious forms of upgrading. This is because outside these survival 
tactics, they argue, lead firms may only occasionally offer some very limited opportunities to upgrade; 
although none in the apparel GVC is cited. It is basically for firms in such countries to consolidate 
their supplier role, focusing on economies of scale, high specialisation and simple and labour 
intensive technologies, and aiming at mass market through large scale retailers.     
 
Since Gibbon and Ponte do not come out clear about what they mean by ‗trading down‘, UNCTAD 
argues that if technological upgrading will be accompanied by such ‗trading down‘ as defined above- 
a focus on high specialisation, economies of scale and firm size expansion- this may be accepted on 
the basis of an ongoing assessment. However, if it implies a withdrawal from technological upgrading 
altogether, UNCTAD urges LDCs and LICs to ignore it. Instead, a continuous search for niche 
markets that offer potential technological upgrading opportunities should never be eschewed. 
UNCTAD dismisses the contention implicit in Gibbon and Ponte‘s work; that LDCs specialising at 
the lower end of the value chain is in tandem with the theory of Comparative Advantage.  
 
This thesis is therefore in agreement with UNCTAD‘s position. Gibbon and Ponte‘s view resembles 
a similar one espoused by Chege (1988) that I rebuffed in Chapter Five. Their view is also in tandem 
with McCormick and Rogerson (2004) who assert that, while the Developmental State approach has 
benefits in the long run, Africa needs export promotion more than anything else. But aimless export 
promotion that lacks inventiveness should be rejected. The overarching theme of my thesis has been 
that owing to regime governance, industrial upgrading in Kenya is intractable, and hence nothing 
short of a master stroke strategy will do.  
 
                                                     
32 Indeed this is where the title of Gibbon and Ponte‘s book comes from. 
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This thesis is also in congruence with UNCTAD‘s dismissal of comparative advantages. It 
emphasises, in agreement with Baissac, that natural comparative advantages, such as labour costs, even 
if exploited successfully, cannot bridge the North-South gap in productivity; the North benefits from 
increasingly rapid productivity gains. Baissac argues that in effect, productivity gains are a dependent 
variable of a technological progress in production-related activities. And technology is self-
reinforcing, so that the South will never catch up with the North if they leave it to the work of free 
trade and the neo-classical allocative efficiency of unfettered markets (Baissac, 2004).  
 
6.4.3 Labour Upgrading  
 
This thesis has shown neo-communitarian form influence on the labour regime as an attempt to seal 
a systemic weakness, and social movements can take advantage of it by pressing for the full 
implementation of minimum labour conditions. The relationship between the issue areas of the 
spread of the GVC on the one hand, and labour standards on the other hand, was shown to be 
crucial. The neo-liberalism influencing trade regimes under the WTO leads them to push for the 
race to the bottom as the chain spreads in the South. To some extent, they also push for the race to 
the bottom in the North, by threatening Northern labour with de-industrialisation. Conversely, 
labour standards in the periphery are so low that regime governance influenced by neo-statist and 
neo-communitarian forms creep into the picture, through neo-statist regimes and the regime on 
labour respectively, with calls for its upgrading. Since we want labour standards to improve, especially 
in the South, these contradictions of capitalism can somehow be exploited. All we do not want is 
hypocrisy. The short term solution, therefore, could perhaps be that we need to press for the full 
implementation of minimum labour conditions, while strategising on the long term solution of 
linking production with consumption in the South.  
 
The point is that a new definition of labour standards is needed, and the argument that labour 
upgrading will undermine Southern competitiveness needs to be rejected. In the case study firm of 
Protex, most workers are unionised. On the one hand, this shows that there is a certain degree of 
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militancy. Perhaps this might not be what one would expect in an EPZ. It is therefore very significant 
that having quite an organised and militant workforce did not inhibit Kenya from taking advantage 
of AGOA to achieve export volume upgrading. This overturns the classic argument that in order to 
benefit from the global economy you need to have a very docile and unorganised workforce. Indeed 
the two might be positively, rather than negatively, correlated. It is hoped that this finding will 
encourage labour activity in other EPZs across the world. On the other hand, the unionisation has 
not improved the conditions of workers. This is mainly because of neo-corporate form influence. 
This is disconcerting, but the high rate of unionisation, coupled with NGOs‘ anti-sweatshop 
campaigns, keeps hope alive in future struggles to implement minimum labour conditions.  
  
This might be seen as a ‗humanising‘ of supply chains. However, since labour can advance its 
interests to the full only outside capitalism- in a system that is more egalitarian, socially sustainable, 
and environmentally sustainable- there is no reason why this ‗humanising‘ of supply chains should 
not be pursued in the mean time. Such a system to replace capitalism has not been analysed in this 
thesis, but one of the ingredients could be linking production with consumption in the South, such 
as apparel ISI was in Kenya between 1960s and 1980s. This is based on the Dependency conviction 
(in particular Samir Amin‘s) that, since capitalism has unified the world by imposing a centre-
periphery hierarchy, progress towards some form of socialism (or whatever form beyond capitalism) 
cannot be based on national socialism as is presently the case with capitalism. It must go beyond 
capitalism and organise the world into a unified whole. But for this to happen, peripheral countries 
must first self-assert themselves in capitalism as complete nations (Amin, 1974). Thus the insertion 
is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. And in Cox‘s words ‗some conjunction of radical 
forces in core and periphery would be the condition necessary for an effective challenge to or reversal 
of existing world social power relations…. [However], just to spell out this possibility is to realise 
how remote it is. Yet the prospect may survive to fire the imagination of those crying out against the 
continuing hegemony‘ (Cox, 1977: 424).   
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: List of Interviews  
 
Interview with Mr Benjamin Chesang and Dr Joseph Bii, Policy Research and Planning Manager and 
Research Officer respectively, EPZA, 14 March 2007, Athi River. 
 
Interview with Mr Elijah Manyara, Deputy Director of External Trade, MoTI, 5 April 2007, 
Nairobi. 
 
Interview with Mr Rudolf Isinga, General Manager, Protex EPZ Ltd, 18 April 2007, Athi River. 
 
Interview with Mr Erastus Kimuri, Senior Deputy Director of Industries, MoTI, 20 April 2007, 
Nairobi. 
 
Interview with Mr David Rono, Industrial Officer in charge of AGOA Desk, MoTI, 23 April 2007, 
Nairobi. 
 
Interview with Mr Fred Kariuki, Executive Officer, KAM Textiles and Garments Sector Division, 30 
April 2007, Nairobi. 
 
Interview with Mr Ongubo Nyakundi, External Trade Officer, MoTI, 5 May 2007, Nairobi. 
 
Interview with Mr William Muga, Secretary General, KTTWU, 8 May 2007, Nairobi. 
 
Personal Conversation with Steve Ouma, Deputy Executive Director, KHRC, 9 May 2007, Nairobi. 
 
71 Interviews with Protex EPZ Ltd Workers, April 2007, Athi River.  
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APPENDIX B: Protex EPZ Ltd Structure33 
 
Managing Director 
Board of Directors 
General Manager 
Import/ Export manager        Factory Manager           Finance Manager 
 
Cutting Manager    Production Manager          Human Resource Manager 
 
Cutting in Charge           Packaging in Charge                  Line in Charge            QA in Charge   Maintenance in Charge 
Senior Supervisor            Packaging Supervisor               Senior Supervisor    QA Supervisor 
Supervisor  Iron Supervisor               Supervisor Line QA  Chief Mechanic 
 
         Cutters          Ironers           Machine Operator    Final Checkers            Mechanic 
 
 
        Helper         Helper      Helper  In-line Checkers              Cleaners 
 
Source: Isinga (2007) 
  
                                                     
33 Support staff such as security ignored 
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APPENDIX C: Apparel Manufacturing Firms: Summary of Main Indicators, 1973-80 
 
Indicator Unit 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Persons 
engaged 
Number 10 509 11 781 12 381 12 878 12 663 14 900 15 412 ca. 14 
700 
Labour 
costs 
K£ ‗000 1 512 1 881 1 951 2 406 2 327 2 755 2 910 ca. 2 
700 
Operating 
surplus 
K£ ‗000 1 100 1 247 1 570 2 076 2 211 2 712 3 241 ca. 3 
400 
Gross 
product 
K£ ‗000 2 612 3 078 3 521 4 483 4 538 5 467 6 151 ca. 5 
800 
Output K£ ‗000 9 966 11 389 13 950 15 767 17 167 20 287 25 944 ca. 20 
300 
Gross 
output 
K£ ‗000 12 578 14 467 17 471 20 250 21 705 25 183 32 095 ca. 25 
600 
Labour 
costs/ 
Gross 
product 
ration 
% 58 59.5 55.4 53.7 51.3 50.4 47.3 ca. 51.0 
Gross 
product/ 
Gross 
output 
ratio 
% 20.8 21.3 20.15 22.1 20.9 21.7 19.2 ca. 20.0 
 
Source: Adapted from GoK (1983: 12) (original data from statistical abstracts)  
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APPENDIX D: World Textile and Apparel Imports, ca. 1980 
 
Country Total imports (US 
billion $) 
Imports per capita (US$) Exports (US billion $) 
Germany 15.3 225 9.2 
France 6.8 114 5.9 
Great Britain 6.5 110 4.8 
Italy Missing 54 Missing 
USA 7.8 39 8.8 (1979 figure) 
Japan Missing 34 Missing 
Netherlands 5.2 Missing 4.7 
Source: Nacken (1982: 31) 
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APPENDIX E: EPZ Contribution to Kenyan Economy, Selected Indicators, 1997-2003 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
National economy 
GDP (KShs 
million) 
536 264 593 456 639 056 686 159 772 893 849 987 968 424 
Exports (KShs 
million) 
120 445 121 181 122 559 134 527 147 590 169 283 193 153 
Employment Missing 5 096 000 5 492 000 5 911 000 6 366 000 6 851 600 7 338 500 
Manufacturing sector  
Non-food 
manufactured 
exports (KShs 
million) 
25 644 20 914 20 511 22 921 27 541 32 548 34 743 
Employment 177 000 180 000 183 000 182 000 183 000 196 400 208 700 
EPZ 
Exports (KShs 
million) 
1 263 1 805 3 020 3 635 5 962 9 741 13 812 
Employment  2 824 3 645 5 077 6 487 13 444 26 447 38 199 
EPZ % contribution  
National GDP 0.24 0.3 0.47 0.53 0.84 1.30 1.53 
National 
exports34 
1.05 1.49 2.46 2.7 4.04 5.75 7.15 
                                                     
34 These figures are a huge improvement since they had remained at slightly more than 1 percent from 1993 to 1998 
(Glenday and Ndii, 2000).   
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National 
employment 
Missing 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.39 0.52 
Non-food 
manufactured 
exports 
4.93 8.63 14.72 15.86 21.65 29.93 39.75 
Manufacturing 
employment 
1.60 2.03 2.77 3.56 7.35 13.47 18.30 
Source: Adapted from EPZA (2002) (data for 1997); EPZA (2004b) (data for 1998-2003)  
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APPENDIX F35: % of Total Kenyan GDP (Constant 1982 Prices), 1992-1995 
 
 1992 1993 1994* 1995** 
Non-Monetary economy 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.8 
Monetary economy     
Enterprises & non-profit institutions     
Agriculture 26.2 25.1 25.0 25.0 
Manufacturing 13.6 13.8 13.7 13.8 
Trade, restaurants & hotels 11.1 11.0 11.3 11.7 
Finance, insurance, real estate & business services 8.7 9.3 9.6 9.8 
Transport, storage & communications 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Ownership of dwellings 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.5 
All other enterprises & non-profit institutions 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.4 
Less imputed bank services -3.3 -3.6 -3.8 -3.8 
Total enterprises & non-profit institutions 76.7 76.0 76.1 76.5 
Private households (domestic services) 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 
Producers of government services 15.8 16.1 15.8 15.4 
Total monetary economy 94.5 94.6 94.2 94.2 
Total monetary & non-monetary economy 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Revised 
**Provisional 
Source: Adapted from GoK (1996) 
  
                                                     
35 I have separated Appendices F- H because the Statistical Abstracts do not indicate the approach used in arriving at the 
percentage representation in GDP (whether expenditure, value added or income approach). However, it seems that the 
first two tables were arrived at using the same approach. 
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APPENDIX G: Sectoral Percentage Shares to Kenyan GDP (Constant 1992 Prices), 1996-2000 
 
 1996 1997* 1998* 1999** 2000** 
Non-Monetary economy 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Monetary economy      
Enterprises & non-profit institutions      
Agriculture 25.0 24.6 24.6 24.5 24.0 
Manufacturing 13.4 13.3 13.3 13.2 13.1 
Trade, restaurants & hotels 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.7 
Finance, insurance, real estate & business 
services 
10.0 10.3 10.5 10.5 10.6 
Transport, storage & communications 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 
Ownership of dwellings 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 
All other enterprises & non-profit 
institutions 
8.8 8.9 8.6 8.7 8.9 
Less imputed bank services -3.9 -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 -4.1 
Total enterprises & non-profit institutions 77.0 77.0 77.1 77.1 76.8 
Private households (domestic services) 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 
Producers of government services 15.0 14.8 14.9 14.5 14.7 
Total monetary economy 94.5 94.5 94.4 94.4 94.4 
Total monetary & non-monetary economy 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Revised 
**Provisional 
Source: Adapted from GoK (2001) 
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APPENDIX H: Kenyan GDP by Activity (%) 
 
Industry 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Agriculture & Forestry  
Manufacturing  
Transport & communication 
Wholesale & retail trade, repairs 
Education 
Real estate, renting & business services 
27.2 
9.8 
9.1 
9.2 
6.2 
 
5.8 
25.2 
9.8 
9.6 
9.0 
7.3 
 
6.0 
25.2 
9.7 
9.2 
9.1 
7.9 
 
5.9 
24.3 
9.9 
9.9 
9.9 
7.8 
 
5.7 
24.2 
10.5 
10.9 
10.8 
7.4 
 
5.6 
  
All other industries 21.6 21.9 22 21.6 21.8   
All industries at basic prices 88.9 88.8 89.0 89.1 91.2   
Taxes less subsidies on products 
GDP at market prices 
11.1 
100.0 
11.2 
100.0 
11.0 
100.0 
10.9 
100.0 
8.8 
100.0 
  
Source: Adapted from GoK (2006) 
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APPENDIX I: EPZ Local Input Purchases, 2005 
 
 Company Local input 
purchases (KShs 
millions) 
Products sourced 
locally 
Ownership 
1 JAR (Kenya)  48.1 Paper products, 
threads, chemicals, 
packaging 
USA 
2 Upan Wasana 39.4 Packaging material, 
stationery, spare 
parts 
Sri Lanka 
3 Kappric Apparels 33.1 Not specified Hong Kong 
4 Ashton Apparels 125.5 Cartons and 
polybags 
India 
5 California Link 9.9 Packaging material 
and garment 
accessories 
Sri Lanka 
6 MRC Nairobi 22.7 Cartons, polybags, 
chemicals, furnace 
oil, steel, block 
boards 
Sri Lanka 
7 Sino Link 0 N/A China 
8 Protex K 0 Packaging 
materials 
Kenya/Taiwan 
9 Sahara Stitch 2.4 Not specified Kenya/ UAE 
10 Sin Lane K 0 N/A Kenya/ Taiwan/ 
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China 
11 Mirage Fashion 
Wear 
39.7 Cartons, polybags 
and tapes 
India 
12 Kenya Knit 
Garments 
90.5 Not specified Taiwan/China 
13 Wild Life Works 0.7 Not specified USA 
14 Global Apparels 
(Kenya) 
2.2 Cartons, polybags 
and tapes 
India 
15 Rolex Garments 23.9 Unspecified India 
16 Baraka Apparels 3.2 Unspecified Bahrain 
17 Mega Garments 0 N/A India 
18 Blue Bird 
Garments (K) 
0 Polybags and 
cartons 
India 
19 Alltex 20 Polybags, cartons, 
industrials, furnace 
oil 
Kenya/Qatar 
20 Rising Sun 16.8 Packaging 
materials 
Sri Lanka 
21 Senior Best 
Garments K 
0 N/A China 
22 United Aryan 42.2 Trims and 
accessories 
(threads, tapes), 
packaging material 
(corrugated boxes), 
consumables 
India 
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(washing 
chemicals) and 
furnace oil 
23 Shin Ace Garments 
K 
0 N/A Taiwan 
24 Apex Apparels 38.6 Sewing thread, 
empty cartons, 
boiler fuel 
India/Bangladesh 
25 Maximus 0 Cut panels for 
embroidery as per 
requirement of 
subcontractors 
Kenya 
Total  558.9   
Source: EPZA (2005b) 
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APPENDIX J: Leading Product Categories in Kenya under AGOA, 2003-5 
 
Data in Million M2 (Metric Equivalent- A notional, common unit of quantity, constant across categories and 
time.  Conversion Factors are used to convert units of quantity into M2). Quantities below 1 000 M2 are 
ignored. 
 
Product 2003 2004 2005 
Women/Girls Slacks, etc 21.005 34.420 35.743 
Cotton Men/Boys 
Trousers 
9.190 11.767 8.276 
Trousers, etc Men/ Boys 1.634 3.530 5.462 
Women/Girls Knit 
Blouse 
3.436 4.641 3.016 
Knit Shirts, Men/Boys 1.615 1.347 2.967 
Baby 
Garments/Accessories 
0.239 .427 2.805 
Slacks, etc. 
Women/Girls 
2.028 2.003 2.460 
Knit Blouses, 
Women/Girls 
1.859 2.474 2.354 
Women/Girls Cotton 
Coats 
0.421 2.254 1.605 
Coats, Women/Girls 1.353 1.293 1.427 
Knit Shirts, Men/Boys 1.201 1.209 1.154 
Non-Knit Shirts, 
Men/Boys 
1.594 0.555 1.026 
Cotton Nightwear/ 
Pyjamas 
0.263 0.855 0.866 
Non-Knit Shirts, 
Men/Boys 
0.019 0.476 0.843 
Other Coats, Men/Boys 0.015 0.049 0.610 
Cotton Skirts 0.273 0.435 0.497 
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Other Coats, Men/Boys 0.924 2.093 0.363 
Dress Gown, Robe 0.000 0.088 0.355 
Cotton Underwear 0.323 0.329 0.284 
Other Man Made Fibre 
Apparel 
1.451 0.556 0.190 
Playsuit, Sun suit 0.093 0.142 0.146 
Skirts 0.119 0.278 0.139 
Non-Knit Blouses 
omen/Girls 
0.496 0.113 0.133 
Other Cotton Apparel 0.151 0.165 0.119 
Cotton Dresses 0.546 0.135 0.092 
Women/Girls Non-Knit 
louse 
0.198 0.123 0.088 
Dresses 0.544 0.001 0.046 
Hosiery 0.003 0.006 0.039 
Dress Gown etc 0.001 0.160 0.037 
Man Made Fibre W./Gs 
Suits 
0.011 0.000 0.022 
S/V Coats 
Women/Girls 
0.000 0.000 0.009 
S/V Trousers 
Men/Boys  
0.076 0.006 0.006 
S/V Underwear 0.000 0.000 0.005 
Other Wool Apparel 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Non- Knit Shirts, Blouse 0.011 0.002 0.000 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on USOTEXA database 
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APPENDIX K: EPZ Skills Training and Technology Transfer, 2005 
 
 
 Company Training type Period of 
training 
No. of 
employees local 
trained 
Total No. of  
local 
employees 
1 JAR (Kenya)  Production 
management, 
fire fighting, 
team building 
and HIV/AIDS 
coordination 
workshops 
2 days to 1 
week 
2030 2 154 
2 Upan Wasana None N/A N/A 2 150 
3 Kappric 
Apparels 
Production 
machinist, 
computer, office 
work and 
receptionist 
Full time unspecified 1 937 
4 Ashton Apparels unspecified unspecified N/A 4 780 
5 California Link None N/A N/A 1 235 
6 MRC Nairobi In house 
training 
3 months 250 1 340 
7 Sino Link None N/A N/A 1 336 
8 Protex K In house 
training 
3 months 31 951 
9 Sahara Stitch Stitching 2 months 500 781 
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10 Sin Lane K In house 
training 
Continuous 300 769 
11 Mirage Fashion 
Wear 
None N/A N/A 1 109 
12 Kenya Knit 
Garments 
Custom trade 
system, 
HIV/AIDS 
seminar, 
machine 
operation 
course, 
mechanics 
(sewing) 
training 
Between 2 and 
30 days 
13 1 299 
13 Wild Life 
Works 
None N/A N/A 55 
14 Global Apparels 
(Kenya) 
Machine 
operations 
As when need 
arises 
unspecified 1 013 
15 Rolex Garments None N/A N/A 1 028 
16 Baraka Apparels None N/A N/A 1 345 
17 Mega Garments None N/A N/A 1 513 
18 Blue Bird 
Garments (K) 
Fire fighting, 
first aid and fire 
extinguishing 
2 days 57 430 
19 Alltex HIV Aids 
awareness 
Continuous 1 247 1 247 
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20 Rising Sun Human resource 
management 
1 week 1 1 220 
21 Senior Best 
Garments K 
In house 1  month 250 790 
22 United Aryan None N/A N/A 2 450 
23 Shin Ace 
Garments K 
Machinist, 
cutting, 
printing, 
embroidery 
2 years 127 783 
24 Apex Apparels None N/A N/A 2 497 
25 Maximus Machine 
operations 
(computer 
panels) 
6 months 2 22 
Total    4 808 (14 %) 34 234 
(100%) 
Source: EPZA (2003b; 2004a) 
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APPENDIX L: Annex to Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United 
States and the People‘s Republic of China concerning Trade in Textile and Apparel Products 
 
 
 
Source: USOTEXA 
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APPENDIX M: EPZ Garments Enterprises, March 2007 
 
 Company Address Phone/Fax/Email Location 
1 JAR Kenya EPZ 
Ltd 
P.O. Box 78788 – 00507, 
Nairobi 
Tel. +254 –20 -532040/50, 
532090, 540058, 828000-3 
Fax. +254 –20 – 540057 
info@jarkenya.com 
Sameer, 
Nairobi 
2 Upan Wasana 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 16730 - 00600, 
Nairobi 
Tel. +254 -20 – 8560962/3 
Fax.+254 – 20 -  8562749 
Email: info@upanwasana.com 
Upan 
Wasana, 
Ruaraka, 
Nairobi 
3 Kapric Apparels 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 81579, Mombasa Tel. +254 – 41 - 
3432609/432626 
Fax. +254 –41- 3434438 
Email: sysop@kapric.com 
Kapric, 
Mombasa 
4 Ashton Apparel 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 43371 Tel. +254 – 41 - 3434251 
Fax. +254 –41- 3435436 
Email: Admin@Ashton-
Apparel.com 
Ashton, 
Mombasa 
5 Sino Link EPZ 
Ltd 
P.O. Box 83218, Mombasa  Tel: +254 - 41 – 3434231 
Fax: +254 - 41- 
3434238/79/31 
Email: 
sinolink@africaonline.co.ke 
King‘orani, 
Mombasa 
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6 Protex EPZ Ltd P.O. Box 504, Athi River Tel:+254 -  45 – 223445 
Fax. +254 - 45 - 22344 
E- mail: protex@skyweb.co.ke 
Athi River 
7 Sinlane EPZ Ltd P.O. Box 87337 
Mombasa 
Tel. +254 - 41- 3433840 
Fax. +254 - 41-3433833 
Email: 
sinlane@swiftmombasa.com 
Emirates , 
Changamwe, 
Mombasa  
8 Mirage Fashion 
Wear EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 538 Athi River Tel.: +254 - 45- 22080/3 
Fax: +254 –45 – 22081 
Email: mirage-
kenya@wananchi.com 
Athi River 
9 Kenya Knit 
Garments EPZ 
Ltd 
P.O. Box 87789, Mombasa Tel.+254 - 41- 
2221230/2223008/2222849 
Fax: +254 - 41- 2221188 
Email: Kenya@honjen.com 
Mazeras, 
Mombasa 
10 Global Apparels 
Kenya EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 322, Athi River Tel.+254 - 45 –22575 
Fax: +254 - 45 –22452 
Email:info@global.co.ke 
Athi River 
11 Rolex EPZ Ltd P.O. Box 10 Athi River Tel: +254 - 45 –22031/ 22039 
Fax: +254 –45 - 22139 
Email: rolex@clubinternetk.com 
Athi River 
12 Mega Garments 
Industries (K) 
P.O. Box 41673, Mombasa Tel: +254 – 41- 3432586/980 M.J.P 
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EPZ Ltd Fax: +254 – 41 - 3433057 
Email: info@megagarments.com 
Mombasa 
13 Alltex EPZ Ltd P.O. Box 30500, Nairobi Tel: +254 – 45 – 22953 
Fax: +254 – 45 - 20098 
Email: general@alltexepz.com 
Athi River 
14 Rising Sun (K) 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 428 Athi River 00204 Tel: +254 – 45 – 20047/49, 
22642 
 Fax: +254 – 45 – 20101 
Email: 
risingsun@risingsunkenya.net 
Athi River 
15 Wild Life Works 
Ltd 
P.O. Box 310, Voi Tel. +254 - 43- 30062/2530 
Fax. +254 - 43- 30062 
E-mail. 
wildlife@africaonline.co.ke 
Voi 
16 Blue Bird 
Garments EPZ 
P.O. Box 81034, Mombasa Tel: +254 –41 – 432917 
Fax: +254 – 41 - 432917 
Email: bluebird@ikenya.com 
Kingorani, 
Msa 
17 Senior Best 
Garments (K) 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 93351 Mombasa Tel. +254 -41- 433882/8/9 
Fax. +254 -41- 433883 
Email: 
senior.best@wananchi.com 
Zois, 
Mombasa 
18 United Aryan 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 126 Village Market 
Nairobi 
Tel.+254 – 20– 8561950/1/2 Indigo, 
Ruaraka, 
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Fax: +254 – 20 – 8561953 
Email: amit@unitedaryan.net 
Nairobi 
19 Shin Ace 
Garments (K) 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O. Box 87337 Mombasa Tel. +254 -41- 3432832 
Fax. +254 - 41- 3433174 
Email: 
shin.ace@swiftmombasa.com 
Kwa Jomvu, 
Mombasa 
20 Apex Apparels 
EPZ Ltd 
P.O 199 Village Market, Nairobi Tel.+254 – 20 – 
8560505/8560214 
Fax: +254 – 20 – 8560767 
Email: 
info@apexapparelskenya.com 
Indigo,  
Nairobi 
Source: Author‘s fieldwork 
 
 
 
